Aspects of banker liability : disclosure and other duties of bankers towards customers and sureties by Van Rensburg, Hermanus Lourens Jansen
FOREWORD 
I wish to thank my promoter, ProfJopie Pretorius, for the inspiration to undertake this thesis. To my 
wife, Irene, I wish to express my gratitude for her patience and understanding. I also wish to thank 
my joint promoter, Prof Lotz, who came out of retirement to assist with the thesis! 
ASPECTS OF BANKER LIABILITY: DISCLOSURE AND OTHER DUTIES OF BANKERS 
TOW ARDS CUSTOMERS AND SURETIES 
BY 
HERMANUS LOURENS JANSE VAN RENSBURG 
SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIRE1\.1ENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF LAWS 
AT THE 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
PROMOTER: PROF JT PRETORIUS 
JOINT PROMOTER: PROF JG LOTZ 
NOVEMBER 2001 
11 
SUMMARY 
Suretyships given in favour of banks are being challenged in the courts on the basis of equitable 
doctrines of unconscionable conduct, undue influence, or statutory provisions dealing with unfair 
conduct or unfair contract terms. 
This thesis is an enquiry into a bank's duties of disclosure or advice to an intending surety. Such an 
investigation also necessitates a study of the relationship between banker and customer, as the surety 
is quite often a customer of the bank as well, and, as a surety's obligation to the bank is an accessory 
obligation, the obligation is dependent on a valid principal obligation between the bank and the 
principal debtor - the customer. 
The face of modern banking has, however, changed dramatically and most major banks have become 
multi-functional.As a result, the banker-customer relationship may often be seen as a fiduciary 
relationship .A major problem brought about by multi-functioning banks is that of conflicts ofinterest 
between the bank and its customer. Furthermore, the banker-customer relationship is providing much 
more scope for lender liability than in the past. 
Various factors are currently having an impact on the law of contract, and this is expected to affect 
the legal policy makers in their assessments of whether a duty of disclosure of material facts exists 
or not. 
A surety has long been a favoured debtor in the eyes of the law, and the courts have developed a 
plethora of technical principles on which a surety can be relieved of his obligation. The escape routes 
of the surety, especially if he is a consumer as well, on new grounds of public policy, 
unconscionability, good faith or unreasonableness, are growing. The result of these trends is the 
expected demise of suretyship as an acceptable, cheap form of debt security in the banking sector. 
KEYWORDS 
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liability; duty to disclose material facts; duty to advise; good faith; boni mores; consumer protection; 
unconscionability. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE BANKER'S DUTIES OF 
DISCLOSURE AND ADVICE TO CUSTOMERS AND 
SURETIES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1 Scope of thesis 
Misrepresentation is one of the factors1 which may result in a contract being rescinded. 2 Although 
it is conceivable that a banker may deliberately make a positive misrepresentation, a more 
common and more difficult problem arises in cases of the non-disclosure of material facts by a 
banker to a surety, for example. 3 
1 The others being dolus (see Derry v Peek ( 18 89) 14 App Cas 3 3 7; Bagus v Estate Moosa 
1941 AD 62; R v Myers 1948 (1) SA 375 (A); Vereeniging Consolidated Mills Ltd v 
Newman 1958 (2) SA20 (C)), metus(seeBroodrykvSmutsNO 1942 TPD47;Arendand 
Another v Astra Furnishers (Pry) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 298 (C)), as well as undue influence 
(seeMauerberger vMauerberger 1948 (4) SA 902 (C); Prellervlordaan 1956 (1) SA 
483 (A); Patel v Grobbelaar 1974 (1) SA 532 (A)). Farlam & Hathaway Contract 321 
states that the remedy of rescission is restricted to cases in which the agreement reached 
is vitiated by circumstances which are believed to distort the autonomous powers of the 
aggrieved party. In Hare's Brickfields Ltd v Cape Town Ciry Council 1985 (I) SA 769 
(C) 774 these grounds for avoidance were seen as being a numerus clausus. Cf Joubert 
Contract 89 et seq, 111 et seq but see, however, Van der Merwe et al Contract 73 who 
propose with reference to Plaaslike Boeredienste (Edms) Bpk v Chemfos Bpk 1986 (1) 
SA 819 (A) that the various grounds for rescission be subsumed under one single ground, 
namely improperly obtained consent. 
2 Viljoen v Hillier 1904 TS 312; Woodstock, Claremont, Mowbray and Rondebosch 
CouncilsvSmith (1909) 26 SC 681;BrinkvRobinson& Wife 1916 OPD 88;Karrooand 
Eastern Board of Executors & Trust Co v Farr 1921 AD 413; Van Niekerk and Van der 
Westhuizen v WepsandMorris 1937 SWA 99; Novickv Comair Holdings Ltd 1979 (2) 
SA 116 (W); Uni-Erections v Continental Engineering Co Ltd 1981 (I) SA 240 (W). 
3 See Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 (Australia); 
Sumitomo Bank of California v Iwasaki 70 Cal 2d 81 73 Cal Rptr 564 447 P 2d 956 
( 1968) (USA); Lloyds Bank v Bundy [ 1975] 1 QB 326; Barclays Bank pie v 0 'Brien and 
Another [1993] 4 All ER 417; [1994] 1 AC 180 (England); BGH NJW 1994 1341 
(Germany); Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 ( 4) SA 
302 (A), (South Africa). 
2 
Contracts are entered into in order to create obligations. 4 People enter into contracts mainly for 
economic reasons. 5 They have to satisfy some need or other. 
When contracting, a contracting party reasonably expects the results that he bargained for. 6 Often, 
the contractant takes a risk. A surety, for instance, would reasonably expect, or take the risk that 
the principal debtor would perform, and only upon the principal debtor's default, would he, the 
surety, have to perform. 7 
In order to assess risk, 8 one needs to have information. 9 Often, on the face of it, mere information 
may not be enough. Information may need to be dissected, and analysed to assess the probability 
of risk, and often advice may have to be sought to make sense of bare information. 10 Briefly, the 
problem which will be addressed in this thesis, concerns what duty a banker has to inform or 
advise a prospective surety, particularly in circumstances where the surety himself is also a 
customer of the bank, and what duty the surety has to investigate the obligations that he is 
undertaking. I have chosen to discuss suretyship as the focal contract form because it would seem 
that the impact of a series of far-reaching judgments in which the appellate division has reformed 
the modem Roman-Dutch law of contract is being felt most severely in the case of suretyship. 11 
The duty of disclosure in regard to sale contracts with their peculiar legal principles, such as the 
aedilitian remedies, will not form part of this investigation. 
4 Joubert (ed) 5 LAWSA par 124; Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 at 324; Van der 
Merwe et al Kontraktereg 1; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 5; Joubert ( ed) 2 LA WSA 
par 228. 
5 Kronman & Posner Economics 1. 
6 Fuller & Perdue 1936 Yale LI 52 at 54. 
7 See Corrans & Another v Transvaal Government and Coull s Trustee 1909 TS 605 at 
612; Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Frysch 1977 (3) SA 562 (A) at 584F; Sapirstein & Others 
v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 ( 4) SA 1 (A) at 1 lH; Nedbank Ltd v Van Zyl 
1990 (2) SA 469 (A) at 473I. 
8 Risk can be described as "a hazard; peril; exposure to loss or injury". See Brigham & 
Gapenski Financial Management 102. The 1978 Oxford Dictionary describes risk as: 
"Chance of or a/bad consequences, loss etc ... exposed to danger." 
9 Kronman 1978 J of Legal Studies 1 at 4 describes information as the antidote to mistake. 
10 Brigham & Gapenski Financial Management 101. 
11 See, eg, Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas & Another 1988 (3) SA 580 
(A) where the exceptio doli genera/is was dispatched "to the outer darkness." For a 
critical discussion, see Lambiris 1988 SAL! 644; Van der Merwe et al 1989SALf235; 
Forsyth & Pretorius 1993 SA Mere LI 181. 
3 
Most Western countries are attempting to level the playing field between contracting parties. 12 
An imbalance in bargaining power could be an important contributing factor in holding an 
agreement to be unconscionable. 13 It is impossible to create absolute equality between the parties. 
Nothing, for example, can be done about the relative sizes, or capital backing of the parties. In 
the banker-surety relationship, for example, the bank will nearly always have a stronger capital 
base and bargaining power than the surety. However, if the parties are placed on a more equal 
footing as far as gaining information in regard to the transaction is concerned, the prospect of the 
agreements being struck down as unconscionable, should start to wane. 14 
The law of obligations has been described as the apportionment of risk according to rules, norms 
and, especially, principles. 15 Principles have a strong social and ethical "flavour" and are 
therefore subject to change. For the law of obligations it would mean that changing social-ethical 
principles may influence the apportionment of risk directly. In Europe, especially, there is a 
renewed interest in the question of disclosure duties, advisory duties, and information duties, as 
well as duties of investigation in the law of obligations. 16 
12 In the European Community Countries see, eg, EC Directive (Consumer Protection) 
85/577/EEC; [1985] OJ L372/31; EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 
93/13/EEC; [1993] OJ L95/29. In Australia, see the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth); 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code of 1996. In the USA, see s 1-203 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. In England, see the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1994. South Africa also has various enactments 
in this regard. See, eg, the Harmful Business Practices Act 71 of 1988; Credit 
Agreements Act 75 of 1980; Consumer Affairs (Harmful Business Practices) Act of 1996 
(Gauteng). 
13 Kennedy 1982 Maryland LR 563 at 614-624. In England, see the remarks of Lord 
Denning MR in regard to inequality of bargaining power as a basis for relief in respect 
of unfair contracts, in Lloyds BankLtdv Bundy [1975] QB 326 at 339. See, also,Arrale 
v Costain Civil Engineering Ltd [1976] 1 Lloyds Rep 98; A Schroeder Music Publishing 
Co Ltd v Macaulay (Formerly lnstone)[l914] 1 WLR 1308; [1974] 3 All ER 616; 
Levison v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co Ltd [1978] QB 69, and the suggested 
definition of contractual unfairness by the SA Law Commission Unreasonable 
Stipulations 85. 
14 See, in this vein, Holmes 1978 University of Pittsburgh LR 381 at 445-446; Kessler & 
Fine 1964 Harvard LR 401 at 445; Scheppele Legal Secrets 119; Kennedy 1982 
Maryland LR 563 at 614-615. 
15 Vranken Plichten v. More strictly, an obligation is a legal relationship which is 
recognized and regulated by law. See Joubert (ed) 19 LAWSA 235; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 4. 
16 Vranken Plichten v (The Netherlands); Vortmann Aufklarungs-und Beratungspflichten 
1; Schmeltz Verbraucherkredit 153 (Germany); Legrande 1986 OJLS 322 (Canada); 
Nicholas in Harris & Tallon (eds) Contract Law; Waddams in Cane & Stapleton (eds) 
Essays/or PatrickAtiyah 237 (England). 
4 
A standard of good faith will become an important factor to be reckoned with in future, if regard 
is had to European and American developments and the importance which the SA Law 
Commission attaches to the concept of good faith. 17 The concept of good faith, therefore, will be 
referred to in the analysis of each of the selected legal systems. 
The object of this thesis is to determine, against a background of changing mores, under what 
circumstances a duty of disclosure of facts or a duty to advise arises for the bank in the banker-
surety relationship. 
1.1.2 Duties of disclosure 
1.1.2.1 Introduction 
The legitimacy of contractual non-disclosure is a problem that has vexed ancient and modem 
scholars alike. Today, the law sometimes compels disclosure, but often it does not. The position 
appears to depend on a variety of variables, such as the nature of the contract, the kind of 
information that is withheld, the relationship between the contracting parties, and the dictates of 
good faith, or public opinion. 18 
This question is central to an understanding of many areas of commercial law including aspects 
17 SALaw Commission Unreasonable Stipulations 85. 
18 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 45; Mes/dn NO v Anglo American Corporation of SA 
Ltd and Another 1968 (4) SA 793 (W); Savage and Lovemore Mining (Pty) Ltd v 
International Shipping Co (Pty)Ltd1987 (2) SA 149 (W) (South Africa); Spencer Bower 
Non-Disclosure 3 to 17 (England); Kronman 1978 J of Legal Studies 1 et seq; Dennis & 
Masling 1991 BL 1323 et seq (USA). 
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of the law of sale, 19 insurance law, 20 insider trading regulations, 21 corporate director's duties, 22 
corporate prospectus requirements23 and, of particular interest to this thesis, the principles 
relating to suretyships. 
1.1.2.2 Ancient disclosure conceptions 
The earliest and most famous discussion of the non-disclosure puzzle is to be found in Cicero's 
treatise on duties, De Officiis. This work24 enjoyed the status of a "jurisprudential classic"25 in 
Europe until around the end of the nineteenth century, when it fell out of scholarly favour. Its 
central passages, though no longer frequently quoted, continue to exert an influence on the law 
of many countries. 
Cicero's concern was to explain for the benefit of his son(" a not over amiable young man of very 
mediocre abilities"26) the difference between what is morally right and what is expedient. He 
gives the example of a grain-merchant who carries a cargo of com from Alexandria to Rhodes 
19 See, eg, Dibleyv Furter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C); Cloete vSmithfieldHotel (Pty) Ltd 1955 (2) 
SA 622 (O); Van der Merwe v Culhane 1952 (3) SA 42 (T). In England, see Smith v 
Hughes(1871)LR6 QB 597. In Germany, BGHNJW 1965 341; BGHNJW 19821386. 
20 See, eg, Fine v The General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd 1915 AD 
213; Colonial Industries Ltd v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd 1922 AD 3 3; Jscor Pension 
Fund v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1961 (1) SA 178 (T); Pereira v Marine and 
Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1975 (4) SA 745 (A). 
21 See, eg, Scheppele 1993 Law and Contempory Problems 123; Olson et al 1991 North 
Western University LR 715; Loss 1910MLR 34; US Federal Securities Exchange Act of 
1935; S 234 of the South African Companies Act 61 of 1973 and the Insider Trading Act 
135of1998. In the UK, see Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act of 1985. 
22 Scott 1949 California LR 53 9; Sealy 1962 Cambridge L J 69. In South Africa, sees 234 
Companies Act 61 of 1973; Treasure Trove Diamonds Ltd v Hyman 1928 AD 464; 
Spieth &AnothervNagel [1997] 3 All SA316 (W). In Australia, seeMillsvMills(1938) 
60 CLR 150; Harlowe 's Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co NL and 
Another(1968) 121 CLR483. InEngland, seeHowardSmithLtdvAmpolPetroleumLtd 
[1974] 1 All ER 1126; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1966] 3 All ER 420. 
23 R v Akoob 1951 ( 4) SA 683 (T); S v Rossouw 1971 (3) SA 222 (T); S v National Board 
of Executors Ltd 1971 (3) SA 817 (D); Devland Investment Co (Pty) Ltd v Administrator, 
Transvaal 1979 ( 1) SA 3 21 (T). The current section applicable in the Companies Act 61 
of 1973 is s 146. 
24 Cicero De Officiis. 
25 Lawson 1988 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 727 at 737. 
26 Rose Literature 16 l. 
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at a time of famine. In the course of the voyage, the merchant's ship overtakes a number of other 
vessels, all carrying grain and all bound for Rhodes. The question posed by Cicero is whether, 
upon arrival, the merchant should tell the Rhodians about the other ships, or whether he should 
say nothing and sell his cargo at the famine price. The merchant is assumed to be honest, and the 
issue is whether an honest man would regard it as wrong to keep the Rhodians in ignorance. 
Cicero presents both sides of the case through an imaginary dialogue between two Stoic 
philosophers, Diogenes of Babylon and his pupil, Antipater. Antipater says that the information 
should be revealed. He asserts that there is a duty to consider the interests of others, and to serve 
society. This derives from the bond of community that links all persons in the world with one 
another. Diogenes, on the other hand, supports the merchant's moral right to silence, provided 
he remains truthful. He says, in a much-quoted passage, that "concealing is one thing, but not 
revealing is another" (aliud est celare, aliud tacere). 27 To keep information secret is not 
necessarily to conceal it, and a seller is not obliged to disclose everything that it would be useful 
for a buyer to know. The bonds of community do not deny the existence of private property and, 
Diogenes says that if full disclosure were always required, then nothing should be sold at all, but 
freely given away instead. 
The next example given by Cicero concerns the case of an honest man wanting to sell a house 
because of certain defects about which he alone knows: the building is supposed to be healthy, 
but it is actually insanitary; or it is infested with serpents; or it is badly built and falling down. 
Does the vendor behave dishonestly by not disclosing the defect? Antipater argues that non-
disclosure in these circumstances is like failing to put right a traveler who has taken the wrong 
road (this was a crime in Athens). Diogenes counters by asserting the caveat emptor principle: 
"When the purchaser can exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there be on the part of the 
seller?"28 
Cicero sides with Antipater, arguing that the grain-merchant ought not to conceal the facts from 
the Rhodians, and that the vendor of the house ought not to withhold its defects from the 
purchaser. "Holding things back does not always amount to concealment; but concealment 
consists in trying for your own profit, to keep others in the dark about something which you 
know, when it is in their interest to know it. "29 The person who fails to disclose what he knows 
27 Cicero De Officiis Book 3 ch 12. 
28 Cicero De Officiis Book 3 ch 13. 
29 "Neque enim id est celare, quicquid reticeas, sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare 
emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire." Cicero De Officiis Book 3 ch 
12. 
7 
is "the reverse of open, straightforward, fair and honest: he is a shifty, deep, artful, treacherous, 
malevolent, underhand, sly, habitual rogue". 30 
This is patently an ethical position, but Cicero goes on to assert that it is reflected in Roman law. 
He cites the case of a property owner who received a direction from the augurs to pull down parts 
of his building because they were an obstruction to the taking of auspices. 31 The property owner 
immediately put the house on the market, and sold it without disclosing the existence of the 
augurs' directive. When the purchaser discovered the truth, he took the case before an arbitrator, 
Marcus Cato. The decision was that the vendor owed the purchaser a duty of disclosure, and was 
therefore required to make good the loss. 32 On the authority of this case, argues Cicero, the 
hypothetical grain-merchant and the vendor of the insanitary house acted wrongly when they 
concealed the facts. He says, moreover, that these principles are not limited to cases involving 
real estate. For example, the law also requires disclosure when a person sells a slave whom that 
person knows to be unhealthy, a runaway, or a thief 33 
1.1.2.3 Modern disclosure conceptions 
Cicero's illustrations have lost none of their currency down the centuries. 34 The Alexandrian 
grain-merchant has a modem counterpart in the company director who deals in a company's 
securities on the basis of inside information affecting their value, and the debate between 
Diogenes and Antipater on the case is echoed in present-day writing about the ethics of insider 
trading and its regulation. 35 The case of the defective house or property is one that still commonly 
30 Cicero De Officiis Book 3 ch 13. 
31 In Rome in Cicero's day, many believed that the observation of, inter alia, the flight of 
birds could disclose the divine will. Auspicia literally means birdwatching. See Ogilvie 
Gods 56. 
32 Cicero De Officiis Book 3 ch 16. 
3 3 Cicero De Officiis Book 3 ch 17 . 
34 Determining where what is unethical becomes unlawful, is a perennial problem. Cicero 
De Officiis Book 3 ch 17 states: 
"Now the law disposes of sharp practices in one way, philosophers in another: the 
law deals with them as far as it can lay its strong arm upon them; philosophers, 
as far as they can be apprehended by reason and conscience." 
35 See the discussions of Lawson 1988 Harvard Journal of Law and Public_Policy 727; 
Scheppele 1993 Law and Contemporary Problems 123; Levmore 1982 Virginia LR 117; 
Anabtawi 1989 Stanford LR 377; Anisman Insider Trading (for a general overview); 
Bradney 1979 Harvard LR 322. 
8 
occurs. 36 While it is true that serpent infestation is not a modern preoccupation, termite 
infestation is - to the extent that, in the USA, it has been observed that the problem arises in 
case law with sufficient frequency to fill a book, while an entire annotation has been devoted to 
the topic of non-disclosure in relation to termites. 37 The case of the house that is condemned by 
the augurs has its modern equivalent in decisions concerning the sale, without disclosure, of 
property that is the subject of a compulsory acquisition order or a demolition notice. 38 The slave 
dealer who fails to disclose the undesirable characteristics of slaves that are offered for sale has 
a counterpart in the nineteenth century horse-trader39 and the twentieth century used-car dealer. 40 
This kind of problem is dealt with today by the law of warranties and, in some jurisdictions, 
legislation on the sale of goods. 
For the most part, these examples are drawn from the law of sale. However, the non-disclosure 
problem occurs in many other contexts as well. For example, where contracts of suretyhip are 
concerned, there is a question about the extent of the credit provider's duty to disclose to the 
surety, before transacting, information concerning the state of the debtor's account or other facts 
which are material to the risk the surety will be assuming. 41 Various other examples spring to 
mind. In insurance law a duty of full disclosure is cast upon both insurer and insured. 42 Non-
36 In some jurisdictions the vendor of a newly constructed house has a duty of implied 
warranty of habitability. See Miller v Cannon Hill Estates Ltd [1931] 2 KB 113 
(England); Park v Sohn 89 Ill 2d 453 433 NE 2d 651 760 Ill Dec 609 (1982) and 
Redarowicz v Ohlendorf92 Ill 2d 171441NE2d 324 65 Ill Dec (1982) (USA). Demko 
1983 Illinois Bar J124 n3 states that he found judicial support for such implied warranty 
in 39 of the states in the US. 
37 Lawson 1988 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 738 n 47. 
38 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 125-129; Re Leyland and Taylor's Contract [1900] 2 
Ch 625 (England); Fletcher v Manton (1940) 64 CLR 37; Summers v Cocks (1927) 40 
CLR 321 (Australia). 
39 For cases dealing with the sale of horses, see Stevens v Beningfield and Son (1884) 5 
NLR 282; Hulston and Smith v Sykes (1889) 10 NLR 127; Dodd v Spitaleri (1910) 27 SC 
196; Von Mellenthin v Macdonald 1969 (3) SA 471 (T). 
40 See Addison v Harris 1945 NPD 444; Schwarzer v John Roderick s Motors (Pty) Ltd 
1940 OPD 170 (South Africa); BHG NJWl 982 13 86 (Germany). 
41 See, eg, Sumitomo Bank of California v Iwasaki 70 Cal 2d 81 73 Cal Rptr 564 44 7 P 2d 
956 (1968) (USA); Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 
(Australia); Barclays Bank pie v O'Brien and Another [1993] 4 All ER 417 (England); 
Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 (4) SA 302 (A) 
(South Africa). 
42 In England, see Marine Insurance Act of 1906; Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905; 
LockerandWoolfLtdv Western Australian Insurance CoLtd[l963] 1KB408;Lambert 
v Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd [1975] 2 Lloyds Rep 485 (England); Bodemer v 
9 
disclosure issues can also arise in the course of business dealings between partners43 or joint 
venturers, or between principal and agent, by virtue of the rules governing fiduciary relationships. 
Certain statutory provisions, which prohibit misleading conduct44 in trade and commerce, have 
confronted courts directly with the question posed by Cicero so long ago: When, as a matter of 
law, can it be said that silence is deception? 
This issue has arisen repeatedly in case law in a variety of factual contexts, and particularly in 
the context of sale. 45 In addition, a wide range of statutory provisions explicitly requires the 
disclosure of information by one contracting party to another. Examples include: 
• prospectus requirements in a corporation's statutes;46 
• consumer credit laws designed to ensure truth in lending, requiring disclosure of 
information concerning the cost of credit, including the annual percentage rate;47 
• trade descriptions law, imposing labeling and marking requirements in relation to 
products including textiles, furniture and footwear, and dealing with such matters as 
product composition and place of manufacture;48 
• food labeling requirements. 49 
American Insurance Co 1960 ( 4) SA 428 (T); !scar Pension Fund v Marine and Trade 
Insurance Co Ltd 1961 ( 1) SA 178 (T); Pereira v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 
1975 (4) SA 745 (A) (South Africa). 
43 Fawcett v 'Whitehouse [1829] 1 Russ & M 132; Bentley v Craven (1853) 18 Beav 75; 
Dunne v English (1874) LR 18 Eq 524 (England); Hutton v Steinweiss 1905 TS 293; 
Doulet v Piaggio 1905 TH 267; Wegner v Surgeson 1910 TPD 571 (South Africa). 
44 A perfect example is the Australian Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth). 
45 For South African cases, see Dibley v Purter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C); Van der Merwe v 
Meades 1991 (2) SA 1 (A). In Germany, see BGH NJW 1965 341; BGH NJW 1982 
1386. In Australia, see Collier and Others v Electrum Acceptance (Pty) Ltd (1986) 66 
ALR 613;Collins Marickville (Pty) Ltd v Henjo Investments (Pty) Ltd (1987) ATPR 46-
020; Trefor v Ivory [1991] ASC 56-076; (1993) ATPR 41-203. In England, see Becker 
v Partridge [1966] 2 QB 155; [1966] 2 All ER 266; English v Dedham Vale Properties 
Ltd[1978] 1 WLR93; [1978] 1 AllER382;RignallDevelopmentsLtdvHalil[l988] 
1Ch190. 
46 S 162 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (South Africa); s 56 of the Companies Act of 
1985; Financial Services Act of 1986 (UK). 
47 Uniform Consumer Credit Code of 1996 (Australia); Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980; 
Usury Act 73of1968 (South Africa). 
48 Merchandise Marks Act 17 of 1941; Trade Marks Act 62 of 1963. 
49 Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act 54 of 1972. 
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These examples could be multiplied. One can therefore safely state that non-disclosure in 
business dealings is no less an issue for the law today than it was in Cicero's time. Indeed, non-
disclosure is an intriguing modem topic because it lies in the grey area between what is clearly 
acceptable in the way of commercial behaviour, and what is clearly unacceptable. 
As far as the banker-surety relationship is concerned, the disclosure dilemma is compounded by 
the following: 
• The bank is nearly always in a stronger bargaining position. 50 
• A standard contract form is nearly always used. 51 
• The bank often has superior information regarding material facts. 
• The surety is often pressurized by a third party, into signing. 52 
• The surety may be a customer of the bank, and the bank may have certain fiduciary duties 
towards the customer/surety. 53 
50 This was clearly illustrated in Lloyds BankLtd v Bundy [1975] 1 QB 626. 
51 A bank will nearly always insist that a surety sign its standard form of suretyship. The 
terms of the contract are not subject to debate and little could be expected in the way of 
modification of terms. The French speak of a contrat d'adhesion in this regard. 
52 In our law, the situation is that if a fraud proceeds from an independent third person, it 
will have no effect upon the contract. See Karabus Motors (1959) Ltd v Van Eck 1962 
(1) SA 451 (C). The situation is the same in Germany, sees 123 BGB; s 875 AGBG. In 
the UK, however, see Barclays Bank plc v O'Brien and Another [1994] 1 AC 180 where 
it was held that a bank will be fixed with constructive notice of the wife's right to set 
aside the transaction if it knows of certain facts that put it on inquiry as to the possible 
existence of the wife's right and fails to take steps to verify whether or not those rights 
exist. (At 195H-196A). This aspect of the law (nowadays popularly called "sexually 
transmitted debt" will be investigated in more detail in the comparison of English law in 
Chapter 2. Australian Courts are more reluctant to consider "a woman as a mere 
appendage of her husband."( See Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd v Gosper 
(1991) 25 NSWLR 32). See also European Asian of Australia Ltd v Kurland and Another 
(1985) 8 NSWLR 192; Commonwealth Bank v Cohen [ 1988] ASC 5 5-681. 
53 Although the banker-customer relationship has traditionally been held to be one of debtor 
and creditor, and not fiduciary, (see, eg, Nedperm Bank Ltd v Verbri Projects CC 1993 
(3) SA 214 <:N)) the face of banking has changed enormously and in its multi-faceted 
format, a bank may well acquire a fiduciary duty or a "duty of good faith and fair dealing" 
to a customer or customer/surety. See Commercial Cotton Co v United California Bank 
163 Cal App 3d 511 209 Cal Rptr 551 (1985); Copesky v Superior Court of San Diego 
County 229 Cal App 3d 678 280 Cal Rptr 338 (1991) (USA). Fiduciary duties are clearly 
imposed upon a bank as trustees and agents. In English law, furthermore, a duty of 
confidence or an assumption ofresponsibility to act in the customer's interests, have been 
suggested as the basis for a fiduciary relationship. See White v Jones [1993] 3 All ER 
481; Finn in McKendrick (ed) Fiduciary 11-12 (England); Glover 1995 Bond LR 50 
(Australia); Waters 1986 Can Bar Rev 37 (Canada); Curtis 1987 Loyola LALR 795 
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1.1.3 The relationships involved in a banker's suretyship 
1.1.3.1 Banking law: modern trends 
1.1.3.1.1 The so-called banker-customer relationship 
Banking law is a broad subject. 54 It consists of statutory regulation55 as well as the private law 
of banking transactions. One aspect of the latter is the law governing the banker-customer 
relationship. Rooted in contract, the relationship in Western democracies is overlaid with a range 
of rights and obligations having their origin in custom, delict, notions of equity and good faith, 
and statute law. Central to the banker-customer relationship in all Western jurisdictions is 
contract. 56 The banker-customer relationship is rarely reduced to one document, however, but 
instead comprises a variety of written forms supplemented by terms implied by law. Typically, 
a standard form contract governs specific aspects of the banker-customer relationship, whether 
it is the general account, electronic funds transfers or security (including suretyship ). In countries 
such as Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland there are general banking conditions, drawn 
(USA). 
54 As the Court observed in Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (3) [1968] 2 All 
ER 1073 at 1118: 
"Banking law is not a separate body of law, though, like innumerable other 
activities, it has statutory provisions dealing exclusively with it, and, being a 
distinctive and important activity, textbooks dealing separately with it". 
55 In South Africa, see, eg, the Banks Act 94of1990, the Financial Institutions (Investment 
of Funds) Act 39of1984; the South African Reserve Bank Act 90of1989; In Australia, 
see Banking Act of 1959 (Cth); Financial Transaction Reports Act of 1988 (Cth); the 
Reserve Bank Act of 1959 (Cth); the Bank Integration Act of 1991 (Cth). In Germany, 
see the AGB-Gesetz of 1996; the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz of 1994; the 
Kreditwesengesetz of 1961. In the USA, see the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery 
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (103 Stat 183 (1989)); Competitive Equality Banking Act 
ofl 987 ( 101 Stat 5 5 2 ( 1987) ); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
of 1991 (105 Stat 2236 (1991)); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 USC s 1841). 
In England, see the Banking Act of 1987; Financial Services Act of 1986. 
56 Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110; Bank of New South Wales v 
Laing [1954] AC 135 (England); GS George Consultants and Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Datasys (Pty) Ltd 1988 (3) SA 726 (W) (South Africa); The German General Conditions 
of Banking known as the AGB-Banken 1993 (contained inter alia in Grill Recht annexure 
C 15); Pikart 1957 WM 1238; Herold & Lippisch Bank-und Borsenrecht 33; Claussen 
Bank-und Borsenrecht 60; the Dutch Algemene Bankvoorwaarden of 1996 (contained 
inter alia in Tjittes & BlomAansprakelijkheid 201 as an annexure). For a commentary 
on the relationship in the USA, see Symons 1983 Banking LJ220; 1983 Banking LJ325. 
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up by associations ofbanks. 57 British and Australian banks have adopted codes ofpractice58 for 
banks dealing with personal customers. The British code is not of itself legally binding but the 
courts may well use it as a base for implying terms into the banker-customer relationship. 59 There 
is, however, further scope for the incorporation of the customer's viewpoint into the drafting of 
the standard form contracts, general banking conditions, and British code. One approach is that 
adopted in the Netherlands: there, representatives of customers negotiate directly with the 
banks. 60 Another approach - at the other end of the spectrum - is regulation: the State acts as 
a surrogate for the customer and compels banks to meet standards purportedly in the customer's 
interest. In contrast with Europe, the banker-customer relationship in the United States is more 
heavily affected by regulation.61 In various legal systems the regulation of unfair contract terms 
has a more general impact on the banker-customer relationship.62 
1.1.3.1.2 Common issues shared by bankers 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, problems have arisen over the same sort of issues in the banker-customer 
relationship in the different Western countries, such as the question whether a bank statement is 
binding on customers if they do not object to its contents within a specific period. May a bank 
vary the terms of the relationship without agreement and/or without notice to customers? What 
services is a bank obliged to provide and generally what can it charge for its services? How 
enforceable is a suretyship or security given by a person for the business debts of a spouse or 
other close relation? The answers to these questions are not uniform across jurisdictions, and in 
57 See AGB-Banken of 1993; Algemene Bankvoorwaarden of 1996. 
58 English Code of Banking Practice (2) or (3); Australian Code of Banking Practice. 
59 See, eg, in Barclays Bankplc v O'Brien and Another [1993] 4 All ER417; [1994] 1 AC 
180 at 197-198. 
60 The present text of the General Conditions of Banking, which has been in force since 1 
February 1996, is the result of of consultations between the Association of Dutch Banks 
and representative consumer and business organisations. See Wessels 1966 WPNR 6222; 
Molenaar 1988 TVVS 99. 
61 Gail, Norton & O'Neil 1992 The International Lawyer 993; There is a multitude of 
statutes regulating banking in the USA, eg, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (105 Stat 2236 (1991)); Bank Secrecy Act of1970 (s 1951 of 
12 USC); Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (101 Stat 552 (1987)); Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (s 3401of12 USC); Equal Credit Opportunity Act(s 1691 
of 15 USC). On the regulation of banking in the USA generally, see Gail & Norton 
Regulatory. 
62 See, eg, the German AGB-Gesetz of 1976; the English Unfair Contract Terms Act of 
1977; the EC Council Directive 93/13/EEC:[1993] OJ L95/29 in regard to unfair terms 
in consumer contracts; and the Australian Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth). 
13 
any one jurisdiction subtle rephrasing of the issue may produce a different response. 63 
Banks in many countries adhere to one or more interbank agreements, and this has implications 
for the banker-customer relationship. These may not be incorporated directly in the banker-
customer contract; indeed, customers may not even be aware of their existence. Interbank 
agreements are often binding between the banks themselves as a matter of contract. But to what 
extent do they confer rights on or subtract from the rights of customers? 
Other issues, for example, that bankers share are bank confidentiality, the multifaceted face of 
banking, liability for advice or liability for failing to give advice, consumer protection measures 
and debt security. 
1.1.3.2 Bank confidentiality 
European, South African and Australian jurisdictions recognize a form of bank confidentiality 
in which banks are legally compelled to keep the financial affairs of their customers secret. 64 
Although as a matter of policy, bank confidentiality is based on the customer's right of privacy, 
as a concept it tends to have other origins. 65 This discrepancy can lead to privacy being breached 
with the law's sanction. 66 An example is the so-called status opinion or banker's reference, where 
a trader will obtain information about the financial standing of another trader through the banking 
63 Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 2. 
64 See Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 
(England); Densam (Pty) Ltd v Cywilnat (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 100 (A) (South Africa); 
the Dutch Privacy Act ofl 989 (Wet persoonsregistraties ); In Germany, see Rehbein 1985 
ZHR 139; Sichtermann et al Bankgeheimnis 111; the AGB-Banken of 1993. In the USA, 
see Peterson v Idaho First National Bank 367 P 2d 284, 290 (l96l);Milohnich v First 
National Bank of Miami Springs 224 So 2d 759 760 (Fla 1969) and the Algemene 
Bankvoorwaarden in the Netherlands. 
65 Banking secrecy is said to be founded on legislation, contract and the protection of 
privacy. See Faul 1989 TSAR 145; Faul 1989 De Jure 312; Faul 1986 TSAR 180; 
Itzikowitz 1989 BML 255; Scott 1989 SA Mere LJ 248; Fourie 1990 South African 
Banker 20. 
66 The concept of banking secrecy has come under severe pressure recently and disclosure 
of confidential information in appropriate circumstances in the public interest is 
increasingly required. In England, see Bankers Trust Company v Shapira [ 1980] 3 All ER 
353; Price-Waterhouse (A Firm) v BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) SA [1992] 1 All ER 
778; [1992] BCLC 583 at 596; A v B Bank (Bank of England Intervening) [1992] 1 All 
ER 778 at 788; Bank of Englandv Riley [1992] 1 All ER 769. See also Drugs and Drug 
Trafficking Act 140of1992. 
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system,67 leading to several issues. Examples of such issues would be whether the customer's 
consent is required, 68 and the liability of the bank giving the opinion. 69 
Multi-functional banking is one reason why confidentiality is under attack at present: banks 
distribute information throughout the corporate group so that the whole range of bank services 
can be marketed to customers, despite the fact that this may be in breach of the principle.70 The 
other, and more defensible reason why bank confidentiality is currently being undermined is 
because the banking system has been used for fraudulent and criminal activity. Money laundering 
is at the top of regulators' agenda, 71 but other concerns include tax evasion, 72 securities violations 
and insolvency offences. 
67 Faul Bankgeheim 508; Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 375; Neate Bank 
Confidentiality 204-205; The Royal Bank Trust Co (Trinidad) Ltdv Pampellone [1987] 
1 Lloyds Rep 218. 
68 Bankers usually try to rely on an implied consent or the fact that the giving of the 
information is a trade usage. See Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v RH Brown & 
Co (1972) 126 CLR337 (Australia);MidlandBankLtdv Seymour [1955] 2 Lloyds Rep 
1477; Parsons v Barclay & Co Ltd and Goddard (1910) 103 LT 196 (England). Lord 
Chorley Banking 24 pointed out that banker's opinions are often given out without the 
knowledge or consent of the customer, and if so would amount to a breach of the bank's 
duty of secrecy. 
69 See, eg, Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 2 All 
ER575; CornishvMidlandBankplc(Humesthirdparty) [1985] 3 AllER513;Bankof 
Tokyo Ltd v Karoon [1987] AC 45; Morgan Crucible Co pie v Hill Samuel Bank Ltd 
[1991] All ER 148; White v Jones [1993] 3 All ER 481 (England); Standard Chartered 
Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 (4) SA 747 (A) (South Africa). 
70 Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon [1987] AC 45; Cranston Banking Law 192-193; Faul 
Bankgeheim 180. 
71 See South African Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992; English Drug 
Trafficking Act of 1994; Australian Financial Transaction Reports Act of 1988 (Cth); 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (US); the Dutch Disclosure of Unusual Transactions Act of 
1993 and Identification Financial Services Act of 1993. 
72 See South African Income Tax Act 58of1962. In Australia, see the Australian Income 
Tax Assessment Act of 1936; Smorgon v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd; Smorgon v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia ( 1976) 134 
CLR 475; Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v 
The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 499. In the 
Netherlands, see the Dutch Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen of 195 9. In Germany, 
the bank has an unlimited duty to to inform the authorities in regard to tax fraud (s 385 
Abgabenordnung (Federal Taxation Act)). 
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1.1.3.3 Multi-functional banks 
Multi-functional banking engenders vanous conflicts of interest. For example, a bank 
recommends to a customer the purchase of securities, or it effects purchase of such securities, the 
issue of which is being underwritten by the bank. Similarly, the transaction may relate to a 
company's issue of securities and the bank may be a substantial creditor of the company, or a 
financial adviser to the company, or may be advising someone who is contemplating a substantial 
acquisition of securities in the company. 73 The assumption seems to have been that competition 
will act as the regulator, driving customers from banks that abuse their position. Reliance may 
also have been placed on agency law: an agent must not use his or her position to acquire benefits 
for himself or herself at the expense of his or her principal (conflict of interest and duty). 
Therefore, a bank instructed to buy a certain number of securities cannot buy on its own account. 
If it does, it must account for the profits. 74 But agency law is not easily applied to the multi-
functional bank. One theoretical problem is knowledge. Can the knowledge of its different parts 
be attributed to the business as a whole, even if one part does not know in fact what another part 
knows, 75 and especially as there are barriers such as Chinese Walls which have prevented the free 
flow of information?76 There are also problems at the level of practice; for example, it is not 
always very easy to distinguish the case where a bank acts as agent for its customer from the case 
where the bank buys securities in its own name and subsequently resells them to the customer. 
The ordinary law has sometimes treated disclosure as a solution to the problem of conflicts of 
interest. Make full disclosure of the conflict to the customer, and the bank is absolved of any 
73 See Poser 1988Michigan YearbookoflnternationalLegalStudies91 at96-97; Cranston 
Banking Law 23. 
74 See Cranston Banking Law 24-25. 
75 There is authority that since a corporation is one entity in law, however many 
departments it can be divided into, if one department acts in terms of a mandate for a 
customer, and another unbeknown to the first, acts contrary to the interests of the 
customer, the company as a whole will be in breach of a fiduciary duty. See Harrods Ltd 
v Lemon [ 1931] 2 KB 157; Lloyds Bank Ltd v EB Savory & Co [ 1933] AC 201; [ 1933] 
All ER 106; Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission 
[1995] 2 AC 500. 
76 "Chinese Walls" has been broadly defined as procedures for restricting the flow of 
information within an organisation to ensure that information that is confidential to one 
department is not improperly communicated (whether deliberately or inadvertently) to 
other departments in the organisation. See the English Law Commission Fiduciary Duties 
par 2.16. See also the concept of Chinese Walls in the Dutch Gedragscode van de 
N ederlandse Vereniging van Bank en (NVB). The primary role of these walls is to prevent 
the spread of koersgevoelige informatie, in regard to trading in securities. See Van Dijk 
1997 TVVS 235 at 236. 
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wrongdoing. 77 Yet disclosure of a conflict of interest may be in breach of a duty to another 
customer. 78 The bank advising customer A to invest in the securities of customer B, whose 
financial health is dubious, should disclose that fact to A - but to do that would be in breach of 
the duty of confidentiality to B. If, as in this case, disclosure is a breach of duty to another, it may 
be that the bank must desist completely from acting. In the situation referred to, therefore, the 
bank would have to inform the client or customer that it was unable to advise or assist. 79 The 
difficulty80 arises, of course, where one department of a multi-functional bank does not know that 
there is a conflict ofinterest as a result of what another department is doing. A Chinese Wall may 
be in operation, designed to keep particular parts of the bank ignorant of what the other parts are 
doing. The strict application of the rule "disclose or desist", however, means that the existence 
of a Chinese Wall is not sufficient. 81 The bank must take positive steps to ensure that there is 
disclosure where this is permissible, or desist from acting. Such positive steps would include the 
American restricted-list procedure, where the bank would make no recommendations about, and 
would not deal in the securities of a company, either on its own account, or on a discretionary 
basis, as soon as it entered into a close business relationship with that company. 82 
Only recently has regulatory law in Europe grappled with conflict-of-interest problems. 83 The 
criminalisation of insider dealing84 is an example, although it misses a ·great deal of the 
77 Cranston Banking Law 25; Warne Litigation 47; Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) 
[1999] 1 All ER 517. 
78 See, eg, Winterton Constructions Pty Ltd v Ham bros Australia Ltd [ 1993] ATPR 41-205. 
79 See, eg, Standard Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1986) 22 
DLR (4th) 410 at 436 (Canada) but cf Washington Steel Corporation v TW Corporation 
602 F 2d 594 (3d Circuit 1979) (USA). In this controversial case it was decided that a 
bank may use confidential information obtained from prior contacts with a corporate 
customer, the target company, and was not precluded from financing the hostile takeover 
of that customer. For critical discussions, see Holland 1980 Cornell LR 292; Millhiser 
1980 Wash & Lee LR 953 and Chao 1980 California LR 153. 
80 See Law Commission Fiduciary Duties pars 2.12 to 2.15 for a discussion of practical 
problems. 
81 See Re A Firm of Solicitors [1992] 1 QB 959 at 971; [1992] All ER 353. 
82 See Lipton& Mazur 1975 NYU LR459 at466-8; Brudney 1979 Harvard LR 322 (USA); 
Warne Litigation 38 (England). 
83 See, generally, Hopt in Hopt & Wymeersch (eds) Insider Dealing 221-231; EC Directive 
(Insider Dealing Directive) 89/592/EEC, [1989] OJ L334/30; s 52 of the English 
Criminal Justice Act of 1993. 
84 See, eg, the Criminal Justice Act of 1993; Financial Services Act of 1986 (England); the 
Dutch Securities Act of 1995; the use of Chinese Walls (see Van Dijk 1997 1WS 23 5-
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informational and positional advantage which can give rise to conflicts of interests. Obligations 
in company legislation on insiders to disclose shareholdings, and criminal prohibitions on 
concealing information and creating a false market, are also relevant. Most Western countries are 
now developing an elaborate system of investor protection, inspired in broad outline by the US 
systems of securities regulation. 85 Detailed rules may prescribe acceptable behaviour for a bank 
engaged in securities activity; breach can be a disciplinary offence and can ultimately lead to a 
bank's having its authorization to engage in such activity withdrawn. 86 
1.1.3.4 Liability for advice 
Advice can be given to customers or to third parties. Delictual liability enables third parties to 
sue banks for negligent advice, 87 as well as for fraudulent advice. 88 A customer may in certain 
instances also be able to sue its banker for negligent advice. 89 The question whether a duty to 
advise exists, will be investigated in each of the chosen jurisdictions. 
Earlier in the twentieth century, it was said that a bank could not be liable for negligent advice 
given by its officers, since it was not a banking function to give advice. 90 But even before banks 
began to promote themselves as financial advisers it would have been unrealistic to divorce 
advice from banking; advice has always been intimately linked with the taking and lending of 
234); the German Wertpapierhandelsgesetz of 1994; s 128 Aktiengesetz. 
85 Securities Act of 1933 (s 77of15 USC); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (s 78of15 
USC). 
86 On the American regulatory environment, see, eg, Norton 1986 Oklahoma City 
University LR 547; Hackley 1969 Virginia LR 1421; Scott 1977 Stanford LR l; Norton 
& Gail 1990 BL 1103. 
87 Hedley Byrne Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 2 All ER 575 
(England); s 826 BGB (Germany); Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank 
Ltd 1994 (4) SA 747 (A) (South Africa). 
88 Derry vPeek(l889) 14 App Cas 337 (England); Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd 
v RH Brown & Co (1972) 126 CLR 336 (Australia} 
89 See, eg, Verity v Lloyds Bankplc [1995] CLC l557;Morgan v Lloyds Bankplc [1998] 
Lloyds Rep 73 (England); State Bank of Iowa Falls v Brown 119 NW 81 (Iowa 1909); 
BrashervFirstNationalBankofBirmingham 168 So 42 (Ala 1936);MillsCountyState 
Bank v Fisher 282 NW 2d 712 (Iowa 1979) (USA); Durr v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another 
1997 (3) SA 448 (A) (South Africa). 
90 Banbury v Bank of Montreal [1918] AC 626. 
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money.91 A more serious legal obstacle has been the reluctance in some jurisdictions to impose 
non-contractual liability for economic loss dissociated from physical injury. The potential 
enormity of recoverable damages is perceived as the major obstacle. Whatever the general 
problem with "pure" economic loss,92 however, the extent of the liability consequent on negligent 
advice is limited - the money itself and the profit which may have been generated through its 
employment elsewhere. 93 It is not surprising, therefore, that in English law negligent advice has 
been carved out as an exception to the rule that there is no liability for pure economic loss. 94 
Banks would normally be able to avoid the consequences of giving negligent advice by suitable 
notice to those receiving it. 95 Whether this is regarded, conceptually, as avoiding liability or as 
exempting from liability already incurred is quite valid, but the central issue in practice should 
be whether the disclaimer of, or exemption from, liability has been made clear to those being 
advised so they are in no doubt that the bank is washing its hands of the consequences of the 
advice proving inappropriate or wrong. Thus, a small-print clause in a document given to those 
being advised is unlikely to satisfy this test. 96 
1.3.5 Consumer protection 
Specific consumer protection for bank customers is a rarity. However, countries such as Britain, 
91 Today there is no doubt that the giving of advice is within the scope of a bank's business. 
See Compafina Bank v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group and Bennet (1984) 
Aust Torts Rep 80-546 (Australia); Morgan v Lloyds Bank pie [1998] Lloyds Rep 73; 
Verity v Lloyds Bankplc [1995] CLC 1557; Warne Litigation 34; Cranston Banking Law 
225-6 (England); Durr v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another 1997 (3) SA 448 (A) (South 
Africa). 
92 See, eg, the conflicting decisions on pure economic loss inAnns v London_Borough of 
Merton [ 1978] AC 728; [ 1977] All ER 492 and Murphy v Brentwood District Council 
[1991] 1 AC 398 (England). See further, Winnipeg Condominium Corp v Bird 
Construction Co [ 1995] 1 SCR 85 (Canada); Von Bar 1992 RabelsZ 410; Hutchison & 
Zimmermann 1995 ZvglRWiss 42 (Germany). 
93 Cranston Banking Law 225. 
94 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; Verity v Lloyds Bank 
pie [1995] CLC 1557. 
95 See Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (England); HR 
1967-05-19 NJ 1967 261 (Saladin v Hollandse Bank Unie) (The Netherlands). 
96 In Hedley Byrne Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, the bank avoided 
liability because of a disclaimer in the reference. In English law, problems of small print 
and unfair disclaimers will fall within the scope of unfair contract terms legislation such 
as the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. 
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Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and Germany have banking ombudsmen for the resolution of 
banker-customer disputes. Several EC initiatives on funds transfers have led to consumer 
protection measures in the member States. 97 Proper prudential regulation should ensure a sound 
banking system and thus protection for customers.98 In particular, deposit guarantee and 
protection schemes give some comfort to customers in the event that banks fail. 99 Usury laws,· 
which limit interest charged on loans have gone by the board in Europe, although disclosure of 
interest and charges feature prominently in the consumer credit laws100 of the different countries 
(which in some respect have been brought into line in the EC as a result of Directives). In the 
USA, consumer credit controls tend to be more extensive than elsewhere. 101 
General banking conditions, 102 drawn up by associations of banks, have long been a feature of 
some Western jurisdictions. The introduction of electronic funds transfers has led banks across 
Europe to prepare standard terms for their customers. 103 Judicial and legislative control of 
standard-form contracts apply in theory to banks. Judicial control has operated by construing 
ambiguities in the banks' contracts against them and by invoking doctrines which in broad terms 
attack inequality of bargaining power. 104 Legislative control has largely replaced judicial control, 
although the courts are the instruments by which the legislative goal is achieved. In some 
European countries the solution to standard clauses is in part administrative. 105 
97 EC Directive (Code of Conduct in the Area of Electronic Funds Transfer) 
87 /598!EEC: [ 1987] OJ L365/72. In the USA these issues are regulated by the Electronic 
Funds Transfer Act (15 USC s 1693). 
98 General consumer protection laws, such as the EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts93/13!EEC:[1993] OJL95/29) can,ofcourse, also be resorted to. See Cranston 
Banking Law 78. 
99 EC Directive (Deposit Guarantee Schemes) 94/19!EEC: [1994] OJ L135/5. 
100 See the Usury Act 73 of 1968; the English Banking Act of 1987. 
101 See, eg, the detailed provisions prohibiting discrimination in the provision of credit, 
namely the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 USC s 1691) and the Community 
Reinvestment Act (12 USC s 2901). 
102 See, eg, the English Code of Banking Practice (2); the Australian Code of Banking 
Practice; the German AGB-Banken; the Dutch Algemene Bankvoorwaarden. 
103 EC Directive (Code of Conduct in the Area of Electronic Funds Transfer) 
87 /598!EEC: [ 1987] OJ L365/72. In the USA these issues are regulated by the Electronic 
Funds Transfer Act (15 USC s 1693). 
104 EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13!EEC:[1993] OJ L95/29. 
105 Reich & Micklitz Legislation 161-184; Beale 1989 Current Legal Problems 191; Bernitz 
1973 Scandinavian Studies in Law 11 at 13-14. 
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Control of standard-term banking contracts has been given impetus by the EC Directive on 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. 106 Potentially this strikes at a number of standard clauses 
in banking contracts which could be said to violate the reasonable expectations of customers. 
1.1.3.6 Conclusion 
This thesis will, in part, endeavour to show that the law relating to the banker-customer 
relationship in Western countries, particularly in Europe, does converge to a degree. 107 However, 
the extent of this convergence falls far short of what has been achieved in bank regulation as a 
result of the work of the Basle Committee on banking regulations and the directives of the 
European Community. It is more of a convergence in outcomes rather than in the means to the 
outcomes; the different statutes and judicial methods remain as divergent as ever. 108 
The pressures on the law relating to the banker-customer relationship to converge will 
continue. 109 In all countries banks face similar demands for more accountability and better 
service. Legal transplanting is expected to continue in all major trading partners. 
International regulatory efforts will become even more of a catalyst for change in our domestic 
law - the drive against money-laundering and its impact on opening accounts and bank 
confidentiality are illustrative. 110 
In view of our being part of the worldwide banking matrix, it would be dangerous to ignore 
trends emanating from other parts of the world, as far as disclosure principles are concerned. 
106 EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13/ EEC: [1993] OJ L95/29. 
107 Cranston Banking Law 68-69; Schneider 1991 Law & Pol'y Int'/ Bus 261; Zavvos 1988 
Common Market LR 263 at 276; Hadjiemmanuil in Norton & Andenas (eds) 
Organisations 183-185; EC Directive (Second Banking Directive) 89/646/EEC;[1989] 
OJ L386/1. 
108 In particular between Britain and the USA, see Cranston Banking Law 69 (England); 
Gruson & Nikowitz 1989 Fordham Int'/ LJ205 (USA). 
109 The process of harmonization of laws is taking place on various levels, by 
intergovernmental organizations, as well as private business or interest groups. See, eg, 
the activities of UNCITRAL, the ICC, UNIDROIT, and the International Law 
Association. One must remember that what is happening within the EC banking matrix 
is but part of a broader international convergence process. See Norton & Andenas 
Organisations 183-185. 
110 Buxbaum et al (eds) Business Law 347. 
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1.2. ASPECTS OF SURETYSHIP 
In order to understand the circumstances under which a suretyship can be rescinded on the basis 
of non-disclosure of material facts, 111 by a bank, I believe that it is necessary briefly, to review 
the nature of suretyship and the purpose and background to a suretyship relationship. In view of 
the rising popularity of good faith as a standard of fairness in contract law, where the reasonable 
expectations of the parties play a dominant role, this purpose and background become very 
important. 
Suretyship is defined as an accessory contract, by which the surety undertakes to the creditor of 
the principal debtor, primarily that the principal debtor, who remains bound, will perform his 
obligation to the creditor and, secondarily, that if and so far as the principal debtor fails to do so, 
the surety will perform it or, failing that, indemnify the creditor. 112 This definition contains the 
heart of a surety's expectation. He expects the principal debtor to perform. Only if the principal 
debtor does not do so, does the surety expect to perform. 113 
Because a surety's obligation is an accessory obligation, a valid114 principal obligation, between 
111 Although this thesis is devoted to this particular problem, it must be borne in mind that 
a surety enjoys a vast array of defences and benefits. The surety may rely upon and plead 
all the defences which the principal debtor has against the creditor, except those defences 
which are purely personal to the principal debtor. See Pothier Obligations pars 3 80-3 81; 
Hastie v Dunstan (1892) 9 SC 449;EatonRobins&Co vNel (2) (1909) 26 SC 624;/deal 
Finance Corporation v Coetzer 1970 (3) SA 1 (A); Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire 
Equipment (Pty) Ltd 1984 (2) SA 693 (C); Barclays National BankLtdv Von Varendorff 
1985 (2) SA 544 (D); Bankorp Ltd v Leipsig 1993 (1) SA 247 <y/). 
The surety can also plead a number of defences peculiar to the contract of suretyship, eg, 
defences as to the legality of clauses (see Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Wilkinson 1993 (3) 
SA 822 (C); First National Bank of SA Ltd v Sphinx Fashions CC 1993 (2) SA 721 (W); 
Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re Nedbank Ltd v Abstein Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
Others and Donelly v Barclays National BankLtd 1995 (3) SA 1 (A)), and the benefits 
of excussion, division, and cession of actions. See Caney Suretyship 107 et seq; Joubert 
(ed) 26 LAWSA pars 202-206). 
112 Caney Suretyship 26-27. 
113 There is no universally accepted definition of a contract of suretyship, but Caney' s 
definition contains the gist of suretyship. For other definitions, see Grotius Inleidinge, 
Voet 46.1.1; Pothier Obligations par 365; De Wet & Van WykKontraktereg3 91; Joubert 
(ed) 26 LAWSA par 190. 
114 The principal debt may not be illegal (see Albert v Papen/us 1964 (2) SA 713 (E) at 717 
approvedinLipschitzNO v UDCBankLtd 1979 (1) SA 789 (A);Brandtv Weber(1886) 
2 SAR 98), forbidden or impossible (see Digest 46.1.11; Digest 46.1.70.5; Voet 
46.1.9.11; Van Leeuwen Censura 1.4.17.6.; Pothier Obligations pars 366 and 395). 
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the debtor and the creditor is essential, and if a suretyship is not grafted upon such a principal 
obligation, it is void. 115 The suretyship is accessory to the transaction which creates the obligation 
of the principal debtor. 116 
In the absence of a valid principal obligation the surety is not bound; therefore, in principle, 117 
the surety can raise any defence which the principal debtor can raise. More subtly, this means that 
in the typical contractual case the surety only takes upon himself the risk of a breach of contract 
by the principal debtor (for invalidity or extinction of the obligation in question). 118 This ties in 
well with the idea of a surety as one who promises that the principal debtor will perform, not 
simply one who will indemnify the creditor for losses caused by non-performance. Therefore a 
surety is not bound to a person to whom the principal debtor is not liable, even if the surety has 
made his promise to that person, for there is no principal obligation between principal and 
creditor to which the suretyship can accede. 119 
From the above it is clear that there are at least three parties concerned in the relationship - the 
creditor, the principal debtor and the surety. There are four obligations: firstly that of the 
principal debtor to the creditor; secondly, accessory to that, the obligation of the surety to the 
creditor; thirdly the obligation of the principal debtor to reimburse the surety what he pays the 
creditor; 120 fourthly the obligation that falls upon the creditor, namely, to do nothing in his 
dealings with the principal debtor and with other sureties to the prejudice of the surety. 121 
115 Digest 46.1.16; Van Leeuwen Censura 1.4.173; Voet 46.1.3; Pothier Obligations 366; 
Joubert(ed) 26LAWSA par192;EatonRobins&CovNel (/) (1909) 26 SC 365;/mperial 
Cold Storage & Supply CoLtdvJulius Weil & Co 1912 AD 747; WiehahnNO v Wouda 
1957 (4) SA 724 (W); Croxon's Garage (Pty) Ltdv Olivier 1971 (4) SA 85 (T). 
116 Voet 46.1.16.3; Sande 7.11; Renou v Walcott (1909) 10 HCG 246; Dorfman v Perring 
1922 EDL 13 7; Schoeman v Moller 1951 (1) SA 456 (O); List v Jungers 1979 (3) SA 106 
(A); Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltdv Durban Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1980 (3) SA 53 (A). 
117 Joubert (ed) 26 LAWSA par 201. 
118 Lubbe 1984 THRHR 383 at 385-386; Caney Suretyship 27. 
119 Digest46.1.16; Voet46.1.3; VanLeeuwenCensura 1.4.17.5. 
120 When the surety intervenes with the consent or knowledge of the principal debtor, a 
contract of mandate comes into existence, either expressly or tacitly. See Rossouw & 
Rossouw v Hodgson & Others 1925 AD 97 at 102. lfhe does so without the knowledge 
of the debtor, the surety is entitled to be reimbursed on the grounds of negotiorum gestio. 
See Joubert (ed) 26 LAWSA par 207; De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 214-215; 
Digest 17.1.6.2; Grotius Jnleidinge 3.3.30-31; Voet 46.1.28; Voet 46.1.31. 
121 Caney Suretyship 28. To this should be added the duty not to do anything in his dealings 
with the surety himself, which may prejudice the surety. As we shall see, the contract of 
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Possibly, in view of the requirement of good faith or at least in terms of a new interpretation 
thereof, the conduct of the creditor vis-a-vis co-sureties, mutual sureties and other creditors of 
the principal debtor and the surety, may also become relevant. It is possible that a banker may 
acquire a duty to protect the expectations of a wide range of persons who, in undertaking 
suretyship obligations, are affected by the bank's conduct. 
In this thesis I shall concentrate on the duties of disclosure of material facts and duties to advise, 
owed by a banker, as creditor, vis-a-vis the surety when taking suretyships. 
1.3 LEGAL COMPARISON: METHODOLOGY 
1.3.l Comparative possibilities 
"Geen hof, ook nie hierdie hof nie, besit die bevoegdheid om ons gemene reg met die reg 
van enige ander land te vervang nie. "122 
Notwithstanding this truism, the law of other nations can be implemented to fill gaps in our own 
law and the value of comparative research is recognized in our law. 123 For historical reasons, it 
was English law in particular which found its way into the South African law. 124 Insofar as 
banking law is concerned, it cannot be denied that English law has been applied instead of South 
suretyship is not considered to be one of uberrimae fides (see Orlando Hosking v 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd (1892) 13 NLR 174; Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v 
OudtshoornMunicipality 1985 (1) SA419(A) (SouthAfrica);Hamiltonv Watson(1845) 
12 Cl & Fin 109;London General OmnibusCoLtdvHolloway [1912] 2 KB 72; Cooper 
v National Provincial Bank [1946] 1 KB l; [1945] 2 All ER 641 (England)), but a more 
prominent role of bona fides in our law of contract may lead to stricter duties on the 
shoulders of the creditor in his dealings with the surety, and the question of non-
disclosure of material information is directly affected by this relationship. A question 
which arises as well is whether a banker owes a more onerous duty to a surety who is also 
a customer of the bank, than to one who is not. 
122 Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Eksteen 1964 (3) SA 402 (A) at 410-411. 
123 For notable comparative research done in South Africa see, eg, Van der Merwe 
Vorderingsregte 1959 (English, American, Dutch, German, Swiss and French Law); Van 
Heerden Grondslae 1961 (German, Dutch, English and American Law); Van Zyl 
Saakwaarnemingsaksie 1970 (French, Dutch, Italian, German, Austrian, Swiss and 
Hungarian Law); Pauw Persoonlikheidskrenking 1976 (German, Swiss, Dutch, French 
and English Law). 
124 For details of the reception of English law at the Cape from 1806 to 191-0 and the role of 
English law in the growth of South African law since 1910, see Van Zyl Roman Law; 
Hosten 1962 THRHR 24-26; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 231-235. 
24 
African law, even in cases where English law has not been specifically imported by legislation. 125 
Our case law also reflects the assistance obtained from English sources. 126 
Various factors, notably consumer protection measures, are currently impacting on the law of 
contract and banking, internationally. In South Africa, furthermore, the full impact of the new 
Constitution will still have to be measured, and in respect of the constitutionality of private-law 
relationships, much can be learned from other nations. The Constitution of South Africa, in fact, 
enjoins one to have regard to comparable foreign case law where applicable in interpreting the 
provisions of the chapter on fundamental rights. 127 
In embarking on comparative research, two main methodological approaches are usually 
employed in South Africa. The legal historical method investigates the historical origin and 
development of a specific concept, rule, institution or aspect of South African law. The most 
important historical sources of our law, according to traditional thought, are Roman and Roman-
125 In an article entitled "The Law of Banking in South Africa" 1904 SALJ355, Morice went 
so far as to say: 
"The law of South Africa is identical with English law in most matters that 
belong properly to banking. Where the one does not borrow from the other, both 
are derived from the Law Merchant. 11 
Further on in his article, however, it becomes clear that there are important differences 
between the two legal systems. 
More cautious is Willis Banking 20-21 who states: 
"Mention has already been made of the fact that our banking practice derives 
from England .. .It is therefore hardly surprising that where our law is silent on a 
matter appertaining to banking practice, the decisions of the English courts have 
had strong persuasive authority. 11 
126 Apart from the numerous cases in regard to negotiable instruments, see, eg, Cargo Motor 
Corporation Ltdv Tofalanos Transport Ltd 1972 (1) SA 186 (W) (the decision whether 
to enforce a contract, performance to be effected through a bank as agent, in 
contravention of Zambian exchange control laws, Zambia being a "friendly foreign 
state"); Rousseau NO v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1976 ( 4) SA 104 (C) (to determine the 
relationship between a banker and customer); Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Senekal 1977 
(2) SA 587 (W) (in order to decide whether an overdraft is normally payable on demand); 
Ensor NO v NedbankLtd 1978 (3) SA 110 (D) (to define the banker client relationship); 
Big Dutchman (South Africa) (Pty )Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1979 (3) SA 267 
(W) (in order to determine the duty of banks to check their mandates). 
127 This should be done with circumspection because of the differing contexts within which 
foreign constitutions were drafted and operate, and the danger of unnecessarily importing 
doctrines associated with those constitutions into an inappropriate South African setting. 
See the comments of Kroon Jin Qozoleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1994 
(1) BCLR 75 (E); Van der Vyver 1994SALJ19 at 23-24. 
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Dutch Law. 128 Legal historical research in South Africa would therefore entail at least a study of 
Roman-Dutch law (embracing the development of Roman law in Europe from the 12th century 
up to its reception in the Netherlands, and the subsequent development in the Netherlands of 
Roman-Dutch law, up to its codification in the nineteenth century), 129 as well as a study of the 
development of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa. 130 
The legal comparative method, on the other hand, investigates corresponding or similar concepts, 
rules, institutions and aspects of other legal systems. 131 Legal comparison can be made 
horizontally, that is, it merely takes note of the current legal position in a foreign system or, 
vertically, that is, the subject is analyzed historically. Comparative law studies legal systems 
coexistent in space, legal history studies systems consecutive in time. 
1.3.2 Choice of comparative method 
In this thesis I shall make use of legal comparison, rather than historical analysis. Where I do 
128 Hosten et al Introduction 129 et seq and at 220; Hahlo & Kahn System 139 at 303. There 
is no uniformity about what exactly in Roman-Dutch law should be considered as South 
African common law. The traditional orthodox view of our courts is that Roman-Dutch 
law as South African common law is limited to the law of the province of Holland and 
is only found in the writers on this area of the law. See,eg, Du Plessis NO v Strauss 1988 
(2) SA 105 (A); Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas & Another 1988 (3) 
SA 580 (A). Some jurists support the view that our common law is the whole European 
ius commune and is not limited to the portion that prevailed in Holland. (See Visser 1986 
THRHR 127 at 135; Scott 1985 De Jure 122 at 124-125; Zimmermann 1986 SALJ259 
at 270; Du Plessis & Olivier 1988 De Jure 371-378). 
129 See VanZyl 1972 THRHR 20 et seq. 
130 English law has played a particularly influential role in South African law. Opinions 
differ about the exact nature and reach of the influence of English law on the 
development of Roman-Dutch law. See Hahlo & Kahn System 584 and further, and 
Zimmermann 1986 SALJ 259 at 260. It is fairly generally accepted that at least some 
English legal rules became part of South African law. See Hosten et al Introduction 197 
and further; Scott 1985 De Jure 122 at 130-131. Some (see, eg, Zimmermann 1986 SALJ 
259 at 274 et seq; Visser 1986 THRHR 127 at 129) even feel that English law is, or has 
become part of our common law. Be that as it may, English law cannot be ignored as a 
historical source of our law, at least as far as it has been received into our law. (See 
Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 235.) South African Courts have over the years referred 
to and greatly relied on the decisions of their English counterparts in order to adapt "to 
the changing and complicated conditions of modern society" (per Innes Autobiography 
329 in a tribute to Lord De Villiers). On the reliance of our courts on English law, see 
Girvin 1994SALJ112 at 121; Girvin 1988 SALJ 479 at 481; Cameron 1982 SALJ38 at 
51. 
131 Ebert Rechtsvergleichung 21 distinguishes between "micro" (in the sense used here) and 
"macro" comparison. Macro comparison consists of comparing legal systems or groups 
oflegal systems. See also Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 4-5. 
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sketch a historical background, it is more for the purpose of establishing a trend, which may 
affect the banker-surety relationship. 
The reason for electing to use the comparative method is firstly practical. The scope of the thesis 
makes it impossible to make use of the legal historical method. 
Secondly, concepts such as "reasonableness", "fairness", "unconscionability" and "good faith", 
fundamentally affect the problem posed in this thesis. The problems addressed therefore relate 
to substantive law, and thus procedural differences between the various systems compared do not 
play such an important role. The problem relates to subjective rights, and not so much to the 
processes with which they are enforced. 132 
Thirdly, the scope of and the possible solutions to the problems modern-day bankers face when 
taking suretyships, will be determined to a large extent by the theoretical and philosophical views 
on the modern function, purpose, and sphere of influence of the law of contracts (and delict) in 
general and the rules in regard to illegality or geoorloofdheid and the role of the boni mores in 
particular. Although a study of the legal historical background can contribute to better insight 
into the problem, I believe that the comparative method is more relevant for an evaluation of the 
problem. 
In the fourth place, modern problems like duties of disclosure or non-disclosure, duties to advise, 
the consequences of unfairness in contract in general, 133 and consumer protection and suretyship 
defences134 in particular, are common to all Western legal systems. In most of these systems the 
aforesaid modern problems have enjoyed the attention of academics, the judiciary and the 
legislature for decades. Inasmuch as our contract law stands poised135 to adopt formally a 
criterion of fairness in contract, much can be learned from the experience of Western systems. 
The insights gained can be used in the evaluation of our own legal position and can serve as 
13 2 This, of course, does not mean that procedural aspects are unimportant as far as the future 
of suretyship is concerned. Modern credit legislation makes particular use of procedural 
steps which have to be followed in "consumer" li~igation and pre-litigation steps. 
133 See Bernitz 1973 Scandinavian Studies in Law 11 (Scandinavia); Sealy 1978 Cambridge 
LJ 15 (England); Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheidv (The Netherlands). For a 
discussion of the topic in German law see Bunte 1981 AcP 31; Wolf/Horn/Lindacher 
AGE Gesetz. In the USA, see Squillante 1970 Albany LR 297; Cellini & Wertz 1967 
Tulane LR l 93; Leff 1967 University of Pennsylvania LR 485. 
134 Cohen 1993 William & Mary LR 1025; Heitner & Frank 1990 California Real Property 
Journal 1. 
135 See the activities of the SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations. 
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indicators for the future development thereof 136 
1.3.3 Comparative material 
Obviously, the choice oflegal systems to be compared is important. 137 For South Africa, with its 
hybrid legal system, 138 with Continental as well as common-law elements, it would appear to be 
essential to compare at least one legal system from each of the two legal families. 139 
I have decided to compare developments in three common-law countries, to wit England, the 
USA 140 and Australia. 141 
From the Roman-German countries I have elected to investigate developments m the 
Netherlands142 and Germany. 143 
13 6 Van Z yl Regsvergelyking 18-21. 
13 7 In regard to the importance and grouping and classification of the various legal systems 
in legal families, see Wigmore Legal Systems; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 63-73; 
Lawson 1982 Hastings Int 'l & Comparative LR 85; Malstrom 1969 Scandinavian Studies 
in Law 127; Arminjon et al Traite 42 et seq. 
138 See Van Blerk 1982 SAL! 365; Cameron 1982 SAL! 38 at 43-44: Zimmermann 1986 
SAL! 259 at 260; Fagan in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 33-64; Hahlo & 
Kahn System 218; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 235. 
13 9 It is obviously a requirement that the systems must be capable of comparison. See Van 
Zyl Regsvergelyking 39; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 34. 
140 As the main representative systems of the Anglo-American family, an investigation into 
the treatment of the problem of non-disclosure in contract and the quest for an effective 
suretyship, in these countries, is important. 
141 The Australians have tackled the problem of unfair contracts in a determined way and 
interesting developments in that regard have taken place in recent years. The Australians 
place great emphasis on the prohibition of misleading or deceptive conduct, duties of 
disclosure and the insistence upon the obtaining of independent advice by contracting 
parties who may suffer from some inequality in the bargaining process. These are issues 
which I consider vital if suretyship is to remain an acceptable and viable form of security, 
hence the inclusion of the Australian legal system in the analysis. 
142 For the South African lawyer, with a strong Roman-Dutch tradition, it is important to 
observe recent Dutch developments more closely. See Van Zyl Regsvergelyking 105. 
143 German private law has been codified. The Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, in regard to spirit, 
content and technique shows strong Roman characteristics and the systematics of the 
Pandectists are strongly reflected therein. Important recent legislation in regard to 
standard contract terms (the Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen 
Geschaftsbedingungen of 1976) and the rise of duties of disclosure and warning in 
banking law, make a study of developments in Germany essential. 
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The origin and development of the European Economic Community (EEC) have brought the 
legal systems of its European member States in line with one another on a large number of 
mutually important issues. The questions of unfairness in contract, and non-disclosure, at least 
as far as consumers are concerned, are some of these issues, and I have therefore included a brief 
look at developments in regard to non-disclosure in consumer contracts in the selected 
jurisdictions of the EEC as well. 
1.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 AND 8: DISCLOSURE PRINCIPLES: A 
LEGAL COMPARISON 
In these chapters, a comparison is made between general banking background and disclosure 
principles, particularly relating to suretyship, as practised in England, the USA, Australia, 
Germany, the Netherlands and South Africa. 
1.5 EXCURSUS: INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE AND DISCLOSURE PROBLEMS: 
AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENTS 
In the case law, reference has often been made to the possibility that disclosure problems can be 
obviated by advising the intending surety to obtain independent advice. In the excursus, which 
forms chapter 5 of the thesis, I shall investigate developments in this field in Australia in an 
endeavour to ascertain how helpful this referral is in difficult non-disclosure situations. 
1.6 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION: ANTICIPATED REFORMS IN THE 
LAW OF SURETYSHIP 
In chapter 9, the various modem trends in contract law, particularly relating to non-disclosure, 
are summarized and I shall endeavour to distil a few general principles of unconscionability that 
lawyers internationally appear to abhor. I shall demonstrate how these trends negatively affect 
suretyships and render them virtually valueless. 
After posing the problems, suggestions will be made about the recommended conduct involved 
in taking suretyships, in order to ensure their validity. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE BANKER'S DUTIES OF 
DISCLOSURE AND ADVICE TO CUSTOMERS AND 
SURETIES: ENGLAND 
2.1 BANKING LAW: BACKGROUND 
2.1.1 Banker-customer relationship 
The legal content of the banker-customer relationship was the subject of a review by the Review 
Committee on Banking Law and Practice set up by the British Government in 1987 in response 
to the political pressures generated by a bank collapse. 1 The Committee under the chairmanship 
of Professor RB Jack reported in 1989, 2 and its recommendations resulted in significant changes 
in practice and a few statutory changes in the law. In particular, codes of banking practice3 have 
sought to spell out specifically the duties of banks toward their customers, not merely in terms 
of legal obligations, but in terms of best banking practice. This may be seen as part of a trend 
toward a recognition of the social responsibilities inherent in the conduct of banking in a modern 
economy. 4 The challenge for the banker is to reconcile these responsibilities, as well as to comply 
with banking regulation, with the commercial imperative of maintaining a financially sound and 
competitive business. 
The banking relationship between a bank and its customer is likely to include a range of separate 
contracts, depending on the nature of the business transacted between them. Loan agreements, 
security transactions, applications to open letters of credit, safe-custody agreements and the like 
will constitute separate, and separately documented, contracts. The term "banker-customer 
relationship" is based on contract and is generally taken to refer to the specific legal relationship 
1 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA, popularly known as Bank of Crook!: and 
Criminals International in view of the frauds discovered after liquidation. Another 
famous bank collapse during this period was that of Barings. These are not unique 
examples. Insider fraud has featured in the collapse of banking institutions around the 
world. See Goodhart Financial System 372-410; Clark 1976YaleLI1at12-13; Swire 
1992 Duke LI 469 at 505-512. 
2 Review Committee Banking Services. 
3 Code of Banking Practice (2) and (3). 
4 The activities of the Banking Ombudsman also affect banking practice. In this regard, see 
Clark 1994 JFRC 195; Roberts 1995 BJ/BL 3 85; Morris l 992 IMCLQ 227; Seneviratane 
et al 1994 CJQ 253. 
30 
generated by the opening and operation of a bank account. 5 A feature of English banking practice 
is that the legal content of this relationship is usually not spelt out in a comprehensive written 
contract between the parties when the account is opened; rather, it has been defined over the 
years in the case law. The basic principle is that the relationship created by the depositing of 
money with a bank, by a customer, is that of debtor and creditor, with a super-added obligation 
on the part of the bank to honour the customer's cheques ifthe account is in credit.6 Money, 
when paid into a bank, ceases to be the money of the depositor; it is the bank's money to deal 
with as its own. 7 One consequence of this is that upon the bank's insolvency the depositor's rights 
are generally those of unsecured creditors, even in the case of a "trust"account. 8 
There are, however, complexities inherent in the banker-customer relationship which distinguish 
it from the ordinary relationship of debtor and creditor. In the leading case of Joachimson v Swiss 
Bank Corporation9 the Court of Appeal analyzed the nature of the contract between a bank and 
its customer when a current account is opened. Atkin LJ rejected the view that the contract 
consists of a simple contract of loan by customer to bank, with added obligations on the bank's 
part. He said that the relationship consists of one contract involving obligations on both sides. 
The bank's promise to repay is treated as localized at the branch where the account is kept, 
because it is only there that the precise liabilities are known. 10 It is a promise to pay on demand 
during banking hours. It is a term of the contract that the bank will not cease to do business with 
the customer except upon reasonable notice. The customer on his part undertakes to exercise 
reasonable care in executing his payment orders so as not to mislead the bank or facilitate 
forgery. The bank is not liable for repayment to the customer until the customer demands 
payment from the bank at the branch at which the account is kept. 11 
5 Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28; Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 11 O; 
Arab Bank Ltd v Barclays Bank (DC & 0) [1954] AC 495; Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v 
Liu Chong Hing BankLtd[l986] AC 80. 
6 London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v MacMillan & Arthur [1918] AC 777 at 789; Selangor 
United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (3) [1968] 2 All ER 1073 at 1118. 
7 Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28; Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 
512; [1991] 2 AC 548 at 574. 
8 Space Investments Ltdv Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co (Bahamas) Ltd 
[1986] 1WLR1072; [1986] 3 All ER 75. 
9 [1921] 3 KB 110. 
10 This judgment was, of course, given before the advent of central computerized 
accounting systems. 
11 Ibid, at 127. The demand must be one which the bank is obliged to comply with; Libyan 
Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728 at 749. 
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This statement of the parties' rights and obligations still summarizes the basic position in English 
law, and has been applied by the courts in various different contexts.12 In subsequent cases, 
obligations additional to those stated have been recognized, such as the bank's duty to keep its 
customers' affairs confidential, 13 and the paying bank's duty of care when making payments on 
its customers' behalf 14 
Recently banks have issued codes of practice applicable to certain classes of customer, which 
seek to restate or supplement these principles. The Code of Banking Practice (3), 15 contains a 
code of practice to be observed by banks, building societies and card issuers when dealing with 
personal customers, so that a customer may have a clear explanation of the terms upon which 
services are offered, and proper information as to charges and interest. The effect, if any, of the 
code on the legal content of the banker-customer relationship has yet to be determined. 16 
The Joachimson11 case concerned a single bank account. An analysis of the relationship can be 
difficult when more than one account is held by the same customer, as was the case in the Libyan 
Arab Foreign Bank litigation. 18 This arose out of the sanctions imposed on Libya by the USA in 
January 1986, freezing Libyan assets within the USA and also dollar deposits held for Libyans 
by US banks outside the USA. Although the precise legal analysis differed, it was held in both 
cases that it is the general rule that the law governing a bank account is the law of the place 
where the account is kept (in the absence of agreement to the contrary). It was recognised that 
under modern conditions it may not be strictly accurate to speak of the branch where the account 
12 See, eg, Arab Bank Ltd v Barclays Bank (DC & 0) [1954] AC 495; Hart v Sangster 
[ 1957] Ch 329; [ 1957] 2 All ER 708. 
13 See, eg, Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [ 1924] 1 KB 461; 
Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 923 at 931; Attorney-General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1AC109. 
14 Westminster Bank Ltd v Hilton (1926) 135 LT 358 at 362; Barclays Bank pie v 
Quincecare Ltd and Another [1992] 4 All ER 363. 
15 Code of Banking Practice (3 ), revised edition effective from 31 March 1999. For a full 
discussion, see Roberts 1995 BJIBL 385; Black l996MLR 24. 
16 The Code of Banking Practice is described as being 11voluntary11 • That does not mean that 
it will have no contractual effect. The promissary nature of the code seems to introduce 
new legal incidents to the banker/customer relationship. See Warne Litigation 31. 
17 [1921] 3 KB 110. 
18 LibyanArabForeignBankvBanker s Trust Co [1989] 1QB128;LibyanArabForeign 
Bank v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co (No 2) [1989] 1 Lloyds Rep 608. 
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is "kept" in that banks no longer depend on books in which they write entries; they have terminals 
by which they give instructions; and the computer itself with its magnetic tape, disk or some 
other device may physically be located elsewhere. Nevertheless, it should not be difficult to 
decide where an account is kept for the purpose of ascertaining the 
governing law.19 
The banker-customer relationship is not normally a fiduciary relationship. 20 It may, however, 
become so, as will be seen hereunder in the discussion of common-law disclosure principles and 
fiduciary principles arising from multi-functional banking. 
2.1.2 The multi-functional bank 
English law does not prescribe or limit the activities that banks may conduct, nor is there a Glass-
Steagall21 type barrier between banking and securities business in England. Nevertheless, until 
the mid 1980s, banks did circumscribe their activities,22 and their exclusion from the securities 
business was reinforced by a Stock Exchange rule book that prevented outsiders from taking a 
controlling interest in member firms. 23 
This and other restrictions were abolished in the series of reforms which culminated in "the Big 
Bang" in 1986. 24 The reforms in part reflected, and in part contributed to, the movement towards 
the financial conglomerate that aimed to provide its customers with an extended range ofbanking 
19 Note the provisions of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations of 1980, given force of law in the United Kingdom on 1 April 1991 by the 
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act of 1990, in terms of which the basic rule is that the 
contract is governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected. 
20 Morrison v Bank of New Zealand [ 1991] 3 NZLR 291 at 295 (New Zealand); James v 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1986) 64 ALR 347 (Australia); Waryk 
v Bank of Montreal (1991) 85 DLR (4th) 514 (Canada); Burmah Oil Ltdv Governor of 
the Bank of England (1981) 125 Sol J 528; The Times, 4 July 1981; Kelly v Cooper 
[1993] AC 205; ClarkBoyce vMouat [1994] 1AC428 (England). 
21 The US Glass-Steagall Act of 193 3 serves to separate the core banking business of a bank 
from securities activities. See Investment Company Institute v Camp 401US617 (1971) 
at 630-633. See Blair et al Financial Services Act 134-144 for a discussion of the risks 
and abuses of a combined investment and commercial bank. 
22 See Perkins 1971BankingLI483 at 486. 
23 See, eg, Dale Deregulation 6; Gower 1988 MLR 1 at 2-5. 
24 The changing by the Stock Exchange of its rules to remove important restrictions, 
particularly permission to outside bodies to acquire a percentage of a member firm. See 
Gower 1988 MLR 1at2-5. 
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and financial services within the one group. Its emergence has had considerable regulatory 
implications, because the regulation of financial institutions as it has developed in the United 
Kingdom over the past few years has been on a functional rather than on an institutional basis. 
Thus, a bank's deposit-taking business was until recently regulated by the Bank of England in 
terms of the Banking Act of 1987. But a bank carrying on investment business within the United 
Kingdom is also within the regulatory regime established by the Financial Services Act of 1986. 
Separate authorizations are required. Most banks that need it have obtained authorization by 
joining one of the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) set up in terms of the Act to regulate the 
investment services industry.25 Under the EC (Investment Services in the Security Field 
Directive), 26 host countries must draw up conduct-of-business rules incorporating the principle 
of avoiding conflicts ofinterest and, when they exist, ensuring fair treatment for customers.27 
This cumbersome system is in the process of being fundamentally reformed. A single financial 
regulator (the Financial Services Authority) has been formed, and powers ofbanking supervision 
have been vested in it in terms of the Bank of England Act of l 998.28Further legislation (the 
Financial Services and Markets Bill) will complete the process of unification, and a much 
improved regulatory system should emerge as a result. 29 
A major problem that has arisen as a result of multi-functioning banks, is that of conflicts of 
interest. Although it is nothing new in the financial field, 30 conglomerates combining banking 
and securities business in the same group increase the risk of generating conflicts of interest. The 
policy aim is to achieve a reasonable balance between the interests of clients, who rightly expect 
that a firm acting for them will not have a conflict with either its own or another client's interests, 
and what is (apparently) the operational reality that the conduct of a modem financial services 
25 Primarily the Securities and Futures Authority (SF A) and the Investment Management 
Regulatory Organisation (IMRO). In terms of the Rules of the SFA and IMRO, a bank 
must not, generally speaking, advise or deal in the exercise of a discretion where it has 
a material interest in the transaction, or where it has a relationship which gives rise to a 
conflict. See Cranston Banking Law 29 and Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 17. 
26 EC Directive 93/22/EEC:[1993] OJ Ll41/27 s 11(1). 
27 See Cranston ( ed) Single Market 202. 
28 Bank of England Act of 1998. 
29 See HM Treasury Financial Regulatory Reform. 
30 See, generally, Blair et al Financial Services Act 134-135; Criminal Justice Act of 1993. 
This Act replaces previous legislation and gives effect to the EC Directive (Insider 
Dealing) 89/592/EEC: [1989] OJ L 334/30. See Hopt & Wymeersch (eds) Insider 
Dealing 221-231. · 
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business will inevitably give rise to some conflicts of interest. Difficult legal questions arise 
about whether such conflicts must be avoided or whether they can be "managed", and if they can 
be managed, how this should be done. These issues are presently far from being resolved. 31 
One quite long-established means of "managing" conflicts of interest is the so-called Chinese 
Wall. In essence, this is an arrangement by which different parts of a business are 
compartmentalized to avoid the leakage of sensitive information from one part to the other. 32 
The effectiveness of the Chinese Wall must be judged against fiduciary law. As the Law 
Commission33 has noted: 
"Broadly speaking, a fiduciary relationship is one in which a person undertakes to act on 
behalf of or for the benefit of another, often as an intermediary with a discretion or power 
which affects the interests of the other who depends on the fiduciary for information and 
advice." 
A fiduciary is one who owes special duties because of the nature of his position. 34 An agent is 
a fiduciary with regard to his principal. Thus a fiduciary relationship is capable of arising35 
between corporate financier and client, stockbroker and client, insurance broker and client and 
investment adviser and client. Other examples of fiduciary relationships are those between trustee 
31 The Law Commission published a consultation paper to address these issues in 1992. See 
Law Commission Fiduciary Duties. 
32 The Law Commission Rules par 2.16, broadly defines Chinese Walls as being 
procedures for restricting flows of information within an organization to ensure that 
information which is confidential to one department is not improperly communicated 
(whether deliberately or inadvertently) to other departments in the organization. 
33 Law Commission Fiduciary Duties par 1.3. 
34 See, eg, Re Coomber, Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 at 728-729; Reading v R 
[1949] 2 KB 232 at 236; Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46; [1966] 3 All ER 721 
affirming Phipps v Boardman [1965] Ch 992. 
3 5 Fiduciary duties can be imposed outside the law of trust and agency. A duty of confidence 
between the parties or an assumption of responsibility to act in the other's interests, has 
been suggested as the basis for doing so. See, eg, White vJones [1995] AC 207 at 270; 
Glover 1995 Bond LR 50; Waters 1986 Can Bar Rev 3 7; Curtis 1987 Loyola LALR 795. 
35 
and beneficiary, 36 solicitor and client, 37 director and company38 and between partners. A fiduciary 
relationship can also arise by virtue of the nature of special circumstances, for example because 
a relationship of "confidence" exists between the parties.39 
The duties which the law generally imposes on a fiduciary may be summarized as follows: 40 
(1) He must not place himself in a position where his own interest conflicts with that of his 
customer. 41 
(2) He must not profit from his position at the expense of his customer. 42 
(3) He owes undivided loyalty to his customer, and therefore must not place himself in a 
position where this duty owed towards one customer conflicts with the duty that he owes 
to another customer. 43 
( 4) A consequence is that a fiduciary must make available to a customer all the information44 
in his possession that is relevant to the customer for the benefit of the customer, and not 
for his own advantage or for the benefit of any other person. 
It is difficult to generalize as to the types of factual situations in which banks will owe fiduciary 
36 Beningfield v Baxter (1866) 12 App Cas 167; Ellis v Barker (1871) LR 7 Ch App 104. 
37 Wright v Carter [1903] 1Ch27; Moody v Cox and Hatt [1917] 2 Ch 71; Wintle v Nye 
[1959] 1 All ER 552. 
38 ParkervM'Kenna(l814)LR 10 Ch App 96;KayevCroydon Tramways Co [1898] 1 Ch 
358; Clarkson v Davies [1923] AC lOORegal (Hastings) vGulliver (1942] 1 AllER378. 
39 See, eg, Gibson v Jeyes (1801) 6 Ves Jun 266; Tate v Williamson {1866) LR 2 Ch App 
55; Lloyds BankLtdv Bundy [1975] 1 QB 326; Coleman v Myers [1977] 2 NZLR 225. 
40 Law Commission Fiduciary Duties par 1. 4. 
41 Aberdeen Railways Ltdv Blaikie Brothers (1854) 1Macq461; [1843-1860] All ER Rep 
249; Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932. 
42 Tate v Williamson (1866) LR 2 Ch App 55. 
43 Since, eg, multiple retainers are contemplated on the part of security dealers in a bank, 
it has been suggested that they cannot be obliged to disclose to a customer, inside 
information given to them by another customer for whom they also act. See Kelly v 
Cooper [1993] AC 205 at 214. 
44 Brickenden v London Loan & Savings Co and Another [ 1934] 3 DLR 465; Cranston 1990 
J of Business Law 163 at164; Collins Contract 196; Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd 
(1986) 160 CLR 371 at 385. 
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duties to customers. 45 However in many cases a crucial issue will be whether the bank is 
providing advice to the customer. If the bank is not providing advice to the customer or is not in 
such a relationship with the customer that it is expected to provide advice, the courts are reluctant 
to impose fiduciary duties on the bank.46 Finn has indicated that, given the general recognition 
that banks are commercial entities with an obvious self-interest in the business they transact, he 
would only expect fiduciary duties to be owed by a bank to a customer in three distinct 
situations: 47 
( 1) where the course of the relationship can found the expectation, not only that 
advice will be given ,but that, where necessary, advice contrary to the bank's 
interests will be given; or 
(2) where the bank has created the assumption that it is advising, or the expectation 
that it will advise in the customer's interest in a matter, because the bank's own 
interest therein is represented as being formal, nominal or technical; or 
(3) where the bank, though expected to act in its own interest in the actual dealing 
inter se, has created the expectation that it will advise otherwise in the customer's 
interests, for example on the wisdom of an investment proposal in respect of 
which a loan application is made. 
45 Indeed it seems clear that a person can owe fiduciary duties in connection with certain 
areas of activity for a customer ,but not in connection with others. In broad terms there 
are two situations where the common-law courts have imposed fiduciary duties upon 
banks outside trust and agency. Firstly, where the bank has assumed the role of financial 
adviser as pro motor of a particular scheme and the customer relies on the decisions being 
made by the bank, to the bank's knowledge and indeed has placed complete faith in the 
bank. See Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371; Hodgkinson v Simms 
[1994] 3 SCR 377. Secondly, a duty is imposed where the bank has led the customer to 
believe that the bank will act in in the customer's interest in advising it on an investment. 
See WoodsvMartinsBankLtd[1958] 3 All ER 166; see, also, Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia and Another v Smith and Another (1991) 102 ALR 453 (Australia); Hayward 
v Bank of Nova Scotia (1984) 45 OR (2d) 542; (1985) 51 OR (2d) 193 (Canada); Collins 
Contract 138. · 
46 Generally speaking, a bank is not undertaking to prefer the customer's interest to its own. 
Moreover, as a matter of policy there is a reluctance to overlay ordinary arm's length 
commercial relationships with fiduciary duties. See Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205 
(England); Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 
41 (Australia); LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR 
(4th) 14 (Canada); DHL International (NZ)Ltd v Richmond [1993] 3 NZLR 10 (New 
Zealand). This is because, in these situations, the parties are said to have adequate 
opportunity to prescribe their own mutual obligations, and the contractual remedies 
available to them to obtain compensation for any breach of those obligations should be 
sufficient. See Finn ( ed) Commercial Relationships 15. 
47 See Finn in an article entitled "Fiduciary Law and the Modem Commercial World" in 
McKendrick (ed) Fiduciary 11-12. 
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Parker Hood reaches a similar conclusion, 48 albeit in the specific context in which banks as 
lenders will be under fiduciary obligations. He concludes that the most likely situation is where 
the lender takes on the role of adviser to the borrower and is in the position where the result of 
this situation is a conflict of interest. Similarly, he provides three common instances of this 
scenario: 
(1) where it is clear that the borrowers are relying on the lender for guidance;49 
(2) where the lender acts for both the vendor and the purchaser in a sale transaction 
or has them as customers, leading to a conflict of interest, particularly when the 
vendor has an overdraft with the lender;50 
(3) where the lender fails to disclose material facts to the borrower or advise 
generally in the context of the type of situation referred to in the previous point. 51 
The key question will concern the role which the bank has taken in the customer's affairs52 and 
whether that gives rise to a reasonable expectation on the part of the customer that the bank 
should put the customer's interest before its own (and that of its other customers) and that the 
customer can therefore relax its consideration of its own position in the belief that the bank is 
taking care of this. 53 It is on this basis that the question of advice is thought to be so crucial in 
that it takes the customer into the areas described above by both Finn and Parker Hood. Thus in 
a situation where a customer approaches a bank for advice and receives that advice, he will 
reasonably expect the advice he receives to reflect his own best interests and not those of the 
48 See Cranston (ed) Risk 23-24. 
49 Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Another v Smith andAnother (1991) 102 ALR 453 
at 476; Catt and Others v Marac Australia Ltd (1986) 9 NSWLR 639. 
50 See, also, Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 166 (England); Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia and Another v Smith and Another (1991) 102 ALR 453 (Australia); 
Hayward v Bank of Nova Scotia (1985) 51 OR (2d) 193; McBean v Bank of Nova Scotia 
( 1981) 15 BLR 296; Standard Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
(1985) 22 DLR (4th) 410; Guertin v Royal Bank of Canada (1984) 1 DLR (4th) 68; 
Waters 1986 Can Bar Rev 37; Ogilvie 1985 Ottawa LR 263 (Canada). 
51 See, eg, Standard Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce ( 1985) 22 
DLR (4th) 410 (Canada); Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Another v Smith and 
Another (1991) 102 ALR 453 (Australia). 
52 See Austin 1986 OJLS 444 at 446. 
53 See Finn in an article in Youdan (ed) Equity 46-47, entitled "The Fiduciary Principle", 
cited with approval in the Canadian case of LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona 
Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 29; Finn 1989 UNSWLJ76 at 93; Gautreau 
1989 Can Bar Rev 1. 
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bank or another customer, and he will reasonably expect the bank not to act in a way which is 
inconsistent with his interests. Fiduciary duties will be imposed on the bank in such situations 
to prevent the bank from so acting or to provide the customer with an appropriate remedy in the 
event of the bank's so acting. Examples follow of situations where the courts have indicated that 
this has occurred or will occur: 
• where a bank gives advice to its customer about a transaction, in which there is a serious 
conflict of interest between the bank and its customer, such as a bank guarantee to be 
given by one customer in relation to the existing indebtedness of another customer;54 
• where a bank gives investment advice or other advice to a customer in relation to 
financial services. 55 
Two aspects of this topic need to be mentioned here. Firstly, where the borrower exercises his 
own independent judgment on a matter, the lender will not be liable as a fiduciary. 56 Secondly, 
there is a distinction between a lender's providing information and giving advice. 57 It is only in 
the second situation that a lender will be liable as a fiduciary. 
Certain techniques have been developed in the USA and the United Kingdom to prevent or 
manage conflicts: 
{l) Chinese Walls as described above;58 
(2) restricted lists and watch lists; 
(3) disclosure to customers. 
A Chinese Wall isolates the trading side of the firm from the investment banking side. A 
54 Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 166; Lloyds BankLtdv Bundy [1975] 1 QB 
326; National Westminster Bank pie v Morgan [1985] AC 686. 
55 Law Commission Rules pars 2.4.3 to 2.4.17; LAC Minerals Ltdv International Corona 
Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14; Indata Equipment Supplies Ltd (tlaAutofleet) v 
ACL Ltd [1998] 1BCLC412. 
56 Finn in Youdan (ed) Equity 50; See, also, the US case of Steinberg v Northwestern 
National Bank 307 Minn 487 238 NW 2d 218. 
57 James v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1986) 64 ALR 347 at 369 
(Australia); Royal Bank Trust Co {Trinidad) LtdvPampellone [1987] 1 Lloyds Rep 218 
(England). 
58 Law Commission Fiduciary Duties par 2.16; Poser 1988 9 Michigan Yearbook of 
International Legal Studies 91; Lipton & Mazur 1975 NYU LR 459. 
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restricted list prohibits recommendations to customers relating to a particular security or the 
solicitation of customer orders to purchase or sell a particular security, and prohibits trading for 
the firm's own account in the security. Another type of restricted list enables the firm to prevent 
activities such as the issuance of a research recommendation concerning a security. Firms 
:frequently use a watch list to monitor trading activity to determine whether any leaks in the 
Chinese Wall have occurred.59 
An alternative or additional technique is the disclosure to the client of an actual or potential 
conflict of interest, and the obtaining of the customer's consent (in writing) to the firm 
continuing to act. In Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm}6° Lord Millett stated that where a 
firm wished to undertake a transaction/assignment which was in direct conflict with the interests 
of the customer, only the express consent of the customer would convert the duty of 
confidentiality into the lesser duty to take reasonable steps to protect that confidentiality. In 
support of this approach, Lord Millett cited the fundamental principle of equity, that a fiduciary 
may not put his own interests or those of another client before those of his principal. 
A general disclosure to a customer of the firm's intention to operate Chinese Walls as an 
established part of the firm's organizational structure may be sufficient for some purposes, but 
is less reliable than an express disclosure of specific circumstances. In practice, as the Law 
Commission has noted, 61 the requirement that the disclosure to the customer be full and that 
consent be fully informed may make it impracticable for the bank to rely on disclosure as a way 
of routinely avoiding the consequences of a conflict of interest. First seeking and obtaining 
consent may not be practical in every situation, and secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
attempts to gain advance consent in contractual agreements may founder because they would not 
be specific enough to cater for every situation and hence to convince a court that fully informed 
consent has been obtained. 
Whether a Chinese Wall is effective enough in law to prevent a conflict of interest arising, or at 
least to relieve a firm of the consequences of such a conflict where one has arisen, has been much 
debated. There is little modem English case law on this matter. But in two recent cases 
concerning solicitors, some scepticism was expressed by the courts as to the effectiveness of 
59 Lipton & Mazur 1975 NYU LR 459 at 466-468; Brudney 1979 Harvard LR 322; Warne 
Litigation 46-47; Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 19. 
60 [1999] 1 AllER517. 
61 Law Commission Fiduciary Duties pars 2.12 to 2.15. 
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Chinese Walls, one judge doubting whether an impregnable wall can ever be created.62 
However, it is possible to argue that rules that apply to solicitors should not necessarily apply in 
the financial field. Indeed, in the financial services field there is statutory recognition of the 
practice. Section 48 (2) (h) of the Financial Services Act of 1986, (which provides for the making 
of conduct-of- business rules) enacts that such rules may make provision enabling or requiring 
information obtained by an authorised person in the course of his carrying on one part of his 
business to be withheld by him from persons with whom he deals in the course of his carrying 
on another part, and for that purpose enabling or requiring persons employed in one part of that 
business to withhold information from those employed in another part. Rules to this effect have 
been promulgated. 63 Judicial recognition of the potential efficacy of Chinese Walls for managing 
conflicts of interest within financial services firms has only come recently. In Prince Jefri 
Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm}64 the House ofLords, while considering the efficacy of Chinese Walls 
within a major accounting firm, endorsed the "good practice [in the financial industry which] 
requires there to be established institutional arrangements designed to protect the flow of 
information between separate departments". 
The effect of the above provisions of the Financial Services Act of 1986 and the Core Rules on 
the general law relating to fiduciaries as it applies in the financial context is unclear. The Law 
Commission "inclines to the view1165 that section 48 (2) (h) of the Financial Services Act of 1986, 
authorizes modification of the private-law rights and duties of those dealing with persons 
authorised in terms of the Act, albeit within its limited sphere. Its provisional view is that 
fiduciary law should take account of rules made by regulatory bodies which operate in the public-
law sphere, either because there is statutory authority to make rules to modify common law and 
equitable obligations or because the court should take account of reasonable regulatory rules in 
ascertaining the precise content of the common law or equitable duty. 66 It is believed that such 
62 Re A Firm of Solicitors [1992] 1 All ER 353 at 363; see, also, Lee (David) & .Co 
(Lincoln) _Ltd v Coward Chance (A Firm) and Others [ 1991] Ch 259; Mortgage Express 
Ltd v Bowerman & Partners (A Firm) The Times, 19 May 1994. See, however, Prince 
Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) [ 1999] 1 All ER 517. 
63 Cranston Banking Law 28 shows as examples, the Core Conduct ofBusiness Rules, r 36, 
as reproduced in the self-regulatory organizations (SRO) Rules, and the Investment 
Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO) Rules, Chapter 1.4, r 4.2(1). 
64 [1999] 1 AllER517. 
65 Law Commission Rules 238. 
66 Ibid, at 242. 
41 
an approach would commend itself to the courts. 67 If that is correct, then it may be predicted that 
a properly implemented Chinese Wall may be effective in certain circumstances to prevent what 
would otherwise be a conflict of interest arising, or at least may relieve a firm of what would 
otherwise be the legal consequences of such a conflict. 
2.1.3 Banker's confidentiality 
English law holds that certain confidential relationships, such as those between lawyer and client 
and doctor and patient, give rise to a duty not to disclose information acquired in confidence. 68 
In the leading case of Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of Englanci'9 it was held 
by the Court of Appeal that a similar prohibition applies to the b~er-customer relationship.70 
It is an implied term of the contract71 between them that the bank is under a duty to abstain from 
disclosing information about its customer's affairs without the customer's consent.72 This is 
generally known as the bank's duty of confidentiality, or secrecy. 73 It also applies to prevent 
disclosure between one separate juridical entity in a group and another.74 
67 See Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) [ 1999] 1 All ER 517. 
68 Allcardv Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145; Parry-Jones v The Law Society (1968] 1 All ER 
177 at 180; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy (1975] 1 QB 326; English v Dedham Vale 
Properties Ltd (1978] 1 All ER 382; Chitty Contracts 424; Collins Contract 197. 
' 
69 [1924] 1 KB 461; See, also, Christofi v Barclays Bank pie [1998] 2 All ER 484 
(England); Posner 1978 Georgia LR 393;Wacks 1990 VandJTrans L 653 at 656-658 
(USA). 
70 When the matter of secrecy had been litigated some half a century before the Tournier 
case, [ 1924] 1 KB 461, the courts implied that, while expected, the observance of secrecy 
by a bank was a matter of moral, not legal, obligation. See, eg, Tassell v Cooper (1850) 
9 CB 509; Hardy v Veasey (1868) LR3 Ex 107; cf Fosterv Bank of London (1862) 3 F 
& F 214. 
71 It may also arise in equity, see Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 923 at 931, Lord 
Denning MR; Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 
or in negligence under the principles enunciated in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & 
Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. See Vita Health Co (1985) Ltdv Toronto-Dominion Bank 
(1993) 51 CPR (3d) 72 and cf Spring v Guardian Assurance pie [ 1994] WLR 3 54. 
72 The Tournier case, ibid, (1924] 1KB461at484. 
73 See, also, Walter & Ehrlich 1989 ALJ 404; Paget's Banking JO 257-264; Waters (ed) 
Equity Ch 8; Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 15; Effros ( ed) Legal Issues 23 9-240. 
74 Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon [1987] AC 45 at 53-54; Blair et al Financial Services Act 
135 et seq. 
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Information will be considered confidential if it satisfies three characteristics: 75 
(1) The information transferred was not in the public domain. 
(2) The circumstances of the transfer are such that the recipient is under a duty to the 
confider with respect to the information. 
(3) The information has been used for a purpose other than that for which it was intended. 
In the Tournier16 case the Court was unanimous in holding that the duty is not an absolute, but 
a qualified one. The qualifications were classified under four heads, 77 namely: 
(1) where disclosure is under compulsion by law;78 
(2) where there is a duty to the public to make disclosure;79 
(3) where the interests of the bank require disclosure;80 
(4) where the disclosure is made by the express or implied consent of the customer.81 
75 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47; LAC Minerals Ltd v 
International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 (Canada); Hospital 
Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 (Australia); 
Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [ 1978] 3 All ER 193; [ 1979] 1 Ch 227 at 248 
and Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1AC109 (England). 
76 [1924] 1 KB 461. 
77 The Tournier case, ibid, [1924] 1 KB 461 at 473. 
78 See, eg, the Companies Act of 1985 (as amended); Banker's Book Evidence Act of 1879; 
Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986; Bankers Trust Company v Shapira [ 1980] 3 All 
ER353;BarclaysBankplc (t/aBarclaycard) v Taylor [1989] 1WLR1066; [1989] 3 All 
ER563;RobertsonvCanadianimperialBankofCommerce [1994] 1WLR1493; [1995] 
1 All ER 824. 
79 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] lQB 728 at 770-771; Price 
Waterhouse (A Firm) v BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) SA [1992] 1 All ER 778; El 
Jawhary v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1993] BCLC 396. 
80 Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon [ 1987] 1 AC 45. The Review Committee Banking Services 
35-37 considered this qualification as vague and suggested that the interests of the bank 
should be specifically defined. 
81 This category is most relevant to bank references, particularly when a reference is given 
without the express consent of the customer. In view of the English Code of Banking 
Practice (2) and (3) which determines that, before there is disclosure of the customer's 
details, the customer's consent should be obtained, the scope for lender liability in this 
area should be reduced. Unauthorized disclosure by the bank gives rise to a cause of 
action in favour of the customer for damages or compensation in equity for losses 
suffered. 
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There are a growing82 number of instances in which the "compulsion by law" qualification 
applies. 83 Thus, a bank must provide information pursuant to an inspection order by the court in 
terms of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act of 1879. However "law" appears to refer to English 
law, so that a foreign subpoena to produce documents in a foreign court will not fall within the 
ambit of English law. 84 More recent examples of legislation under which information must be 
provided include the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 and the Drug Trafficking Act 
of 1994 which, together with the Money Laundering Regulations of 1993, place substantial duties 
on banks in respect of both the opening and operation of accounts, to prevent money laundering. 
The effect of s 98 of the Criminal Justice Act of 198 8 is that a bank may disclose to the police 
its suspicion or belief that property has been obtained in connection with the commission of an 
indictable offence, without breach of its duty of confidentiality. In Barclays Bank pie (t!a 
Barclaycard) v Taylor85 it was held that a banker need not advise the customer of proposed 
disclosures of information under compulsion of statute and need not to be seen as resisting the 
demand for disclosure. 
There is little authority concerning "duty to the public to disclose"; one case indicates that this 
qualification might include disclosure by a bank to the central bank, of sensitive information. 86 
The interests of the bank will require disclosure when, for example, it states the details of the 
account in legal proceedings to recover a customer's indebtedness. 87 
82 Warne Litigation 283 describes it as a "torrent" oflegislation in recent years. In England, 
there are now in excess of 20 statutes which require or permit disclosure by the banks of 
confidential customer information. 
83 See, eg, the Companies Act of 1985 (as amended); Banker's Book Evidence Act of 18.79; 
Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986; Bankers Trust v Shapira [1980] 3 All ER 353; 
Barclays Bank pie (tla Barclaycard) v Taylor [1989] 3 All ER 563; Robertson v 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [1995] 1 All ER 824. 
84 X AG and Others v A Bank [1983] 2 All ER 464. 
85 [1989] 3 All ER 563; As Lord Diplock LJ put it in one case, the overriding duty to 
disclose is a duty to comply with the law of the land. See Parry-Jones v The Law Society 
[1968] 1 All ER 177. 
86 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] 1 QB 728 at 770-771; Price 
Waterhouse (A Firm) v BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) SA [1992] 1 All ER 778; El 
Jawhary v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1993] BCLC 396. 
87 See Sunderland v Barclays Bank Ltd (1938) 5 LDAB 163; The Times, 24 and 25 
November 1938; Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 
KB 461at473. 
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The fourth qualification concerns disclosure made with the express_ or implied consent of the 
customer. Implied consent may justify the well-established practice by which banks give credit 
references concerning customers at the request of other banks without asking on each occasion 
for the customer's express consent. 88 Reporting in 1989, the Review Committee on Banking 
Services Law and Practice89 recommended that a bank should be able to rely on implied consent 
only if could show that the customer was aware of the purpose for which the consent was 
required, and advised that he was free to withhold his consent. This recommendation has not 
been adopted. 90 
The Review Committee regarded the duty of confidentiality as being at the heart of the banker-
customer relationship,91 and was concerned that this confidentiality was being gradually eroded.92 
The Government's response was that broader public policy issues often overrode the need to 
preserve confidentiality. It is submitted that although there are plainly many instances in which 
the duty must be treated as subordinate to the public interest, the Committee was right to stress 
the desirability of preserving it where possible. 
The Review Committee's report has not been entirely without practical results. It appears that 
banks have routinely circulated information about their customers within the group for the 
purpose of marketing non-banking services. The Code of Banking Practice93 now states that 
banks will observe a strict duty of confidentiality about their customers' (and former customers ) 
personal financial affairs and, in the absence of express consent, will not disclose details of 
customers ' accounts or their names and addresses to any third party, including other companies 
in the same group, other than in the four exceptional cases permitted by the law. 
88 In TourniervNationalProvincial Union BankofEngland[l924] 1KB461, AitkenLJ, 
speculated, without deciding, that banker's references are given with the implied consent 
of the customer. This is a controversial issue, as can be seen from the discussion in the 
Review Committee Banking Services par 6.26 et seq. A leading commentator on the 
English law of breach of confidence suggests that the duty's precise legal source in the 
common law is secondary to the underlying notion; he argues for the existence of a sui 
generis action. See Gurry Breach of Confidence 58; see, also, Goff & Jones Restitution 
683-686. 
89 Hereinafter referred to as the Review Committee Banking Services. 
90 Review Committee Banking Services pars 6.26 et seq. As regards personal customers, the 
Code of Banking Practice (2) states that, on request, banks will explain how the system 
of banker's references works. 
91 Review Committee Banking Services par 5.26. 
92 Ibid, at par 5.08. 
93 Code of Banking Practice (2) par 9 .1. 
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2.1.4 Banker's liability for advice 
When a bank advises a customer on financial matters it must, of course, do so while recognizing 
· that there is no general duty that banks have to advise their customers. Thus, it has been held that 
in general a bank does not owe a customer a duty to advise on the prudence ofborrowing,94 tax 
implications,95 and that a bank's duty of care does not extend to requiring it to advise the 
customer of the risks involved in the collecting of cheques. 96 
Liability for negligent advice may be founded in contract or in tort. 97 A legal duty to advise may 
arise out of a misrepresentation (including a failure to speak or act and conduct capable of giving 
94 Williams and Glyn's Bank Ltdv Barnes [1981] Com LR 205; Lloyds Bank pie v Cobb 
(unreported, December 18, 1991, CA) per Scott LJ noted in [1992] JBL 419; Lipkin 
Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1989] 1WLR1340 at 1356; [1992] 4 All ER 512 
(England); Redmond v Allied Irish Bank pie [1987] 2 FTLR 264 at 266 (Ireland); 
Weitzman v Hendon (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 525 at 547 (Canada). The "neighbourhood 
principle" enunciated in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, could not be extended 
to a lending transaction, where moneys were lent as requested. See, in general, Andrew 
[1989] JIBL 101 at 104; Nestell (1990)ALJ776. 
95 Schioler v Westminster Bank Ltd [ 1970] 3 All ER 177. 
96 In Redmond v Allied Irish Bank pie [1987] 2 FTLR 264 Saville J drew a distinction 
between a duty to advise and a duty to take reasonable care in ascertaining, interpreting 
and acting in accordance with the customer's instructions. The undoubted existence of 
the latter duty did not imply a duty to advise as to the wisdom of what the customer 
instructed the bank to do. This approach was confirmed in the decision in Honourable 
Society of the Middle Temple v Lloyds Bank pie [1999] 1 All ER 193, where Rix J 
applied Saville J's reasoning in the Redmond case, ibid, to the banker-customer 
relationship between a domestic bank and a foreign correspondent bank, commenting 
that, if anything, a customer bank should be in a better position to look after itself. 
Moreover, he accepted the submission that an English clearing bank has no duty to its 
foreign correspondent banks to advise them of every aspect of English law, just as it does 
not expect to be advised by its correspondent banks of the foreign banking law to be 
observed in all the countries of the world. 
97 Liability in tort and contract are separate and distinct. There can be an overlapping, 
particularly in cases of negligent misrepresentation, and particularly in the precontractual 
situation. See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] 2 All ER 5; Howard Marine and 
Dredging Co Ltd v A Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd [1978] 2 All ER 1134; Midland 
Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett Stubbs and Kemp [1979] Ch 384. In regard to concurrent 
liability, the House ofLords recently ruled in Henderson and Others v Merrett Syndicates 
Ltd and Others [1994] 3 WLR 761, (see, also, [1995] 2 AC 145) that where there is an 
assumption of responsibility, in terms of the principle enunciated in Hedley Byrne & Co 
Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [ 1964] AC 465, which is not inconsistent with, or excluded 
by, an existing contractual chain or structure between the parties, there can be concurrent 
liability in contract and tort. 
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rise to an estoppel).98 A duty may also arise where there has been a voluntary assumption of 
responsibility to advise, and reliance on that assumption.99 Finally, a duty may arise from a 
fiduciary relationship, 100 or through regulation. 101 
Reference must here be made to the third edition of the Banking Code. 102 The first two editions 
of the code used language consistent with a public declaration of good intentions, rather than 
evidencing an intention to affect the bank's legal relationships with its relevant customers. The 
third edition of the Code, however, is expressed rather differently. It begins with a number of 
"Key Commitments" expressed in unequivocally promissory language, for example: 
"We, the subscribers to the Code, promise that we will: 
* act fairly and reasonably in all our dealings with you; 
* give you information on our services and products in plain language, and offer help if 
there is any aspect which you do not understand; 
* help you to choose a service or product to fit your needs; 
* help you to understand the financial implications of: 
-a mortgage; 
-other borrowing; 
-savings and investment products; 
* consider cases of financial difficulty and mortgage arrears sympathetically and 
positively." 
This promissory language is continued throughout the text. These "promises" seem to introduce 
new legal incidents to the banker-customer relationship. It remains to be seen whether the Code 
will be found in practice to increase the number of claims against banks for failing to give advice, 
and if it does, what proportion of such claims will be successful. 103 
98 Chitty Contracts 368. 
99 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [l 964] AC 465; Box v Midland Bank pie 
[1979] 2 Lloyds Rep 391. 
100 Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 166 (England); Hayward v Bank of Nova 
Scotia (1984) 45 OR (2d) 542 (Canada); Catt and Others v Marac Australia Ltd (1986) 
9 NSWLR 639; Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Another v Smith and Another 
(1991) 102 ALR 453 at 476 (Australia). 
101 Eg, in terms of the Financial Services Act of 1986. 
102 Code of Banking Practice (3), effective from July 1, 1997. 
103 See Warne Litigation 31. 
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Although there are many situations in which banks owe no duty to advise they very often do so. 
Once a bank has taken it upon itself to give advice, whether or not it had a duty to do so, it is 
difficult to avoid the implication of a duty to advise with reasonable skill and care104 (that is the 
care and skill of a reasonable bank in carrying on its advisory duties), unless perhaps the advice 
is so general or the circumstances are such that it could not have been reasonably expected that 
the customer would act upon it. 
It is sometimes suggested that a bank is not liable for negligent advice unless the advice was 
specifically requested by the customer. There is no basis for such a view. The fact that the bank 
has accepted a request for advice may be cogent evidence that it has assumed responsibility for 
the advice it gives, but a request is in no sense a condition precedent. The Court of Appeal has 
now held that an antecedent request is not necessary where the advice given is within the scope 
of the bank's business. 105 
In order to determine the scope of the bank's business, its advertisements and other publications 
(not including confidential internal instructions) may all be taken into account. Such publications 
frequently invite customers to consider the bank as a source of financial and commercial advice 
of various kinds. This was a feature of the well-known case of Verity v Lloyds Bank pie. 106 In that 
case the plaintiffs wished to buy a property with a view to making improvements, and then to sell 
it at a profit. As customers of the defendant bank they had seen its pamphlet entitled "Starting 
104 See, eg, Cornish v Midland Bank pie (Humes third party) [1985] 3 All ER 513 at 520. 
A duty of reasonable care and skill for anyone providing a service (including giving 
advice) runs through contract, tort and fiduciary law. In a banking law context, the duty 
is to exercise the care and skill of a reasonable bank in carrying out the particular activity 
concerned. See, eg, Barclays Bank pie v Quinceeare Ltd and Another [ 1992] 4 All ER 
363; Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1989] 1WLR1340. Very occasionally it 
is stated explicitly as a standard, as in the Uniform Customs and Practices for 
Documentary Credits, which are regularly incorporated by reference into letter-of-credit 
contracts. See UCP 500 art 13 (a). Section 13 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 
of 1982 implies a term to this effect in contracts for the supply of a service in the course 
of a business'. Mostly, however, the duty of reasonable care and skill is a duty imposed 
as a matter of common law. 
, 
After the challenge to concurrent liability in contract and tort posed by the banking case 
of Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [ 1986] AC 80, it is now settled 
that a claimant may seek compensation for economic loss caused through the failure to 
exercise reasonable care and skill in both contract and tort, where the assumption of 
responsibility is not inconsistent with, or excluded by, an existing contractual chain or 
structure between the parties. See Henderson and Others v Merrett Syndicates Ltd and 
Others [1995] 2 AC 145. 
105 Morgan v Lloyds Bank pie [ 1998] Lloyds Rep 73. 
106 [1995] CLC 1557. 
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a Business", which proclaimed among other things: "We don't help only with money. Our advice 
is tailor-made, confidential and free." They approached their bank manager for advice and to 
raise the necessary finance. The manager went with them to inspect two properties. He expressed 
reservations about the first ,but he advised them that the second was financially viable and 
encouraged them to proceed with it. For several foreseeable reasons, the project went 
spectacularly wrong. The judge held that the plaintiffs had made it clear to the bank manager that 
they were seeking his advice on whether the project was a "sensible thing for them to do", and 
that the manager had responded to this request by agreeing to advise them on the viability of the 
project and to assist them in setting it up. He found that ifthe manager had exercised reasonable 
care and skill in advising the plaintiffs, he would have told them plainly that the project was not 
a sensible thing for them to do and that they should forget about it. The plaintiffs would not then 
have entered into the transaction and would not have suffered the losses which they did suffer. 
The Verity101 case decides no new principle of law. It illustrates the way in which a bank's 
literature may be relevant in determining the scope of its business, although on the facts the bank 
might well have been liable even without the bank 's literature advertising this kind of assistance. 
The manager had gone to extraordinary lengths to involve himself in his customer's project. It 
would have been difficult for the bank to argue that the manager did not have apparent authority 
to act as he did. The case may well have been decided in the same way even in the absence of any 
promotional literature offering general financial advice. 
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between claims based on a failure to advise and 
claims based on negligent advice. Where it is alleged that the bank has failed to advise on a 
particular topic mentioned in the banks promotional literature the bank 's answer may well be to 
say that no such advice was requested. In James v Barclays Bank plc108 the bank's literature 
advertised the availability of a comprehensive range of advisory services to farmers. Striking out 
the plaintitf s notice of appeal, Millet LJ stated that: 
"although the promotional literature put in front of us shows that the bank would no 
doubt have given comprehensive financial advice to the appellants if they had sought it, 
it does not suggest for a moment that the bank was willing to undertake the quite different 
obligations of general financial adviser so as to become responsible for volunteering 
advice from time to time even though it was not sought". 109 
107 Verity v Lloyds Bank pie [ 1995] CLC 15 57. 
108 [1995] 4 Bank LR 131. 
109 Ibid, at 13 5. 
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Liability for negligent advice may be founded in contract or in tort. 110 Where the plaintiff is a 
customer, the claim will generally be made in contract. Where the plaintiff is not a customer, but 
a prospective customer or guarantor, the claim will be made in tort. The basis ofliability will be 
the bank's voluntary assumption of responsibility for the advice given, on the principle in Hedley 
Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd. m Of interest in this regard is Box v Midland Bank 
plc. 112 In that case the plaintiff applied for a loan of£ 45,000 from the defendant bank. The 
defendant's manager said that the application would have to be approved by his head office, but 
carelessly indicated that this was a mere formality when in fact there was never the slightest 
possibility that the facility would be approved. The plaintiff incurred irrecoverable expenses in 
reliance on the manager's statements and succeeded in a claim for damages against the bank. 
Much of the recent case law has concerned the nature of a bank's duty to advise in the case of 
third-party security, particularly where the security is to be given by the principal debtor's wife, 
or some other person closely related to him. It is clear that, in general, a creditor does not owe 
any legal duty to a proposed surety to explain to the surety the effect of the proposed suretyship 
transaction or the effect of any security proposed to be given. 113 This applies notwithstanding the 
fact that the internal rules of many (or most) banks have for a long time contained instructions 
to the effect that a proposed surety should receive such an explanation, or be told to obtain 
independent legal advice. 
There are good reasons for this course because, unless a bank has advised the proposed surety 
to take independent legal advice as to the nature of the transaction, it risks finding itself fixed 
with any undue influence that has been exerted by the debtor to obtain the security, or with any 
110 English Courts, whilst not imposing greater liability in tort than in contract, when there 
is a contract between the parties giving rise to liability (see Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v 
Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [ 1986] AC 80) are now more ready to allow concurrent 
liability provided the imposition of liability in tort is not excluded by the contractual 
structure. See Spring v Guardian Assurance pie [1994] 3 WLR 354; Henderson and 
Others v Merrett Syndicates Ltd and Others [1995] 2 AC 145. The Courts, however, it 
would appear, will rarely award punitive damages: which are tortious, and not 
contractual. 
111 [1964] AC 465. 
112 [1979] 2 Lloyds Rep 390. 
113 0 'Hara v Allied Irish Banks Ltd [1985] BCLC 52 at 53; Barclays Bankplc v Khaira and 
Another [ 1992] 1 WLR 623; Chetwynd-Talbot v Midland Bank Ltd 13 2 NLJ 901. It has 
been said, obiter, that such a duty may be owed by a bank where the surety is the bank's 
customer. See Cornish v Midland Bank plc (Humes, third party) [1985] 3 All ER 513 at 
522-523. 
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misrepresentation that has been made by the debtor to the surety. 114 It has been held that a bank 
is so affected where the debtor acted as its agent in obtaining the security, and where it was on 
notice of the undue influence or misrepresentation. 115 
Thus, it was held that if a creditor, or potential creditor, of a husband desires to obtain, by way 
of security for the husband's indebtedness, a guarantee from the husband's wife or a charge on 
the property of his wife, and if the creditor entrusts to the husband himself the task of obtaining 
the execution of the relevant document by the wife, then the creditor can be in no better position 
than the husband himself, and the creditor cannot enforce the guarantee or the security against 
the wife if it is established that the execution of the document by the wife was procured through 
the undue influence of the husband, and the wife had no independent advice. 116 The same 
principle applies in the case of a husband who in similar circumstances procures the execution 
of the document by giving his wife a deliberately false explanation. 117 
In the leading case of Barclays Bank pie v O'Brien andAnother118 much of the old law was swept 
away. The House of Lords held that the applicable principle in terms of which a lender incurs 
liability for the wrongdoing of a third party (thereby preventing the enforcement of a security) 
is that of notice. The court held that in certain situations, such as that which arises when a couple 
lives together, 119 constructive notice will exist unless the bank has taken certain steps to see that 
114 The advantages and pitfalls of independent advice will be discussed in the excursus to 
this thesis. 
115 National Westminster Bank pie v Morgan [ 1985] AC 686; Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International SA v Aboody and Another [ 1990] 1 QB 923 at 979. 
116 Kingsnorth Trust Ltd v Bell and Another [ 1986] 1 WLR 119; Coldunell v Gallon [ 1986] 
1 All ER 429;MidlandBankplc v Perry and Perry [1988] 1FLR161; Bank of Baroda 
v Shah [1988] 3 All ER 24; Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody 
and Another [1990] 1 QB 923. 
117 Kingsnorth Trust Ltdv Bell and Others [1986] 1 All ER423 at 427. 
118 [1993] 4 All ER 417; [1994]1AC180. This case was not followed in Australia as will 
be discussed in the Australian Chapter of this thesis. For a more detailed discussion of 
this important case see, eg, Stallworthy 1994 JIBL 118; Gross & Wolfson 1994 BJIBFL 
265 ( in which reference is made to the following unreported cases; Allied Irish Bank v 
Byrne [1995] 1 FCR 430; Bank Melli Iran v Samadi-Rad (Unreported, February 9, 
1994)); Harrison 1993SolJ1126, and cf Midland Bank pie v Serter [1995] 1FLR1034. 
119 The relationship must be of a close emotional or economic nature, may be heterosexual 
or homosexual, and need not have involved cohabitation. See Massey v Midland Bank 
pie [1995] 1 All ER 929; Hooley 1995 LMCLQ 346; Stallworthy 1994 JIBL 118; Berg 
[1994] LMCLQ 34. 
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the proposed surety was fairly apprised of his or her legal position. 120 There have been a large 
number of decisions by the Court of Appeal since then, and it is clear that a bank will normally 
avoid difficulties in enforcing a guarantee or other security by recommending to the proposed 
surety that he or she take independent legal advice. 121 
As far as personal customers are concerned, the Mortgage Code of Practice of 1997 states that 
banks will advise private individuals proposing to give them a guarantee or other security for 
another person's liabilities, that by giving the guarantee or third-party security they might become 
liable instead of or as well as that other person, and that they should take independent legal 
advice. Guarantees and other third-party security forms will contain a clear and prominent notice 
to this effect. Unlimited guarantees are no longer taken. 
120 In the O'Brien case, ibid, [1993] 4 All ER 417 at 431-432, the Court went so far as to 
insist that the bank call in the wife for a private meeting, in the absence of the husband, 
where she is told of the extent of her liability, the risks, and where she should be urged 
to obtain independent advice. 
121 It would appear as ifthe English Courts place great faith in solicitors and expect that, 
regardless of who is paying the fee, solicitors will regard themselves as owing an 
exclusive duty to the person being advised and the advice they give will be appropriate. 
See Bank of Baroda v Rayarel [1995] 2 FLR 376; Midland Bank pie v Serter [1995] 1 
FLR 1034. 
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2.2 DISCLOSURE PRINCIPLES: ENGLISH COMMON LAW 
2.2.1 The role of good faith in English contract law 
In England, in all transactions and relations known to the law, the parties owe each other a 
general duty of truthfulness. 122 Any departure from this duty constitutes, under certain conditions, 
122 There is no general duty in English law to negotiate nor to perform contracts in good 
faith, although, of course, ideas of good faith are often incorporated into the law through 
specific legal doctrines like mistake, or implied terms. See Atiyah Contract 266; 
Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 45-47. There are, however, to be found, in 
old as well as modem English cases, a number of assertions inconsistent with the view 
that there is no duty of disclosure, or of good faith. Thus, in Mellish v Motteaux (1792) 
Peake 156, Lord Kenyon said: 
"In contracts of all kinds, it is of the highest importance that courts oflaw should 
compel the observance of honesty and good faith." 
Similar dicta can be found in Blisset v Daniel (1853) 10 Hare 493 at 522; British 
Equitable Insurance Co v Great Western Railway Co (1868) 38 LJ Ch 132 at 135. In 
Phillips v Homjray, Fothergill v Phillips (1871) LR 6 Ch App 770 at 778, Lord Hatherley 
LC said: 
"This court requires the utmost good faith between buyer and seller, and will not 
specifically enforce a contract which is not entirely according to good faith." 
In respect of decisions prior to 1865, the English Reports references of the cases have 
been included in the bibliography. 
Some modem Canadian cases have asserted that the vendor of a house has a duty to 
reveal material facts, at any rate if dangerous to the purchaser's health. See Rowley v Isley 
(1951) 3 DLR 766; McGrath v McLean ( 1979) 95 DLR (3d) 144 at 151. 
A recent English case, Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd 
[1989] QB 433 at 445 makes reference to the duty of good faith, but states that English 
law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle ,but has 
developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness. 
Despite these suggestions, however, the general position against a duty of disclosure has 
been reaffirmed in recent English and Commonwealth cases. See Stephenson v Toronto-
Dominion Bank (1989) 68 OR (2d) 118; Queen v Cognos (1990) 69 DLR (4th) 288 
(Canada); Banque Financiere de la Cite SA v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd sub nom 
Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 All ER 947; 
WalfordvMiles [1992] 2 AC 128 (England). 
Collins Contract 169 points out that the Courts are reluctant to acknowledge a general 
principle of good faith. His objection is that the meaning of the idea is obscure. It tends 
to function, as pointed out by Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195, as a negative concept in 
practice. Collins Contract 169-170, argues that the sources of pre-contractual obligations 
can be usefully conceived as deriving from a general principle, namely a duty to negotiate 
with care. Be that as it may, in regard to consumer contracts, the concept of good faith 
will play an increasingly larger role in English law in accordance with European Union 
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a misrepresentation which is actionable at the suit of the person who has been misled. English 
law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a proposed contract to 
give information to each other. 123 Each party must make up his own mind and exercise his own 
judgment in deciding whether to contract or not, and it is not the duty of either party to put before 
the other facts of which he has knowledge and which may influence the other in deciding whether 
to enter into the contract or not. 124 There are also specific types of transaction and relation, where 
the law recognizes that the parties are obliged not merely to state truly whatever is stated, but also 
to divulge with candour and completeness, facts, which, in other cases, there would be no 
obligations to disclose at all. There are two principal classes of such cases. In the first of these, 
the duty has its origin and justification in the nature of the transaction into which the parties are 
about to enter. The parties need as yet be in no relationship one with the other; it is the nature of 
the contemplated transaction, and this alone, which generates a duty of disclosure between 
them. 125 In, the second class the duty of disclosure does not depend at all on the nature of the 
transaction - this is, at most, of secondary importance only, and often of no significance at all. 
In this class the duty is generated by a relationship of confidence, or influence, or advantage, 
existing between the parties, laying upon one of them the duty of disclosing to the other all 
material facts. 126 
Generally, the law requires no more from one party to a transaction, than to speak the truth, if 
commitments. See EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13 
EEC:[l993] OJ L95/29. 
123 Collins Contract 171 states that the law imposes a duty of care on parties to negotiations 
for a contract when they make statements to one another. The duty requires that 
statements of fact are made with reasonable care in the light of the specialized knowledge 
and expertise of the representor. 
124 See Atiyah Contract 265; Fox v Mackreth (1788) 2 Bro CC 400; Bell v Lever Brothers 
Ltd [1932] AC 161. 
125 In certain contracts where, from the very necessity of the case, one party alone possesses 
full knowledge of all the material facts, the law requires him to show uberrimae fides. 
See Cheshire Contract 302: Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161; MacKender v 
Feldia AG [1967] 2 QB 590. This obligation is particularly common in insurance cases. 
See, eg, Lambert v Co-operative Insurance Society [1975] 2 Lloyds Rep 485; Pan 
Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [ 1994] 3 All ER 581. 
126 Cheshire Contract 307 states that this group is classified as "Constructive Fraud". 
Whenever the relation between the parties to a contract is of a confidential or fiduciary 
nature, the person in whom the confidence is reposed and who thus possesses influence 
over the other cannot hold that other to the contract unless he satisfies the court that it is 
advantageous to the other party and that he has disclosed all material facts. See Cheshire 
Contract 307-308; Tate v Williamson (1866) LR 2 Ch App 55 at 61; Moody v Cox and 
Hatt [1917] 2 Ch 71 at 88; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v_Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134n. 
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anything at all is said; in the special situations dealt with in this thesis the law exacts not merely 
a deliverance of "the truth and nothing but the truth" ,but a full revelation of "the whole truth" .127 
2.2.2 Important definitions: disclosure 
English law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a proposed 
contract to give information to each other. 128 Mere silence does not amount to concealment. 129 
Each party must make up his own mind and exercise his own judgment in deciding whether to 
contract or not, and it is not the duty of either party to put before the other facts of which he has 
knowledge and which may influence the other in deciding whether to enter into the contract or 
not. 130 In the commercial sphere this approach is closely associated with the economic basis of 
English society. The whole essence of trade and business in a free-enterprise society is that 
parties compete with each other at arms' length, that is, on a footing of equality. Each party is 
entitled to make use of what information he has in order to obtain the best bargain he can get; 
neither party is under any obligation to assist the other party. In a sense all this is of the essence 
of freedom of contract and free enterprise, and it is doubtful whether trade and commerce could 
operate in the way it does on the basis of any other rule in the ordinary way. 131 That does not 
mean that English law does not require disclosure under certain circumstances, as will be seen 
hereunder. 132 The general pattern of the law requires disclosure of the terms of the contract, and 
127 Re Banister (1879) 12 Ch D 131 at 136; Re Marsh and Earl Granville (1882) 24 Ch D 
11 at 17. 
128 Wardv Hobbs (1878) 4 App Cas 13; Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch421; but cf Hurley 
v Dyke [1979] RTR 265. 
129 "Aliud est celare, aliud tacere; neque ego nunc te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura 
deorum sit, qui sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici vilitas; 
sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est." Cicero De Officiis 
Book 3 ch 13. Translated, the passage states that: 
"It is one thing to conceal, not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment 
I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of the gods 
or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than 
to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you 
everything that it may be to your interest to be told." 
130 See, eg, Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1910; Cornfoot v Fowke (1840) 6 M & 
W358 at380; TurnervGreen [1895] 2 Ch205 at208; Coleman vMyers [1977] 2 NZLR 
225. 
131 Atiyah Contract 265; Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597; Banque Financiere de la Cite 
SA v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd sub nom Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) 
Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 All ER 947. 
132 Sub par 2.2.5 et seq, infra. 
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failure to do so will render the contract unenforceable either as a whole or in part. 133 The law 
sometimes requires disclosure of facts other than the terms of the contract as well. The principal 
legal technique for creating duties of disclosure seems to comprise a development of the law of 
misrepresentation and reliance upon the implication of terms into contracts. 134 There are 
exceptions to the general rule that there is no duty to disclose, namely where the contract is 
within the class termed uberrimae fidei, where there is a fiduciary relationship between the 
parties, and where failure to disclose some fact distorts a positive representation. 135 Regulation, 
of course, may also provide for disclosure. 136 
By disclosure is meant the communication (to the person entitled to the information) of material 
existing facts and past events;137 It must be exact, complete, explicit and unambiguous. The 
disclosure must be "full and fair". 138 A "partial or imperfect" revelation of the facts, 139 or a "half-
disclosure" 140 will not do. 
Besides being exact and complete, the disclosure must be made in terms which are clear and 
unambiguous. The party on whom the obligation lies must not leave the other party to put two 
and two together. He must put them together himself, and call them four. 141 Failing to do so 
133 See, eg, Scriven Brothers & Co v Hindley & Co [1913] 3 KB 564; Olley v Marlborough 
CourtLtd[l949] 1 All ER 127; Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd[1971] 1 AllER686; 
Hollier v Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd [1972] 1 All ER 399. 
134 Collins Contract 190; Harris & Tallon (eds) Contract Law 166. 
135 Chitty Contracts 339. 
136 See, eg, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulation of 1994. 
137 "Facts" and "circumstances" are often used as convertible terms. See Carter v Boehm 
(1766) 3 Burr 1905; Bridges v Hunter (1813) 1 M & S 15; Gordon v Gordon (1821) 3 
Swans 400. 
138 See, eg, Bowles v Stewart (1803) 1 Sch & Lef209 at 226. 
139 GreenwoodvGreenwood(1863) 2 De GJ & S 28 at42-43; Traillv Baring(1864) 33 LJ 
Ch 521; With v 0 'Flanagan [1936] Ch 575; Goldsmith v Rodger [1962] 2 Lloyds Rep 
249. 
140 Jenkins v Hiles (1802) 6 Ves Jun 646; Walker v Symonds (1818) 3 Swan 1 at 73; 
Rickards vMurdoch (1830) 10 B & C 527; Re Madrid Bank, Ex parte Williams (1866) 
LR 2 Eq 216; Wright v Carter [1903] 1 Ch 27; Bartram & Sons v Lloyd (1904) 90 LT 
357 at 359; R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586 at 591. 
141 Bates v Hewitt (1867) LR 2 QB 595",}licholson v Power (1869) 20 LT 580; Gandy v 
Adelaide Marine Insurance Co (1871) LR 6 QB 746; LeighvAdams (1871) 25 LT 566. 
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amounts to a non-disclosure of a particularly disingenuous type. 142 Illustrations are frequent of 
the failure of such expedients for the purpose of withholding material facts, whilst insuring in 
advance against the consequences of so doing, as ambiguous conditions and particulars of sale 
in contracts between vendor and purchaser, 143 tricky waiver clauses in prospectuses of 
companies, 144 and other similar pretences of candour without its reality. 145 
2.2.3 Important definitions: materiality; inducement 
Where the law imposes a duty of disclosure, that disclosure, must be full and precise, clear and 
unambiguous. But it extends only to facts and circumstances, 146 and only to such facts and 
circumstances as are material in the particular case. This is clearly stated or assumed in all the 
authorities. 147 
The duty of disclosure which the law imposes extends only to facts and circumstances which are 
material. 148 Any fact or circumstance is deemed sufficiently material to be disclosed, which, if 
disclosed would on a fair consideration of the evidence have influenced a reasonable prudent 
person in the decision whether to enter into the transaction contemplated or in deciding upon 
142 Greenwood v Greenwood (1863) 2 De GJ & S 28 at 42-43; Gluckstein v Barnes [1900] 
AC 240. 
143 Brandling v Plummer (1854) 2 Drewry 427; Smith v Harrison (1857) 26 LJ Ch 412; 
Re Banister (1879) 12 Ch D 131; Re Marsh and Earl Granville (1882) 24 Ch D 11. 
144 Greenwoodv Leather Shod Wheel Co [1900] 1 Ch421at431; Cackettv Keswick [1902] 
2 Ch 456; Watts v Buclmall [1903] 1 Ch 766. 
145 Coulson v Allison (1860) 2 De GF & J 521; Oelkers v Ellis [1914] 2 KB 139. 
146 "Fact" and "circumstance" are often used as convertible terms. The latter expression has 
the advantage over the former of suggesting the idea of relevancy to the transaction in 
hand, circumstances being neither more nor less than surrounding facts. 11 Circumstances11 , 
rather than "facts" are referred to in many of the judgments relating to the duty of 
disclosure, eg, in those of Mansfield CJ in Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, of Lord 
Ellenborough CJ in Bridges v Hunter (1813) 1 M & S 15 at 18, of Lord Eldon LC in 
Gordon v Gordon (1821) 3 Swans 400 at 473, of Leach VC inSelsey (Lord) v Rhoades 
(1824) 2 Sim & St 41 at-49-50. 
147 See, eg,MurphyvO'Shea (1845) 2 Jo & Lat422;Dunne vEnglish (1874) LR 18 Eq 524; 
Jonides v Pender (1874) LR 9 QB 531; The Bedouin [1894] P 1. 
148 See, eg, the decision of Lord Hals bury in Seaton v Burnand, Burnand v Seaton [ 1900] 
AC 135. 
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terms; 149 having regard to the class and character of the transaction contemplated. 150 
149 The currrently accepted statement of the rule as set out above is taken from the decision 
of the Judicial Committee in Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Ontario Metal 
Products Co Ltd [ 1925] AC 344 at 3 51, a life insurance case in which the actual words 
of the Judicial Committee were: 
"It is a question of fact in every case whether if the matters concealed or 
misrepresented had been truly disclosed they would, on a fair consideration of the 
evidence, have influenced a reasonable insurer to decline the risk or to have 
stipulated for a higher premium." 
The word "prudent" in the proposition in the text above does not appear in the judgment 
in Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Ontario Metal Products Co Ltd [ 1925] AC 
344. It appears however, in many of the supporting cases, and it is to be noticed that it 
appears also in the statutory provisions both of s 18(2) of the English Marine Insurance 
Act of 1906, where mention is made of the "the judgment of the prudent insurer", and of 
s 10( 5) of the English Road Traffic Act of 1934. The cases also use the words frequently. 
See, eg, the judgment of Lord Robertson in Zurich General Accident & Liability 
Insurance Co v Leven and Another l 940 SC 407; Becker v Marshall (1922) 12 Lloyds 
Rep 413 and that ofRowlatt Jin North British Fishing Boat Insurance Co v Starr ( 1922) 
13 Lloyds Rep 206 at 210. 
See, also, the expressions in the following cases: Sir James Mansfield CJ in Wills v 
Glover (1804) 1 Bos PNR 14 at 16 ("an opportunity of exercising their judgment in 
settling the premium"); Gibbs CJ in Durrell v Bederley (1816) Holt NP 283 at 286 and 
Holroyd J of Berthon v Loughman (1817) 2 Stark 258 at 259 ("whether particular facts 
if disclosed to an underwriter would ... make a difference as to the amount of premium"); 
Lord Tenterden CJ in Rickards v Murdock (1830) 10 B & C 527 at 540 ("would have 
influenced the mind of the underwriter in deciding upon what terms he would accept the 
risk"); Rolfe Bin Dalglish v Jarvie (1850) 2 Mac & G 231 at 243-244 ("anything that 
may affect the rate of premium which the underwriter may require"); Cockburn CJ in 
Bates v Hewitt (1867) LR 2 QB 595 at 604-605 ("all matters which will enable him to 
determine the extent of the risk against which he undertakes to guarantee the assured"); 
The Court of Queen's Bench of Ionides v Pender (1874) LR 9 QB 531 at 539 (" ... all 
should be disclosed which would affect the judgment of a rational underwriter governing 
himself by the principles and calculations on which underwriters do in practice act, seems 
to us a sound one"); and the legislature ins 18 (2) of the English Marine Insurance Act 
of 1906 ("every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a 
prudent insurer in fixing the premium or determining whether he will take the risk"). 
See, also, the following four modem cases - Glicksman v Lancashire and General 
Assurance Co Ltd[l925] 2 KB 593 affirmed subsequently in the House ofLords [1927] 
AC 139; Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co Ltd v Morrison [1947] 2 
KB 53; Godfrey v_Britannic Assurance Co Ltd [1963] 2 Lloyds Rep 515; Lee v British 
Law Insurance Co Ltd [1972] 2 Lloyds Rep 49. 
150 See Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 33 n3 and Ionides v Pender (1874) LR 9 QB 531, 
one of the leading cases on this subject. Blackbum J delivering the judgment of the Court 
of Queen's Bench said at 538: 
"it was argued before us that the nature of the risk (that is as to the strength and 
seaworthy qualities of the Da Capo and the probability of encountering storms on 
the voyage and so forth) was not in the least affected by the amount at which the 
goods were valued: which was no doubt true." 
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Trifling details need not be disclosed, as being not sufficiently weighty to influence the judgment 
of the person entitled to disclosure. 151 
It is not necessary for the party entitled to disclosure to prove that he was actually induced by the 
non-disclosure to enter into the contract. It is enough for materiality if the fact, if disclosed, 
would have been likely to influence a prudent person in entering into, or declining to enter into, 
a transaction of the kind proposed, or to require an amendment of the terms proposed. 152 If it is 
shown that disclosure would have "given him pause", this will be sufficient. 153 
The belief of any of the parties to a proposed transaction as to the materiality or non-materiality 
of any undisclosed fact or circumstance, is quite unimportant. Materiality is not a matter to be 
tested subjectively, by inquiring whether the party owing a duty of disclosure believes the 
particular fact or circumstance to be material or not. 154 If a material fact or circumstance is known 
to the person owing the duty of disclosure, he is bound to disclose it whether he believes it to be 
The Court, however, agreed that for the establishment of materiality it was enough that 
non-disclosure would affect the judgment of an underwriter governing himself by the 
rules on which underwriters act. 
See, also, Tate v Hyslop (1885) 15 QBD 368 at 376: 
"The authorities show that the materiality is not as to the risk ,but as to whether 
it would influence the underwriters in entering upon the insurance or the terms 
on which they would insure." 
151 See, eg, Morrison v Muspratt (1827) 4 Bing 60; Perrins v Marine and General 
Traveller s Insurance Society (1859) 2 E & E 317. 
152 JenningsvBroughton (1854) 5 De GM& G 126 at 130; Smith vChadwick(1884) 9 App 
Cas 187. 
153 See Traill v Baring (1864) 4 De G J & S 318 at 330 where Turner LJ says: 
"it is impossible to say what course the plaintiffs might have pursued, whether 
they would or would not have accepted the policy. They might have done so, but 
it is equally clear that they might not and we cannot say whether they would or 
would not; but it was to them that the communication should have been made, in 
order that they might exercise their option upon the subject." 
See, also, William Pickersgill & Sons Ltd v London and Provincial Marine and General 
Insurance Co Ltd [1912] 3 KB 614 at 619; Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v 
Ontario Metal Products Co Ltd [1925] AC 344; Zurich General Accident and Liability 
Insurance Co Ltd v Morrison [1947] 2 KB 53. 
154 Greenhill v Federal Insurance Co Ltd [1927] 1 KB 65; Looker v Law Union and Rock 
Insurance Co Ltd [1928] 1 KB 554. 
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material or not. 155 
The materiality of a fact or circumstance is always a question of fact, or perhaps one of mixed 
fact and law; if a fact is shown by evidence to be material, no belief, however genuine, by the 
person under a duty to disclose it can make it immaterial;156 on the other hand, ifit is not shown 
to be material, no belief by the person entitled to its disclosure can make it so. 157 
The cases contain numerous dicta indicating that the asking of questions may be taken into 
account, together with the other facts, to assist in the determination of materiality. 158 The asking 
of a question, it is submitted, therefore leaves the party contending for materiality in a better 
position than if no question had been asked. On the other hand, if no question is asked, the court 
may by that very fact be assisted to a conclusion in favour of non-materiality; for, if it did not 
occur to the party entitled to disclosure to make any inquiry, it may be a matter of difficulty to 
conclude that the point was one which might have influenced a reasonable person against 
entering into the contract proposed, or persuaded him to ask for better terms. Insurance 
companies also run the risk of the contention that matters they do not ask questions about are not 
155 McNair J inRoselodge Ltd (formerly "Rose" Diamond Products Ltd) v Castle [1966] 2 
Lloyds Rep 113, citing Brownlie v Campbell (1880) 5 App Cas 925 and Joel v Law 
Union and Crown Insurance Co Ltd [ 1908] 2 KB 863: 
"The disclosure must be of all that you ought to have realised to be material, and 
not of that only which you did in fact realise to be so." 
156 Lindenau v Desborough (1828) 8 B & C 586 at 592; Brownlie v Campbell (1880) 5 App 
Cas 925 at 954; Joel v Law Union and Crown Insurance Co [1908] 2 KB 863; Godfrey 
v Britannic Assurance Co Ltd [1963] 2 Lloyds Rep 515 at 529, ("it is also well 
established that the opinion of the assured whether a particular fact is material is 
irrelevant"). 
157 See Haywood v Rodgers (1804) 4 East 590 where Lord Ellenborough C J at 597 speaks 
of the "almost absolute impossibility for the assured to state ... everything which, if stated 
might have been deemed, in the judgment of the underwriter material to the question". 
See, also, Beachey v Brown (1860) EB & E 796 at 803: 
"I do not think that non-disclosure of a fact which is material in the mind of the 
defendant is enough." 
In this case, the defendant was setting up non-disclosure as an answer to an action for 
breach of promise of marriage. 
158 Dawsons Ltd v Bonnin [1922] 2 AC 413; Roselodge Ltd (formerly "Rose" Diamond 
Products Ltd) v Castle [1966] 2 Lloyds Rep 113. 
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material, or, that if they were, they would ask questions about them. 159 
If materiality is disputed, it must be for the court to decide the question on the facts of the 
particular case; it will be a matter oflaw whether the particular undisclosed fact or circumstance 
is capable of being material160 and one of mixed fact and law, 161 whether in the particular 
circumstances of the case before the court it is material. 
2.2.4 Important definitions: knowledge 
It would be illogical and unfair indeed to penalize a party, by ordering or allowing the avoidance 
of the contract into which he has entered, or by rejecting a claim by him for moneys due under 
that contract, because of his non-disclosure of a material fact, if that fact had been unknown to 
him. English law requires accordingly that in an action for avoidance of a contract, or in the 
presentation of a defence to a claim for moneys due under that contract, on the ground of non-
disclosure, it is necessary for the party complaining to prove strongly not only the existence of 
the undisclosed material fact, but also that the party owing a duty to disclose that fact, knew of 
it at the time when the contract was concluded. 162 It must, however, be emphasized that this 
159 Newsholme Brothers v Road Transport and General Insurance Co Ltd [ 1929] 2 KB 3 56 
at363. See, also, SeatonvHeath [1899] 1QB782; GlicksmanvLancashireandGeneral 
Assurance Co Ltd [1925] 2 KB 593, and on appeal [1927] AC 139. 
160 Dawsons Ltdv Bonnin [1922] 2 AC 413 is an example of the court's deciding, at an early 
stage of the judgment that a fact was not material - but this did not assist the non-
disclosing party, for the case was determined on another aspect of the facts, namely that 
certain facts had been warranted and that therefore no question of materiality arose. See, 
also, Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co v Leven and Another l 940 SC 
406, where Lord Normand said, at 416: 
11 a conviction 20 years old with an impeccable record between the date of the 
conviction and the date of the signature on the form would by all reasonable 
people be regarded as immaterial. 11 
161 Roselodge Ltd (formerly "Rose" Diamond Products Ltd) v Castle [1966] 2 Lloyds Rep 
113. 
162 There must be knowledge on the part of the person with a duty of disclosure, of the non-
disclosed fact. So Fletcher Moulton LJ in Joel v Law Union and Crown Insurance Co 
[1908] 2 KB 863 says at 884: 
"But in my opinion there is a point here which often is not sufficiently kept in 
mind. The duty is a duty to disclose, and you cannot disclose what you do not 
know. 11 
These words must, however, be read subject to the important proposition that knowledge 
may be either actual or imputed: See Greenhillv Federal Insurance CoLtd[l921] 1 KB 
65 at 66-67. See further Godfrey v Britannic Assurance Co Ltd (1963) 2 Lloyds Rep 515 
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knowledge may be actual or presumptive. 
Similar considerations apply to the knowledge of the party complaining of non-disclosure. His 
action or defence cannot succeed unless he is able to show (the onus being in this regard upon 
him) that he did not know of the existence of the undisclosed fact. 163 
Knowledge may be either a fact to be established by evidence, like any other fact; 164 or it may be 
deemed in law to have existed 165 without proof as a fact. The former class of knowledge is 
usually called "actual" knowledge or notice, although the epithet has been extended by some 
authorities to certain species of the other class: the latter has been termed "constructive", 
"imputed", or "presumed", knowledge or notice. 
Actual knowledge or notice, in the above sense, when alleged, must be strictly proved as a fact 
by evidence. That is to say, the fact of which the actual knowledge is alleged must be shown to 
have been personally, and not vicariously, known to the person to whom it is attributed, 166 and 
actually present to his mind at the material date. 167 
at 529. 
163 Stikeman v Dawson (1847) 1 De G & Sm 90 at 101-108; Foley v Tabor (1861) 2 F & F 
663 at 672. 
164 Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society v Rayner (1880) 14 Ch D 406. 
165 He must disclose not only every material circumstance of which he has actual knowledge, 
but every material circumstance that he ought to know - per Roskill J in Godfrey v 
Britannic Assurance Co Ltd [1963] 2 Lloyds Rep 515 at 529. See, also, Greenhill v 
Federal Insurance Co Ltd [1927] 1 KB 65. 
166 Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society v Rayner (1880) 14 Ch D 406 at 410-
412, and at 414-418. 
167 In Bates v Hewitt (1867) LR 2 QB 595, it was pointed out by Cockburn CJ at 605, that 
the party charged had failed to prove that the party complaining knew that the SS 
"Georgia", the subject of the policy, had been the notorious Confederate cruiser of that 
name, it appearing that though he had at one time known the history of the Confederate 
"Georgia", he had, at the date of the insurance, forgotten it, so that the knowledge in 
question was not then present to his mind, and it was the duty of the party charged to 
bring home to him such information as would enable him to identify the vessel, in which 
duty he had failed. See Ellis v Rogers (1884), 29 Ch D 661 a vendor and purchaser case, 
where the purchaser knew of the restrictive covenants, the suppression of which he 
complained of, but did not know or believe that they were operative at the time: per 
Cotton LJ, at 671; Nocton v LordAshburton [1914] AC 932, per Lord Dunedin at 962, 
a solicitor and client case; in Australia, see Re Cronk and Slattery's Contract [ 1915] VLR 
272 where a purchaser's vendor and purchaser summons failed when it was shown that 
he had been personally aware of the true position, though it had not been mentioned in 
the agreement for sale and purchase. 
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Presumptive knowledge consists of five species, which may be stated broadly as follows: 168 
( 1) Facts of public notoriety, and rules and principles of general application in ordinary life, 
are presumed without proof to be within the knowledge of both parties. 
(2) The law presumes, without proof, knowledge of all facts which, in the course of his 
business, the party ought to be acquainted with. 
(3) From the proved actual knowledge of a fact by an agent, the law infers, without proof, 
a knowledge of that fact on the part of his principal. 
(4) From the proved actual knowledge by a party of a fact, the law infers, without proof, a 
knowledge by that party of any further fact to which the actual knowledge of the first fact 
would naturally have led, or which such inquiries as were reasonable under the 
circumstances, would have elicited. 
( 5) By virtue of certain enactments, the legislature imputes knowledge of certain facts to the 
persons, and under the conditions, prescribed. 169 
For the purpose of the duty of disclosure, any party to a contract or transaction is presumed to be 
acquainted with all matters of general notoriety, 170 whether the notoriety extends to the entire 
community, or only to a class or section of the public, ifthe class or section is one to which the 
168 See Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 56. 
169 The first two of these classes, in relation to marine insurance, are dealt with in Carter v 
Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1910-1911; also by Cockburn CJ at 605- 607, Mellor J at 
609- 610, and Shee J, at 610- 611 of Bates v Hewitt (1867) LR 2 QB 595; by Cockburn 
CJ at 757 of Gandy v Adelaide Marine Insurance Co (1871) LR 6 QB 746; and ins 18 
of the English Marine Insurance Act of 1906. The third and fourth are summarily 
described by Lore Eldon LC at 120 of Hiern v Mill (1806) 13 Ves Jun 114. 
170 Sees (3)(b) of the Marine Insurance Act of 1906, whereby it is provided that: 
"the insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety of knowledge." 
It is true that in the corresponding provision in this Act relating to the presumed 
knowledge of the assured - s 18 ( 1) - there is no express mention of such matters, but 
they are probably intended to be included in the general phrase: "every circumstance 
which, in the ordinary course ofbusiness, ought to be known to him". 
See Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 57. 
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party to whom the knowledge is imputed belongs, 171 or to a locality or district, if it is one in 
which the party to whom the local knowledge is ascribed either carries on business or resides, 
as the case may be. 172 
Almost from the time when the rules as to presumptive knowledge began to assume a definite 
shape and form, the Judges who had invented and established these rules began to discern their 
perilous possibilities and potency. 173 Though here and there in the decisions protests can be found 
against any attempt to emasculate them, 174 the main current of judicial authority set in favour of 
vigilance, if not of jealous restriction, and warnings from eminent judges frequently enough 
appear175 against any further extension of a doctrine which, even admitting it to be "based on 
171 In Durrell v Bederley (1816) Holt NP 283, a marine insurance case, "the current 
knowledge of Jersey", as to a French frigate which had made captures on that coast, was 
imputed to the plaintiff who was the party charged (for he carried on his business there), 
but was not imputed to the party complaining, the underwriter in London, for "the 
underwriters could know nothing of it", per Gibbs CJ at 286. See, also, Harrower v 
Hutchinson (1870) LR 5 QB 584 at 591-593, as to the presumption of an underwriter's 
knowledge of the local regulations of foreign States. Again, in Edwards v Meyrick ( 1842) 
2 Hare 60 at 73-75, a solicitor and client case, Wigram VC pointed out that the solicitor 
was not bound to call his client's attention to the speculative possibility that a railway, 
which in the district where the parties resided was known to be in contemplation, might 
improve the value of the land which was the subject of the action. 
172 See, eg, Bowles v Round (1800) 5 Ves Jun 508; Brandlingv Plummer (1854) 2 Drewry 
427 at 431; Pimm v Lewis (1862) 2 F & F 778; Ashburner v Sewell [1891] 3 Ch 405; 
Hales v Reliance Fire and Accident Corporation Ltd [1960] 2 Lloyds Rep 391. 
173 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 80. 
174 Thus Turner LJ, in Wilson v Hart (1866) LR 1 Ch App 463 at 467 says: 
"I am not by any means inclined to extend the doctrine of constructive notice ,but 
on the other hand I am as little inclined to fritter away the principles of the Court 
by refusing to apply them to cases to which they properly extend." 
To the same effect are the observations ofKekewich J, in Davis v Hutchings [1907] 1 Ch 
356 at 361 
175 Such as Lord St Leonards in Roddy v Williams (1845) 3 Jo & Lat 1 at 29; Lord Cranworth 
LC in Ware v Lord Egmont (1854) 4 De GM & G 460 at 473: 
"I must not part with this case without expressing my entire concurrence in what 
has on many occasions of late years fallen from Judges of great eminence on the 
subject of constructive notice, namely that it is highly inexpedient for Courts of 
equity to extend this doctrine and to attempt to apply it to cases to which it has 
not hitherto been held applicable." 
See, also, Lord Westbury LC in Wyllie v Pollen (1863) 3 De G J & S 596 at 601 who said 
that he concurred with those Judges who thought that the doctrine of constructive notice 
ought not to be extended, but ought to be reduced within clear and definite principles. Cf 
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good sense", is still to be recognised as "subtle and difficult", 176 and "refined" 177 and to be applied 
with the utmost caution. 
2.2.5 Classification of transactions and relations where disclosure is required 
2.2.5.1 Introduction 
The main categories in which a stricter duty of disclosure may exist than discussed above can be 
set out in four sub-classes, all of which require disclosure; some involve other duties as well. In 
the first two of these classes the duty arises exclusively from the nature of the transaction which 
is under negotiation, 178 or from the character of an application which the disclosing party is 
making to some independent tribunal or authority. In regard to the remaining two of these classes, 
the duty of disclosure does not find its source in the nature of the transaction in contemplation 
between the parties. It will lie upon one of them, whatever the transaction may be into which they 
are about to enter. The duty arises exclusively from a relationship, either established by legal rule 
Allen v Seckham (1897) 11 Ch D 790, per Brett LJ at 795, "the doctrine of constructive 
notice ought to be narrowly watched, and not enlarged. Indeed anything 'constructive' 
ought to be narrowly watched because it depends on a fiction"; English and Scottish 
Mercantile Investment Co Ltd v Brunton [1892] 2 QB 700, per Lord Esher l\.1R at 708, 
who held: 
"oflate years after the doctrine had been invented and put into form, the Chancery 
Judges saw that it was being carried much further than had been intended, and 
they declined to carry it further. In a series of cases Lords Cottenham, Lyndhurst, 
and Cranworth, Lord Justice Turner, and the late Master of the Rolls, Sir George 
Jessel have said that the doctrine ought not to be extended one bit further; all the 
Judges seem to have agreed upon that. InAllen v Seckham, I pointed out that the 
doctrine is a dangerous one ... ". 
See, also, Bailey v Barnes (1894) 1 Ch 25;Molyneux v Hawtrey [1903] 2 KB 487; Powell 
v Browne (1907) 97 LT 854 at 856: 
"the Courts have oflate years refused to extend the doctrine of constructive notice 
which has been put forward here - a doctrine which rests on imputing to a 
person knowledge which it is admitted he never had. I am speaking of 
constructive notice of the sort which is suggested here where there is no 
imputation of want of good faith." 
176 See Kettlewell v Watson (1882) 21 Ch D 685 at 704. 
177 SeeRe Cousins(l886) 31ChD671 at616;ReAshton, ExparteMcGowan(l89l) 64LT 
28 at 29. 
178 Cheshire Contract 302-307; Atiyah Contract 272-274; Chitty Contracts 339. 
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or created by parties themselves, which already existed between them before negotiations began. 
In these cases, the relationship is such as to cast a duty on that party to ensure that the other is 
properly informed and advised. Even more may have to be done, for example, the provision of 
independent advice. 179 
The four classes of cases which can be discerned will now be outlined in more detail. 
2.2.5.2 Duty of disclosure in contracts uberrimae fidei 
A positive duty of disclosure of material facts rests upon parties negotiating certain classes of 
contracts. 180 These are contracts in the negotiation of which one of the parties must, from the very 
nature of the transaction, have either actual or presumptive knowledge off acts and circumstances 
which ordinarily are not within the actual or presumptive knowledge of the other party, but the 
knowledge of which is, or may be, ofimportance to that other party to enable him to judge of the 
expedience of entering into the particular contract proposed. 181 The contracts discussed here are 
often called contracts uberrimae fidei. 182 
The best-known example is the contract of insurance;183 but there are other contracts, not all 
probably in a strict sense uberrimae fidei, that qualify for inclusion in this class, such as contracts 
to subscribe for shares in a company, releases and compromises, contracts for partnership, 
contracts to marry and separation deeds. 184 The reluctance of the Courts to extend this stricter 
duty of disclosure to other contracts, is illustrated by the case of Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd. 185 
179 Cheshire Contract 307-308; Atiyah Contract 274-275; Chitty Contracts 362-363; Tate 
v Williamson ( 1866) LR 2 Ch App 5 5. 
180 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1909; Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161; 
Banque Financiere de la Cite v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd sub nom Banque Keyser 
Ullman SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 All ER 947. 
181 See, eg, Wainwright v Bland (1836) 1 M & W, 32; Cornfoot v Fowke (1840) 6 M & W 
358; Robinson v Mollett (1875) LR 7 HL 802; lonides v Pender (1874) LR 9 QB 531; 
Brownlie v Campbell (1880) 5 App Cas 925; Seaton v Heath [1899] 1 QB 782 .. 
182 Chitty Contracts 390 -398; Cheshire Contract 290. 
183 See, eg, Joel v Law Union and Crown Insurance Co [1908] 2 KB 863; Lambert v Co-
operative Insurance Society [1975] 2 Lloyds Rep 485; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v 
Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 3 All ER 581; Woolcott v Sun Alliance and London 
Insurance Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 1253. 
184 Cheshire Contract 293-294; Chitty Contracts 394-396. 
185 [1932] AC 161. 
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It is outside the scope of this thesis to examine each and every type of contract that may be 
classified as requiring uberrimae fides, especially in view of the fact that suretyship is not 
considered to fall in this class. 186 
Broadly speaking, there are three classes of cases in which an obligation of disclosure, which 
does not ordinarily arise at all, or which does not originally arise, may be created by 
circumstances occurring before or during the negotiation. These are as follows: 
(1) where one of the negotiating parties enters upon the negotiation laden with the duty of 
revealing his own previous fraud in relation to the subject of the contemplated contract 
or transaction- 187 
' (2) where, during the negotiation, one of the negotiating parties says or does something, or 
something happens which, having regard to his previous declarations or acts, requires 
him to speak, in order to correct or remove a delusion created in the mind of the other 
party, for which he is responsible; 188 
(3) where, in the course of negotiation, one of the parties is asked a question by the other 
party in respect of any matter, whereupon a duty arises for the first party, if he answers 
the question at all, 189 to answer it truthfully and fully. 190 
186 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109; North British Insurance Co v Lloyd (1854) 
10 Exch 523; Lee v Jones (1864) 17 CB (NS) 482; Davies v London and Provincial 
Marine Insurance Co (1878) 8 Ch D 469; London General Omnibus Co Ltd v Holloway 
[1912] 2 KB 72; CoopervNationalProvincialBankLtd[l946] 1KB1. 
187 Story Jurisprudence par 384 and 390; Jones v Bowden (1813) 4 Taunt 847; Ormrodv 
Huth (1845) 14 M& W 65l;PerensvJohnson(l857) 3 Sm& G4l9;Horsfallv Thomas 
(1862) 1 H & C 90; Walsham v Stainton (1863) 1 De GJ & S 678; Phillips v Homfray; 
Fothergill v Phillips (1871) 6 Ch App 770; Maxon v Payne (1873) LR 8 Ch App 881. 
188 Turner v Harvey (1821) Jae 169; Walters v Morgan (1861) 3 De GF & J 718; Davies v 
London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co ( 1878) 8 Ch D 469; Arkwright v_Newbold 
(1881) 17 Ch D 301; Coaks v Boswell (1886) 11 App Cas 232; Re Edwards to Daniel 
Sykes & Co Ltd (1890) 62 LT 445; Re Hare and O'More's Contract [1901] 1 Ch 93; 
RoyalBankofScotlandvGreenshields 1914 SC259; WithvO'Flanagan [1936] Ch575. 
189 Coaks v Boswell (1886) App Cas 232; London Assurance Co v Mansel (1879) 11 Ch D 
363; Re Robinson, Ex parte Burrell (1876) 1 Ch D 537; Nelthorpe v Holgate (1844) 1 
Coll 203; Re General Provincial Life Assurance Co Ltd, Ex parte Daintree (1870) 18 
WR 396 at 397. 
190 Harrower v Hutchinson (1870) LR 5 QB 584; Re General Provincial Life Assurance Co, 
Ex parte Daintree (1870) 18 WR 396; Mackreth v Walmesley (1884) 51 LT 19; The 
Bedouin(1894)P I; [1894] lOTLR 70; WestminsterBankLtdvCond(1940)46Com 
Cas 60. 
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2.2.5.3 Duty of disclosure to court, tribunal or State agencies 
The second sub-class consists of cases in which a person is injuriously affected by, and has a 
right of complaint and relief in respect of, another person's breach of a duty of disclosure owed 
by him, primarily or immediately to the court, 191 the State, 192 or a class of third persons, 193 and 
only indirectly to the party complaining. 
2.2.5.4 Duty of disclosure in relations of confidence 
The duty of disclosure in relations of confidence, is owed directly to the person who complains 
of its non-fulfilment. It may arise under conditions of a wholly different character. Here, there 
is no question of a contractual relationhip between the parties: a fiduciary relation (whether 
contractual, or implied or "resulting")194 is assumed to be already established, which relation 
involves an obligation, during its existence, of complete candour and good faith toward the one 
who has placed it~195 
Modem theory and judicial practice do not attempt to ascribe any specific legal meaning to the 
term "fiduciary". Sealy, in a leading article on the subject, observes: 196 
"[T]he word 'fiduciary' we find is not definitive of a single class of relationship to which 
a fixed set of rules and principles apply. Each equitable remedy is available only in a 
191 BrookevLordMostyn (1865) 2 De GJ & Sm373;Priestmanv Thomas(1884) 9PD 210; 
Boswell v Coaks (No 2) (1894) 6 R 167; Cole v Langford [1898] 2 QB 36; Sturrock v 
Littlejohn (1898) 68 LJ QB 165; White v Ivory (1900) The Times 27 April; Brink's-MAT 
Ltdv Elcombe and Others [1988] 3 All ER 188; The Nordglimt [1988] 2 All ER 531. 
192 Alton Woods" Case (1600) 1 Co Rep 40b;R v Butler (1685) 3 Lev 220; Hillv Thompson 
(1818) 8 Taunt 375; R v Wheeler (1819) 2 B & Ald 345; Alcock v Cooke [1824-34] All 
ER Rep 497;EasternArchipelago Co v R(1853) 2EL & BL 856; Great Eastern Raf/way 
CovGoldsmid(1884) 9 App Cas 927; CityofVancouverv Vancouver Lumber Co [1911] 
AC 711. 
193 Such as creditors in negotiations for composition arrangements. 
194 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 303. 
195 The distinction between the two classes of case is emphasized by Fry J in Davies v 
London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co (1878) 8 Ch D 469 at 474-475 and by 
Scrutton LJ in Moody v Cox and Hatt [1917] 2 Ch 71 at 88. 
196 Sealy 1962 Cambridge LJ 69 at 73 and also at 68-72 for the history of the use of this 
expression. 
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limited number of fiduciary situations; and the mere statement that John is in a fiduciary 
relationship towards me means no more than that in some respect his position is trustee-
like; 197it does not warrant the inference that any particular fiduciary principle or remedy 
can be applied." 
It would be a misuse of the term "fiduciary", then, to infer from the fact that that label could be 
attached to a particular relationship, the existence of some specific duty on the fiduciary's part. 
As Fletcher Moulton LJ says, in a passage, which has been frequently cited by the courts since:198 
"Fiduciary relations are of many different types: they extend from the relation of myself 
to an errand boy who is bound to bring back my change up to the most intimate and 
confidential relations which could possibly exist between one party and another where 
the one is wholly in the hands of the other because of his intimate trust in him. All of 
these are cases of fiduciary relations, and the courts have again and again, in cases where 
there has been fiduciary relation, interfered and set aside acts which, between persons in 
a wholly independent position, would have been perfectly valid. Thereupon in some 
minds there arises the idea that if there is any fiduciary relation whatever any of these 
types of interference is warranted by it. They conclude that every type of fiduciary 
relation justifies every kind of interference. Of course that is absurd. The nature of the 
fiduciary relation must be such that it justifies the interference. There is no class of case 
in which one ought more carefully to bear in mind the facts of the case, when one reads 
the judgment of the court on those facts, than cases which relate to fiduciary and 
confidential relations and the action of the court with regard to them." 
It follows that the word "fiduciary" is not of itself a constituent part of any specific legal rule. 
Therefore, there is no point in attempting to establish a legal definition for it. 199 
197 Cf Re West of England and South Wales District Bank, Ex parte Dale & Co (1879) 11 
Ch D 772 at 778 where Fry J described a fiduciary relationship as one: 
"in respect of which if a wrong arise, the same remedy exists as against the 
wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf of 
the cestui que trust. " 
198 Re Coomber, Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 at 728-729. This passage is also 
influential in Australia; Jenyns v Public Curator (Qld) (1953) 90 CLR 113 at 132-133; 
in Canada, Glover v Glover [1951] 1DLR657 at 663-664; in New Zealand, Coleman v 
Myers [1977] 2 NZLR 225 at 370-371. 
199 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 304. 
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The matter can be taken further, however, by putting forward a descriptive, rather than 
prescriptive, formulation. Finn describes a fiduciary in these terms:200 
"He is, simply, someone who undertakes to act for or on behalf of another in some 
particular matter. That undertaking201 may be of a general character. It may be specific 
and limited. It is immaterial that the undertaking is gratuitous. And the undertaking may 
be officiously assumed without request. 11202 
Finn goes on to point out that, though the courts have "refrained judiciously" from attempting any 
such general definition, the above description might be taken as "accurate and workable" in the 
light of the decisions he discusses. Sealy, dealing with fiduciary obligations more generally, 
suggests that four broad types of fiduciary relationship have been recognized by the courts.203 
They are; 
( 1) where "one person has control of property which . . . in the view of a court of 
equity is the property of another"; 
(2) "[w]herever the plaintiff entrusts to the defendant a job to be performed";204 
(3) where a person who holds or controls property for another, acquires as a personal 
benefit something which the courts regard as an accretion to the property; and 
(4) where the doctrine of undue influence205 applies. 
The rule is that he who bargains in matters of advantage with a person placing confidence in him 
200 Finn Fiduciary 201. Similar descriptions have been used judicially. See Reading v R 
[1949] 2 KB 232 at 236. See, also, Sealy 1962 Cambridge LJ 69 at 76; Scott 1949 
California LR 539 at 540. 
201 On the contractual nature of some fiduciary undertakings, see the case of Nordisk 
lnsulinlaboratorium v Gorgate Products Ltd [1953] 1 Ch 430 at 442-443. 
202 On the assumption of fiduciary duties without the principal' s request, see Lyell v 
Kennedy (1889) 14 App Case 437 at 456; Phipps v Boardman [1965] Ch 992 at 1017-
1018; English v Dedham Vale Properties Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 382 at 395-398. In 
Australia, see Walden Properties Ltd v Beaver Properties Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 815 
at 833. 
203 Sealy 1962 Cambridge LJ 69 at 74-79. The different duties of these various classes of 
fiduciaries are further discussed by Sealy at 119. 
204 Citing Reading v R [1949] 2 KB 232 at 236 per Asquith LJ for the purposes of the law 
of disclosure, the most significant "job" is that of giving advice, as to the fiduciary 
character of which see Tufton v Sperni [1952] 2 TLR 516 at 521-522 at 531-532; 
Godsworthy v Brickell [1987] I Ch 378 at 403. 
205 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 305. 
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is bound to show that a reasonable use has been made of that confidence.206 To this rule, as the 
fountainhead, or rather to its principle and reason, all subordinate and derivative rules, and all 
particular questions, must be referred for interpretation and solution.207 
Fiduciary relations in regard to the banker-customer relationship have been discussed above208 
and I shall devote no further attention to this aspect here. 
2.2.5.5 Duty of disclosure in relations of influence or advantage 
There are certain relations which are deemed to give rise to what in English law has in the past 
been called "undue influence", that is to say, from the existence of which the law presumes that 
one of the related parties, whom it may be convenient to call "the stronger party", is in a position 
of ascendancy, predominance or advantage over the other, who may be called "the weaker 
party". 209 The former will then have the responsibility of candour and good faith toward the latter, 
as regards disclosure and otherwise, in respect of any transaction between them while the 
relation, and the influence springing therefrom, continues. These relations may exist by nature, 
independently of human will, such as the parental or quasi-parental relationship,210 or may be 
constituted by the voluntary action of the parties, such as the professional relations of solicitor 
and client,211 spiritual director and penitent,212 or medical man and patient,213 or may be created 
206 Gibson v Jeyes (1801) 6 Ves Jun 266 at 278. 
207 See Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 306; McPherson v Watt (1877) 3 App Cas 254 at 
262-263; Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 at 1243; In 
Australia, see Elders Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v E G Reeves Pty Ltd (1987) 78 ALR 
193 at 234 238. Similar observations have been made in cases involving self-dealing and 
the making of secret profits and commissions. See Greenlaw v King(1841) 10 LJ Ch 129 
at 130; Benson and Others v Heathorn (1842) I Y & C Ch Cas 326 at 342-343. 
208 In sub-chapter 2.1.2 on multi-functional banking. 
209 Undue influence implies habitual ascendancy or influence over a weaker mind and if it 
is present on one occasion it is present on all unless the contrary is shown. See Tate v 
Williamson (1866) LR 2 Ch App 55. 
210 Wright v Vanderplank (1856) 8 De GM & G 133; Chambers v Crabbe (1865) 34 Beav 
457 Powell v Powell [1900] 1Ch243; London and Westminster Loan & Discount Ltd 
v Bilton (1911) 27TLR184;Brutyv Edmundson (1915) 113LTl191;Lancashire_Loans 
Ltd v Black [1934] 1 KB 380; Re Pauling's Settlement Trusts; Younghusband v Coutts 
& Co [1964] 1Ch303. 
211 WardvSharp(1884)53LJCh313;RhodesvBate(1866)1 ChApp252; WillisvBarron 
[1902] AC 271; Wright v Carter [1903] 1 Ch 27. 
212 Norton v Reily (1764) 2 Eden 286; Nottidge v Prince (1860) 2 Giff 246; Allcard v 
Skinner (1887) 36 ChD 145;Morleyv Loughnan [1893] 1Ch136;Roche vSherrington 
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by circumstances and conduct generally.214 
There are three groups of relations from which an inference or presumption of undue influence 
arises.215 In the first place, there are domestic relations. These include parentage, or quasi-
parentage,216 where the law has traditionally presumed influence from the nature of the relations 
alone, and a number of other relationships, such as that of husband and wife, where additional 
facts and circumstances must be proved before any such inference will be drawn. 217 Secondly, 
there are what may be called the professional relations, such as those which exist between 
solicitor and client, 218 between spiritual director and penitent or disciple, 219 and between medical 
adviser and patient220 - all of these often being classed together as 11 recognized11 , or the 
"known". 221 Thirdly there are the suspected relations, where proof of the relations, not being 
within either of the two above-mentioned classes, are constituted by the circumstances of the 
particular case, with particular regard to the confidence the weaker party has in the stronger 
[ 1982] 2 All ER 426. 
213 Dent v Bennett (1839) 4 My & Cr 269; Pratt v Barker (1826) 1 Sim 1; Radcliffe v Price 
(1902) 18 TLR466; WilliamsvJohnson (1937] 4AllERAnnotated 34;Re CMG (1970] 
Ch 574; (1970] 2 All ER 740n; Claughton v Price (1997] EGCS 51. 
214 From a banking law perspective, see Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy (1975] 1 QB 326; 
National Westminster Bank pie v Morgan [ 1985] AC 686;Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International SA v Aboody and Another (1992] 4 All ER 955. 
215 31 Halsbury par 843; Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 521. 
216 Wrightv Vanderplank(1856) 8 De GM& G 133;BerdoevDawson(1865) 34Beav. 603; 
Powell v Powell (1900] 1 Ch 243; London and Westminster Loan and Discount Cc Ltd 
v Bilton (1911) 27 TLR 184; Lancashire Loans Ltd v Black (1934] 1 KB 380; Re 
Pauling s Settlement Trusts; Younghusband v Coutts & Co (1964] 1 Ch 303. 
217 Lloyds Bank Ltd, Re Bomze and Lederman v Bomze [ 1931] 1 Ch 289; Gillman v Gillman 
(1946) 201 LT 13 5; Zamet v Hyman [ 1961] 3 All ER 933; Midland Bank pie v Shephard 
(1988] 3 All ER 17. 
218 Rhodes v Bate (1866) 1 Ch App 252; Liles v Teny (1895] 2 QB 679; Wright v Carter 
(1903] 1Ch27;Moody v Cox andHatt (1917] 2 Ch 71; Willis v Barron [1902] AC 271; 
Wintle v Nye (1959] 1 All ER 552. 
219 Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves 273; Nottidge_v Prince (1860) 2 Giff246;Allcardv 
Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145; Morley v Loughnan (1893) 1 Ch 736. 
220 Dent v Bennett (1839) 4 My & Cr 269; Radcliffe v Price (1902) 18 TLR 466; Williams 
v Johnson (1937] 4 All ER Annotated 34. 
221 Hunter v Atkins (1834) 3 My & K 113 at 135. 
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party.222 There are other cases where "actual influence" has been proved by direct evidence.223 
The question of proof of "actual" influence was recently considered in Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA v Aboody and Another224 where the requirements were restated in 
these terms: 
"[A] person relying on a plea of actual undue influence must show that 
(a) the other party to the transaction (or someone who induced the transaction for his 
own benefit) had the capacity to influence the claimant; 
(b) the influence was exercised; 
( c) its exercise was undue; 
( d) its exercise brought about the transaction. "225 
The decision also held that there would need to be "manifest disadvantage", as well as undue 
influence before the transaction would be set aside. This requirement was considered by the 
House of Lords in CIBC Mortgages pie v Pitt and Another226. The Court overruled the decision 
in theAboody221 case on this point and held that, where actual undue influence has been proved 
(as distinct from cases of presumed undue influence), a claimant was not under the further burden 
of proving that the transaction induced by undue influence was manifestly disadvantageous ,but 
was entitled as of right to have it set aside, since actual undue influence was a species of fraud, 
and like any other victim of fra1;1d, the victim was entitled to have the transaction set aside as of 
right.228 
222 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 521. 
223 See, eg, Bennet v Vade (1742) 2 Atk 324 at 326; Hunter v Atkins (1834) 3 My & K 113 
at 134-135 140; Harrison v Guest (1855) 6 De GM & G 424 at 432-436; Williams v 
Bay lee (1866) LR 1 HL 200; Mutual Finance Ltd v John_Wetton & Sons Ltd [ 193 7] 2 All 
ER 657; Re Craig, Meneces v Middelton [1971] Ch 95 at 121; Coldunell Ltd v Gallon 
[ 1986] 1 All ER 429; [ 1986] QB 1184 at 1195-1196. On the need for complete proof, see 
Curson v Be/worthy (1852) 3 HLC 742 at 752;. 
224 [1992] 4 All ER 955; [1989] 2 WLR 759. 
225 Bank of Credit and Commerce International, SA v Aboody and Another [1992] 4 All ER 
955; [1989] 2 WLR 759 at 782. 
226 [1993] 4 All ER 433. 
227 [1992] 4 All ER 955. 
228 CIBC Mortgages pie v Pitt and Another [1993] 4 All ER 433 at 439. 
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Evidence of disclosure has a significant role to play, particularly in cases where it is necessary 
for the stronger party to rebut an inference the court would otherwise make against the 
transaction. Where the stronger party is trusted to advise the weaker party, or at least speak out 
if the transaction is not conceived to be in the latter's best interests, proof of full disclosure of 
material facts including a full account of the effect of the transaction, 229 discussion of the courses 
of action open to the weaker party, and sound advice on their merits, will help establish that the 
transaction is procedurally fair. 230 It will not necessarily do so, however, since there is often a 
possibility of unfair pressure, which cannot be relieved, though it may possibly be ameliorated, 
by information and advice. In those circumstances, it may be necessary to go further and provide 
the weaker party with independent advice231 which is always the prudent course anyway,232 or to 
show that the transaction itself is a meritorious one, despite the means by which it has been 
induced. 233 
There are other relationships, called "relations of advantage", 234 of a less well-defined character. 
229 Archer v Hudson (1846) 15 LJ Ch211at212-213; Hartopp v Hartopp (1856) 25 LJ Ch 
471; Toker v Toker (1863) 3 De GJ & S 487 at 489-490; Proctor v Robinson (1866) 15 
LT 431 at 432; Kempson v Ashebee (1874) 10 Ch App 15 at 20-21 (advice about the 
invalidity of a prior agreement should have been given); Bank of Montreal v Stuart 
[1911] AC 120; London and Westminster Loan and Discount Co Ltdv Bilton (1911) 27 
TLR 184; Kali Bakhsh Singh and Another v Ram Gopal Singh and Another (1913) 30 
TLR 138. 
230 See the following cases, where it was said that proper disclosure should have been made. 
Hatch v Hatch (1804) 9 Ves 292 at296 (value of property and profits from it); Grosvenor 
v Sherratt (1860) 28 Beav 659 at 665-666 (previous offers, value of property and steps 
which could be taken to improve its value); In Dawson v Massey ( 1809) 1 Ball & B 231 
the relation of guardian and ward had ended, but when dealing with the ward the guardian 
made unfair use of information acquired during the guardianship. See the judgment at 
236-237 by Lord Manners LC (IR). 
231 See the following cases, where it was said that independent advice was necessary or 
desirable. Griffiths v Robins (1818) 3 Madd 191 at 192 (to rebut claim of misplaced trust 
and confidence); Harvey v Mount (1845) 8 Beav 439 at 452; Thornber v Sheard (1850) 
12 Beav 589 at 601 (accounts not made available for consideration by independent 
adviser); Sercombe v Sanders ( 1865) 34 Beav 3 82 at 3 86 (to explain transaction and what 
was best thing to do); De Witte v Addison (1899) 80 LT at 209 (to protect against moral 
pressure as a result of threats by creditors against father); Cf Powell v Powell [1900] 1 
Ch 243 at 247 per Farwell J, who appears to say that the solicitor, by declining to approve 
the transaction, may prevent it from occurring, but that view does not represent the law. 
232 See Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 570; Morley v Loughnan (1893) 1 Ch 736; Re 
Coomber,Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723; Jnche Noriah v ShaikAllie Bin Omar 
[1929] AC 127. 
233 Chitty Contract 424. 
234 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 601. 
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Here courts of equity have from earliest times exercised the same jurisdiction as in cases of 
undue influence; or, if not, a jurisdiction very close to it, sharing many of its characteristics and 
its history. Indeed, examples of its exercise will be found, occurring long before the doctrine of 
"undue influence" as it is known today in English law, became a distinctive principle of equity.235 
In some of these cases, the existence of a relation of advantage will give rise to the presumption 
that an unfair use has been made of that advantage. In others, that fact will be proved directly, 
or by employing the ordinary processes of inference. In either event, the courts may then set aside 
the transaction which results. This jurisdiction, which in modern authoritative texts236 is 
described237 as a jurisdiction to set aside "unconscionable bargains", or as the doctrine of 
unconscionability,238 will be discussed in this sub-chapter. 
A relation of advantage is one where the stronger party is better able to negotiate favourable 
terms than the weaker party, because the latter is ignorant, inexperienced, or under stress, or 
otherwise unable to give effective attention to a transaction which has been proposed. It is not 
necessarily wrong to enter into a contract, or take a gift from such a person, but if that favourable 
position is abused by the stronger party and unfair advantage taken, then the court may set the 
transaction aside.239 
235 See WoodvAbrey (1818) 3 Madd 417; Longmate v_Ledger (1860) 2Giff157; Clarkv 
Malpas (1862) 4 De GF & J 401; Baker v Monk (1864) 4 De GJ & S 388; Prees v Coke 
(1871) LR 6 Ch App 645; Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312; Rees v De Bernardy [1896] 
2 Ch 437; James v Kerr (1899) 40 Ch D 449. 
' 
236 See, eg, Chitty Contracts 428-430; Snell Equity 545 et seq. 
237 The term "harsh and unconscionable" was most precisely used by Lord MacNaghten in 
Samuel v Newbold [1906] AC 461 at 470 to cover cases where the transaction alone 
(without reference to the relations between the parties) is sufficiently unfair to attract 
equitable intervention. Once extended to cover cases where the relationship is an 
important factor in the decision, there is no reason to stop at cases of what are here called 
"relations of advantage"; it is apt to cover a wide range of cases, including those of undue 
influence and breach of fiduciary duty as well as many other legal doctrines, wherever 
it is against conscience for the stronger party to enforce the contract. See Waddams 
Contracts Ch 14. By way of contrast, see Tip lady 1983 MLR 601 who argues that many 
of such cases are well able to be resolved without reference to the concept of an 
"unconscionable" contract or a "harsh and unfair" bargain, at all. 
238 Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125 at 154; Davis v Duke of 
Marlborough (1819) 2 Swans 108; Samuel v Newbold [ 1906] AC 461 at 470; National 
Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686. 
239 See Buckley v Irwin [1960] NI 98; In Canada; Knupp v Bell (1968) 67 DLR (2d) 256; 
Marshall v Canada Permanent Trust Co (1968) 69 DLR (2d) 260; Mundinger v 
Mundinger (1968) 3 DLR (3d) 338. 
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The reference to "relations of advantage" is not favoured by many modern theorists who tend to 
emphasize the resulting transaction rather than the relation which brought it about, and hence 
speak, (as has been said) of "unconscionable" contracts or transactions. 240 
Though the terms "unfair advantage" or "undue advantage", or simply "advantage", have not 
hitherto been adopted to indicate any particular legal category, nevertheless their use is well 
established in the law241 to describe the objectionable feature of some cases where the transaction 
is set aside. 
The doctrine of"unfair advantage" depends, as an essential condition to its applicability, on there 
being an "inequality" between the parties in the sense already indicated; that is to say, in Lord 
Hardwicke' s language, 242 there must be both "weakness on one side" and "on the other advantage 
taken of that weakness". 243 Inequality in any other sense is absolutely irrelevant. A mere disparity 
in natural qualities, resources, 244 or fortuitous advantages, comes to nothing. The inequality must 
have been a factitious one: a case must be shown of marked cards, loaded dice, or "a little 
shuffling" of the rapiers. 245 It must appear that the stronger party either brought about the 
unevenness in the conditions, or, finding it ready to hand, utilized and traded on it to extract from 
240 See, eg, Waddams 1976 MLR 369; Chitty Contracts 429-430. The concept of an 
unconscionable contract is favoured in statutory provisions dealing with unequal 
bargains, particularly in the area of consumer protection, but these are beyond the scope 
of the present inquiry because of their focus on the harshness of the contract rather than 
the means by which it is brought about. See (in respect of credit contracts), Moneylenders 
Actofl900s1 (now repealed); ss 137-141 oftheConsumerCreditActof1974andalso 
(in respect of exemption clauses and other contractual stipulations or reservations) the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. But it cannot be said that the distinction is a very 
clear one, and it will be noted that the latter Act contains in its 2nd Schedule express 
provisions allowing the courts to have regard to similar considerations to those taken into 
account by courts exercising their inherent jurisdiction to deal with relations of 
advantage. 
241 As Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 601 points out, the terms have not yet attained the 
status of terms of art, in the same way as have the expressions "undue influence" and 
"fiduciary duty", but they are frequently found in cases dealing with this subject, and are 
nearly as ancient; see, eg, Evans v Llewellin (1787) 1 Cox CC 333 at 340; Baker v Monk 
(1864) 4 De G J & S 388 at 394; Clarke v Malpas (1862) 4 De G F & J 401at405; Rees 
v De Bernardy [1896] 2 Ch 437 at 441. 
242 Earl o/Chesterfieldvlanssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125 at 155-157. 
243 Ibid 
244 Osmondv Fitzroy (1731) 3 P Wms 129 at 129-130. 
245 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 608. 
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the weaker party a gift or contract which would not otherwise have been made. 246 Wherever the 
weaker party has been unable to establish "circumstances and conditions" of the kind 
contemplated by Lord Hardwicke no relief has been given. 247 
Though judicial language may have changed, the underlying basis on which the court intervenes 
appears to remain the same in the twentieth century. 248 
Two theories are propounded, namely the victimization or fraud approach, and the "inequality 
of bargaining power" approach to problems in regard to unfair advantage. 
In regard to the "victimization" or "fraud", approach the "unfair conduct" which must be 
established is described as "victimization, which can consist either of the active extortion of a 
benefit or the passive acceptance of a benefit in unconscionable circumstances" .249 The Privy 
Council's use of the words "passive victimization"250 leave the matter very much open to further 
legal development and elucidation.251 
A more ambitious attempt to define the element of inequality of bargaining power in the case, 
and at the same time to put the doctrine in a wider context, is made by Lord Denning :MR in 
246 Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd and Another v Marden [1979] 1 Ch 84; Alec Lobb 
(Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] 1 All ER 303; Hart v O'Connor 
[1985] AC 1000; Boustany v Pigott [1993] NPC 75. 
247 Proof of these facts failed in Farmer v Farmer (1848) 1 HLC 724; Harrison v Guest 
(1860) 8 HLC 481; Haygarth v Wearing (1871) LR 12 Eq 320 at 327; Armstrong v 
Armstrong (1873) IR 8 Eq 1; Henry v Armstrong (1881) 18 Ch D 668 at 669; Howes v 
Bishop [1909] 2 KB 390 at 398-399. 
248 See, eg, the Privy Council decision in Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000; Dyck v 
Manitoba Snowmobile Association Inc (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 635. 
249 Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000 at 1024. The latter form of "victimization", if such it 
can be called, is well established; see Baker v Monk (1864) 4 De G J & S 388; Earl of 
AylesfordvMorris (1873) LR 8 Ch App 484 at 490; Fry v Lane (1888) 40 ChD 312 at 
321. In Australia, see Commercial Bank of AustraliaLtdv Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; 
(1983) 46 ALR 402 at 422 where Deane J said that in such cases the weakness must be 
"sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make it prima f acie 'unfair' or 
'unconscientious' that he procure, or accept, the weaker party's assent". 
250 The term "victimize" has also been used in respect of undue influence; Allcardv Skinner 
(1887) 36 Ch D 145 at 182; See, also, Tufton v Sperni [1952] 2 TLR 516 at 528; Re 
Craig,_Meneces v Middleton [1971] Ch 95 at 101-102; National Westminster Bank pie 
v Morgan [1985] AC 686 at 705. 
251 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 611. 
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Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundj52 where he states, with reference to undue influence cases that: 
"Gathering all together, I would suggest that through all these instances there runs a 
single thread. They rest on 'inequality of bargaining power'. By virtue of it, the English 
law gives relief to one who, without independent advice, enters into a contract upon terms 
which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is grossly 
inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs 
or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue influences or 
pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of the other." 
Lord Denning' s views on this matter excited considerable controversy when they were put 
forward; later, they met with judicial disapproval.253 
It has been suggested that it might have been more helpful, and certainly would have been more 
accurate, if Lord Denning had conceded that a contract or transaction need not always be "very 
unfair" or the consideration "grossly inadequate" before the court will intervene in the various 
classes of case he mentions. 254 While the inequality of the bargain is obviously an important 
consideration255 it is not always seen as an indispensable prerequisite to a holding of unfair 
advantage, 256 and past decisions are not to be treated as laying down any particular standards of 
252 [1975] QB 326. There are several other judgments delivered by Lord Denning MR to the 
same effect, such as Arrale v Costain Civil Engineering Ltd [ 197 6] 1 Lloyds Rep 98 at 
102; Levison v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co Ltd [ 1978] QB 69 at 78-79; Langdale 
v Danby, The Times Nov 24, 1981. 
253 See National Westminster Bank pie v Morgan [ 1985] AC 686; It has been well received 
in Canada. Waddams Contracts 334 points out that it has been followed in a number of 
cases. The case law which has resulted is assessed not unfavourably by Enman 1987 
Anglo Am LR 210-214 though he concedes that it is somewhat uneven; and a much less 
favourable prognosis is offered by Vaver 1988 Canadian Bus LJ 40. 
254 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 612. In Canada, Lambert J, delivering a concurring 
judgment in Harry v Kreutziger (1978) 95 DLR (3 rd) 231 at 241, suggested a wider test 
namely "whether the transaction, seen as a whole is sufficiently divergent from 
community standards of commercial morality that it should be rescinded", arguing that 
this method of expression prevents the "real issue from being obscured by an isolated 
consideration of a number of separate questions". The problem with that, is that it is not 
clear from the judgment how "community standards" are to be determined by a judge 
without resort to introspection based on a consideration of each of the various aspects 
mentioned above. 
255 Nicols v Gould (1752) 2 Ves Sen 422; Griffith v Spratley (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 383 at 
388-389; Cresswell v Potter [1978] 1WLR255 at 257. 
256 In Australia, see Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 at 405, instancing Cooke v 
Clayworth (1811) 18 Ves 12 (though "inadequacy of consideration .... will often be a 
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unfairness or inequality which later courts should follow. 257 Lord Denning' s formulation thus 
appears to give undue force to a single and apparently unchangeable element in cases of 
unconscionability, namely, inequality of exchange. 
Lord Denning' s statement was strongly criticized as a departure from principle, by Lord Scarman 
when the latter was delivering the principal speech of the House of Lords in National 
Westminster Bank pie v Morgan, 258 although not for the reasons so far put forward. The first of 
Lord Scarman's objections is that the law of undue influence also applies to transactions by way 
of gift, where the concept of 11 inequality of bargaining power" is inappropriate. 259 The second 
objection is that 11 even in the field of contract I question whether there is any need in modem law 
to erect a general principle of relief against inequality of bargaining power", 260 since in his view 
this would be to embark on an essentially legislative task, and one where Parliament had itself 
determined what limits on contractual freedom should be imposed, and what remedies 
afforded.261 
Rather than define closely what is meant by "victimization" or 11fraud 11 in an equitable sense, the 
courts in the nineteenth century often preferred to infer such wrongdoing from a consideration 
of the surrounding facts of the case, when those facts indicated (by reason of the apparent 
weakness of one party, and an unexplained benefit received by the other) that some underhand 
dealing may have taken place. As will be seen, the presumptive process was adopted particularly 
in cases involving dealings with expectant heirs and others in poverty and want.262 And there 
specially important element in cases of this type"); Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v 
Amadio (1983) 151CLR447 at 475. 
257 In New Zealand, see Harris v Richardson [1930] NZLR 890 at 920. 
258 [1985] AC 686 at 707-708; 31 Halsbury par 854n2. 
259 Although it seems that the principle applied in such cases would not be too dissimilar, 
and it is likely that a slight change of wording could meet Lord Scarman' s objection. 
See, in Australia, Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 at 126; Wilton v Farnworth 
(1948) 76 CLR 646 at 655. 
260 National Westminster Bank pie v Morgan [1985] AC 686 at 708. 
261 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 614 n4, finds it surprising that, in this area of law in 
particular, Lord Scarman should have insisted on so rigorous a division between judicial 
and legislative lawmaking functions. The doctrine of equitable fraud existed for centuries 
alongside extensive statutory provisions dealing with usury. 
262 Cheshire Contract 428; Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312; Cresswell v Potter [1978] 1 
WLR 255; Backhouse v Backhouse [1978] 1 All ER 1158; Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 
1000. 
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were also some extreme cases where the necessary "circumstances and conditions" were 
established by mere inference from the enormity of the transaction itself, the provisions and 
contents of which may be so extravagant and oppressive ex f acie as to raise a presumption at 
once against the stronger party, without further enquiry.263 In approaching this problem by way 
of a presumption, the courts maintained consistency not only with their treatment of cases of 
undue influence, but also with the underlying theory of "presumptive" or inferred fraud as stated 
by Lord Hardwicke in the foundation authority on this subject. 264 
If satisfactory evidence was given of facts of such a nature as to constitute those classes of 
relation, the same presumption265 in favour of the weaker party was made, and the same burden 
of repelling it was at once cast upon the stronger party, as in the case of any of the domestic or 
professional relations considered in relation to the law of undue influence. The presumption here 
was of an unconscientious use of power arising out of the circumstances and conditions of the 
parties contracting. Thus, inEarl of Aylesfordv Morris, 266 the second of the two classical sources 
for the law of unfair advantage, Lord Selborne LC, dealing with a case of an extortionate bargain 
entered into with an expectant heir, observes that: 
" ... when the relative position of the parties is such as prima facie to raise this 
presumption, the transaction cannot stand unless the person claiming the benefit of it is 
able to repel the presumption by contrary evidence, proving it to have been in point of 
fact fair, just and reasonable. "267 
263 Dunnage v White (1818) 1Swans137 at 150-151;MacCabe vHussey (1831) 5 Bligh NS 
715 at 729. The stronger party's difficulties in sustaining the transaction were 
accentuated, in some of these cases, by false recitals in the relevant deeds; see, also, 
Bridgman v Green (1757) Wilm 58 at 62-64. 
264 Earl ofChesterfieldvJanssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125. 
265 Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000. 
266 (1873) LR 8 Ch App 484. 
267 Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873) LR 8 Ch App 484 at 491. Although Lord Selborne was 
at this point speaking generally of the doctrine of undue influence, it is clear that he 
intended his comments to apply equally to cases of expectant heirs. See Spencer Bower 
Non-Disclosure 618. His observations have been followed in decisions of high authority. 
See Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales Ltdv Bridgewater [1936] 3 All ER 501 
at 508 (PC on appeal from Australia, Lord Russell). In Australia, see Blomley v Ryan 
(1956) 99 CLR362 at428-429. In Canada, seeMorrison v Coast Finance Ltd(1965) 55 
DLR (2d) 710 noted by Crawford 1966 Can Bar Rev 142; Harry v Kreutziger (1978) 95 
DLR (3rd) 231 at 236. In New Zealand, see Harris v Richardson [1930] NZLR 890 at 
918. 
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The courts have no jurisdiction to interfere merely because the transaction is an improvident 
one.
268 Nor is there any established equitable jurisdiction (short of the legal doctrine of 
frustration) to relieve a party of the harsh consequences of a contract in events which have not 
been foreseen. 269 The central substantive issue is whether the contract or other transaction is in 
all the circumstances a 11fair 11 one, and "unfairness" usually involves more than inequality of 
power or exchange: it requires "victimization" .270 
It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss particular relations of advantage in detail. Suffice 
it to say that particular examples of relations of advantage can be considered under two principal 
headings. The first comprises the courts' ancient jurisdiction over dealing with "catching 
bargains" made with expectant heirs and others similarly placed.271 The second comprises all 
other types of the taking of unfair advantage. 
2.3 APPLICATION OF ENGLISH COMMON-LAW DISCLOSURE PRINCIPLES TO 
SURETYSHIP 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The English contract of suretyship, more commonly referred to as a guarantee, has been 
defined272 as an accessory contract273 by which the promissor undertakes to be answerable274 to 
268 Clark v Ma/pas (1862) 4 De G F & J 401 at 403; White and Carter (Councils) Ltd v 
McGregor [ 1962] AC 413 at 445; Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd [ 1962] AC 600 
at 626; Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090; (1981) 125 Sol J 528; 
Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltdv Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd[l985] 1WLR173 at 182. In 
New Zealand, seeBrusewitz v Brown [1923] NZLR 1106 at 1109. The only exception to 
this rule may exist where the undervalue is very gross. See Clark v Ma/pas, ibid, at 403; 
Griffith v Spratley (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 383 at 389. 
269 Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd and Others v Marden [ 1979] 1 Ch 84 at 112-113. 
270 Chitty Contract 431. 
271 The prominent case being Earl ofChesteljieldvJanssen(1151)2 Ves Sen 125. See, also, 
Earl of Aylesfordv Morris (1873) LR 8 Ch App 484; Nevill v Snelling (1880) 15 ChD 
679. 
272 Mercers Co v New Hampshire Insurance Co [1992] 3 All ER 57. 
273 Re Stratton, Ex parte Salting (1883) 25 Ch D 148 at 151; Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd 
[1973] AC 331at347. 
274 "Translated into modern legal terminology 'to answer for' is 'to accept liability for'. 11 See 
Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] AC 331 at 347. 
81 
the promisee for the debt, default or miscarriage275 of another person, whose primary liability to 
the promisee must exist or be contemplated.276 
A contract of suretyship, like any other contract, is liable to be avoided if induced by a material 
misrepresentation of an existing fact, even if made innocently. 277 
Misrepresentation may be either written278 or oral. 279 It usually consists of the direct assertion by 
the creditor280 of "fact" which is not fact and which is calculated to influence a person to become 
a guarantor. 281 However, it may also consist of statements by the creditor which tell only a 
misleading part of the truth, 282 or arise from the creditor's failure to correct a statement which 
he believed to be true when he made it , but which he subsequently discovers to be untrue, or a 
275 11 ••• 'debt, default or miscarriage' is descriptive of failure to perform legal obligations, 
existing or future, arising from any source, not only from contractual promises, but in any 
other factual situations capable of giving rise to legal obligations such as those resulting 
from bailment, tort or unsatisfied judgments". SeeMoschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] 
AC 331 at 347-348. 
276 There must be a principal obligation of some other principal obliger to which the 
guarantee is to be ancillary and subsidiary. See Swan v Bank of Scotland (1836) 10 Bligh 
NS 627; Lakeman v Mountstephen (1874) LR 7 HL 17 at 24-25; Laugher v Molyneux 
[1916] 1KB718; General Surety and Guarantee CoLtdv Francis Parker Ltd(1977) 6 
BLR 16 at 21. 
277 See, in regard to materiality, Davies v London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co 
(1878) 8 Ch D 469; Bank of New South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR42; in regard to 
factuality, see National Bank of New Zealand v Macintosh (1881) 3 NZLR 217; in regard 
to fault, see, eg, Mackenzie v Royal Bank of Canada [1934] AC 468; the 
Misrepresentation Act of 1967. 
278 Lee v Jones (1864) 17 CB (NS) 482. 
279 Blest v Brown (1862) 4 De GF & J 367. 
280 Circumstances in which the creditor will be affected by misrepresentation or other 
wrongdoing by the principal debtor or other third party, shall be discussed below. 
281 Foster v Mackinnon (1869) LR4 CP 704; Lewis v Clay (1897) 67 LJQB 244. Thus, if to 
a question asked by the proposed surety as to the existence of trade debts owing by the 
principal debtor, the creditor's agent replies in the negative, when in point of fact there 
is one such debt owing, this amounts to misrepresentation: Blest v Brown (1862) 4 De GF 
& J 3 67; as does also a gratuitous assertion that an estate is free from incumbrances, other 
than those specifically mentioned, when in fact there is another and undisclosed 
incumbrance: see Willis v Willis (1850) 17 Sim 218. See, also, Stone v Compton (1838) 
5 Bing NC 142, a case of a misleading statement that a sum owing by the principal debtor 
to the creditor had already been paid; M'Kewan v Thornton ( 1861) 2 F & F 5 94 an alleged 
misrepresentation as to the state of the principal debtor's account with the creditor bank. 
282 Willis v Willis (1850) 17 Sim 218; Lee v Jones (1864) 17 CB (NS) 482. 
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statement which was true when made ,but which has subsequently become, to his knowledge, 
untrue. 283 Whether the non-disclosure of a fact amounts to a representation of its non-existence 
is, in every case, a question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances. 284 
The primary remedy for misrepresentation is rescission. 285 However, rescission may be refused 
and damages awarded in lieu if it is equitable to do so, having regard to the nature of the 
misrepresentation and the loss that would be caused by it if the contract were upheld, as well as 
to the loss which rescission would cause to the other party.286 The right to rescind may be lost by 
affirmation of the guarantee287 by the fact that the parties cannot be restored to their pre-
contractual positions,288 and by the intervention of third-party rights. 289 Damages may be awarded 
for loss caused by misrepresentation. 290 There are restrictions on the right to exclude or restrict 
liability for misrepresentation. 291 
As I have pointed out, in English law non-disclosure is not seen as part of the concept of 
misrepresentation, but rather as a doctrine with its own rules. An ordinary contract of guarantee, 
283 Davies v London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co (1878) 8 ChD 469 at 475. 
284 Lee v Jones (1864) 17 CB (NS) 482; London General Omnibus Co Ltd v Holloway 
[1912] 2 KB 72 at 77. Apart from these cases, mere silence is not in general 
misrepresentation; see Fox v Mackreth (1788) 2 Bro CC 400 on appeal (1791) 2 CoxEq 
Cas 320 at 320-321; Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 at 227. 
285 See, eg, MacKenzie v Royal Bank of Canada [1934] AC 468; s 1 of the Misrepresentation 
Act of 1967 and 20 Halsbury par 123 et seq. 
286 S 2 (2) of the Misrepresentation Act of 1967. In Wardv National Bank of New Zealand 
(1886) 4 NZLR 35 a guarantor was induced by misrepresentation to give a second 
guarantee in substitution for the first. The court refused to set the second guarantee aside 
except on terms that the guarantor restored the creditor bank to the position that it was 
in before the second guarantee was given. 
287 20 Halsbury para 123 . 
288 20 Halsbury para 123. 
289 20 Halsbury para 123. 
290 See s 2 of the the Misrepresentation Act of 1967 and 20 Hals bury par 123. In appropriate 
circumstances, a misrepresentation may also give rise to a cause of action in the tort of 
deceit or the tort of negligence; see, eg, Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] 2 All 
ER5. 
291 Sees 3 of the Misrepresentation Act of 1967 (substituted bys 8(1) of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act of 1977); and 20 Halsbury par 123. 
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unlike a contract of insurance,292 is not a contract uberrimae fidei, 293 requiring full disclosure of 
all material facts by the contracting parties. 294 
2.3.2 Matters which need not be disclosed 
On the basis that an ordinary contract of guarantee is not one uberrimae fidei, 295 it has been held 
that a creditor (who had not been specifically asked)296 was under no duty to disclose to an 
intending surety the fact that the principal debtor was already overdrawn, 297 or the extent of that 
292 For the principle that insurance is a contract uberrimae fidei, see London Assurance Co 
v Mansel (1879) 11 Ch D 363; Container Transport International Inc and Reliance 
Group Inc v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd [1984] 1 Lloyds 
Rep 476; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyds 
Rep 496. 
293 It was formerly held that a creditor's duty of disclosure when communicating with a 
surety was similar to that of a person seeking insurance; Owen v Homan (1851) 3 Mac 
& G 378 at 397 per Lord Truro. But in offering his opinion Lord Truro had failed to 
notice the celebrated speech in the Lords of Lord Campbell in Hamilton v Watson ( 184 5) 
12 Cl & Fin 109, as was soon pointed out in the later case of North British Insurance Co 
v Lloyd (1854) 10 Exch 523 in which it was held that a contract of suretyship is not one 
requiring disclosure of all material facts. 
294 Williams v Rawlinson (1825) 3 Bing 71; Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 CL & Fin 109 at 
118-1191; North British Insurance Co v Lloyd (1854) 10 Exch 523; Wythes v Labouchere 
(1859) 3 De G & J 593; Lee v Jones (1864) 17 CB (NS) 482; Davies v London and 
Provincial Marine Insurance Co (1878) 8 Ch D 469 at 475; London General Omnibus 
Co Ltd v Holloway [ 1912] 2 KB 72 at 81. There is no magic in the use of the word 
11insurance11 or 11 guarantee". Many contracts may with equal propriety be called by either 
term, in English law; whether the contract is one requiring uberrima fides depends upon 
its substantial character. See Seaton v Heath [1899] 1 QB 782 at 792 per Romer LJ 
revised, without affecting this point, sub nom Seaton v Burnand, Burnand v Seaton 
[1900] AC 135. 
295 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109; Lee v Jones (1864) 17 CB (NS) 482. 
296 If the intending guarantor is unacquainted with the risk he is undertaking he should 
inquire about it; Seaton v Heath, Seaton v Burnand [1899] 1 QB 782 at 793, per Romer 
LJ revised without affecting this point, sub nom Seaton v Burnand, Burnand v Seaton 
[1900] AC 135. For the creditor's obligation to give proper answers to the guarantor's 
questions see Parsons v Barclay & Co Ltd and Goddard ( 1910) 103 LT 196; Westminster 
Bank Ltd v Cond (1940) 46 Com Cas 60 at 69. 
297 As it is not a matter of presumption that a customer's account stands clear at the time the 
guarantee is given, the surety should inquire about it. See Kirby v Duke of Marlborough 
and Another ( 1813) 2 M & S 18 at .22. Where a bond is given for the continuance of an 
old bank account the guarantor will not be discharged by the non-disclosure of the fact 
of the principal debtor's having a balance against him duly secured at the date of the 
bond, as it is well known that such accounts are not carried on until the old balance has 
been secured; Williams v Rawlinson (1825) 3 Bing 71at77. See, also, Lloyds BankLtd 
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overdraft or other indebtedness to the creditor, 298 whether the principal debtor is in the habit of 
overdrawing, 299 how the principal debtor's account has been kept, 300 the fact that the principal 
debtor's account has been conducted in an irregular way, 301 whether the principal debtor has been 
punctual in his dealings, 302 the fact that the creditor bank has dishonoured cheques drawn by the 
principal debtor, 303 the fact that the principal debtor has previously defaulted,304 the fact that the 
creditor is suspicious that the principal debtor has been defrauding him, 305 the fact that the 
husband of the principal debtor, who has authority to draw on the account to be guaranteed, is 
an undischarged bankrupt, 306 the fact that the manager of the creditor bank had "taken partial 
v Harrison (1925) 4 LDAB 12; Wes/minister Bank Ltd v Cond (1940) 46 Com Cas 60; 
Cooper v National Provincial Bank Ltd [ 1946] 1 KB 1 (England); Commercial Bank of 
AustraliaLtdvAmadio (1983) 151 CLR447 at 455-463 (Australia). But see Lee vJones 
(1864) 17 CB (NS) 482 where the guarantee was of payments to be made by an agent to 
his merchant principals, and it was held that non-disclosure of existing arrears was in the 
circumstances evidence of fraud. It was held, at 505 per Blackbum J: 
"It depends whether in such a transaction as that described in the agreement it 
might or might not naturally be expected that the matters might have allowed a 
balance of this extent to accumulate and might have allowed the amount to stand 
unsettled over so long a time. 11 , 
298 Hamiltonv Watson(1845) 12Cl&Fin109;RoyalBankofScotlandvGreenshields 1914 
SC 259; London General Omnibus Co Ltd v Holloway [1912] 2 KB 72. National 
Provincial Bank of England Ltd v Glanusk [1913] 3 KB 335. 
299 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109. "No surety asked to guarantee a banking 
account is entitled to assume that the customer of the bank has not been in the habit of 
overdrawing; the proper presumption in most instances is that he has been doing so, and 
wishes to do so again": London General Omnibus Co Ltdv Holloway [1912] 2 KB 72 at 
83 per Farwell J. 
300 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109; London General Omnibus Co Ltd v 
Holloway [1912] 2 KB 72. 
301 Cooper v National Provincial Bank Ltd [ 1946] 1 KB 1, a case of cheques drawn then 
countermanded. 
302 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109. 
3 03 National Provincial Bank of England Ltd v Glanusk [ 1913] 3 KB 3 3 5. 
304 Roper v Cox (1882) 10 LR IR 200, a case where the principal debtor was guilty of gross 
irregularity and delay in paying rent, and substantially in arrears at date of guarantee. See, 
also, Home Insurance Co v Holway (1881) 39 American Reports 179. 
305 Bank of_Scotland v The Morrison 1911 SC 593 at 602; National Provincial Bank of 
England Ltdv Glanusk [1913] 3 KB 335 at 339; Royal Bank of Scotlandv Greenshields 
1914 SC 259. 
3 06 Cooper v National Provincial Bank Ltd [ 1946] 1 KB 1. 
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control" of the principal debtor's business,307 whether the principal debtor has performed his 
promises in an honourable manner, 308 the fact that the creditor intends to lend a further substa.'ltial 
sum on the faith of the guarantee, 309 or the fact that the guarantee is required because another 
guarantor wishes to retire. 310 
2.3.3 Where disclosure is required 
There are, nevertheless, four circumstances311 in which the creditor must make disclosure to an 
intending guarantor: 
(1) where the creditor is asked a specific question;312 
(2) where a bank misleads the guarantor by volunteering only part of the truth;313 
(3) where the guarantor makes a statement in the creditor's presence that demontrates that 
he entirely misunderstands the principal debtor's position;314 and 
( 4) where there is anything that might not naturally be expected to take place between the 
principal debtor and the creditor, something the surety would not expect to exist. 315 
307 Lloyds Bank Ltd v Harrison (1925) 4 LDAB 12 (CA). The bank manager had agreed to 
give an extended credit to the principal debtor only on terms that he should not buy 
further stock, but should confine his business to selling his existing stock, and should lay 
off certain of his employees. 
308 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109. 
309 Westminster Bank Ltd v Cond (1940) 46 Com Cas 60. 
310 North British Insurance Co v Lloyd (1854) 10 Exch 523. 
311 Apart from statutory compulsion to make disclosure. See eg, s 47 of the Financial 
Services Act of 1986 which provides that a person who makes a statement, promise or 
forecast which he knows or realizes is likely to be misleading, false or deceptive, or 
dishonestly conceals any material facts, for the purpose ofinducing another to enter into 
an investment, commits an offence. 
312 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109; Royal Bank of Scotland v Greenshields 1914 
SC 259; Westminster Bank Ltd v Cond (1940) 46 Com Cas 60. 
313 Royal Bank of Scotland v Greenshields 1914 SC 259. 
314 Royal Bank of Scotland v Greenshields 1914 SC 259. 
315 Hamilton v Watson (1845) l2 Cl & Fin 109atl19;NationalProvincialBankofEngland 
Ltdv Glanusk [1913] 3 KB 335 at 338;LloydsBankLtdv Harrison (1925) 4 LDAB 12 
(CA) at 13, per Sir Ernest Pollock :MR and at 15-16 per Bankes LJ; Cooper v National 
Provincial Bank Ltd [1946] 1 KB 1; Levett and Others v Barclays Bank pie [1995] 2 All 
ER 615 at 628. 
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2.3.3.1 The duty to answer questions 
It is the duty of a creditor to give a true, honest and accurate answer to any specific question 
directed to him by an intending guarantor which is in any way material to the giving of the 
guarantee. 316 If the creditor's answer is misleading, it may amount to a misrepresentation and so 
entitle the guarantor to avoid the guarantee. 
The questioner must be careful in putting his questions. As Spencer Bower17 points out, ifthe 
question is too hastily or unskillfully put, it may prove to be disadvantageous to him as the asking 
of a question on one aspect of a proposed contract may serve as an indication that some other 
question, which has not been asked, was regarded by the parties as immaterial. 
2.3.3.2 Disclosure of special circumstances 
The creditor must disclose to an intending guarantor anything which might not naturally be 
expected to take place between the parties who are concerned in the transaction, namely whether 
there is a contract between the debtor and the creditor to the effect that the debtor's position is 
to be different from that which the guarantor might naturally expect. 318 
The omission to mention any such special fact is an implied representation to the intending 
guarantor that it does not exist,319 entitling the guarantor upon discovering the true position to 
avoid the guarantee. 320 
316 Westminster Bank Ltd v Cond (1940) 46 Com Cas 60 at 69. The creditor is not obliged 
to make inquiries in order to answer, merely to answer truthfully from the information 
which he has. See Parsons v Barclay & Co Ltd and Goddard (1910) 103 LT 196. 
317 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 168. 
318 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109 at 119. See, also, Smith and Others v The 
Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland (1813) 1 Dow 272; Railton v Matthews 
(1844) 10 Cl & Fin 934; North British Insurance Co v Lloyd (1854) 10 Exch 523; Lee 
v Jones (1864) 17 CB (NS) 482 at 503-504; Phillips v Foxall (1872) LR 7 QB 666; 
London General Omnibus Co Ltd v Holloway [ 1912] 2 KB 72; National Provincial Bank 
of England Ltd v Glanusk [1913] 3 KB 335 at 338; Royal Bank of Scotland v 
Greenshields 1914 SC 259; Lloyds BankLtdv Harrison (1925) 4 LDAB 12 at 13, CA 
per Sir Ernest Pollock MR and at 15-16; Westminster Bank Ltd v Cond (1940) 46 Com 
Cas 60 at 69; Cooper v National Provincial Bank Ltd [ 1946] 1 KB 1 at 6; Commercial 
Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 447. 
319 See the cases cited in the previous note. 
320 MacKenzie v Royal Bank of Canada [1934] AC 468. 
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It depends on the circumstances of each case whether a fact not disclosed is such that it is 
impliedly represented not to exist. 321 In general the guarantor should be informed of every private 
bargain between the creditor and the principal debtor varying the degree of the guarantor's 
responsibility, 322 and it may sometimes become necessary even to disclose the existence and 
nature of an agreement between the creditor and some person other than the principal debtor. 323 
It has been held, for example, that a creditor was obliged to disclose to an intending guarantor 
the existence of an agreement that part of the· advance to be secured by the guarantee was to be 
applied to repay a pre-existing debt. 324 The guarantor was held to be discharged by the creditor's 
failure to disclose a further incumbrance, where an estate was conveyed to a person "free from 
encumbrances" except those set out in a particular schedule, in consideration of that person and 
his guarantor doing certain things. 325 Where the creditor failed to disclose his understanding with 
the principal debtor that the promissory note, in which the guarantor had joined the principal 
debtor, should not be payable for five years ,but should bear interest at five per cent per annum, 
secured by a separate promissory note given by the principal debtor, the guarantor was also held 
to be discharged. 326 Similarly, the guarantor was held to be discharged where the creditor made 
a secret arrangement to take payment of his debt in full, the guarantee having been given to 
321 LeevJones(1864) 17 CB (NS) 482 at 506;LondonGeneralOmnibusCoLtdvHolloway 
[1912] 2 KB 72 especially at 85-88. 
322 Smith and Others v The Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland (1813) 1 Dow 
272 at 292; Pidcock v Bishop (1825) 3 B & C 605; Stone v Compton (1838) 5 Bing BC 
142 at 157; Pendlebury v Walker (1841) 4 Y & C Ex424;RailtonvMatthews (1844) 10 
Cl & Fin 934; Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109; Burke v Rogerson (1866) 14 
LT 780; Mackreth v Walmesley (1884) 51LT19. 
323 Stiffv Eastbourne Local Board (1886) 19 LT 408. In the case of a surety for payment of 
part of the purchase money of ships, it has been held that the fact that one of the ships is 
laden with munitions of war destined for a belligerent port should be disclosed to the 
surety. Burke v Rogerson (1866) 14 LT 780. 
324 Stone v Compton (1838) 5 Bing NC 142 where the mortgage for the same sum as the 
guarantee, which was read over to the guarantor, recited that the full sum was being 
advanced. In fact it had been agreed that part of it should be kept back to pay a pre-
existing debt, which the mortgage recited as paid. See, also, Lee v Jones (1864) 17 CB 
(NS) 482 andBlestv Brown (1862) 4 DeGF & J 367. SeeMackrethv Walmesley(1884) 
51 LT 19 where the creditor was held not to have been obliged to disclose an arrangement 
made by the principal debtor to pay a debt to another surety with the advance to be 
guaranteed; Smith and Others v The Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland 
(1813) 1 Dow 272; Westminster Bank Ltd v Cond (1940) 46 Com Cas 60; Cooper v 
National Provincial Bank Ltd [ 1946] 1 KB 1. 
325 Willis v Willis (1850) 17 Sim 218 and see Blest v Brown (1862) 4 De G F & J 367. 
326 Espey v Lake (1852) 10 Hare 260. 
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secure an advance to enable the debtor to pay a composition agreed by the general body of 
creditors. 327 
2.3.3.4 No duty on bank to explain 
There is no special obligation upon a person to whom another is about to give a guarantee, to 
explain the meaning or effect of the guarantee, any more than a person who is taking from 
another any other species of deed or instrument which is to enure to the benefit of the person 
taking it, is under such obligation. 328 
The fact that the creditor is a bank or other large institution does not impose upon it an obligation 
to explain, without being asked, the meaning or effect of the guarantee, whether the intending 
guarantor is a customer of the bank329 or not. 330 Nor is a bank, unasked, obliged to advise the 
guarantor on the financial wisdom of the transaction,331 or to recommend the customer to take 
327 Pendlebury v Walker (1841) 4 Y & C Ex 424. 
328 Small v Currie (1853) 2 Drewry 102 at 114-115. 
329 Barclays Bank pie v Khaira and Another [1992] 1WLR623, not following the obiter 
dictum of Kerr LJ in Cornish v Midland Bank pie (Humes, third party) [ 1985] 3 All ER 
513 at 522-523. See, also, Chetwynd-Talbot v Midland Bank Ltd (1982) 132 NLJ90l. 
330 O'Hara v Allied Irish Banks Ltd [1985] BCLC 52; Union Bank of Finland v Lelakis 
[1995] CLC 27. However, seethe new Codes ofBankingPractice (2) and (3). The Codes 
contain provisions to the effect that that banks will advise private individuals, proposing 
to give them a guarantee or other security for another person's liabilities: 
(a) that by giving the guarantee or other security he or she might become liable 
instead of or as well as that other person, and 
(b) that he or she should seek independent legal advice before entering into that 
guarantee or security. In Lloyds Bank pie v Waterhouse (1991) IO Tr LR 161, 
WoolfLJ referred to Lloyds Bank's similar internal rule as "what I would expect 
of a responsible financial institution". See, also, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
Barclays Bank pie v O'Brien and Another [1994] 1 AC 180 at 197, who referred 
approvingly to these good banking practices. In Union Bank of Finland v Lelakis 
[1995] CLC 27 the surety defendant argued that Lord Browne-Wilkinson's 
remarks in the O'Brien case [1994] 1AC180, supported a general duty to advise 
prospective sureties, but this submission was rejected. It would seem as if, in 
principle, the adoption of the Code has not imposed any legal duty to advise a 
guarantor as to the effect of the proposed transaction. Whether this would remain 
the case in view of the promissory tone of the third edition of the code, (par 3 .14) 
remains to be seen. It is possible that as par 3 .14 is now addressed to the customer 
and not to the surety, there may be no reason to give it more contractual effect 
than the corresponding provisions in the two earlier editions. 
331 Midland Bank pie v Hubbard (Unreported, February 16, 1993, (CA)). See Schioler v 
Westminster Bank Ltd [1970] 2 QB 719; [197-0] 3 All ER 177; Williams and Glynn 's 
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legal advice. 332 
If, however, the creditor does give the intending guarantor any explanation, it must be sufficiently 
accurate and complete so as not to be misleading. 333 
2.3.4 Duress 
A guarantee procured by duress by the creditor is liable to be set aside. 334 Duress may take the 
Bank Ltd v Barnes [1981] Com LR 205; Redmond v Allied Irish Banks pie [1987] 2 
FTLR 264. Where a guarantee policy is given for the solvency of a surety for the maker 
of a promissory note, the non-disclosure by the holders of the policy of the rate ofinterest 
and the circumstances of the loan obtained by means of the promissory note does not 
afford any defence to the guarantor in the absence of evidence that these facts were 
material to the ordinary risk he undertook. See Seaton v Burnand, Burnand v Seaton 
[1900] AC 135. 
332 Wardv Hobbs (1878) 4 App Cas 13; Hurley v Dyke [1979] RTR265; Barclays Bankplc 
v Khaira and Another [1992] 1 WLR 623. The question of independent advice brings 
about its own special problems. In Levett and Others v Barclays Bank pie [ 1995] 2 All 
ER 615, eg, the bank had arranged for the surety to obtain independent advice, but it was 
held that this was to no effect as the bank officer did not explain to the solicitor, who was 
to advise Levett, of a key term in the contract. 
333 CornishvMidlandBankplc (Humes, third party) [1985] 3 AllER513. InMidlandBank 
pie v Hubbard (Unreported, February 16,1993, (CA)) the bank manager told the wife, 
about to mortgage her home to secure the indebtedness of her husband's company, that 
the mortgage was to secure borrowing in accordance with arrangements agreed with her 
husband. He also explained to her what he called the "worst scenario," which was that the 
bank could take possession of the house and sell it, and said that her rights were removed 
by signing the charge. Gibson LJ described this explanation as "entirely adequate". 
334 See, eg, Mutual Finance Ltd v John Wetton & Sons Ltd [1937] 2 All ER 657 where a 
guarantee obtained from a family company by a threat to prosecute a family member, was 
held voidable. The case was argued and decided as a case of undue influence, on the basis 
that "the common law doctrine of duress has been superseded by the equitable doctrine 
of undue influence"(see at 394). See, also, Williams v Bayley (1866) LR 1 HL 200; 
Kaufman v Gerson [1904] 1KB591; Societe des Hotels Reunis SA v Hawker (1913) 29 
TLR 578. In Barton v Armstrong [1975] 2 All ER 465 the Privy Council described 
certain deeds as being "void" as a result of duress. However, such contracts are more 
commonly spoken of as being only voidable - see Lynch v Director of Public 
Prosecutions for Northern Ireland [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 938; North Ocean Shipping 
Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd; The Atlantic Baron [ 1979] QB 705; [ 1978] 3 All 
ER 1170; Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614 at 634; [1979] 3 All ER 65 at 77-78. 
Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation and 
Laughton; The Universe Sentinel [1983] 1AC366 at 383; [1982] 2 All ER 67 at 75. 
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form of physical coercion, 335 or of any other conduct or threat which the law regards as 
illegitimate336 which coerces the will of the guarantor and so vitiates his consent to the 
guarantee. 337 
2.3.5 Undue influence 
A guarantee procured by undue influence on the part of the creditor is liable to be set aside. 338 
Such undue influence can be either actual undue influence or presumed undue influence. 339 In 
335 Friedberg-Seeley v Klass (1957) 101 Sol J 275; Barton v Armstrong [1975] 2 All ER 
465. 
336 Legitimate commercial pressure can never amount to duress. See Occidental Worldwide 
Investment Corporation v Skibs AIS Avanti, Skibs AIS Glarona, Skibs AIS Nava/is, The 
"Siboen" and The "Sibotre" [1976] 1 Lloyds Rep 293 at 336. 
"Now let me say at once that in the vast majority of cases a customer who signs 
a bank guarantee ... cannot get out of it. No bargain will be upset which is the 
result of the ordinary interplay of forces. There are many hard cases caught by this 
rule ... take the case of a borrower in urgent need of money. He borrows it from the 
bank at high interest and is guaranteed by a friend. The guarantor gives his bond 
and gets nothing in return. The common law will not interfere." 
per Lloyds BankLtdv Bundy [1975] 1 QB 326 at 336; [1974] 3 All ER 757 at 763. 
337 Occidental Worldwide Investment Corporation v Skibs AIS Avanti, Skibs AIS Glarona, 
Skibs AIS Nava/is, The "Siboen" and The "Sibotre" [1976] 1 Lloyds Rep 293 at 336; 
North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd; The Atlantic Baron 
[1979] QB 705; [1978] 3 All ER l l70;SyrosShippingCoSA vElaghill Trading Co; The 
Proodos C [1981] 3 All ER 189 at 192; [1980] 2 Lloyds Rep 390 at 393; Universe 
Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation and Laughton; 
The Universe Sentinel [1983] 1 AC 366; [1982] 2 All ER 67; B & S Contracts and 
Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] ICR 419; Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd 
v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1985] 1 All ER 303; Vantage Navigation Corporation v 
Suhail and Saud Bahwan Building Materials LLC; The Alev [1989] 1 Lloyds Rep 138; 
Atlas Express Ltdv Ka/co (Importers and Distributors) Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 641; Dimskal 
Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers Federation; The Evia Luck [l 992] 
2 AC 152. 
338 Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] 1 QB 326. National Westminster Bank pie v Morgan 
[1985] AC 686. Wood.stead Finance Ltdv Petrou [1986] BTLC 267;MidlandBankplc 
v Phillips (Unreported, March 14, 1986, CA). 
339 In Barclays Bank pie v O'Brien and Another [1993] 4 All ER 417 the House of Lords 
approved the classification adopted by the Court of Appeal in Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA vAboodyandAnother[l990] 1QB932 at 953; [1992] 4All 
ER 955 at 964 under which cases of actual undue influence are referred to as falling into 
"Class l" and cases of presumed undue influence into "Class 2". Class 2 is further sub-
divided into "Class 2A" and "Class 2B". 
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cases of actual undue influence, it is necessary for the claimant to prove affirmatively that the 
wrongdoer exerted undue influence on the complainant to persuade him to enter into the 
transaction. 340 In cases of presumed undue influence, the complainant only has to show, in the 
first instance, that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between the complainant and 
the wrongdoer of such a nature that it is fair to presume that the wrongdoer abused that 
relationship in procuring the complainant to enter into the impugned transaction; the burden then 
shifts to the wrongdoer to prove that the complainant entered into the impugned transaction 
freely. 341 
2.4 CONSUMER PROTECTION IN A BANKING CONTEXT 
English law has been slow to recognize that the customer of a bank needs any protection over and 
above established rules as to misrepresentation, undue influence and the like. In this, as in other 
fields, freedom of contract has been the order of the day. But in recent times recession and 
unprecedented levels of problem domestic debts342 have contributed to growing political pressure 
for greater sensitivity to the position, not just of the consumer, but also of the small business. As 
one leading banker has put it, the 1990s will be a caring decade, where the power of the 
consumer will require banks to be more responsive to the needs of their customers. 343 Its response 
to these pressures is one of the major challenges presently facing the banking industry. 
2.4.1 Case law 
English law has not so far recognized an overriding principle of good faith in the making and 
carrying out of contracts, 344 such as the principle existing in many civil-law systems, or that 
enshrined in the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in the USA.345 Judicial attempts to limit 
340 Barclays Bank pie v O'Brien and Another [1993] 4 All ER417. 
341 Ibid, at 423. 
342 See Bank ofEngland'sBanking Act Report for 1991/1992 at 10, quoted by Cranston(ed) 
European Banking Law 22n52. 
343 Lord Alexander ofWeedon QC, Chairman ofNational Westminster Bank plc, Chartered 
Institute of Bankers, Bristol Lecture, 26 November 1991, quoted in Cranston (ed) 
European Banking Law 22n53. 
344 See Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 39; Beatson & Friedmann Good Faith 
3; Collins Contract chapters 13 and 15; Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 
345 S 1-203 UCC provides that every contract or duty within the Code imposes an obligation 
of good faith in its performance or enforcement (reflecting existing case law to the effect 
that every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties). 
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the effect of exclusion clauses by developing the "fundamental breach" doctrine came to 
nothing.346 The courts did develop rules strongly protective of the position of a surety, but these 
rules are largely ineffective in providing real protection because they are subject to contrary 
agreement between the parties, 347 and are inevitably excluded in standard bank guarantee forms. 
However, in some circumstances the courts will intervene to strike down onerous contractual 
terms.348 
2.4.2 Statute law 
Two statutes need mentioning here. The first is the Consumer Credit Act of 197 4, which provides 
detailed protection for individuals in relation to small credit transactions. The Act provides for 
the licensing of consumer credit business, and regulates such matters as advertising, canvassing, 
the form and content of agreements, cooling-off periods, the liability of creditors for breaches by 
the supplier, and default and termination. There are also provisions relating to credit cards.349 
Current account overdrafts granted by banks are exempt from Part V of the Act350(which provides 
for the form and content of agreements and cooling-off periods) by virtue of a determination by 
the Director General of Fair Trading made on 21December1989 under s 74 (1) (b) of the Act. 
To take advantage of the exemption, a bank must inform the Office of Fair Trading in writing 
of its general intention to grant such overdrafts, and comply with certain conditions as to the 
provision of information to the borrower concerning the credit limit, interest and charges. 
The second is the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, which provides that a person cannot 
unreasonably exclude liability for negligence. It also provides that where one party deals as 
consumer, or on the other's written standard terms, the other party cannot unreasonably exclude 
or restrict his liability for breach of contract. The possible impact of this Act on exclusion clauses 
routinely adopted by banks in standard form documentation has been little explored in the 
authorities. In one case it was suggested that a clause in a guarantee making the guarantor liable 
346 Suisse At/antique Societe d' Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale 
[1967] 1 AC 361. 
347 Eg, Perry v National Provincial Bank of England [1910] 1Ch464. 
348 Interfoto Picture Library Ltdv Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433; [1988] 
1 All ER 348. 
349 For a full discussion, see Goode Consumer Credit and see, also, Whitford 1973 
Wisconsin LR 400 at 423-425. 
350 Consumer Credit Act of 1974. 
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for a sum larger than that of the principal debtor would be unenforceable by virtue of the Act. 351 
In some respects, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1994 (which 
implement the EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13!EEC; OJ L95/29) are 
wider in that they apply more generally than just to exclusion clauses. However, they are 
restricted to consumer contracts. The Regulations also seek to promote the use of plain, 
intelligible language in standard contract provisions. 
Section 137 of the Consumer Credit Act of 1974, empowers the court to reopen a credit 
agreement so as to do justice between the parties if it finds the credit bargain extortionate. This 
provision applies to credit agreements generally, not just to those regulated under the Act. A 
credit bargain is extortionate if it requires the debtor to make payments which are grossly 
exorbitant, or if it otherwise grossly contravenes ordinary principles of fair dealing.352 
The Office of Fair Trading was set up under the Fair Trading Act of 1973,353 and has important 
licensing and administration functions under the Consumer Credit Act of 1974. It also has a 
watchdog role in relation to consumer affairs generally, and a duty from time to time to 
pronounce on questions of banking practice. 
2.4.3 Alternative dispute resolution 
Rights are, of course, of limited value unless they can be enforced. The courts of law are often 
an unsuitable forum for settling consumer-type disputes between banks and customers, not only 
because the amounts concerned are comparatively small, but also because an arbiter, having a 
degree of expertise can be helpful in resolving the dispute fairly. The financial services industry 
generally has taken considerable strides in the setting up of alternative disputes resolution 
schemes. These include the Banking Ombudsman, the Investment Ombudsman, the Insurance 
Ombudsman and Building Society Ombudsman schemes. A common feature of such schemes 
is that there is a limit of£ 100,000 on what can be awarded; this covers the vast majority of 
consumer claims. From the complainant's perspective there is the great advantage that using the 
service normally costs nothing. It is of course essential to the credibility of the schemes that the 
Ombudsman is seen to be independent. 
351 Standard Chartered Bank Ltdv Walker [1982] 1WLR1410 at 1416. 
352 S 138 of the Consumer Credit Act of 1974. 
353 Fair Trading Act of 1973. 
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The Banking Ombudsman's function is to receive complaints relating to the provision of banking 
services by any member bank (the main UK retail banks are all members) to any individual, and 
to facilitate the settlement of such complaints by agreement or by the making of 
recommendations or awards. In making any recommendation or award, the Ombudsman is to 
have reference to what is fair in all the circumstances, and is to have regard to general principles 
of good banking practice and any relevant code of practice; the latter now includes the Code of 
Banking Practice (3), referred to above. 
2.4.4 Codes of practice 
Probably the most significant recent development has been the adoption of a banking code of 
practice. The Jack Committee354 recommended that banks should promulgate an agreed code of 
banking practice to achieve the improvements in banking practice which the Committee 
recommended should be introduced. After considerable consultation, the British Bankers' 
Association, the Building Societies Association and the Association for Payment Clearing 
Services have produced the "Good Banking" code of practice. It will be reviewed at least once 
every two years and monitored on an annual basis. The code sets out the standard of good 
banking practice to be observed by banks, building societies and card issuers when dealing with 
personal customers in the United Kingdom. A sister code is the Mortgage Code issued by the 
Council of Mortgage Lenders, which seeks to promote best practice in this area. 
Some of the provisions of the code relating to transparency, confidentiality and third-party 
security have already been commented on. There are also important provisions relating to cards 
(ie credit and debit cards). A subject of particular contention is the incidence of liability for 
unauthorized use. The code limits customers' liability for unauthorized transactions to a 
maximum save in cases of fraud or gross negligence by the customer. In cases of disputed 
transactions the burden of proving fraud or gross negligence lies with the card issuer. 
It is one of the governing principles of the code that banks will act fairly and reasonably in all 
their dealings with their customers. It is however non-statutory and not in itself legally binding. 
The extent to which its provisions may translate into legal rights and liabilities is an open 
question. It seems unlikely that the courts will ignore it in determining the legal content of the 
banker-customer relationship. An analogy may perhaps be drawn withs 63C of the Financial 
Services Act of 1986 which empowers the issuing of codes of practice in that field. It provides 
that, whilst contravention of such a code does not in itself give rise to liability or invalidate a 
354 Review Committee Banking Services. 
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transaction, in determining whether a person's conduct amounts to a breach of the law, 
contravention of the code may be relied on as tending to establish liability, and compliance relied 
on as tending to negative liability. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Three important issues emerge from the above survey. Firstly, the relationship between banker 
and customer has changed dramatically and more and more fiduciary duties toward a customer 
have arisen. Conflicts of interest, or rather, the prevention thereof will be a major task for the 
modem banker. 355 
Secondly, a proliferation of claims alleging a duty to advise and/or negligent advice is 
expected. 356 On a practical level, it is clear that bankers should keep the following in mind: 
• Banks should check that their promotional literature conforms with the business they do, 
and not oversell what they are prepared to do for the customer. 
• Staff should be well trained and must understand what advice can and cannot be given 
by staff at each level of seniority. 
• Staff should be careful not to enter into sophisticated transactions with customers unless 
they know what they are doing. 
• Contractual documentation with the customer should exclude liability for pre-contractual 
representations, the terms to comply with statutory provisions. 357 
Thirdly, the concept of good faith does not play a major role in English banking law at this point 
355 See pars 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. 
356 Warne Litigation 36. 
357 Such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, and the EC Directive (Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts) 93/13/EEC: [1993] OJ L9S/29. 
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in time, 358 as existing doctrines, relating to a duty of reasonable care and skill, 359 are more 
important. As far as the banker's duty of disclosure to an intending surety is concerned, it is not 
yet clear what effect the Codes of Banking Practice will have on the common-law position. It is 
submitted, that in view of the promissory language contained in the third edition of the code, 360 
its provisions may well override the common law. 
358 Inlnterfoto Picture Library Ltdv Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 348, 
Bingham LJ, with reference to the concept of good faith, declared that English law has 
not committed itself to such an overriding principle, but has developed piecemeal 
solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness. As far as consumers are 
concerned, the concept of good faith has been imported into English law by virtue of its 
membership of the European Community. See EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts) 93/13/EEC:[l993] OJ L95/29; Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations of 1994 which implements the aforesaid EC Directive. 
3 59 Collins Contract 169-170, argues that the sources of pre-contractual obligations can be 
usefully conceived as deriving from a general principle, namely a duty to negotiate with 
care. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE BANKER'S DUTIES OF 
DISCLOSURE AND ADVICE TO CUSTOMERS AND 
SURETIES: AUSTRALIA 
3.1 THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP 
In Australian law there is no precise legal definition of the terms 11bank11 or "banker", despite the 
attempts by many Courts to provide one. 1 This represents no real problem as the Banking Act 
1959 (Cth) allows only incorporated and licensed institutions to function as banks. 
There is no statutory definition of the term "customer" of a bank in Australian law. Both the Bills 
of Exchange Act of 1909 (Cth) (BEA) and the Cheques and Payment Orders Act of 1986 -
which are the principal statutes that concern banks - mention the term, but offer no definition. 
In the absence of a statutory definition, one must look to judicial decisions to appreciate the legal 
interpretation of who is a customer of a bank or what the circumstances are that make a person 
a customer. In the event of a dispute, although a court will take into consideration what ordinary 
intelligent businessmen understand by "a bank's customer", and hear evidence of experts if 
necessary, the ultimate decision lies with the court. 2 
The relationship ofbanker and customer is normally a contractual relationship.3 The relationship 
of banker and customer does not arise unless both parties intend to enter into such a relationship. 
1 See United Dominions Trust Ltd v Kirkwood [1966] 1 All ER 968 (a "Bank" must 
conduct current accounts, pay cheques drawn on himself, collect cheques); Bank of 
Chettinad Ltd v The Commissioner of Income Tax Colombo [1948] AC 378 at 383 
(different shades of meaning); in Australia, see Bank of New South Wales and Others v 
The Commonwealth and Others (1948) 76 CLR 1 (must have wide flexible meaning); 
Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v FCT (1950) 81 CLR 263 (lending money); 
Commissioners of the State Savings Bank of Victoria v Permewan Wright & Co Ltd 
(1914) 19 CLR457 (receiving deposits on loan and lending out); approved in Melbourne 
City Council v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 at 63-65. 
2 See Tyree Banking 30; WeerasooriaBanking Law par 21.4. 
3 Stewart v Bank of Australasia (1883) 9 VLR (L) 240; Aschkenasy v Midland Bank Ltd 
(1934) 51 TLR34; Burnettv Westminster BankLtd[l965] 3 AllER81; Tai Hing Cotton 
Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank [ 1986] AC 80. 
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There must be evidence to show that a bank accepted a person as a customer and dealt with that 
person on that footing. 4 
A person must have some sort of account, either a current or savings account5 or some similar 
relationship to make him or her a customer, for example, a fixed- or term-deposit account.6 
A person becomes a customer immediately he or she opens an account with a bank even though 
he or she may never operate on the account. It is not necessary for there to be some regular course 
of conduct or dealing in the sense of regularly visiting the bank or doing business with it. This 
appears to be the essential difference between a customer of a shop and the customer of a bank. 
Some of the early decisions considered the element of use and habit to be the essence of the 
banker-customer relationship, but now it is well-established that duration is of no significance. 7 
Where a person deals with a bank and both parties contemplate the person's becoming a 
customer, and a bank account is, in fact, subsequently opened, the relationship of a banker and 
customer is deemed to have been established from the date the bank accepted the instructions of 
the would-be customer even though at that time there was no account in existence. 8 
One bank can become a customer of another bank. For instance, if a bank does the business of 
collecting or clearing cheques for another bank, the latter is the former' s customer. 9 
The banker-customer relationship cannot arise where a company account is opened, for purposes 
4 Stewart v Bank of Australia (1883) 9 VLR (L) 240; Mathews v Brown & Co (1894) 10 
TLR 3 86; Robinson v Midland Bank Ltd (1925) 41 TLR 402. 
5 Hart v Sangster [1957] 1Ch337; [1957] 2 All ER 208). 
6 Dixon v Bank of New South Wales (1896) 17 LR (NSW) Eq 355 (Australia); Lacave & 
Co v Credit Lyonais (1897) 1 QB 148; Great Western Railway Co v London & County 
Banking Co [ 1901] AC 414 (England); Warren Metals Ltd v Colonial Catering Co Ltd 
and Others [1975] 1 NZLR 273 (New Zealand). 
7 Ladbroke & Co v Todd[1914-1915] All ER 1134; Commisioners of Taxation v English 
Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd [ 1920] AC 683 (England); Kendall v London Bank of 
Australia (1918) SR (NSW) 394 (Australia); Tyree Banking 29; Weerasooria Banking 
Law par 21.9. 
8 WoodsvMartinsBankLtd[1959] 1QB55; ChorleyBanking36. 
9 Importers Company Ltd v Westminster Bank Ltd [ 1927] 2 KB 297; Aschkenasy v Midland 
Bank Ltd (1934) 51 TLR 34; Lloyds Bank Ltd v The Chartered Bank of India Australia 
and China [1929] 1KB40. 
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of purchasing of business, on false documents and without authority. 10 
An account-holder continues to be a customer of the bank although his or her account may be 
overdrawn. 11 While the normal debtor-creditor relationship can be terminated without notice, a 
bank cannot close a customer's account, in credit, without reasonable notice to him or her. 12 As 
far as a debt due to the bank is concerned, and in the absence of specific arrangements to the 
contrary, the principle is that the debt is not due until demand has been made. 13 
It is established that the contract between a bank and its customer is governed by the law of the 
place where the account is kept in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary. 14 
Customers of banks are not only numerous, but also constitute different categories and types of 
persons, from adult individuals to minors, from partnership firms to societies, clubs and 
associations, from one-person proprietary companies to large corporations. The services that the 
banks offer their customers also vary from investment advice to the financing of overseas trade. 
Consequently, in modern banking business it is not easy to define the nature of the relationship 
that exists between a banker and his customer. 15 
Indeed, the relationship between the parties must vary according to the facts and circumstances 
of each case and the type of transaction in question. The relationship can be that of agent and 
principal when, for instance, the bank collects the proceeds of cheques for and on behalf of its 
10 Marfani & CoLtdvMidlandBankLtd[l967] 3 All ER 967; [1968] 1WLR956; Stoney 
Stanton Supplies (Coventry) Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd [ 1966] 2 Lloyds Rep 3 73; Tyree 
Banking 31; Weerasooria Banking Law par 21.14. 
11 Clark v London & Country Banking Co [1897] 1 QB 552. 
12 Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [ 1921] 3 KB 11 O; National Westminster Bank Ltd 
v Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies Ltd [1972] AC 785; [1972] 1 All ER 641; 
Prosperity Ltdv Lloyds BankLtd(l923) 39 TLR 372; Buckingham & Co v The London 
andMidlandBankLtd(l895) 12 TLR 70. 
13 Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation[ 1921] 3 KB 110; Re Australia and New Zealand 
Savings Bank Ltd; Mellas v Evriniadis [1972] VR 690; Bank of New South Wales v Laing 
[ 1954] AC 13 5; Tunstall Brick and Pottery Co v Mercantile Bank of Australia Ltd ( 1892) 
18 VLR 59. 
14 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] 1QB728;AttockCement Co Ltd 
vRomanianBankofForeign Trade [1989] 1 Lloyds Rep 572;LibyanArabForeignBank 
v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co [ 1989] 1 Lloyds Rep 608. 
15 Tyree Banking 23; Weerasooria Banking Law par 21. 18. 
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customer. 16 A banker also acts as agent when he or she accepts a customer's instructions in 
regard to the purchase and sale of stocks and shares. 17 
There are many special circumstances which may affect and vary the normal relationship between 
a banker and his or her customer. The question arises as to the general relationship that exists 
between the parties. The legal position has been explained as follows: 18 
• The banker-customer relationship is a relationship peculiar to banking. The general 
relationship that exists between the parties is a complex contractual relationship 
consisting of reciprocal rights and duties founded on the practices and usages prevailing 
among bankers. The relationship consists of a general contract which is basic to all 
transactions, together with special transactions or banking services. The general contract 
is a simple, indivisible contract, though with many facets. 19 
• The contract is basically of an implied nature. In Australia (as in England) there is rarely, 
if ever, a written or even an oral contract setting out the terms and conditions of the 
relationship. 
• Outside the ambit of the current account operation, however, the relationship is subject 
to special arrangements which are normally reduced to writing. These documents are 
called 11 customers' authorities 11 • 
Apart from contract, the legal relationship of banker and customer is that of debtor and creditor 
(the banker being the debtor and the customer the creditor) with the super-added obligation of 
the banker's having to honour the customer's cheques when there is sufficient credit in his or her 
account at the bank. The debtor and creditor relationship though at one time doubted, has been 
firmly established in case law since 1848. 20 
lnJoachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation21 the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the existence of this 
16 Tyree Banking 25; Weerasooria Banking Law par 21.19. 
17 Weerasooria Banking Law par 21. 19. 
18 W eerasooria Banking Law par 21. 20. 
19 The contractual nature of the banker-customer relationship was highlighted in Burnett v 
Westminster Bank Ltd [ 1965] 3 All ER 81. 
20 Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28; and the English Court of Appeal inJoachimson v Swiss 
Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110. 
21 [1921] 3 KB 110. 
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debtor and creditor relationship and its contractual foundation. In Laing v Bank of New South 
Wales22 the Supreme Court of New South Wales approved of the decisions in Foley v Hil/23 and 
the Joachimson24 case and held that the primary relationship of banker and customer is that of 
debtor and creditor. The High Court decision in this case was reversed on appeal by the Privy 
Council, but not on the question of the debtor-creditor relationship, which the Privy Council 
confirmed. 25 
Although the debtor-creditor relationship is the basic principle underlying the law of banking, 
it is not an exhaustive definition of all the obligations arising out of the relation between banker 
and customer. Nor does it provide a sufficiently wide formula for the solution of all the problems 
or the understanding of the business of modern banking. There are a number of implied super-
added obligations26 in the relationship between banker and customer that distinguish it from the 
ordinary case of a loan of money and the normal debtor and creditor relationship. 27 
The fact that the relationship is contractual means that it may come within the scope of the 
Contracts Review Act of 1980 (NSW). 
3.2 THE MULTI-FUNCTIONAL BANK 
Banks are today moving away from traditional deposit taking and lending activities into roles 
more akin to those of financial supermarkets or conglomerates. 28 Modern banking is multi-
22 (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 318. 
23 (1848) 2 HLC 28. 
24 [1921] 3 KB 110. 
25 Bank of New South Wales v Laing [1954] AC 135. For further Australian cases 
acknowledging the debtor-creditor contractual relationship, see Re City of Melbourne 
Bank Ltd; Ex parte Ferguson (1897) 23 VLR 78; Croton v R (1967) 117 CLR 326. 
26 Per Banks LJ, in Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110 at 119 or 
"peculiar incidents", per Lord Asquith in Bank of New South Wales v Laing [1954] AC 
135 at 138. 
27 Tyree Banking 27; Weerasooria Banking Law par 21.38. 
28 See WeerasooriaBanking Law par 24.1. Before 1980, eg, Westpac Banking Corporation 
was a bank. It accepted money on deposit, cashed and collected cheques and gave money 
out on loan. Today it is an insurance company, superannuation fund, investment adviser, 
stockbroker, travel agent, currency dealer and property investment trust. It has become 
a financial supermarket and now it even owns a television station! See Weerasooria 
Banking Law par 24. 7. 
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functional and multi-divisional, particularly following partial deregulation of the Australian 
financial system. 29 
The law governing the banker-customer relationship was formulated when banks offered only 
traditional services and a new law is required for the new roles that bankers now play. Indeed, 
new trends in bank liability are emerging. More and more bank managers and even senior 
management are seeing the inside of court rooms either as defendants or as witnesses. 30 
Apart from contract law - the foundation of the banker-customer relationship - banks are 
being sued in tort law31 for negligence where the pitfalls are greater and the scope of liability 
wider. 32 Many equitable doctrines are now often relied on to sue banks. Duress, economic duress, 
undue influence, unconscionable conduct are favourites especially after the High Court judgment 
in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio.33 
Other artillery aimed at banks is the consumer protection legislation in each Australian 
jurisdiction, for example, the various Fair Trading Acts34 and Contracts Review Act of 1980 
(NSW). The Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) also opened up a Pandora's box of ills and 
litigation for banks. Section 52 of this Act with its far reaching concept of "misleading and 
deceptive" conduct has become a real headache for bankers. 35 
29 N eate Bank Confidentiality 61. 
30 Wheeler Grace & Pierucci Pty Ltd v Wright [1989] ATPR 40-940; Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Eltran Pty Ltd [ 1987] ATPR 40-802; Chiarabaglio v Westpac Banking 
Corporation [1989] ATPR 40-971. 
31 Tyree 1980 ABLR 220; Mutual Life and Citizen's Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 
CLR556; CompafinaBankvAustraliaandNew ZealandBankingGroupLtdandBennet 
(1984) Aust Torts Rep 80-546; Johns Period Furniture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Savings 
Bank of Australia (1980) 24 SASR 224. 
32 The High Court of Australia has expressly adopted the principle that concurrent liability 
in contract and in tort may exist between parties that are in a contractual or commercial 
relationship. See Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 at 575. 
33 (1983) 151 CLR447. 
34 S 13 of the Fair Trading Act of 1992 (ACT); s 43 of the Fair Trading Act ofl 987 (NSW); 
s 43 of the Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act of 1990 (NT); s 39 of the Fair Trading 
Act of 1989 (QLD); s 57 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (SA); s 15 of the Fair Trading 
Act of 1990 (Tas); s 1 lA of the Fair Trading Act of 1985 (Vic); s 11 of the Fair Trading 
Act of 1987 (YI A). 
35 Misleading advice in a commercial setting will probably give rise to a contravention of 
s 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) and its Fair Trading Act equivalents. 
Financial Institutions have already been the target of considerable s 52 litigation. See 
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Another emerging area of bank liability is the concept of equitable or promissory estoppel. The 
High Court has gone further than the English courts and in recent landmark cases has held firmly 
that promissory statements which are clear and unambiguous and on which another has relied to 
his detriment, are valid and actionable. 36 
In most situations the relationship between the bank and its customers will be governed by the 
express or implied terms of a contract. Circumstances can arise where a bank may owe fiduciary 
duties to a customer, 37 or equitable duties of confidence. 38 
As banking business has expanded beyond the range of traditional banking functions the main 
trading banks have formed subsidiary organizations to perform these functions. 39 The Reserve 
Bank has established guidelines concerning the relationship of banks to these other organizations 
in order, particularly, to protect the depositors of the banks.40 
Australian investment banks are also using Chinese Walls in an attempt to justify representation 
of conflicting interests. Whilst the courts of Australia41 and the United Kingdom42 have been 
sceptical about the effectiveness of Chinese Walls in resolving conflicts of interests, such 
Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales (1990) 170 CLR 276; Barton v Westpac 
Banking Corporation [1983] ATPR 40-388. 
36 Legione vHateley(l983) l52CLR406;ForanandAnotherv WrightandAnother(l989) 
168 CLR 385; Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; 
Commonwealth of Australia v Verawayen ( 1990) 170 CLR 3 94; Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro 
(1988) 13 NSWLR 466. 
3 7 Tyree Banking 24; Weerasooria Banking Law par 21.3 3; Neate Bank Confidentiality 63; 
Ex parte Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works (1895) 21 VLR 563; 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Another v Smith and Another (1991) 102 ALR 
453; Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41. 
3 8 N eate Bank Confidentiality 62; Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd ( 1980) 14 7 
CLR 39; Castro/ Australia Pty Ltd v Emtech Associates Pty Ltd (1980) 51 FLR 184; 
Stevens Travel Service International Pty Ltd Receivers and Managers Appointed v 
Qantas Airways Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 331 and Attorney General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109. 
39 Tyree Banking 11. 
40 Reserve Bank Prudential Statement No G 1 "Banks' Associations with Non-Banks" 
quoted in Tyree Banking 12. 
41 Mallesons Stephen Jaques v KPMG Peat Marwick ( 1990) 4 WAR 3 57. 
42 David Lee & Co Ltd v Edward Chance [1990] 3 WLR 1278. 
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structures are a recognised defence to the insider trading provisions of the Corporations Law, 43 
and are a well-established part of corporate practice. 
3.3 THE BANKER'S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
3.3.1 The leading decision 
The banker's duty of confidentiality is contractual - being an implied term of the contract 
between the parties. 44 As is the case in English law, the duty is not absolute, but qualified. 45 
While an exhaustive definition is not possible, its qualifications have been classified and their 
limits indicated. It was established as far back as 1923 by the English Court of Appeal in 
Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England. 46 
In several Australian High Court cases and other judicial decisions this duty has been recognised 
and explained. 47 
The Tournier48 case remains the leading judicial authority on a banker's duty of secrecy.49 
According to Weaver & Craigie50 the Tournier51 case remains the unchallenged authority on the 
subject and represents one of the most respected and celebrated instances of judicial law making 
43 S 1002M. 
44 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461. 
45 Ibid, at 473. 
46 [1924] 1 KB 461. 
4 7 See Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v The 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 499; Smorgon v 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group ltd; Smorgon v Commissioner of Taxation 
of the Commonwealth of Australia (1976) 134 CLR 475; Southwestern Indemnities Ltd 
v Bank of New South Wales (1973) 129 CLR 512; Australian Securities Commission v 
Zarroand0thers(l99l) 6 ACSR385; CitibankLtdv Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
and Others ( 1988) 83 ALR 144; approved by full Federal Court in Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation and Others v Citibank Ltd (1989) 85 ALR 588; Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltdv Ryan (1968) 88 WN (NSW) (Pt 1) 368. 
48 [1924] 1 KB 461. 
49 Neate Bank Confidentiality l. 
50 Weaver & Craigie Banker par 2631. 
51 [1924] 1 KB 461. 
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in the entire field of banking. 
Clause 12.1 of the recently introduced Code of Banking Practice52 specially acknowledges a 
bank's general duty of confidentiality towards its customers and incorporates the Tournier53 
decision as part of the code. 
The Tournier54 case, as to the nature and extent of the banker's duty of secrecy, may be 
summarised as follows. The confidentiality extends to all information and transactions that go 
through an account including securities and guarantees, if any. It extends beyond the state of the 
customer's account, that is, whether there is a debit or credit balance and the amount of the 
balance. It extends to information obtained from sources other than the customer's actual account 
- if the occasion upon which the information was obtained arose out of the banking relations 
of the bank and its customer. 55 For example, information obtained with a view to assisting the 
bank in conducting the customer's business or in coming to decisions on the bank's treatment 
of its customer, would be covered by this duty of secrecy. As Megarry J observed in Royal Bank 
of Canada v Inland Revenue Commissioners: 56 
" [A] banker's duty of secrecy to its customers is not confined to ordinary banking 
transactions but would extend to any banking transaction which is effected for a 
customer, ordinary or extraordinary." 
3.3.2 Remedies for breach of duty 
Wrongful disclosure of information by a bank can result in an action for breach of contract. 57 
52 The Australian Code of Banking Practice was formulated as a result of the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Financial and Public Administration Report of 
November 1991, entitled "A Pocket Full of Change". See NeateBankConfidentiality 29. 
The Code of Banking Practice is quoted in full in Weerasooria Banking Law par 15.30. 
53 [1924] 1 KB 461. 
54 Ibid 
55 Weaver & CraigieBanker par 6590. 
56 [1972] 1 Ch665 at680; [1972] 1 AllER225. 
57 See, eg, Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v The 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 499 at 522. In the 
Tournier case, ibid, [1924] 1 KB 461, the bank was sued for both slander (defamation) 
and breach of contract, but since a new trial was ordered it is not known how the award 
of damages to the customer was calculated. 
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The banker may also be liable for damages for any resulting defamation, 58 because as Bankes LJ 
observed in the Tournier59 case, the credit of the customer depends very largely upon the strict 
observance of confidence. 
At the time of the Tournier60 case, (1923), banks operated only their core business ofbanking and 
the modern-day concept of subsidiary companies was unknown. In Bank of Tokyo Ltd v 
Karoon61 , the view was expressed that where a bank operated its business through a corporate 
structure involving a holding company and subsidiaries, disclosure by one company to another 
may constitute a breach of the duty of secrecy. 62 Section 12.2 of the Australian Code of Banking 
Practice permits disclosure ofinformation concerning the customer to a related entity of the bank. 
Merchant Banks and Financiers are bound by confidentiality laws. Although a merchant bank, 
is not a banker in the ordinary sense of that word, however, there is much to be said for the view 
that a merchant bank has, likewise, a contractual duty of confidence to its clients, that duty being 
an implied term in the relationship between them. 63 
There are also certain statutory provisions in some cases, for example the Privacy Act of 1988. 
Section 36(1) of this Act provides that an individual may complain to the Privacy Commissioner 
about an act or practice that may interfere with the privacy of the individual. 64 
3.3.3 Qualifications to the Tournier rule 
3.3.3.1 Introduction 
As conceded in the Tournier65 case, the banker's duty of secrecy is not absolute or all-embracing, 
58 Neate Bank Confidentiality 3. 
59 [1924] 1 KB 461at474. 
60 [1924] 1 KB 461. 
61 [1987] AC 45. 
62 See, also, Bhogal v Punjab National Bank, Basna v Punjab National Bank [1988] 2 All 
ER296. 
63 See Winterton Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Hambros Australia Ltd [1992] 111 ALR 649. 
64 Neate Bank Confidentiality 3; Privacy act of 1988 s 36 (1). 
65 [1924] 1 KB 461 at 473. 
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but qualified, and a bank would be justified in making a disclosure concerning its customer's 
affairs or would be relieved of its obligation of confidentiality in the following circumstances; 
• where disclosure is under compulsion oflaw;66 
• where there is a duty to the public to disclose; 
• where the interests of the bank require disclosure; 
• where the disclosure is made with the express or implied consent of the customer. 
In the Tournier61case, the Court of Appeal conceded that the above classification of the instances 
where a banker is entitled to disclosure are also not exhaustive. As Atkin LJ said, it is difficult 
to hit upon a formula which will define the maximum of the obligation of secrecy which is of an 
implied nature. 
3.3.3.2 Disclosure under compulsion of law 
Statutory provisions exist in all the Australian jurisdictions relating to the production, proof and 
inspection of a banker's books in legal proceedings. 68 
The main object of these statutory provisions is to facilitate evidence relating to entries in 
banker's books, and these provisions were designed to prevent needless expense and trouble and 
to save the time of bankers and their staff by dispensing as far as possible with the production 
of the originals of their books and with their personal attendance in courts. 69 It was also an 
intolerable inconvenience for bankers to produce in courts books of accounts which were often 
in daily use.70 The provisions enable a party who formerly had the right to issue a summons, to 
66 Sankey v Whit/am (1978) 142 CLR 1; Campbell v Tameside Metropolitan Borough 
Council [1982] 3 WLR 74; Trade Practices Commission v Queensland Aggregates 
(No 2) (1981) 51FLR364. 
67 [1924] 1 KB 461. 
68 Ss 21-25 of the Evidence Act of 1971 (ACT); ss 44-51 of the Evidence Act of 1898 
(NSW) ands 415 of the Crimes Act of 1900 (NSW); ss 83-91 of the Evidence Act of 
1977-1984 (Qld) (books of account of any business); ss 46-52 of the Evidence Act of 
1929 (SA); ss 33-39 of the Evidence Act of 1910 (Tas); ss 58A-58J of the Evidence Act 
of 1958 (Vic) (books of account of any business); ss 89-96 of the Evidence Act of 1906 
(WA). 
69 Waterhouse v Barker [1924] 2 KB 759 at 763. 
70 Pollock v Garle [1898] 1 Ch 1 at 4; see, also, Re Colonial Bank (1889) 15 VLR 360; 
Elsey v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1969) 121 CLR 
99. 
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compel bankers to produce their books and to attend and be examined on them, to obtain an order 
for permission to inspect and take copies of a banker's books. The legislation was intended to 
facilitate the proof of, and not to preserve or exclude from evidence banker's books which would 
otherwise have been available to litigants. 71 
Various statutes and statutory regulations, both federal and State, empower public authorities and 
some professional bodies to call upon bankers (among others) to supply them with information 
regarding the bank's customers and the bank's affairs. 72 Certain Victorian Acts are illustrative 
of State statutes that compel bankers to disclose information.73 
The powers given under these statutes must be exercised strictly in accordance with the statute 
authorising it. It is not every inquiry or demand for information that can be sustained by the 
statute or statutory regulations under which it is made. For instances 62 of the Banking Act of 
1959 (Cth) compels a bank to furnish to the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) any information 
in respect ofits banking business as required by the Reserve Bank, but s 62(2) specifically states 
that any such direction by the RBA cannot require information to be furnished with respect to the 
affairs of an individual customer. This and other provisions of the Banking Act of 1959 (Cth)74 
recognize and uphold the banker's duty of secrecy in respect of his or her customer's account. 
Most of the Australian decisions relating to statutory compulsion on banks to disclose 
information about their customers relate to investigations conducted by the Commissioner of 
Taxation.75 In several cases in the mid-1970s relating to the well-known Smorgan family, the 
71 Re Colonial Bank (1889) 15 VLR 360 at 362; see, also, R v Bono (1913) 29 TLR 635. 
72 Instances of commonwealth statutes are: 
(1) Ss 128Q, 263 and 264 of the Income Tax Assessment Act of 1936 (Cth); 
(2) S 39 of the Gift Duty Assessment Act of 1941 (Cth); 
(3) Ss 51, 62 and 69 of the Banking Act of 1959 (Cth); 
(4) S 125 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1966 (Cth); 
(5) S 141 of the Social Services Consolidation Act of 1947 (Cth). 
73 Ss 384 and 541 of the Companies (Vic) Code; s 41 of the Gift Duty Act of 1971; s 20 of 
the Probate Duty Act of 1962; s 44 of the Legal Profession Practice Act of 1958; Estate 
Agents Act of 1980; ands 36 of the Stamps Act of 1958. 
74 Sees 61(3) of the Banking Act of 1959 in particular. 
75 Tyree Banking 105; Weerasooria Banking Law par 27.42. S 263 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act of 193 6 gives the Commissioner at all times full and free access to all 
buildings, places, books, documents and other papers for any of the purposes of the Act, 
and the power to make extracts or copies of these documents. For further tax and bank 
confidentiality cases, see Simionato Ha/dings Pty Ltd v FCT (No 2) ( 1995) 95 ATC 4 720; 
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High Court had to consider a banker's duty of confidentiality about his or her customer's account 
vis-a-vis the powers of the Commissioner of Taxation to require information from the bank about 
the customer for income-tax assessment purposes.76 
The Financial Transaction Reports Act of 1988 (Cth) made several inroads into the banker-
customer relationship. One of the major inroads was the modification of the banker's common-
law duty of confidentiality by providing him with statutory protection and immunity77 if he had 
to disclose information in terms of the statute (for example, reporting of significant and suspect 
transactions). 
The contractual duty of confidentiality is overridden by the duty of both parties to submit to other 
legal requirements. The point was made clearly and forcefully by Lord Diplock in Parry-Jones 
v The Law Society78 who stated that the duty of confidentiality is overri~den by the duty to 
comply with the law of the land. 79 
3.3.3.3 Disclosure in the public interest 
This type of case is extremely rare. In England, one can perhaps refer to the matter of Libyan 
Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co80 where, it transpired that several hours before the US 
President issued decrees which had the effect of freezing all Libyan assets held with American 
institutions, a senior executive of the defendant bank had told the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York that "it looked like the Libyans were taking their funds out of the various accounts". The 
Libyan bank alleged that by this statement, Bankers Trust had breached its duty of confidentiality. 
In defence, Bankers Trust pleaded; 
Industrial Equity Ltdv FCT(I990) 21ATR934. 
76 See Smorgon v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group ltd; Smorgon v Commissioner 
of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1976) 134 CLR 475; Commissioner of 
Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v The Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 499; 23 ALR 480; Elsey v Commissioner 
of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1969) 121CLR99. 
77 Ss 16 and 17 of the Financial Transaction Reports Act of 1988 (Cth). 
78 [1969] 1 Ch 1at9. 
79 Other notable statutory inroads into the duty is contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 
of 1987; s 155 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth); Australian Securities 
Commission Act of 1989; National Crime Authority Act of 1984; the Bankruptcy Act of 
1966. 
80 [1989] I QB 728. 
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• implied consent; 
• public duty; and 
• protection of their own interests which were permitted under the rule in the Tournier81 
case. 
Staughton J refused to accept that the disclosure was in the bank's interest or had been permitted 
by the customer, but was willing to reach a "tentative conclusion" that the disclosure was justified 
by public duty and in any event that the breach of the confidence resulted in no loss to the 
customer - the Libyan bank. 82 
Australian Courts have not resolved any of the uncertainty regarding this exception. Sheppard 
J inAlliedMills Industries Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (No 1), 83 when considering the 
balance between the non-disclosure of private and confidential information and the public 
interest in the disclosure of iniquity, commented that a bank firstly had to establish whether 
conduct amounted to an "iniquity". 84 An iniquity is wider than a crime or misdemeanor. 85 In this 
case Sheppard J found that a breach of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) was an iniquity 
although liability was civil only. The breach was held to be an iniquity because the Judge was 
of the opinion that Parliament had taken a serious view of the importance of the legislation from 
the standpoint of the public interest. 86 
Chorley87 suggests that an example of this qualification might be where the customer's dealings 
indicated trading with the enemy in time of war. Ellinger88 suggests that any supposed duty 
hereunder is purely cosmetic. Walter & Ehrlich suggest that, where bankers are involved, the 
judiciary may develop a test to weigh up whether the disclosure was justified and they list 
several factors which would be relevant to such an assessment. 89 
81 [ 1924] 1 KB 461. 
82 Libyan Arab Foreign, Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] 1 QB 728 at 770-1. 
83 (1981) 34 ALR 105. 
84 Ibid, at 141. 
85 Ibid, at 141. 
86 Ibid, at 142. 
87 Banking 23. 
88 Banking Law 103. 
89 Walter & Ehrlich 1989 ALJ 404 at 416. 
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3.3.3.4 Disclosure in the interests of the bank 
An example of this exception is where a bank is suing or being sued by a customer.90 Likewise 
a disclosure may be made where the bank makes a claim or brings an action against someone 
other than the customer; for example, against a guarantor of the customer's loan or overdraft. 91 
Often customers expressly authorize their bankers to disclose their affairs to third parties. A 
common example is where a customer gives a third party a banker's reference; that is, he or she 
requests or authorizes the third party to enquire from his or her bank about his or her 
creditworthiness and thereby authorizes the bank to answer such enquiry, which may incidentally 
disclose the state of his or her account. Generally, banks obtain standing orders from their 
customers to provide such information and in any event disclosure under express consent has not 
given rise to difficult problems.92 
On the other hand a bank may be able to justify a disclosure on the ground that the customer has 
impliedly consented to it. Such cases are infrequent. 93 
It is not clear on what ground a banker is entitled to disclose information relating to a customer's 
account to a guarantor or an intending guarantor. Megrah94 favours the view that the customer 
has impliedly authorised disclosure by introducing the guarantor to the bank. Chorley,95 however, 
doubts whether any disclosure could be based on implied authority. Milnes Holden,96 agrees with 
Lord Chorley and states that the safest course - and, indeed, the usual course - is to arrange 
a joint meeting between the guarantor, the customer and the banker at which the guarantor may, 
in the customer's presence, ask for information on any matters concerning the customer's affairs. 
When a guarantee has been taken, the guarantor has a right to obtain information as to the 
90 Weaver & Craigie Banker par 6.670. 
91 Sunderlandv Barclays BankLtd (1938) 5 LDAB 163, is an interesting case where a bank 
successfully defended an action for damages by a customer for wrongful disclosure by 
pleading, inter alia, that the disclosure was in the interest of the bank. 
92 Tyree Banking 108; Weerasooria Banking Law par 27.59. 
93 SunderlandvBarclaysBankLtd(l938) 5 LDAB 163. 
94 Paget's Banking Law 8 173. 
95 Chorley Banking 23. 
96 History 72. 
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account that he has guaranteed, including a general statement about whether the account is being 
kept in a manner satisfactory to the bank. 97 A guarantor who has mortgaged property to the bank 
as collateral security is entitled to demand from the bank information on the balance owing, the 
rate of interest charged and the amount, if any, realized by the bank in respect of the collateral 
securities, but he or she is not entitled to obtain from the bank the same full account that the bank 
is obliged to give its customers. Nor would he be entitled to demand from the bank a copy of the 
statement relating to the customer's account or information on how many cheques drawn upon 
the account had been made in favour of a particular payee. 98 
3.3.3.5 Bank references 
Bankers' references are memoranda from one bank to another detailing certain financial 
information about a customer of the advising bank. Although given by a bank to a bank, the 
characteristic feature of these references is the fact that the information will be passed on to a 
customer of the receiving bank. The references are often given without the knowledge of the 
customer whose affairs are being investigated. 99 
The legal basis for the supply of such status opinions is not clear. Judges and textwriters in 
England are divided in their views and it has often been justified in the interest of the customers, 
banking practice100 and implied consent101 of the customer. 
97 Neate Bank Confidentiality 26-27 argues that such entitlement can be justified on the 
grounds of the interest of the bank. Normally the problem can be resolved easily. Get the 
customer's consent. 
98 Ross v Bank of New South Wales (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 539; Goodwin v National Bank 
of Australasia Ltd (1968) 42 ALJR 11 O; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio 
(1983) 151 CLR447. 
99 Tyree Banking 108-9; Weerasooria Banking Law par 3 0. 1. 
100 The giving of information as to the financial position of their customers, commonly 
called a bank "opinion" is part of the everyday business of banking. See Chorley Banking 
248 and Weaver & CraigieBanker par 6680. "It is one of the services which abank offers 
to its customer", per Devlin Jin Midland Bank Ltd v Seymour (195 5) 2 Lloyds Rep 14 77. 
In Parsons v Barclay & Co Ltd and Goddard (1910) 103 LT 196, Lord Cozens-Hardy 
l\1R referred to it as "a very wholesome and useful habit". In Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v 
Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, Lord Morris said that the service that a bank 
performs in giving a reference is not done simply out of a desire to assist commerce. It 
would discourage the customers of the bank if their deals fell through because the bank 
had refused to testify to their credit when it was good. 
101 Weerasooria Banking Law par 22.19 quotes Lord Chorley in his Gilbart Lecture on 
Banking, 1964 23-24 where he states that the general opinion in banking circles is that 
when a customer opens his account, he impliedly agrees to his bank supplying references 
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In Australia, bankers' opinions are attributed to a combination of banking practice and implied 
consent. 102 In Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v RH Brown & Co103 the High Court 
expressed the view that supplying such opinions is considered a banking usage in Australia. 
However, bankers' opinions are often given without the knowledge or consent of the customer 
and if so, there can be no implied consent and it will amount to a breach of the bank's duty of 
secrecy. 104 As the Supreme Court ofWestem Australia pointed out in Brown RH & Co v the Bank 
of New South Wales and Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd105 : 
"A banker can be faced with a conflict of duties when supplying such a status opinion. 
On the one hand there is the duty of a banker to maintain secrecy regarding a customer's 
affairs; on the other, there is the duty owed to a person to whom he supplied information 
or an opinion as to a client's financial affairs or credit, at least to give an honest opinion, 
or where a duty of care arises to give a report which observes that duty ... Certainly the 
bank is not bound to give any opinion whether with its customer's consent or not. But if 
an answer is given, the person giving it on the bank's behalf (usually the Manager) 
cannot allow his loyalty to his customer and his regard for the customer's interest, or the 
bank's own interest in maintaining a profitable relationship, to interfere with the duties 
which the law imposes on him in making his answer." 
In 1990 the Privacy Act of 1988 (Cth), was amended, introducing a Code of Conduct as well. As 
a result, banks can no longer give credit references about personal/individual customers (as 
distinct from corporate and commercial references) without informing the customer and 
obtaining consent to do so. 106 Privacy law which is governed by the Privacy Act of 1988 (Cth) 
about him. As Chorley points out, many customers do not know about this practice and 
they can only be taken as having impliedly agreed to it by its being imported into the 
contract as a usage of banking business. 
102 In the Tournier case [1924] 1 KB 461 at 486 Lord Aitkin clearly contemplated implied 
consent. 
103 (1972) 126 CLR 337 at 348. 
104 Weaver & Craigie Banker par 6680 believe that the practice is as well known as several 
other practices which are undoubtedly incorporated into the banker-customer contract, 
eg, the practice that an overdrawn customer is taken to assent to the charging of interest, 
even though it is extremely unlikely that the customer is aware of the details of the 
arrangements to which he has consented. 
105 [1971] WAR 201 at 213. See, also, Compafina Bank v Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltd and Bennet (1984) Aust Torts Rep 80-546. 
106 NeateBank Confidentiality 26 points out that in terms ofs 12.11 of the Australian Code 
of Banking Practice, a banker's opinion must comply with the requirements of the Credit 
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as amended in 1991 and the Credit Reporting Code of Conduct (formed in terms of s 18 of the 
Privacy Act of 1988 (Cth)) is binding on all credit providers like banks. 107 Section 18 N of the 
Privacy Act of 1988 (Cth) is the pivotal section and it prescribes rules for the disclosure of any 
information which has a bearing on an individual's creditworthiness, history, standing or 
eligibility. 108 
Individual customers now also have a right of access to any credit reports which might be in the 
possession of the bank. According to the Privacy Commissioner, the area covered by s 18N of 
the Privacy Act of 1988 (Cth) has created problems for the financial sector (including banks) in 
its interpretation and scope and suitable amendments to the law are envisaged. 109 
The common-law liability of a bank for giving a status opinion or credit reference or report may 
occur in the following ways; 
• The customer may allege that the opinion was an unauthorized disclosure of his or her 
affairs and amounted to a breach of the duty of secrecy. 
• Consent, whether express or implied, would only be to giving a fair and accurate report 
of the customer's financial position. If the report is favourable, it hardly seems possible 
that the customer could sustain any damage regardless of the accuracy, although the 
ultimate recipient of the advice might suffer losses. 110 
• If the report is unfavourable, but accurate, then any damage suffered by the customer 
would most likely not be recoverable, because the customer would be forced to argue 
that, but for the accurate report a more favourable (inaccurate) impression of the 
customer's financial position would have been given to the inquirer. In the words of 
Weaver & Craigie, 111 "it seems unlikely that a plaintiff in this position would attract a 
reporting Code of Conduct, issued by the Privacy Commissioner under s 18A(l) of the 
Privacy Act of 1988 (Cth). Under this code, a bank may not give a banker's opinion to 
another bank without the subject's specific agreement to the disclosure for the particular 
purpose if the opinion contains information relating to the subject's consumer 
creditworthiness. 
107 Neate Bank Confidentiality 33. 
108 S 18 N(9) of the Privacy Act of 1988 (Cth). 
109 See K O'Connor, Privacy Commissioner, "Impact of Privacy Act on Financial 
Institutions", Monash University Seminar on Banking and Finance, Melbourne, 10 
November 1992, quoted in Weerasooria Banking Law par 30. 6. 
110 See Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
111 Weaver & Craigie Banker par 6690. 
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great deal of sympathy from a court". 
There is undoubtedly a duty on the bank to exercise reasonable care and skill in the giving of the 
reference. If the customer suffers damages as a direct result of inaccurate information carelessly 
supplied by the advising bank, then there seems no reason why these should not be recoverable 
in an action for breach of contract. 112 The foundation judgments for the tort of negligent 
misstatement in Candler v Crane Christmas and Co113 and Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & 
Partners Ltd114 relied on the closeness and directness of the relationship measured by various 
ipdicators as a prima facie test on the duty question. The Hedley Byrne115 case involved 
defendant bankers supplying a negative credit reference to a specified identified plaintiff. 
Proximity was defined in these cases in terms of a special relationship between a plaintiff user 
and defendant provider. There was a close or special relationship between a plaintiff who had 
requested advice or information, known or identifiable by the defendant, and to whom the 
defendant had supplied such advice or information for use specifically by the plaintiff. An 
analysis of the judgments in the Hedley Byrne116 case indicates that the court makes reference to 
a number of factors upon which it was appropriate to find a duty of care for negligent 
misstatement, such as a special relationship based on reliance which is both foreseeable and 
reasonable, a voluntary assumption of responsibility, and a relationship equivalent to contract. 
These factors are indicators of a close and direct relationship (proximity). There is also frequent 
reference in the judgments to the notion of proximity. 117 Since the Hedley Byrne118 case, cases 
in Australia involving identified users of negligent advice who were the intended recipients have 
consistently applied closeness and directness of relationship as the prima f acie yardstick for a 
duty of care. 119 
112 Tyree Banking 111. 
113 [1951] 2 KB 164. 
114 [1964] AC 465. 
115 [1964] AC 465. 
116 [1964] AC 465 at 483;486-487; 502-503; 505;509-511; 514; 528-530. 
117 Ibid, at 483;505;51land514. 
118 [1964] AC 465. 
119 See, eg, Mutual Life and Citizens Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; L 
Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd and Another v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (1981) 
150 CLR 225. The notion of reliance was referred to in San Sebastian Pty Ltd and 
Another v Minister Administering Environmental Planning & Assessment Act 1979 and 
Another (1986) 162 CLR 340 as playing "a prominent part in the ascertainment of a 
relationship of proximity between plaintiff and defendant", where economic loss results 
116 
The customer may also have an action in defamation if the report is unfavourable. In such a 
circumstance, the banker would need to plead justification if the report is accurate, and qualified 
privilege if it is not. The defence of qualified privilege, although ordinarily available when there 
is a contractual duty, may not be available since, strictly speaking, there is no contractual duty 
for the bank to supply a banker's reference. 120 
Except in cases where the person making the inquiry is also a customer of the same bank, there 
is usually no contractual relationship between the bank giving the status opinion and the third 
party who requires it and to whom it is communicated. 121 The bank cannot, therefore, be sued by 
the third party if it refuses to give any information. 122 If, however, the bank provides an opinion 
and that opinion turns out to be incorrect and the third party acts on that opinion and suffers loss 
as a result, the bank will be liable ifthe opinion was given negligently or fraudulently. 123 
In order to establish that the opinion was fraudulent it must be proved that the representation was, 
in fact false, was made knowingly or recklessly, with the intention to deceive and with the intent 
that it should be acted upon by someone who did act upon it and thereby suffered damage. 124 
In determining the bank's liability for a fraudulent opinion one must bear in mind s 6 of the 
Statute of Frauds (Amendment) Act of 1828 (UK.)125 which applies in some Australian 
jurisdictions. 126 According to this statutory provision no action may be brought against a person 
from negligent misstatement. 
120 See Tyree 1980ABLR 220-231. 
121 The House of Lords in Smith v Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 increased the scope of the duty of 
care to include a plaintiff who was a known user in a contemplated transaction, although 
not the intended recipient of the defendant's negligent advice or information. See, also, 
Caparo Industries pie v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 at 638-639. 
122 Tyree Banking 111; Weerasooria Banking Law par 30.10. 
123 The leading authority is the House of Lords' decision of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller 
& Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. A recent Australian case where bankers were sued for 
both negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation was Brown RH & Co v The Bank of New 
South Wales and Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd [ 1971] WAR 201. 
124 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 approved by the High Court in Commercial 
Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v RH Brown & Co (1972) 126 CLR 337. 
125 Better known as Lord Tenterden' s Act. 
126 Lord Tenterden' s Act applies in Australia by reason of the following statutes, eg, s 10 of 
the Usury, Bills of Lading and Written Memoranda Act of 1902 (NSW); Evatt v Mutual 
Life and Citizens Assurance Co (1967) 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 165, affirmed on this point 
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who makes a fraudulent representation concerning another person's credit unless such 
representation is made in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith. Thus even if 
a bank manager gives a false and untrue reference and signs it himself or herself, the bank cannot 
be held liable because the Act specifically states "signed by the party to be charged therewith". 127 
In the Hirst 128case the Court of Appeal held that the bank was protected bys 6 as the opinion by 
the bank manager was held to be insufficient to impose liability upon the bank. The bank 
manager could have been made personally liable, but he had not been joined as a defendant. In 
Swift v Jewsbury and Goddard, 129 however, a customer sued a bank for false representation, and 
added the bank manager as second defendant. The court held that s 6 excluded the bank from 
liability, but the bank manager who had signed the representation was held to be personally liable 
to the customer in damages. 130 
A bank giving a status report must give an accurate and honest answer based on facts available 
and known to the bank. Beyond this there is no duty to obtain information from any outside 
source and the reply need be based only on information obtained from the account. In Parsons 
v Barclay & Co Ltd and Goddard131 the court emphatically repudiated the suggestion that when 
a banker was asked for a reference of this kind it was any part of his duty to make enquiries from 
outside sources as to the solvency or otherwise of the person asked about or to do anything more 
than answer the question put to him from what he knew from the books and accounts before him. 
In Mutual Life and Citizens Assurance Co v Evatt132 Lord Diplock, in the Privy Council summed 
up the legal position as follows: 
in ( 1968) 122 CLR 5 56) (since repealed); see, also, Compafina Bank v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd and Bennet (1984) Aust Torts Rep 80-546. The Act is in 
force in South Australia, see De Garis v Dalgety & CoLtd[1915] SALR 102 at 124; and 
in Victoria, see s 128 of the Instruments Act of 195 8 (Vic); Barrow v Bank of New South 
Wales; [ 1931] VLR 3 23; and in Western Australia, see Law Reform (Statute of Frauds) 
Act of 1962 (WA); Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v RH Brown & Co ( 1972) 126 
CLR 336; and in Tasmania, sees 11 of the Mercantile Law Act of 1935 (Tas). 
127 See Hirst v West Riding Union Banking Co Ltd [1901] 2 KB 560. 
128 Ibid. 
129 (1874) LR 9 QB 301. 
130 See, also, Parsons v Barclay & Co Ltd and Goddard (1910) 103 LT 196. 
131 Ibid. 
132 (1970) 122 CLR 628. 
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"A banker giving a gratuitous reference is not required to do his best, for instance, 
making enquiries from outside sources which are available to him, though this would 
make his reference more reliable. All he is required to do is to conform to that standard 
of skill and competence and diligence which is generally shown by persons who carry on 
the business of providing references of that kind. Equally it is no excuse for him to say 
that he has done his honest best, if what he does falls below that standard because in fact 
he lacks the necessary skill and competence to attain to it. The reason why the law 
requires him to conform to this standard of skill and competence and diligence is that by 
carrying on a business which includes the giving of references of this kind he has let it 
be known to the recipient of the reference that he claims to possess that degree of skill 
and competence and is willing to apply that degree of diligence to the provision of any 
reference which he supplies in the course of that business, whether gratuitously so far as 
the recipient is concerned or not. If he supplies the reference the law requires him to 
make good his claim. 11133 
The matter of Compafina Bank v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd and Bennet134 
which involved a claim by a Swiss bank against the ANZ Bank for $5.5 million, is of great 
importance as far as several legal issues relating to the following are concerned: 
• the effect of a bank's letter of introduction; 
• a favourable credit report with a disclaimer clause; 
• authority of branch managers to issue such references; 
• liability of the bank for misrepresentations in such references - both fraudulent and 
negligent; and 
• the assessment of damages for loss suffered by relying on them. 
The Compafina135 case is also a rare case because the bank manager was held personally liable 
for deceit and the bank held entitled to be indemnified by him. 136 
13 3 For a similar view see, Brown RH & Co v The Bank of New South Wales and Commercial 
Banking Company of Sydney Ltd [ 1971] WAR 201. 
134 [1984] Aust Torts Rep 80-546. 
135 Ibid 
136 For further important decisions as to the reasonableness in believing the reference, as 
well as contributory negligence in relying on the references, see L Shaddock and 
Associates Pty Ltd and Another v Parramatta City Council (No J) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 
JEE Fasteners Ltd v Marks Bloom & Co (A Firm) [ 1981] 3 All ER 289. 
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In the Compafina137 case the court distinguished between a letter ofintroduction and an opinion 
as follows. The purpose of a letter of introduction in the ordinary sense of the word is to make 
the customer of that branch known to the person to whom the letter is directed as a customer of 
that branch. A branch manager has no implied authority in a letter of introduction to give an 
opinion on the customer's general position and character. Where a representation or reference 
contains a bank's assessment of the character and business ability of a customer such a 
representation falls quite comfortably within the description of an "opinion". In this case, the 
letter of introduction signed and given by the manager was quite unusual. It was more in the 
nature of an opinion. In the court's view a letter of introduction (on an official letterhead) by a 
manager of one of Australia's largest banks, which spoke so eloquently of the customer's honesty, 
integrity and business ability, would, no doubt, prove a strong inducement to any institution in 
deciding to lend the customer money. Indeed, this was the purpose of writing the letter and 
indeed, this is what actually happened. 
A bank may escape liability ifit is in effect merely passing on a reference given by another bank, 
without express or implied endorsement. 138 
The House of Lords in the Hedley Byrne139 case found that although the defendant had been 
negligent, there was no liability because of the disclaimer of liability. In Australia, the High 
Court140 treated the matter as one that was still open, as the court doubted whether a duty of care 
imposed by law can be circumvented by a mere reservation. It is, of course, clear that no 
disclaimer will be effective in the avoidance of liability for advice which is given fraudulently 
or recklessly. 141 
3.4 THE BANK'S LIABILITY FOR INVESTMENT ADVICE 
In some earlier cases, 142 the courts had to determine a bank's liability for investment advice. In 
137 [1984] Aust Torts Rep 80-546. 
13 8 See Cunningham and Others v National Australia Bank Ltd and Others ( 1987) 77 ALR 
632; Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82; Yorke 
v Ross Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661. 
139 [1964] AC 465. 
140 See Mutual Life and Citizens' Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt ( 1968) 112 CLR 556. 
141 Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltdv RH Brown & Co (1972) 126 CLR 337. 
142 Most notably being Banbury v Bank of Montreal [1918] AC 626. 
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Banbury v Bank of Montrea/143 the majority in the House of Lords took the view that advising 
on investments was not part of the business of banking. In Barrow v Bank of New South Wales144 
and Byrne v Nicke/145 the decision in the Banbury146 case was relied on by the bank in order to 
avoid liability. 
In the Barrow141 and Byrne148 cases, the respective bank managers, although they were under no 
obligation to do so, held themselves out as willing to advise. It may happen that the bank holds 
itself out as a financial adviser and in such a case it would be futile for it to plead afterwards that 
investment advice was no part ofits business. This is exactly what happened in Woods v Martins 
Bank Ltd149 The plaintiff who had no real business experience asked a branch manager of the 
defendant bank to act as his financial adviser and the manager replied that the bank would be 
only too pleased to take care of the plaintiff's financial affairs. Acting on the manager's advice, 
the plaintiff invested large sums of money in a company, but the investment turned out to be 
disastrous loss. Unknown to the plaintiff, but well known to the manager, the company in 
question was heavily indebted to that bank and the bank's head office had been pressing the 
manager to get the company's overdraft reduced. The plaintiff sued the bank to recover the 
amount he had lost on the ground of negligent advice. No fraud was alleged because it was 
admitted that the manager himself honestly believed in the advice he gave. 
The bank was held liable. In demolishing the argument that the bank was not liable because it 
was not within its scope to advise on investments, Salmon J observed that the court cannot do 
better than to look at the bank's advertisements. The words (in the advertisement) "you may 
consult your bank manager freely and seek his advice on all matters affecting your financial 
welfare", seemed to the Judge to be in the widest possible terms. The decision in Banbury v Bank 
of Montrea/150 was distinguished on the ground that the facts in that case were peculiar and there 
it was admitted without argument, that the bank manager had no general authority to advise. 
143 Ibid. 
144 [ 193 1] VLR 3 23. 
145 [1950] St R Qd 57. 
146 [1918] AC 626. 
147 [1931] VLR 323. 
148 [1950] St R Qd 57. 
149 [1959] 1 QB 55. 
150 [1918] AC 626. 
121 
Salmon J added: 
"In any event what may have been true oftheBankofMontrealin 1918 is not necessarily 
true of Martins Bank in 1958". 151 
One of the Court's findings was that the plaintiff had reposed complete confidence in the 
manager's financial experience and acumen and supposed knowledge and skill in financial 
affairs. In that situation the manager had created a fiduciary relationship with the customer. 
Today, banks, together with their wholly owned subsidiaries and associated companies, openly 
advertise and compete strongly for several types of investment and financial services. Their role 
as "money managers" has grown more rapidly and extensively since the deregulation of the 
financial system in the 1980s and the entry of foreign banks in 1985. 152 
Several judicial decisions relating to banks' foreign loans, and claims against banks for 
misleading and deceptive conduct in terms ofs 52 of the Trade Practices Act ofl974 (Cth) have 
clearly held that investment and financial advice is part of banking business today. 153 
Specialized divisions of the banks (for example, corporate, international, investment, treasury 
and global treasury, corporate advisory, merchant banking, capital markets and project finance 
divisions) now offer several services that may well fall within the ambit of the law relating to a 
bank's liability for financial and investment advice as discussed in this chapter, 
Examples of these areas of activity are: 
151 The decision in Woods v Martin Bank [1959] 1 QB 55 was expressly approved by the 
House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [ 1964] AC 465 at 530 
and by the Privy Council inMutual Life and Citizens Assurance Co v Evatt (1970) 122 
CLR 628 at 657. Paget's Banking Law 8 at 188-9, says of the decision in Woods v 
Martins Bank Ltd: 
"The case is of the first importance to bankers, for it takes account of the change 
which has taken place in banking practice, as evidenced by the advertisements, 
since the Banbury case ... The probability is that advising has become part of the 
business of banking, at any rate of those who advertise to that effect, in which 
case banks must gauge the responsibility thereby entailed and provide 
accordingly". 
152 Tyree Banking 120; Weerasooria Banking Law par 30.46. 
153 Barton v Westpac Banking Corporation [1983] ATPR 40-388; Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Eltran Pty Ltd (1987) 74 ALR 45; Chiarabaglio v Westpac Banking 
Corporation [ 1989] ATPR 40-971. 
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• provision and management of portfolios, share units, and 
investment trusts and superannuation funds; 
• reports, advice and valuation of new issues of shares and other notices to shareholders; 
• management of securities under custodial care, custodial and settlement services 
including international custodial facilities for Australians investing in foreign securities; 
• advice and reports and implementation of business acquisitions, takeovers, mergers and 
disposals and general financial advice on such matters; 
• advice on capital raising, underwriting of debts and equity issues; 
• preparation of financial feasibility studies for project finance and advice on loan 
structuring for projects and advice on acquisitions and disposals of investments in 
projects; 
• advice on corporate foreign exchange exposures and arranging off-shore finance in 
foreign currency including syndication. 154 
Investment advice is subject to the prohibition of misleading or deceptive conduct. 155 Where a 
misrepresentation of fact, past or future, is otherwise absent, relief may still be available where 
the advice given is not underscored by a genuine belief and where there are no reasonable 
grounds for such advice. Inadequate grounds were found to exist in Chiarabaglio v Westpac 
Banking Corporation156 where the defendant bank was held liable towards its customer in respect 
of an overseas currency loan into which it had entered on the advice of the bank. Foster J held 
that the bank had honestly held the opinion it gave, but that there was no reasonable basis upon 
which the opinion could be justified. The advice included representations that there was no 
significant risk in the loan, that hedging an offshore loan was not worthwhile and that the 
Australian dollar would not devalue against the Japanese yen. Foster J took into account the fact 
that the customer had limited English and found that he should have been given: 
"[A] most careful explanation of offshore borrowing with clear emphasis on the 'open 
ended' nature of the risks associated with it, together with a clear and detailed exposition 
of the steps such as short term hedging which the borrower would himself be required to 
undertake in order to exercise some control over those risks. "157 
154 See WeerasooriaBanking Law pars 30.48 and 30.49. 
155 S 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth). 
156 [ 1989] ATPR 40-971. Affirmed in Westpac Banking Corporation v Chiarabaglio [ 1991] 
ATPR (Digest) 46-067. See, also, Dennison v Ace Shohin (Australia) Pty Ltd [1987] 
ATPR40-793). 
157 Chiarabaglio v Westpac Banking Corporation [1989] ATPR 40-971. 
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Advice has been held to amount to misleading or deceptive conduct in the context of: 
• a statement to a guarantor of an account that the bank's customer was "trading 
satisfactorily" when the bank knew the customer had a cash-flow problem;158 
• a statement to a customer that the bank would advance money in the future; 159 
• a statement that the bank intended to close down an account in respect of which a 
guarantee was sought and then to terminate the guarantee as soon as a nil balance was 
achieved in the account;160 
• a statement that a loan would be approved, followed by the subsequent refusal of the 
loan.161 
Representations made in the course of negotiating foreign currency loans have been the subject 
of a number of recent cases such as the Chiarabaglio162 case. For example, in Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Eltran Pty Ltd163 representations made by the defendant bank's officer to the effect 
that the bank had a competent foreign-currency department which would assist in the 
management of a loan and that it would act on the customer's instruction concerning hedging 
when it did not in fact intend to do so, were held to amount to a breach of s 52 of the Trade 
Practices Act of 1974 (Cth). 
The authority of branch managers to advise, and whether such advice will bind the bank, will 
naturally depend on the particular transaction and the facts of each case. General principles 
governing the express, implied and ostensible authority of employees, will also apply. 164 
158 Nobile v National Australia Bank Ltd [ 1987] ASC 5 5-580; Banque Brussels Lambert SA 
v Australian National Industries Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 502. 
159 Menhaden Pty Ltd v Citibank NA (1984) 1 FCR 542. 
160 Hamer v Westpac Banking Corporation [ 1987] ATPR 40-811. 
161 Westpac Banking Corporation v Eltran Pty Ltd (1987) 74 ALR 45. 
162 [1989] ATPR40-971.See, also, Westpac Banking Corporation v Spice [1990] 12 ATPR 
51-3 86; David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) 93 ALR 
271; McEvoy Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [ 1990] Aust Torts Rep 67-
690. 
163 (1987) 74 ALR 45. 
164 Outsiders dealing with a company can assume that the company's business activities and 
transactions are being properly and duly performed and are not bound to enquire whether 
the company's internal management has been regular. Royal British Bank v Turquand 
(1856) 6 E & B 327. This common-law assumption is now a statutory assumption by 
virtue of ssl64(2) and (3) of the Corporations Law. 
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Often bank staff with professed expertise in financial matters (for example, investments, offshore 
borrowing, etc) take it upon themselves to advise customers with little knowledge of the subject 
matter. In Chiarabaglio v Westpac Banking Corporation165 Foster J stated that in such cases, the 
bank officer must realize that he or she could be exercising, to a not inconsiderable degree, the 
power of persuasion and could thereby cause harm of an economic nature to customers' accepting 
that information and advice. Moreover, it is reasonable that in the absence of any inquiry on his 
or her part, such a bank officer should assume that those to whom he or she was imparting 
information possessed no worthwhile knowledge of the involved subjects being explained and 
that they would be dependant upon that information and advice in making their decision whether 
or not to enter into a particular transaction. The approach taken by courts when considering the 
duty of care in this area of the law is to develop in appropriate cases new categories of liability 
for negligence. 166 
In the context of current judicial decisions, a banker can incur liability towards a customer for 
negligent financial or investment advice if: 
• the customer relied on that advice and suffered loss; 
• the banker was aware or ought to have been aware that the customer was going to rely on 
such advice; 
• the advice was given in serious circumstances and not in an informal way or on an 
informal occasion (for example, in a casual telephone conversation) which would make 
it unreasonable for the customer to have relied on such advice. 167 
Where an opinion was given in good faith, in terms of an opinion honestly held on reasonable 
grounds, the bank should escape liability. 168 In the absence of special knowledge, the banker has 
165 [1989] ATPR 40-971. 
166 For cases proposing an incremental development of novel categories of negligence, see 
Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; Caparo Industries pie v 
Dickman and Others [ 1990] 2 AC 605; Murphy v Brentwood District Council [ 1991] 1 
AC 398. 
167 See L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (1981) 150 CLR 
225; Mohr v Cleaver [1986] WAR 67; Royal Bank Trust Co (Trinidad) v Pampellone 
[1987] 1 Lloyds Rep 218; Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371. 
168 James v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1986) 64 ALR 347; Stanton v 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [ 1987] ATPR 40-755; Bill Acceptance 
Corporation Ltd v GWA Ltd (1983) 78 FLR 171. 
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no duty to consider the taxation aspects of transactions. 169 
3.5 THE BANKER'S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AND OTHER RELEVANT COMMON-
LAW PRINCIPLES 
3.5.1 Introduction: rising tide of defences based on unconscionability and misleading 
conduct 
As in most Western countries, Australian banks and other lenders are increasingly being faced 
with claims by borrowers, guarantors and mortgagors that their contracts with the lender ought 
to be set aside on the grounds that the contract or the lender's or borrower's conduct in relation 
to the contract is unfair. 170 In recent times cases in which sureties have applied and obtained relief 
from their suretyships or mortgages have proliferated. The long list of Australian cases171 setting 
aside or re-opening suretyships demonstrates that there are many guarantors who have not 
understood the nature and extent of their obligations under the suretyship and the financial risk 
represented by the debtor or the project being financed, or who have been misled about this by 
the debtor or the lender. 172 The cases are also filled with sureties who have been subjected to 
undue influence173 or unfair pressure by the debtor174 (and, infrequently, the lender) to enter into 
169 Schioler v Westminster Bank Ltd [ 1970] 2 QB 719. 
170 See Moon 1993 LJJ 592, an article based on the author's booklet "How to get out of a 
Contract of Guarantee". 
171 See, eg, Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Bawn v 
Trade Credits [1986] NSW Conv R 55-290; Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation 
(Australia) Ltd v Diprose [1987] NSW Conv R 55-364; Budget Nominees (Pty) Ltd v 
Registrar of Titles [ 1988] V Conv R 54-311; Broadlands International Finance Ltd v Sly 
[1987] NSW Conv R 55-342;NationalAustraliaBankLtdv Nobile and Martelli [1988] 
ATPR 40-856; Money v Westpac Banking Corporation [1988] ATPR 46-034; Westpac 
Banking Corporation v Sugden [1988] NSW Conv R 55-377; Nolan v Westpac Banking 
Corporation(1989) 51 SASR496; GuthrievAustraliaandNew Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd [1989] NSW Conv R 55-463; Esanda Finance Corporation v Murphy [1989] ASC 
55-703;Robinson vAustraliaandNew ZealandBankingGroupLtd[l990] ASC 58-890. 
172 For the nugatory effect of a misleading statement by an officer of an intending mortgagee, 
see CookvBankofNew South Wales [1982] ASC 55 -223. 
173 See, eg, Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Whitelaw (1906) VLR 711; Robertson v 
Robertson [1930] QWN 41; Bank of New South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 42; 
Yerkey v Jones ( 193 9) 63 CLR 649. 
17 4 Particularly in cases where the wife stood surety for the husband's debts, and he exerted 
undue influence or unconscionable conduct towards her. See, eg, Akins v National 
Australia Bank ( 1994) 34 NS WLR 155; National Australia Bank Ltd v Garcia (1996) 3 9 
NSWLR 577; Burke v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd (1994) 37 NSWLR 53; Gregg 
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the transaction, who did not have the opportunity to reflect on the risks involved or to seek 
adequate independent advice, who were not informed of defaults and were unaware that a 
guarantee believed to be for a fixed sum advance was an all-moneys suretyship for now-inflated 
debts which would exhaust all or most of the surety's assets. 
Sureties' allegations of unconscionable conduct have become commonplace in statements of 
claim or defences and cross-claims in enforcement proceedings. 175 Lenders have received 
considerable adverse publicity and are uncertain whether their suretyships will stand up to 
challenge. 176 
Naturally, lenders and their advisers are concerned about this trend and have sought to develop 
procedures in arranging guarantees and securities which will minimize the risk of those 
transactions being later set aside or modified by the courts. 177 Australian bankers and the various 
Law Societies are also striving to find a set of procedural steps which, if followed, will make the 
transaction immune from later challenge. 178 One of the principal elements included in such 
procedures is that the surety receives independent advice, or at least is urged to take such advice 
and is given a real opportunity to do so. 179 It is important to note at the outset that the absence of 
independent advice does not ofitself make a transaction unfair. 180 An excursus to this thesis will 
be devoted to a discussion of independent advice by reason of the fact that Australian lawyers 
v Tasmanian Trustees Ltd (1997) 143 ALR 328. 
175 See, eg, Westpac Banking Corporation v Robinson [ 1990] ASC 59-027; European Asian 
of AustraliaLtdv Kurland andAnother (1985) 8 NSWLR 192; National Australia Bank 
Ltd v Nobile &Martelli [ 1988] ATPR 40-856; Sneddon 1992 JBFLP 92; Sneddon 1990 
UNSWLJ302; O'Donovan 1992 LIJ 51; Binghaml996 LIJ 42. 
176 See, eg, O'Donovan 1992 LIJ 51-54; Nolan v Westpac Banking Corporation (1989) 51 
SASR 496; National Australia Bank Ltd v Nobile and Martelli [1988] ATPR 40-856; 
Speirs 1986 Banking Law Bulletin 49; Turley 1991LIJ1039. 
177 Speirs 1986 Banking Law Bulletin 49. 
178 See ss 17.1-17. 7 of the Code of Banking Practice of the Australian Banker's Association, 
discussed in Neate Bank Confidentiality 27. 
179 See, eg, Powell v Powell [ 1900] 1 Ch 243; Jnche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [ 1929] 
AC 127; Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v 
Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Harrison v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1928) 23 
Tas LR 1. 
180 See, however, s 44 of the Consumer Transaction Act of 1972 (SA) requiring a lender in 
Southern Australia to ensure that a prospective guarantor obtains a certificate from a 
solicitor confirming that the debtor understands the true purport and effect of the 
guarantee. See O'Donovan 1992 LJJ 51 at 52. 
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have built up a fairly sophisticated body of law on the subject, and it is my contention that the 
concept may become more important in South African suretyship relations. 
Sureties can obtain relief from unfair contracts from several sources. Traditionally, relief from 
unfair bargains has been obtainable in equity, notably through the doctrines of undue influence 
and unconscionable conduct. Today relief can also be obtained under statutes such as the 
Contracts Review Act of 1980 (NSW), certain sections of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) 
which proscribes engaging in unconscionable conduct, and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code181 
which is based upon the principle of truth-in-lending which will enable borrowers through 
adequate disclosure to make informed choices when obtaining credit. Sections of the Trade 
Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) are often used as an alternative source of relief where the unfair 
conduct is misleading or deceptive. In those States with Fair Trading Acts certain sections of the 
Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth), are replicated as State law. 182 In addition, the circumstances 
of a case may permit relief to be obtained on common-law grounds such as misrepresentation, 183 
mistake, undue influence184 or failing in a duty of disclosure. 
The prohibition of misleading or deceptive conduct185 has largely usurped the role of the general 
law relating to pre-contractual misrepresentation, whether innocent, negligent or fraudulent. The 
prohibition of misleading or deceptive conduct is able to provide a remedy in all cases of pre-
contractual misrepresentation's occurring in trade or commerce. 186 Consequently, as a general 
181 The UCCC replaced existing Credit Acts in each State such as the Credit Act of 1984 
(Vic); Credit Act of 1984 (NSW); Credit Ordinance of 1985 (ACT); Credit Act of 1984 
(WA) and the Credit Act of 1987 (QLD). 
182 Thus equivalents of s 52A of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) are found ins l lA 
of the Fair Trading Act of 1985 (Vic), s 43 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (NSW), s 57 
of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (SA), s 11 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (WA), ands 
39 of the Fair Trading Act of 1989 (QLD). 
183 See Nolan v Westpac Banking Corporation (1989) 51 SASR 496; National Australia 
Bank Ltdv Nobile and Martelli [1988] ATPR 40-856. 
184 LloydsBankLtdvBundy[l914] 3AUER151;Nationa/AustraliaBankLtdvNobileand 
Martelli [1988] ATPR40-856;Dalyv Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd(1986) 160 CLR371. 
185 S 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth); s 12 of the Fair Trading Act of 1992 
(ACT); s 42 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (NSW); s 42 of the Consumer Affairs and 
Fair Trading Act of 1990 (NT); s 3 8 of the Fair Trading Act of 1989 (QLD); s 56 of the 
Fair Trading Act of 1987 (SA); s 14 of the Fair Trading Act of 1990 (Tas); s 11 of the 
Fair Trading Act of 1985 (Vic); s 10 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (WA). 
186 Reliefin terms of the Fair Trading Act ofl 989 (QLD) is limited to consumer protection, 
buts 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) affords relief in relation to corporate 
misleading conduct. The relevant provisions of the Fair Trading Act of 1989 (QLD) are: 
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rule, it is only where the "in trade or commerce" requirement cannot be satisfied, the shorter 
limitation period of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) has expired, or where 
exemplary damages are sought for fraud that the victims of misrepresentation are required to 
have recourse to the general law. 187 As there are a number of significant advantages in relying 
upon s 52 and its extensive and flexible remedies, this means that in practice, the general-law 
misrepresentation actions are almost obsolete. 
Two matters of terminology should be explained at this point, which are relevant in regard to 
Australian suretyships, or guarantees188 as they are called there. A surety's contract may be one 
of guarantee or indemnity. In some cases the "surety" is made a co-debtor under the terms of the 
loan agreement, in others the "surety" is the borrower of record although all parties understand 
that the proceeds of the loan will be passed as a gift to the "debtor". The terms "debtor" and 
"surety" will be used in this section of the thesis to denote the substance of the transaction rather 
than the form. Thus the debtor is the person who receives the principal and direct benefit of the 
financial accommodation from the lender and the surety is the person who is liable for the debt 
although he or she does not receive the direct benefit of the financial accommodation. 189 Also, 
for the sake of brevity, references to guarantees should be treated as including suretyship. 
Secondly, reference will often be made to independent advice because of its importance in 
Australian law. 190 Reference will be made throughout to independent advice without specifying 
s 99(3) (damages), s 100(6) (rescission), s 6 (consumer). 
187 If the misrepresentation is also a term of the contract or of a collateral contract, an action 
under the general law may be more advantageous as the measure of damages may be 
more favourable to the applicant. It has been held that exemplary damages are not 
recoverable in terms of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth): see Musca v Astle 
Corporation Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 251. 
188 In Australia and in most English common-law jurisdictions the terms "surety" and 
"guarantor" are used interchangeably. See O'Donovan & Phillips Guarantee 8. 
189 The degree to which the surety benefits from the transaction are relevant in assessing 
whether relief ought to be granted. Thus in cases of undue influence it may be necessary 
to show that the transaction was manifestly disadvantageous to the surety and in cases of 
unconscionable conduct a material benefit to the surety may show that the transaction 
was fair, just and reasonable in all the circumstances. See Sneddon 1990 UNSWLJ 3-02 
at 304. 
190 Various statutory provisions and the case law direct attention to whether independent 
legal or other advice was obtained. See, eg, s 9(2)(h) of the Contracts Review Act of 1980 
(NSW); s 44 of the Consumer Transactions Act of 1972 (SA). See, also, Powell v Powell 
[1900] 1Ch243; Jnche Noriah v ShaikAllie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127; Yerkey vJones 
(1939) 63 CLR 649; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltdv v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; 
McNamara v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1984) 37 SASR232; Guthrie 
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the type of that advice. Traditionally, the independent advice required has been legal advice and 
almost all the case law concerns independent legal advice. However, as commercial transactions 
become more sophisticated, a surety may equally need accounting or economic advice in order 
to understand the effect of a transaction and the risks involved in it. 191 Although most cases have 
been and probably will continue to be concerned with legal advice, the expression "independent 
advice" will be used so as not to exclude other desirable forms of advice from contemplation. 
3.5.2 Common-law defences 
3.5.2 1 Introduction 
At common law, sureties have available all the usual contractual defences, such as 
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and unconscionability. Although not strictly limited 
to issues of disclosure, the common-law aspects of undue influence and unconscionability will 
be addressed hereunder, as they particularly bear the seeds of disclosure. Thereafter the common-
law principles of disclosure will be highlighted. A brief survey of duties of explanation will 
round off the common-law aspect of disclosure. A discussion of duress falls outside the scope 
of this thesis. As previously stated, the prohibition of misleading or deceptive conduct in terms 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and in terms of the various states' Fair Trading Acts, has 
largely usurped the role of the general law relating to pre-contractual misrepresentation, whether 
innocent, negligent or fraudulent. 192 
3.5.2.2 Relief in equity: undue influence 
3.5.2.2.1 Background 
In Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Whitelaw 193 Hodges J described undue influence in the 
v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1989] NSW ConvR 55-463; Vital 
Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Taylor [1991] ASC 58-167. 
191 See Sneddon 1990 UNSWLJ 302; Smith v Elders Rural Finance Ltd (Unreported, 
Supreme Court NSW, 25 November 1994) - a case where the guarantor was incapable 
of assessing the financial risks of the transaction. 
192 S 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth); s 12 of the Fair Trading Act of 1992 
(ACT); s 42 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (NSW); s 42 of the Consumer Affairs and 
Fair Trading Act of 1990 (NT); s 38 of the Fair Trading Act of 1989 (Qld); s 56 of the 
Fair Trading Act of 1987 (SA); s 14 of the Fair Trading Act of 1990 (Tas); s 11 of the 
Fair Trading Act of 1985 (Vic); s 10 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (WA). 
193 [1906] VLR 711. 
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following terms: 
"Influence is the ascendancy acquired by one person over another. 'Undue influence' is 
the improper use by the ascendant person of such ascendancy for the benefit of himself 
or someone else, so that the acts of the person influenced are not in the fullest sense of 
the word, his free, voluntary acts. "194 
Since the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Allcard v Skinner195 a distinction has been drawn 
between two categories of cases of undue influence: 196 
( 1) those where influence is presumed from the nature of a pre-existing relationship between 
the parties to the transaction whereby one is in a position to exercise domination over the 
other (hereafter referred to as cases of presumed undue influence). 197 
In cases where undue influence is presumed, the stronger party has the onus of proving 
that the weaker party did not enter into the transaction as a result of the influence, by 
showing that entering into the transaction was "the voluntary and well-understood act" 
of the weaker party's own mind. 
(2) those where the stronger party's dominance arises not from a pre-existing relationship 
but from particular circumstances. 
In such cases there is no presumption of undue influence and the weaker party must prove 
that the transaction was the result of undue influence exercised by the stronger party 
(hereafter referred to as cases of actual undue influence). 198 
194 Ibid, at 720. 
195 (1887) 36 Ch D 145. 
196 Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 at 135-136 per Dixon J; Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA v Aboody and Another (1989] 2 WLR 759. 
197 Relationships in which undue influence will be presumed can be divided into two types: 
relationships within certain established categories where the presumption automatically 
arises (eg doctor and patient, religious superior and inferior) and relationships not within 
those categories (eg husband and wife, bank and customer) where the evidence in the 
case shows that the particular relationship was one of influence, so as to justify the 
application of the presumption to the transaction in question. 
198 In England, at least, the party complaining of undue influence must also show that the 
transaction was manifestly disadvantageous to him or her: National Westminster Bank 
pie v Morgan (1985] AC 686 and see European Asian of Australia v Kurland and 
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Ifit is proved that the transaction was entered into because of undue influence the normal remedy 
is for the transaction to be set aside and the parties restored to their original positions. 199 The 
order to set aside may be made subject to conditions so as to allow justice to be done between 
the parties.20° For the purposes of this thesis, the doctrine of undue influence in Anglo-American 
law is summarized sufficiently under the discussion of English law and needs no further 
discussion except for the issue of undue influence by third parties, particularly that of husbands 
over wives, where Australian law initially differed from English law. 
3.5.2.2.2 Undue influence by husbands over wives 
In most cases concerning undue influence in relation to guarantees, the lender will not have 
exercised undue influence over the surety directly. 201 Most often it is the debtor and not the lender 
who has exercised the undue influence and the question is whether the lender is in some way 
liable (or should at least have to bear the loss upon the setting aside of the suretyship) for the 
debtor's conduct. The general proposition is that the stronger party must have had actual 
knowledge of the special disability or of facts indicating a special disability, or that the debtor 
was acting as the agent of the lender in procuring the signature of the surety, before the rights of 
the stronger party under the suretyship can be subject to the surety's equity to have the 
transaction set aside. 202 
A debtor is not considered to be the agent of the lender merely because the lender allows the 
Another (1985) 8 NSWLR 192 which applied the requirement in Australia. See, also, 
Farmer's Co-operative Executors & Trustees Ltdv Perks (1989) 52 SASR 399, and Cope 
1986ALJ97. 
199 Thermo-Flo Corporation Ltd v Kuryluk (1978) 84 DLR (3d) 529; Mutual Finance Ltd 
v John Wetton and Sons Ltd [1937] 2 KB 389; Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649. 
200 Sercombe v Sanders (1865) 34 Beav 382; Bank of New South Wales vRogers (1941) 65 
CLR42. 
201 Such cases are rare because the lender usually is not in a relationship of influence over 
the surety. Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] 3 All ER 757 is an example of where a lender 
exercised direct undue influence over a surety. The relationship of influence arose 
because the surety was a long-standing customer of the lender. See, also, Daly v Sydney 
Stock Exchange Ltd ( 1986) 160 CLR 3 71. 
202 On this subject, see Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; 
Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 (wife guaranteeing debts owed 
by husband); Burke v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd(1994) 37 NSWLR 53 (elderly 
parents guaranteed debt owed by son); State Bank of New South Wales v Bosday Pty Ltd 
(1995) 7 BPR 14-492 (SC NSW) (elderly migrants guaranteeing debt owed by son-in-
law). 
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debtor to take the necessary steps to find a suitable guarantor and arrange for the guarantee to be 
executed. 203 
Previously, a special rule afforded reliefin respect of a wife's guarantees of her husband's debts. 
In Yerkey v Jones204 it was noted that, although the "relation of a husband to his wife is not one 
ofinfluence, and no presumption exists of undue influence, it has never been divested completely 
of what may be called equitable presumptions of an invalidating tendency". 205 
The special principle governing relief for guarantor wives was expressed by Dixon J in the 
following terms: if a married woman's consent to become surety for her husband's debt is 
procured by the husband and if, without understanding its effect in essential respects, she 
executes an instrument of suretyship which the creditor accepts without dealing directly with her 
personally, she has a prima facie right to have it set aside. 206 
Accordingly, as a general rule, a wife had a right, or "special equity" to have a guarantee set aside 
where she had guaranteed her husband's debt. 207 
The special rule attracted strong criticism for failing to recognize changes in the status and 
education of women, and the increasing role of women in business and financial affairs. 208 The 
special rule has now been abandoned since the decision in Barclays Bank pie v O'Brien and 
Another.209 The Australian Courts have followed the O'Brien210 decision in holding that the 
position of wives who guarantee the debts of their husbands is now governed by the ordinary 
203 Barclays Bankplc v O'Brien [1994] 1AC180; [1993] 4 All ER417; HG &RNominees 
Pty Ltd v Fava [1995] V Conv R 66-155. Until recently, in Australia, the opposite was 
true. See Avon Finance Co Ltd v Bridger [1985] 2 All ER 281; Kingsnorth Trust Ltd v 
Bell and Others [1986] 1 WLR 119; [1986] 1 All ER 423; Borg-Warner Acceptance 
Corporation (Australia) Ltd v Diprose [1987] NSW Conv R 55-364. 
204 (1939) 63 CLR 649. 
205 Ibid, at 675. 
206 Ibid, at 683 . 
207 See, also, Bank of Victoria Ltd v Mueller [ 1925] VLR 642. 
208 See, eg, European Asian of Australia Ltd v Kurland and Another ( 1985) 8 NS WLR 192 
at200; Warburton v Whiteley [1989] NSW ConvR55-453; Aitken l993ABLB46; Chen-
Wishart 1993 NZLJ 224; Aitken 1992 JBFLP 26 l. 
209 [1994] 1AC180; [1993] 4 All ER417. 
210 [1994] 1AC180; [1993]4AllER417. 
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equitable principles, as set out in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio. 211 
It is unclear whether the approach that the transaction must hold a substantial risk (as required 
in the 0 'Brien212 case), as adopted by the House of Lords, applies in Australia. It has been applied 
in some cases,213 but the weight of opinion appears to favour the view that the "substantial risk" 
approach is inconsistent with the principles of Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio. 214 
3.5.2.3 Relief in equity: unconscionable transactions 
3.5.2.3.1 Common law 
The equitable jurisdiction to set aside unconscionable transactions is long established. 215 It was 
described by Kitto J in Blomley v Ryan216 as applying when two elements are present. First, one 
party to a transaction is at a special disadvantage in dealing with the other party (for example 
because of illness, ignorance, unfamiliarity with the language used or financial hardship) and 
secondly, the other party unconscientiously takes advantage of the opportunity thus placed in his 
hands. This formulation was approved by the High Court in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd 
v Amadio211 where the doctrine was applied to set aside a mortgage and guarantee given in favour 
of a bank by an elderly immigrant couple. Since the Amadio218 case, there have been many claims 
211 (1983) 151 CLR447. See, eg,AkinsvNationalAustraliaBank(1994)34NSWLR 155; 
National Australia Bank Ltd v Garcia (1996) 39 NSWLR 577; Gregg v Tasmanian 
Trustees Ltd (1997) 143 ALR 328. 
212 [1993] 4 All ER 417 at 429. 
213 Burke v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd (1994) 37 NSWLR 53; State Bank of New 
South Wales Ltd v Bosday Pty Ltd (1995) 7BPR 14-492. 
214 (1983) 151 CLR 44 7. See, eg, Lisciandro v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [ 1995] ATPR 
41-436;NationalAustraliaBankLtdv Garcia (1996) 39 NSWLR577; Teachers' Health 
Investments Pty Ltd v Wynne [1996] ASC 56-972. 
215 See Earl ofChesterfieldvJanssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125; Langdon v Rees (1883) 4 LR 
(NSW) Eq 28; Cope 1983 ALJ279 at 279-295. 
216 (1956) 99 CLR 326 at 415. 
217 (1983) 151 CLR 447. Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ set aside the transaction on the 
ground of unconscionable conduct. Gibbs CJ did not consider that ground to be made out, 
but held that the transaction should be set aside because the lender did not disclose 
certain unusual features of the transaction when it had a duty to do so. Dawson J 
dissenting, would have upheld the transaction. 
218 Ibid 
134 
for relief by guarantors on the basis of unconscionable conduct219 by the lender, often allied with 
a claim of misleading conduct under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth).220 
Unconscionability has been described by learned commentators as a "pejorative adjective" and 
a "universal talisman in many fields of equity". 221 Some writers have eschewed any attempt at 
categorization or definition. 222 It is clear that the notion can decline all too readily into a 
generalized justification for the courts' doing whatever they deem to be fair, although the 
Australian Courts clearly reject such an approach. 223 
If the transaction is held to be unconscionable, the normal remedy is for the transaction to be set 
aside in whole or in part and on conditions, if necessary, in order to do justice between the 
parties. 224 
Undue influence and unconscionable transactions (or unconscionable conduct) are related, but 
distinct doctrines of equity. The doctrine of undue influence affords relief where the will of the 
innocent party is not independent and voluntary because it is dominated or suppressed. The 
doctrine of unconscionable conduct provides relief where the will of the innocent party, whether 
or not independent and voluntary, is the result of the disadvantageous position in which he or she 
is placed and the unconscientious advantage taken of that position by the stronger party. 225 
A distinction has been drawn between two types of unconscionability: procedural and 
219 "Unconscionability" is a recurrent notion in many branches of the Australian law (as well 
as that of Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and has been the guiding principle 
of many developments in equity in recent years. See the article by Finn in Y oudan ( ed) 
Equity 6 on the subject. 
220 See, eg, NationalAustraliaBankv NobileandMartelli [1988] ATPR40-856 andMoney 
v Westpac Banking Corporation [1988] ATPR46-034. 
221 Finn (ed) Essays 106 at 110; Mason in Finn (ed) Essays 242 at 244. 
222 Sheridan Equity 2. 
223 Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd [ 1962] AC 600 at 626; Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 
160 CLR 583 at 615; Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489 at 514. 
224 See Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362; Commercial Bank Australia Ltd v Amadio 
(1983) 151 CLR447. 
225 Per Mason Jin Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 461, 
and per Deane J at 474. Deane J referred to the following cases: Union Bank of Australia 
Ltdv Whitelaw [1906] VLR 711; WatkinsandAnothervCombesandAnother(l922) 30 
CLR 180; Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd (1965) 55 DLR (2d) 710. 
135 
substantive. 226 Procedural unconscionability refers tq unfairness in the bargaining process and 
the method of making the contract. Substantive unconscionability refers to unfair terms in the 
contract or the unjust effects of the operation of the contract. The two types ofunconscionability 
will often be present together227 because unfairness in the bargaining process often results in one-
sided contract terms. This distinction originated in an analysis by Professor Leff of the 
unconscionability provision in s 2-302 of the United States' Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC).228 The two are related. Much of the concern with unfairness in the process of contracting 
is the result of the unconscionable outcomes which arise from one-sided bargains. Grossly unfair 
outcomes lead to an inquiry about the negotiating process. Ideas about what is or what is not an 
unfair outcome may have a strong influence on decisions about whether aspects of the process 
should be deemed "unconscionable", such as the absence of independent advice.229 
The classic equitable doctrines as described in Blomley v Ryan230 and Commercial Bank of 
Australia Ltd v Amadio231 are concerned with procedural unconscionability: the methods used 
to make the contract. Relief from substantive unconscionability usually has to be sought under 
statute and not in equity. In the United States it appears that equity may grant relief for one type 
of substantive unconscionability - an overall gross imbalance in the rights and duties of the 
parties under the contract. 232 In Australia the view appears to be that inadequate consideration or 
other unfair terms do not of themselves make a transaction unconscionable, but will be evidence 
of the relationship of special disadvantage or the unfair taking of advantage which constitutes 
procedural unconscionability. 233 
The circumstances which may constitute a special disadvantage may take a wide variety of forms 
226 West v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 610; Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000; 
Leff 1967 University of Pennsylvania LR 485. 
227 Atiyah Essays 333-335; Chen-Wishart Unconscionable Bargains 104. 
228 Leff 1967 University of Pennsylvania LR 485. 
229 Bester v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd[l970] 3 NSWR30; Lloyds BankLtdv Bundy [1975] 
QB 326; [1974] 3 All ER 757; Backhouse v Backhouse [1978] 1 All ER 1158; also 
reported as [ 1978] 1 WLR 243. 
230 (1956) 99 CLR 362. 
231 (1983) 151 CLR447. 
232 Leff 1967 University of Pennsylvania LR 485 at 538. 
233 See Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 at 405. 
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and cannot be listed exhaustively.234 In the Amadio235 case the justices had regard to the age of 
the sureties (7 6 and 71 years), their limited grasp of written English, their lack of relevant 
business experience, their misunderstanding of the extent of their liability under the guarantee 
and their mistaken belief that the debtor company's business (controlled by their son) was 
flourishing and their reliance on their son's financial advice and judgment. The unconscientious 
taking of advantage in the case consisted in the bank manager's proceeding with the transaction 
while knowing of the Amadios' situation of disadvantage and doing nothing to seek to correct 
it. 236 Indeed, if the manager were aware of a reasonable possibility that the Amadios were unable 
to make a judgment about what was in their own best interests because of their position of special 
disadvantage, and still proceeded with the transaction without making enquiries or disclosing 
necessary facts or counseling them to take independent advice, the bank would be guilty of 
unconscionable conduct.237 It was held that the manager knew or ought to have known that the 
Amadios did not understand the extent of their liability under the guarantee and that they had a 
mistaken belief as to the financial soundness of the debtor company. In fact the bank and the son 
had been colluding to honour and dishonour cheques selectively in order to give the company the 
appearance of solvency, thereby giving credence to the mistaken belief 
Once the two elements of a special disadvantage and an unconscientious taking advantage are 
established, the transaction will be set aside unless the party seeking to uphold the transaction 
can prove that the transaction was, in all the circumstances, fair, just and reasonable.238 
234 Commercial Bank of AustraliaLtdvAmadio(l983) 151 CLR447 at462-463. Types of 
unconscionability can consist of exploitation of vulnerability, see Stern v McArthur 
(1988) 165 CLR489;EarlofChesterfieldvJanssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen l25;Blomleyv 
Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362), or the abuse of trust or confidence, see Chan v Zacharia 
( 1984) 154 CLR 178), or the insistence on rights which make that harsh or oppressive, 
see Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; Pierce Bell Sales Pty Ltd v Frazer (1973) 
130 CLR 575, or an unconscionable denial of obligations, see Last v Rosenfeld [1972] 
2 NSWLR 923. 
235 (1983) 151 CLR447. 
236 Commercial Bank of AustraliaLtdvAmadio(l983) 151 CLR447 at479. 
237 Ibid, at 466-468. 
238 Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312 at 321; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio 
(1983) 151CLR447 at 474 and 479; European Asian of Australia Ltdv Kurland and 
Another (1985) 8 NSWLR 192. 
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3.5.2.3.2 Overlap of statutory provisions and equitable doctrine 
Unconscionable conduct is a ground for relief both in equity and under statute.239 The statutory 
provisions and the equitable doctrine overlap considerably, but there are also differences, the 
reasons for which are not always obvious. For example, the Contracts Review Act of 1980 
(NSW), the various Credit Acts and the Consumer Credit Code240 generally deny relief to 
corporations that may take advantage of the provisions of Pt 1 VA of the Trade Practices Act of 
1974 (Cth) and the Fair Trading Acts. 241 The Trade Practices Act ofl974 (Cth) furnishes a broad 
array of remedies, many of which are not available under the equitable doctrine. The statutory 
definitions of the conduct in question, although generally aimed at "unconscionable" behaviour, 
differ in their formulations between "unfair", "harsh", "unjust" and "unconscionable". Despite 
the size of the body of legislation, its meaning and its impact upon many transactions remain 
indeterminate. It is not always clear whether a particular Act is directed at abuses by the stronger 
party or the lack of bargaining strength of the weaker. Of course, an Act may be directed at both. 
The established concepts of the equitable doctrine may have influenced the elements required by 
the Acts, but the various statutory expressions are not limited by the twin concepts of a special 
disability and the unconscientious taking of advantage which underpin the equitable doctrine. 
The equitable doctrine of unconscionable dealing provides a basis for relief from transactions 
which have been procured by the unfair advantage taken by a stronger party of a special disability 
239 In addition to the "unconscionable conduct" to which Pt IVA of the Trade Practices Act 
of 1974 (Cth) and Fair Trading Act equivalents are directed, two other Acts that provide 
relief against unconscionable or harsh contracts are the Petroleum Retail Marketing Act 
of 1980 (Cth) and the Petroleum Retail Marketing Sites Act of 1980 (Cth), which provide 
certain protection for franchisees and lessees in the petroleum industry. In relation to the 
operation of these acts, see Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Best (1990) 170 CLR 516; 
MajikMarkets Pty Ltd v Brake & Service Centre Drummoyne Pty Ltd ( 1991) 28 NS WLR 
443. See, also, Industrial Relations Act of 1991 (NSW), s 275 (1). 
240 Credit Ordinance of 1985 (ACT); Consumer Credit Act of 1995 (ACT); Credit Act of 
1984 (NSW); Consumer Credit Act of 1995 (NSW); Consumer Credit Act of 1995 (NT); 
Credit Act of 1987 (QLD); Consumer Credit Act of 1994 (QLD; Consumer Credit Act 
of 1995 (SA); Consumer Credit Act of 1996 (Tas ); Credit Act of 1984 (Vic); Consumer 
Credit Act of 1995 (Vic); Credit Act of 1984 (yV A); Consumer Credit Act of 1996 (yV A). 
The Consumer Credit Act in each jurisdiction incorporates the Consumer Credit Code 
for that jurisdiction. The provisions of the Codes in all jurisdictions are identical and it 
is sufficient to refer to the Consumer Credit Code as one body of legislation. 
241 S 13 of the Fair Trading Act of 1992 (ACT); s 43 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (NSW); 
s 43 of the Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act of 1990 (NT); s 39 of the Fair Trading 
Act of 1989 (QLD); s 57 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (SA); s 15 of the Fair Trading 
Act of 1990 (Tas ); s 11 A of the Fair Trading Act of 1985 (Vic); s 11 of the Fair Trading 
Act of 1987 (yV A). 
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or disadvantageous position of a weaker·party.242 It must be shown that: 
(1) the weaker party suffered a special disability in dealing with the other, with the 
consequence that there was the absence of any reasonable degree of equality between 
them; and 
(2) the disability was sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make it unfair that the 
stronger party procure or accept the weaker party's assent to the impugned transaction. 243 
Where such circumstances are shown to have existed, the burden of proof is cast upon the 
stronger party to show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable. 244 
The equitable doctrine is given statutory recognition by s 51 AA of the Trade Practices Act of 
1974 (Cth). 
Section 51 AB of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) relates to both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability, so that a contravention may occur in pre-contractual negotiations 
or by reason of the actual contents of the transaction. It is unclear whether a requirement exists 
that the supplier should either be aware of the consumer's disability or at least that the supplier 
should be in such a position that he should reasonably have known of it. The relative bargaining 
strengths of the parties are a factor in determining whether conduct is unconscionable. Clearly, 
the presence or absence of independent legal advice can be a critical factor in the assessment of 
the effect of an imbalance between the parties to a transaction. Factors prescribed for 
consideration, which are not exclusive, are referred to ins 5 lAB (2). Section 5 lAB, likes 5 lAA, 
is directed at "unconscionable conduct", and so is not limited in its application to contracts. 
Consequently, the enforcement of a contractual term may be unconscionable even though the 
initial inclusion of that term in the contract itself does not meet that description. 
The notion of "unjustness in all the circumstances" which underlies the Contracts Review Act 
242 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 461 and at 474; 
Louthv Diprose (1992) 175 CLR621at627; Earl of AylesfordvMorris (1873) LR8 Ch 
App 484 at 491; Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd (1965) 55 DLR (2d) 710 at 713. 
243 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 at 428-429; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v 
Amadio(1983) 151 CLR447 at474;Earl of AylesfordvMorris(l873)LR8 ChApp484 
at 491; O'Rorke v Bolingbroke (1877) 2 App Cas 814 at 823. 
244 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 at 428-429; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v 
Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 474; Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621 at 632, and 
636-637; Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873) LR 8 Ch App 484 at 491; O'Rorke v 
Bolingbroke (1877) 2 App Cas 814 at 823; Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312. 
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of 1980 (NSW), is wider than equity's notion of "unconscionable dealing". It allows greater 
emphasis to be given to contractual outcomes. 
The Credit Acts and the Credit Consumer Code have a particular advantage in terms of ready 
access to informal tribunals. However, their scope is limited to consumer credit contracts. 
3.5.3 The duty of disclosure 
3.5.3.1 Introduction 
While the courts will not hold a surety to a guarantee extracted from him as a result of 
unconscientious dealings or an abuse of the creditor's superior bargaining power, they have 
steadfastly refused to classify contracts of guarantee in the category of uberrimae fidei. 245 Unlike 
contracts of insurance, suretyships are not contracts of the utmost good faith requiring full 
disclosure of all material facts by both parties.246 
3.5.3.2 No general duty to disclose 
At common law there is no universal obligation upon the creditor to disclose to the proposed 
surety all facts relative to his dealings with the principal debtor or affecting the debtor's credit.247 
Nor is he expected to advise the proposed surety of every circumstance of which he has 
knowledge and which is material to the contract of guarantee and which it is essential for the 
surety to be acquainted with before he executes the guarantee.248 The creditor is not even obliged 
245 Seaton v Heath [1899] 1 QB 782 at 792; Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649; Goodwin 
v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1968) 42 ALJR 110 at 111; Lindsay v L Stevenson 
and Sons Ltd (1891) 17 VLR 112; Fitzgerald v Jacomb (1873) 4 AJR 189 Davies v 
London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co (1878) 8 Ch D 469 at 475; Lee v Jones 
(1864) 17 CB(NS) 482 at 495; Behan v Obelon Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 326. 
246 Seaton v Heath [1899] 1 QB 782 at 792; It is otherwise however, where the creditor's 
concealment of material facts amounts to fraud or misrepresentation; See, also, 
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 44 7. Moreover the creditor 
may be required by statute in certain contexts to give the guarantor a duplicate copy of 
his contract of suretyship. Sees 13 of the Money Lenders Act of 1916 and the Consumer 
Credit legislation. 
247 Re Banister (1879) 12 Ch D 131 at 136; Re Marsh and Earl Granville (1882) 24 Ch D 
11 at 17; Isman v Widen [1926] 1 DLR 247; National Mortgage & Agency Co of New 
ZealandLtdv Stalker [1993] NZLR 1182. 
248 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 CI & Fin 109; Davies v London and Provincial Marine 
Insurance Co ( 1878) 8 Ch D 469. For this reason the creditor has no duty to disclose to 
one intending co-surety any adverse information about the credit of another intending 
140 
to divulge information unconnected with the transaction which may render the surety's 
undertaking more hazardous. 249 The creditor has no general duty to the surety to advise him of 
any changes of circumstances or defaults by the principal debtor after the suretyship is created. 250 
A failure to disclose material facts at any stage will not vitiate the guarantee unless there is fraud 
or misrepresentation. 251 It is for the guarantor to ascertain and assess the risk which is being 
assumed. 252 
Several reasons have been advanced to justify this general rule. Sometimes there is an appeal to 
practicalities and business efficacy. Thus the rule is supported on the grmmd that otherwise no 
creditor could rely on a contract of guarantee unless he communicated to the proposed sureties 
everything relating to his dealings with the principal debtor. 253 In Hamilton v Watson254 Lord 
Campbell went so far as to suggest that bankers would never get sureties, iffull disclosure of all 
materials facts were required. In some cases such a disclosure might constitute a breach of 
confidence by the creditor. 255 In London General Omni bus Co Ltd v H ollowaj-56 Farwell LJ also 
surety Behan v Obelon Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 326. 
249 Lindsay v L Stevenson and Sons Ltd (1891) 17 VLR 112. 
250 See Britannia Steamship Insurance Association Ltd v Duff (1909) 2 SLT 193 at 195; 
Toronto-DominionBankvRooke (1983) 3 DLR(4th) 715; Georgia Pacific Corporation 
(Williams Furniture Division) v Levitz 149 Ariz 120 716 P 2nd 1057 (1986). Certain 
statutes require the creditor to disclose specified information to the guarantor on request 
during the currency of a credit contract. 
251 Seaton v Heath [1899] 1 QB 782 at 792. There are three classes of cases in which an 
obligation of disclosure does not ordinarily arise at all, or does not originally arise, but 
may be created by circumstances occurring before or during the negotiations. These are 
as follows; 
( 1) where the party has a duty of disclosure owing to his previous fraud; 
(2) where a party has a duty to remove a delusion or make a correction in respect of 
a misunderstanding during the negotiations; 
(3) where a party is asked a direct question. When asked a direct question, the party is 
compelled to answer fully and truthfully. 
252 Seaton v Heath [1899] 1 QB 782 792; Goodwin v National Bank of Australasia Ltd 
(1968) 42 ALJR 110; Behan v Obelon Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 326; Union Bank of 
Australia Ltd v Puddy [1949] VLR 242; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio 
(1983) 151 CLR447. 
253 Lee v Jones (1864) 17 CB (NS) 482 at 503. 
254 (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109. 
255 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461. 
256 [1912] 2 KB 72. 
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stressed the difficulties which full disclosure would entail for bankers taking a guarantee: it 
would be indispensable for them to state how the principal debtor's account had been kept, 
whether he was in the habit of overdrawing, whether he was punctual in his dealings, and 
whether he performed his promises in an honourable manner. 
The general rule obviates these difficulties by allowing the creditor to assume that the proposed 
surety has acquainted himself with the principal debtor's position. The surety is presumed to 
know that the guarantee is intended to secure repayment of the principal' s debts and that 
dissatisfaction with the principal debtor's account is the probable reason for the creditor's 
insistence that a guarantee be given. 257 It is left to the principal debtor to explain his financial 
position to the intending surety. At any rate, it is expected that the proposed surety will have 
ready access to the principal debtor and his financial statements so that he can assess the risk for 
himself258 
While there is no universal obligation to disclose all material facts to the intending surety, he is 
entitled to be informed of unusual matters in the principal transaction, which have the effect of 
making the position of the principal debtor different from that which the surety would naturally 
expect; this is especially so if those matters affect the nature and degree of the surety's 
responsibility. 259 The emphasis is upon those matters which are different from those that the 
surety would naturally expect in the particular case. There is no duty to reveal to the surety all 
the facts which relate to the transactions of the customer simply because those transactions are 
out of the ordinary, and there is probably also no duty to disclose unusual transactions which 
have taken place between the principal debtor and third parties. 260 In Westpac Banking 
257 FitzgeraldvJacomb (1873) 4 AJR 189 at 190. 
258 Seaton v Heath [1899] I QB 782 at 792; Behan v Obelon Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 326. 
259 Commercial Bank of AustraliaLtdvAmadio(1983) 151 CLR447;Hamiltonv Watson 
(1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109; Goodwin v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1968) 42 ALJR 
110; London General Omnibus Co Ltd v Holloway [1912] 2 KB 72; Lloyds Bank Ltd v 
Harrison (1925) 4 LDAB 12 (CA); Scott Pty Ltdv Dawson [1962] NSWR 1166. See, 
also, Westminster BankLtdvCond(1940) 46 ComCas60; CoopervNationalProvincial 
BankLtd [1946] 1 KB I; Goad v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1968) 67 DLR 
(2d) 189. 
260 See Commercial Bank of AustraliaLtdvAmadio (1983) 151 CLR447;London General 
Omnibus Co Ltd v Holloway [ 1912] 2 KB 72 at 791. The test laid down in Goodwin v 
National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1968) 42 ALJR 110 is that there is a duty to disclose 
"anything which has taken place between the bank and the principal debtor which was 
not naturally to be expected in the transaction". 
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Corporation v Robinson261 Clarke JA expressed the duty of disclosure to be. as follows: 
11 [T]he rule concerning contracts of guarantee stands apart from the rule applicable in 
cases such as contracts uberrimae fidei and the general rule relating to contracts and 
requires disclosure of facts only if concealment of those facts would otherwise 
misrepresent the transaction which the guarantor is undertaking to guarantee. In general, 
it would only be the non-disclosure of those circumstances which were not naturally to 
be expected which would misrepresent the material features of that transaction. 11 
Most Australian Courts, however, do not require a misrepresentation and the definition in 
Goodwin v National Bank of Australasia Ltd262 is normally followed, 263 namely that the duty to 
disclose arises when there is something which has taken place between the bank and the principal 
debtor which was not naturally to be expected in the transaction - something unusual. 
What it is that constitutes a matter that is different from that which the surety would normally 
expect in the principal transaction will depend upon the nature of the transaction in each case. 264 
Any private arrangements modifying the transaction between the principal debtor and the creditor 
as contained in the guarantee must be disclosed to the surety.265 Where a guarantee, which was 
obtained by merchants to secure payments to them of the receipts of their def credere agent, 
recited that the agent was employed on terms that he would settle with his principal's account 
promptly at intervals, the surety was entitled to be told that at the date of the guarantee, the agent 
was already behind in his accounts for coal sold. 266 
261 (1993) 30 NSWLR 668. 
262 (1968) 42 ALJR 110. 
263 See Murdoch 1995 Journal of Contract Law 288. 
264 See National Mortgage & Agency Co of New Zealand Ltd v Stalker [ 193 3] NZLR 1182; 
Hamilton v Watson ( 1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio 
(1983) 151 CLR447 at457;LevettandOthersvBarclaysBankplc [1995] 2AllER615. 
265 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109; Lee vJones (1864) 17 CB(NS) 482; Walker 
v Hardman (1837) 4 Cl & Fin 258; Espey v Lake (1852) 10 Hare 260; Pendlebury v 
Walker (1841) 4 Y & C Ex 424. Indeed a surety for a contractor was held to be entitled 
to be informed that the employer had entered into a separate arrangement with another 
party for the completion of the same project. See Stiff v Eastbourne Local Board ( 1868) 
19 LT 408. 
266 Lee v Jones ( 1864) 17 CB(NS) 482 
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3.5.3.3 A duty of explanation? 
An interesting judgment was recently handed down in New Zealand in Shotter v Westpac 
Banking Corporation and Villars. 267 In this case the Court created a new duty founded in tort: 
"A duty of explanation, warning or recommendation of separate advice arises when a 
bank should reasonably suspect that its customer may not fully understand the meaning 
of the guarantee and the extent of the liability undertaken thereby or that there is some 
special circumstance known to the bank which it should reasonably expect might not be 
known to the prospective guarantor and which might be likely to affect that person's 
decision to enter to the guarantee". 
In Westpac Banking Corporation v McCreanor, 268 however, the Court reviewed all the authorities 
and particularly the Shotter69 case and came to the following conclusion: 
"I have difficulty in accepting that by invoking a tortious duty of care the Court should 
negate the very clear line of authority based on equitable principles that a Bank is under 
no duty to explain, except in the circumstances described in Hamilton v Watson and the 
authorities that have followed it. .. Thus with great respect I cannot agree with the 
conclusion reached by Wylie Jin the Shatter case" .270 
3.5.4 Statutory relief and duties of disclosure 
3.5.4.1 Background 
Australians enjoy a vast array of statutory protection measures in regard to their contracts. 
Several enactments enforce disclosure of facts. I have decided to discuss also the activities of the 
ombudsman and the Code of Banking Practice under this head, notwithstanding the fact that it 
is not statute law. 
267 [1987] BCL 352. 
268 [1990] 1 NZLR580. 
269 [1987] BCL 352. 
270 A conclusion accepted by O'Donovan 1992 LJJ52; Walker 1988 NZLJ3l9 at 324. 
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3.5.4.2 The banking industry ombudsman 
The Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman Scheme (ABIO) commenced on 18 June 1990 and 
provides an independent mechanism for the resolution of banker-customer disputes. Offering a 
free service to customers, it was the first self-regulatory scheme operating on an industry-wide 
basis in Australia. 271 
The scheme was created to provide individual customers of member banks with access to an 
independent avenue ofredress when they had a complaint about one of those banks. The rationale 
behind the scheme was the high cost oflitigation, the inability of the average customer to contest 
matters in courts against a bank and the inadequate in-house dispute resolution mechanisms of 
banks. 272 
The ABIO's mission is to facilitate the resolution of disputes between banks and consumers by; 
• ensuring equitable access for all users of bank services; 
• resolving banker-consumer disputes efficiently and fairly; and 
• ensuring that the scheme maintains the highest level of public confidence.273 
The ombudsman's powers and duties are set out in the Terms of Reference. The scheme provides 
as follows: 
• The ombudsman has the final power to determine whether a matter falls within his or her 
Terms of Reference. A bank is entitled to challenge whether a complaint falls within the 
Terms of Reference. If such a challenge is made, the issue will be referred to a senior 
commercial lawyer drawn from a panel chosen by the council. The bank concerned will 
bear the costs and the ombudsman has the discretion to accept or reject such opinion. 
• The ombudsman has power to make an award of up to $100, 000, which if accepted by 
the customer, becomes binding on the bank. 
• The ombudsman can determine the procedures of his or her office in considering disputes 
and accepting referrals. 
271 The scheme was modelled on a comparable scheme then introduced in the UK. Westpac 
Banking Corporation was the driving force behind the scheme. See Burton 1990 JBFLP 
29. 
272 Tyree Banking 292; Weerasooria Banking Law par 14 .2. 
273 The ombudsman scheme is comprehensively explained in Weerasooria & Wallace 
Banker-Customer; Weerasooria 1992 AJCL 225; Osborn 1992 JBFLP 268. 
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• The ombudsman can, with the consent of-the customer, obtain the bank file of the 
customer or bank-held information relating to· the dispute. 
• The ombudsman can determine what is "fair in all the circumstances" with reference to 
the law, principles of good banking practice or codes of practice. 
• Except for the power to make a recommendation or award, the ombudsman has a general 
power of delegation so that he/she could concentrate on substantive complaints. 
• The council can appoint a deputy ombudsman to act in place of the ombudsman where 
the ombudsman is absent through leave of illness; or when a conflict of interest arises. 
In addition to the specific exclusions contained in the Terms of Reference, the ombudsman can 
exercise his or her powers only after the senior management of the subject bank of the complaint 
has had the opportunity to consider and respond to the complaint. In other words, the ombudsman 
must be used as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism of last resort. 274 
The ombudsman's decisions are binding on banks, but not on applicants. When a matter is not 
resolved after reference to the bank the ombudsman calls a conciliation conference and acts as 
an independent third party. Applicants may come in person or be represented. In developing 
procedures to secure independence, the ombudsman's office relied on the experiences of judicial 
administration for both case management and alternative dispute resolution. The ombudsman 
couples investigative and determinative powers to award compensation. In resolving disputes he 
or she adopts the more innovative practices of alternative dispute resolution rather than the more 
formal evidentiary processes of the court system or the formal interview process of parliamentary 
ombudsmen. 275 The processes of mediation, conciliation, negotiation and arbitration276 have been 
identified as working particularly well in situations where the disputing parties need to re-
establish relationships. 277 
The ombudsman considers that banker-customer complaints were ideally suited to this type of 
274 Tyree Banking 293;Weerasooria Banking Law par 14.6. Recent research shows that the 
existence of the ombudsman may have been responsible for a substantial improvement 
in the practice of banks' handling of customer complaints. See Osborn 1992 JBFLP 268. 
275 In terms of par 15 of the Terms of Reference, the ombudsman is not bound by any legal 
rules of evidence. 
276 When making any recommendation or award the ombudsman must have reference to 
what is, in his opinion fair, in all the circumstances. However, he is also required to 
observe any applicable rule of law or relevant judicial authority, and to have regard to 
general principles of good banking practice and any relevant code of practice applicable 
to the subject matter of the complaint. See par 15 of the Terms of Reference. 
277 Weerasooria Banking Law par 14.9. 
146 
dispute resolution mechanism. Essentially, the banker-customer relationship is a relationship of 
trust. That trust is placed at risk when a complaint remains unresolved. The ombudsman's office 
empowers the customer by placing him or her on a more equal footing to negotiate with the 
banks.218 
3.5.4.3 The Code of Banking Practice. 279 
The Code of Banking Practice (CBP) was released by the Australian Bankers Association on 3 
November 1993. 280 Its coverage is limited to individual (personal, domestic) customers as 
opposed to business customers (companies, partnerships, small business proprietors, and so forth) 
and the term "banking service" is restrictively defined. However, its impact on day-to-day 
banking is expected to be far greater and far more significant than the establishment of the 
voluntary banking ombudsman scheme, 281 and, furthermore, the code enjoys the endorsement of 
the federal Treasury. 
The purpose of the Code, according to the preamble of the Code itself, is to describe standards 
of good practice and service, to promote disclosure of information which is relevant and useful 
to customers, to promote informed and effective relationships between banks and customers and 
to require banks to have procedures for the resolution of disputes between banks and 
customers. 282 
As far as the banker-surety relationship is concerned·, it should be noted that the code was more 
conservative than the High Court's landmark decision in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v 
Amadio283 which concerned third-party guarantees. In that case, the High Court ruled that a bank 
should disclose unusual risks to guarantors. 
278 See Banking Ombudsman Annual Report 1993-1994, quoted in Weerasooria Banking 
Law par 14.10 .. 
279 Published as an appendix to WeerasooriaBanking Law par 15.30. 
280 WeerasooriaBanking Law par 15.3. 
281 Weerasooria Banking Law par 15. 3. 
282 For an overview of the Code, see Weaver 1994 JBFLP 60. 
283 (1983) 151 CLR447. 
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An important aspect of the code is the fact that disclosure duties in various respects284 are placed 
on bankers. As far as suretyship is concerned ss 17 .1-17. 6 relate to guarantees, and are ofinterest 
to this thesis: 
• A bank can accept a guarantee only if the amount of the guarantor's liability is limited 
to a specific amount plus other liabilities (for example, interest, recovery costs) 
described in the guarantee. 
• The bank must give written warning to the prospective guarantor that he may become 
personally liable for the borrower's indebtedness and must be shown a copy of the 
relevant documentation. 
• The bank must recommend that the prospective guarantor obtain independent legal 
advice. 
• With the borrower's approval the bank must, on request, inform the guarantor about the 
borrower's account. 
• A guarantor may at any time extinguish his liability to the bank under the guarantee by 
paying the sum then due or by making other arrangements satisfactory to the bank. 
In Barclays Bank v 0 'Brien and Another, 285 a recent House of Lords decision, a wife's guarantee 
to a bank of her husband's indebtedness was set aside onClhe ground of undue influence. The 
House of Lords considered the provisions of the United Kingdom banking code on guarantees 
and felt that they adequately warned prospective guarantors of the legal effects and possible 
consequences of their guarantee and of the importance of receiving independent advice. It is 
noteworthy that the Australian provisions are far wider in the customer's favour. 
The Code also imposes a duty on banks: 
• to develop internal processes for handling customer disputes; and 
• to develop an external and impartial process with jurisdiction similar to the banking 
ombudsman scheme to resolve a dispute that the bank's internal process has failed to 
resolve. 286 
As far as the interrelation of the Code, common law and statute law is concerned, the Code has 
284 Disclosure, eg, in regard to terms and conditions, cost of credit, fees and c~es, 
payments services, and operation of accounts are prescribed. . 
285 [1994] 1AC180; [1993] 4AllER417. 
286 S 20 of the Code of Banking Practice. 
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to be read subject to any Commonwealth, State or Territory legislation, and, to the extent of any 
inconsistency, the Electronic Funds Transfer Code ofConduct. 287 Tyree288 is of the opinion that 
the omission of any reference to non-statute law presumably means that the Code is to override 
non-statute law where this conflicts with the code. In some circumstances, it may not be possible 
for a non-statutory instrument such as the Code to override the general law, 289 but where the non-
statutory law merely defines implied contractual terms it seems as though the Code could 
prevail. 290 
Weerasooria291 states that the terms of the Code become part of the bank's contract with its 
customer. Accordingly: 
• a customer can insist that the Code's terms be observed; and 
• the bank will be liable for breach. 
A complaint about non-compliance, if not settled by the bank's internal dispute resolution 
mechanism, can be pursued by the customer with the banking Ombudsman or the Courts.292 
3.5.4.4 Uniform consumer legislation and banki~g 
A new regime of consumer credit regulation known as the Uniform Consumer Credit Code of 
1996 (UCCC) is in force in Australia since 1996. This new legislation, which will replace the 
existing Credit Acts in each State, will affect most credit transactions with individual debtors. 
While there is no limiting monetary ceiling, the legislation covers all credit providers such as 
banks, finance companies, building societies and credit unions. 293 
287 See ss 1.2 and 1.4 of the Code of Banking Practice. 
288 Tyree Banking 272. 
289 No direct authority could be found, but by analogy there are several cases which have 
held that any conflict between the journalists' Code of Ethics and obedience to the law 
must be resolved in favour of the law. See Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(JCAC) v Cornwall (1993) 111 ALR 97; McGuiness v Attorney General (Vic) (1940) 63 
CLR 73. 
290 Tyree Banking 272. 
291 Weerasooria Banking Law par 15 .28. 
292 WeerasooriaBanking Law par 15.28. 
293 Lanyon 1995 LIJ 440; Kapman 1994 Australian Banker 45. 
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The new UCCC is the result of an inter-governmental agreement known as the Uniform Credit 
Laws Agreement of 1993. Under the agreement, uniform laws (codes) are to be established by 
what is termed "template" legislation. This expression means that a consumer credit law will be 
enacted principally in one State, Queensland (namely, Consumer Credit (Queensland) Act of 
1994 (Qld)) and the other States and Territories will then either adopt that "template" legislation 
or pass alternative legislation which is consistent with the Queensland statute. All States and 
Territories (except Western Australia) will adopt the template legislation of Queensland. Western 
Australia is to pass its own consumer credit legislation which will not, however, conflict with the 
uniform legislation. 294 
The objectives of the new scheme are to provide laws which apply uniformly and equally to all 
forms of consumer lending and to all lenders throughout Australia. 295 This is based on the 
principle of truth-in-lending which will enable borrowers through adequate disclosure to make 
informed choices when obtaining credit. It provides for all contracts, guarantees and notices 
governing the "credit" to be legible and clearly expressed and also seeks to ensure that the cost 
of credit is disclosed in order to prevent deception and to enable comparability and encourage 
competition. It also provides significant redress mechanisms for borrowers and civil and criminal 
penalties for non-complying lenders. There are also distinct advantages to credit providers like 
banks. For instance, they can use uniform documentation and procedures in all jurisdictions and 
while there are onerous sanctions for non-compliance, there are no automatic penalties as is 
currently the case. 296 
A detailed discussion of the UCCC falls outside the scope ofthis thesis and only aspects relevant 
to sureties and disclosure will be discussed.297 The UCCC applies to all credit provided for a 
personal, domestic or household purpose, 298 regardless of the amount to be provided. 299 The rate 
of interest charged is also irrelevant. Thus, there is no monetary or interest threshold. The term 
294 The Courts view compliance by banks as of the utmost importance. See AWA Ltd v 
Daniels (1992) 10 ACLC 933; GIO FinanceLtdv Various Debtors [1994] ASC 56-292. 
295 The previous consumer legislation was far from uniform and was both outdated and 
overly prescriptive. See Owens et al Code 11 .. 
296 See Owens et al Code 11. 
297 For comments on the code, see further Bingham 1996 Lil 42; Lanyon 1995 Lil 440; 
Pascoe 1996 CLQ 15; Boxall 1996 LIJ35. 
298 Lending to corporations (companies) is not covered by the UCCC other than lending to 
a "strata corporation" (a body corporate) defined in the UCCC. 
299 S 6 of the UCCC. 
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"credit" is widely defined. Personal loans, bank term loans, overdraft facilities and other 
continuing credit contracts, credit-card facilities, housing loans, consumer leases and hire-
purchase agreements, are all covered. 
All credit contracts, guarantees or notices given under the UCCC must be easily legible and 
clearly expressed. 300 The debtor must always be given a copy of the credit contract. 301 While the 
interest levied may vary through the life of the contract, it must be calculated on daily balances302 
and periodic statements of account must be given to the borrower. 
In regard to guarantees the Code provides that: 303 
• they must be "easily legible and clearly expressed, 304 lest they be open to complaint as 
being unjust and be prone to re-opening having regard to the 'form' and 'intelligibility' of 
the language in which they are expressed";305 
• under s 55, each must contain a prominent statement to the effect that the guarantor may 
not be entitled to an indemnity against the debtor in circumstances where the debtor was 
under 18 when the liability occurred; and each will be void to the extent that it purports 
to limit the guarantor's right of indemnity from the debtor;306 
This latter provision will outlaw those provisions usually included in guarantees to 
prevent the guarantor from competing with the credit provider in bankruptcy proceedings. 
• whilst "all accounts" guarantees are permissible, they are unenforceable in relation to any 
further credit contract unless the credit provider gives the guarantor a copy of the further 
credit contract and obtains from the guarantor an acceptance of the extension of the 
300 S 16(2) of the UCCC. 
301 S 18 of the UCCC. 
302 S 26 of the UCCC. 
303 See in general Quirey 1995QLSJ165 at 170-171. 
304 S 162 of the UCCC. 
305 S 70(2)(g) of the UCCC. 
306 S 55(5) of the UCCC. 
151 
guarantee. 307 
A credit contract or associated mortgage or guarantee may be re-opened if a court is satisfied that 
it was unjust. 308 The definition of "unjust" includes "unconscionable, harsh or oppressive". 309 A 
debtor or guarantor suffering loss due to a breach of the code may obtain compensation from the 
credit provider. 310 The UCCC does not prescribe an automatic forfeiture of interest for a breach 
(as is the current position). However, substantial penalties are imposed ifthe credit provider has 
breached a "key requirement". The following are some of the key requirements: 
• credit provider's name; 
• amount of credit; 
• method of calculating interest charged; 
• default interest rate; 
• total interest (if ascertainable) and instalments payable; and 
• fees, charges and commissions received. 311 
Any officer of a credit provider who knowingly authorises or permits a contravention of the 
UCCC will also be exposed to prosecution.312 Civil penalties imposed on a credit provider are 
capped at $500,000 Australia-wide if the credit provider rather than an affected debtor, applies 
first to court. 313 
It is obviously very desirable that credit providers like banks should promote a compliance-
conscious culture throughout their organization .. This requirement was highlighted in A WA Ltd 
v Daniels314 from which case it is clear that companies must have in place, properly supervised 
307 S 56 of the UCCC. 
308 S 70(1) of the UCCC. 
309 S 70(7) of the UCCC. 
310 S 107(1) of the UCCC. 
311 S 15 of the UCCC. For current case law on penalties imposed on credit providers for 
breaching the Credit acts, see Westpac Banking Corporation v Donald Murrell [1992] 
2 VR 429; Custom Credit Corporation v Grey [1990] ASC 56-069; Avco Financial 
Services Ltd v Abschinski [ 1994] ASC 56-256. 
312 S 183(1) of the UCCC. 
313 S 105(1) of the UCCC. 
314 (1992) 10 ACLC 933. 
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internal controls and reporting mechanisms to ensure that senior management and the boards of 
directors are properly informed and that risks are properly managed. The courts will impose 
lesser penalties where they are satisfied that the defaulting credit provider genuinely promoted 
a compliance program rather than merely paying lip service to it. In G/O Finance Ltd v Various 
Debtors315 the Commercial Tribunal of New South Wales emphasized that compliance with the 
UCCC should be controlled at the level of the board of directors, that senior management should 
regularly monitor compliance and that lenders must not assume that staff - because of their 
experience - knew how to comply with UCCC. 
The new UCCC is expected to radically change the way in which personal lending is undertaken 
in the future. 316 Accordingly, a legal-compliance program should not be looked upon as a luxury, 
but as a necessity. 317 
3.5.4.5 The Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) and consumer legislation on banking 
3.5.4.5.1 Introduction 
The Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth)318 is Commonwealth legislation which came into 
operation on 1 October 1974. It is modeled on US anti-trust law. It provides a new code of 
conduct for the business community and encourages fair trading at all levels - from 
manufacturer to retailer to shopkeeper- right down to the ultimate customer or consumer. The 
TP A has broad scope and reach. It promotes competition, controls mergers and acquisitions, 319 
misuse of market power, anti-competitive agreements, exclusive dealings, price maintenance and 
discrimination, misleading, deceptive and unconscionable conduct, sharp practices, and ensures 
that goods are of merchantable quality and covers product and manufacturers' liability. Thus the 
315 [1994] ASC 56-292. 
316 Despite its shortcomings, even the previous credit legislation was successfully used to 
curb unconscionable conduct by bankers. See Custom Credit Corp v Lupi [ 1991] ASC 
56-024;MorelendFinance Corporation (Vic) Pty Ltdv Westendorp [1993] ASC 56-200; 
Custom Credit Corp v Lynch [1993] ASC 56-201. 
3 17 W eerasooria Banking Law par 16. 10. 
3 18 Abbreviated as TP A 
319 Eg, in March 1995, the Trade Practices Commission, after protracted negotiations and 
extracting conditions, approved the $3 billion merger of petrol giants Caltex and Ampol, 
which merger it had earlier rejected. According to the TPC the merger would result in 
greater efficiency in the industry while protecting consumers from higher petrol prices. 
The merged entity will control 28 per cent of the retail market. See Weerasooria Banking 
Law par 18.2. 
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TP A protects not only consumers, but also their sources of supply. 320 The prohibition on 
misleading or deceptive conduct found ins 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth), and the 
Fair Trading Acts of the various States and territories,321 must rate as one of the most widely 
litigated statutory provisions in recent Australian history. 322 
Lawyers appearing for banks' customers are now resorting to the TPA- as a substitute for or 
in addition to the common law323 - in litigation against banks. Its application to banks and 
banking business is now well established and beyond any doubt. 324 Banks are specifically 
included in the definition of corporations. Also the term "services" is defined to include: 
• a contract between a banker and a customer of the banker entered into in the course of the 
carrying on by the banker of the business of banking; or 
• any contract for or in relation to the lending of moneys.325 
3.5.4.5.2 Misleading or deceptive conduct by banks 
Section 52 of the TP A on "misleading and deceptive" conduct is one of the shortest statutory 
sections enacted and it simply states: 
"A corporation shall not in trade or commerce engage in conduct that is misleading or 
deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 11 
320 See Steinwall & Layton Annotated Trade Practices Act 197 4 1. 
321 Fair Trading Act of 1992 (ACT); Fair Trading Act of 1987 (NSW); Consumer Affairs 
and Fair Trading Act of 1990 (NT); Fair Trading Act of 1989 (QLD); Fair Trading Act 
of 1987 (SA); Fair Trading Act of 1990 (Tas); Fair Trading Act of 1985 (Vic); Fair 
Trading Act of 1987 (WA). 
322 Lockhart, in Lockhart ( ed) Misleading Conduct iii, states that at last count in 1996 there 
were. ~ver 1 500 reported decisions concerning the prohibition and associated remedial 
prov1s1ons. 
323 In Brown vlam Factory Pty Ltd (1981) 53 FLR 340 at 348 Fox J described s 52 of the 
Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) as "a comprehensive provision of wide impact, which 
does not adopt the language of any common law cause of action". 
324 Re Ku-ring-gai Co-operative Building Society (No 12) Ltd (1978) 36 FLR 134; Barton 
v Westpac Banking Corporation [1983] ATPR 40-388; Westpac Banking Corporation 
v Eltran Pty Ltd (1987) 74 ALR 45. 
325 See, also, Barton v Westpac Banking Corporation [1983] ATPR 40-388; Westpac 
Banking Corporation v Eltran (Pty) Ltd (1987) 74 ALR 45. 
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The simplicity and breadth of its language, coupled with its lack of any express limitations or 
qualifications has led to s 52's being the most litigated section in any Australian statute.326 It has 
been used as a substitute for or as an alternative to actions in tort such as passing-off, 
misrepresentation and defamation, and in contract. 327 Its general nature is such that it may be the 
basis of a remedy in circumstances where tort, contract, or other areas of the common law would 
not provide a remedy. 328 
This is also the section which customers commonly use against banks. 329 As an experienced 
lawyer and former TP A Commissioner has stated, "banks and financial institutions are currently 
in fashionable target of customers riding to battle mounted on their s 5 2 white chargers". 330 This 
section has been resorted to by customers in order to sue banks in almost every sphere of banking 
business, for example, in the spheres of financial and investment advice, bankers' credit 
references and opinions, the granting ofloans and overdrafts, taking of guarantees and mortgages 
and the advertising of banks' services and more recently, foreign-currency transactions.331 
Under s 52 of the TPA, a customer may claim not only damages, but also ancillary and 
interlocutory relief as set out in ss 82 and 87 of the TP A The type of ancillary relief available 
under s 87 includes: declaring contracts and collateral agreements void in whole or in part; 
varying such contracts or agreement; refusing the enforcement of all or any of the provisions of 
326 See French 1989 AL.I 250-268, who states that in the 14 years (at that stage) of its 
existence, the TPA has generated a considerable body of case law. In the first five years 
to 1979 there were 19 cases reported in the Australian Trade Practice Reports. From 
1979-84 there were a further 23 6 cases reported or digested in that service, and as seen 
cases abound in other jurisdictions. The simplicity and strength of the language of s 52 
has been reflected in its wide application as a norm for commercial conduct. Whatever 
course it takes in the future, it is clear that the story of s 52 is a long way from its 
conclusion. See Weerasooria Banking Law 18 .15. 
327 See French 1989AL.f250; Clarke 1989 ABR 109. 
328 In Brown v Jam Factory Pty Ltd (1981) 53 FLR 340 at 348, Fox J held that the section 
does not purport to create liability at all; rather it establishes a norm of conduct, failure 
to observe which has consequences provided for elsewhere in the same statute or under 
the general law. See, also, the remarks of Malcolm J in Lockhart (ed) Misleading 
Conduct 5-6; Duns & Davison Cases 581. 
329 WeerasooriaBanking Law par 18.5. 
330 See Pengilley 1989 Bond LR 157. 
3 31 See, eg, Kullack v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [ 1988] ATPR 40-861; 
Rhone Poulenc Agrochimie SA and Another v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd and 
Another (1986) 68 ALR 77; Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd 
(1988) 79 ALR 83; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Mehta (1991) 23 NSWLR 84. 
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a contract; ordering the refund of money or property; ordering payment of the amount of any loss 
or damage suffered; directing the execution of an instrument to vary or terminate the effect of an 
instrument transferring an interest in land. 
Banks, being corporations, are clearly covered by TPA s 52. Additionally, by the combined 
operation of ss 82 and 7 SB of the TP A, even an individual bank staff member may be liable if 
he or she has aided, abetted, procured, induced or conspired to contravene the provisions of Pt 
IV or Pt V of the TP A. However, for individual liability, fault must be proved. 
The section also includes advice given in negotiations between the claimant and the bank prior 
to a particular transaction. 332 The Federal Court recognizes that there now exists the trade or 
business of advising on investments. 333 
Several judicial decisions have interpreted s 52 of the TPA. The following aspects of this section 
are relevant to banking, guarantees and disclosure. 
Section 52 of the TPA aims at having a broad reach in order to prevent consumers (for example, 
customers of banks) from being misled or deceived. 334 While the words "misleading" and 
"deceptive" may overlap, they are not necessarily synonymous. 335 As Mason J said in Parkdale 
Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd:336 
"s 52 should be generously construed and should not be read down to conform with 
former common law or equitable requirements. 11 
In contrast to the common law, the application of s 5 2 of the TP A is not restricted to cases where 
it is necessary to show fault or intent. Intention is not a necessary element or ingredient under s 
52.337 The section includes fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations, but is not restricted to 
332 Chiarabaglio v Westpac Banking Corporation [1989] ATPR 40-971. 
333 See Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 104 ALR 485. 
334 French 1989 ALI 250 at 268. 
335 BrownvJamFactoryPtyLtd(1981) 53 FLR340. 
336 (1982) 149 CLR 191 at 204. 
337 Yorke v Ross Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 at 666; Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty 
Ltdv Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191; Greco v Bendigo Machinery Pty Ltd [1985] 
ATPR 40-521. 
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them. Even a bank that has behaved honestly, carefully and reasonably may contravene the 
section. 
Liability under s 5 2 of the TP A is quite unrelated to fault. For instance the lack of awareness of 
a banker who breaches s 52, of the consequences of his or her conduct, is not an answer to the 
allegations that the conduct was misleading or deceptive. Nor is there any requirement to 
establish a duty of care dependent on the existence of a special relationship between the parties. 
This section could also catch misleading and deceptive statements made in brochures and other 
forms of advertisements in respect of which no relationship is likely to exist because the maker 
of the statement may not know that he or she was being relied on. 338 
Misleading or deceptive conduct339 generally consists of misrepresentations, whether express or 
by silence, but it does not have to be so. Whether any particular conduct is misleading or 
deceptive is a question of fact to be decided in each case in the context of the surrounding facts 
and circumstances. The question is an objective one. 340 
Silence alone may constitute a breach of s 5 2 of the TP A when there is an obligation to reveal 
facts. 341 "Half truths" would infringe the section because there is a duty to speak and complete 
3 3 8 Conduct will not be misleading if it merely confuses those to whom it is directed, 
although an intent to cause confusion may give rise to liability. See Hornsby Building 
Information Centre Pty Ltdv Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 
216; Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pt; Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191; 
Mc William's Wines Pty Ltd v McDonald s System of Australia Pty Ltd (1980) 49 FLR 
455; Taco Company of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 177. 
339 The TPA and Fair Trading Acts define the concept of engaging in conduct as meaning 
broadly "doing or refusing to do any act", and refusing to do an act is in tum defined to 
include refraining from doing an act, or making it known that an act will not be done. 
340 Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191; Taco 
Company of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 177; Rhone-Poulenc 
Agrochimie SA and Another v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd and Another (1986) 68 
ALR 77. 
341 Where a duty to disclose information exists, the conscious (although perhaps not the 
unconscious) failure to fulfil that duty will amount to engaging in misleading conduct. 
See Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA and Another v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd and 
Another (1986) 68 ALR 77; Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd 
(1988) 79 ALR 83; Kimberley NZ/ Finance Ltd v Torero Pty Ltd [1989] ATPR Digest 
46-054. 
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the full story.342 In the Rhone-Poulenc343 case, Bowen CJ observed: 
"Where silence is relied on in order to show a breach of s 52 it will depend upon the 
circumstances whether the silence constitutes conduct which is misleading or deceptive. 
As in the case of other sections of the Trade Practices Act 1974 the court may gain 
assistance from consideration of cases at common law and in equity dealing with related 
types of situations. However, the court is not confined by such cases because it is 
concerned with the interpretation and application of the words of the particular statute. 11 
In several banking cases it was alleged that the bank's silence when it had a duty to inform the 
customer of certain facts amounted to misleading or deceptive conduct. 344 In Demagogue Pty Ltd 
v Ramensky345 a vendor company had remained silent when the buyer thought that the access to 
the property was a private driveway when in fact it was a public road. The purchaser succeeded 
in a claim under s 5 2 of the TP A for breach of duty of disclosure. A full Federal Court held: 
"The question is whether in the light of all of the relevant factual circumstances, 
constituted by acts, omissions, statements or silence, there has been conduct that is or is 
likely to be misleading or deceptive. "346 
The circumstances of the particular case are therefore of determining importance. 347 
342 Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 79 ALR 83; Rhone-
Poulenc Agrochimie SA and Another v UJM Chemical Services Pty Ltd and Another 
(1986) 68 ALR 77. 
343 (1986) 68 ALR 77. 
344 See Robertson 1991 QLf 29 at 29-37. 
345 (1992) 110 ALR 608. 
346 For further cases on the duty of disclosure of bankers see Nobile v National Australia 
BankLtd [1987] ASC 55-580;Nolan v Westpac Banking Corporation (1989) 51 SASR 
496; Stanton v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1987] ATPR 40-755; 
Crisp v Australia andNew Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1994] ATPR 41-294. 
347 Duncan 1988QUTLJ3l;Robertson1991 QLJ29;Hoover(Australia)PtyLtdvEmail 
Ltd (1991) 104 ALR 369; Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA and Another v UIM Chemical 
Services Pty Ltd and Another (1986) 68 ALJ 77; Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins 
Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 79 ALR 83; Kimberley NZ! Finance Ltd v Torero Pty Ltd 
[1989] ATPR Digest 46-054; Warner v Elders Rural Finance Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 517. 
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3.5.4.5.3 Opinions, advice and gratuitous comments 
Several cases relating to bankers and financial advisers have considered the circumstances in 
which opinions, advice and gratuitous statements could constitute misleading or deceptive 
conduct under s 5 2 of the TP A 348 Where a banker embarks on advice or opinion to an intending 
surety, the transaction will be subject to s 52 of the TPA. 
3.5.4.5.4 Some notable disclosure decisions 
In Nobile v National Australia Bank Ltd349 the parents and parents-in-law of the main director 
of the company had given a guarantee and mortgage security for an overdraft of $250,000 by the 
bank to the company. It was held that the bank manager's conduct in obtaining the documents 
was both misleading, deceptive and unconscionable because some of his representations about 
the company's financial position were untrue. The facts in the Nobile350 case were very similar 
to those in the Amadio351 case. 
Money v Westpac Banldng Corporation352 was an uncommon case where a husband alleged that 
he had been misled when he had signed as a guarantor for a bank loan to his wife's travel 
business. Normally, it is the converse situation that comes before the courts, namely, where wives 
complain that they had been misled into signing as guarantors for their husbands' business debts. 
When the bank claimed about $96,000 plus interest, the husband argued that the bank manager 
had assured him that the advances to his ex-wife would not exceed $35,000 and that his liability 
should be so limited. The court held in his favour observing that the bank manager's omitting to 
inform the husband of the unlimited nature of the mortgage security, amounted to misleading and 
deceptive conduct. 
Nolan v Westpac Banldng Corporation353 where the bank was held liable, illustrates the 
348 In regard to advice and future predictions, see Pengilley 1992 QUTLJ 35; James v 
Australia and New Zealand Banldng Group Ltd (1986) 64 ALR 347; Hamer v Westpac 
Banking Corporation [1987] ATPR40-81 l;Lake KoalaPtyLtdv Walker [1990] ATPR 
41-041; Wheeler Grace & Pierucci Pty Ltd v Wright [1989] ATPR 40-940. 
349 [1987] ASC 55-580. 
350 Ibid 
3 51 (1983) 151 CLR 447. For the facts of that case, see par 3 .5 .2.3 .1. 
352 [1988] ATPR 46-034. 
353 (1989)51 SASR496. 
• 
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disgraceful conduct ofa bank manager. Mrs Nolan was a pensioner, a divorcee in her late thirties 
bringing up an 18-year-old daughter. She mortgaged her home unit, already the subject of a 
mortgage to the State Bank of South Australia, to support a loan to her ex-husband in connection 
with his heavily indebted carpet cleaning business. The court found that Westpac' s branch 
manager who got the mortgage executed by Mrs Nolan did not caution her against the transaction 
or advise her to get independent advice. The manager's manipulation of Mrs Nolan in the matter 
of her dealings with the bank, amounted to fraudulent conduct on his part, conduct based on his 
concern about his own position in relation to the husband's account. The totality of the manager's 
conduct showed that he took unconscionable advantage of Mrs Nolan in getting her to sign the 
guarantee. Further, it was found that he had misrepresented the position about the ex-husband's 
overdraft. Mrs Nolan's guarantee was set aside. 
In Crisp v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd354 Crisp had mortgaged his house to 
the bank as security for moneys loaned by the bank to a company operating a take-away food 
business in Hobart, of which his wife and daughter ~ere directors. The company defaulted and 
the bank sought to sell C's house to recover $162,300, plus interest, owing to it. Crisp asked that 
the mortgage be set aside on the ground that the bank had engaged in misleading or deceptive 
conduct under s 52 of the TPA by not disclosing to C that on the very morning of the day the 
mortgage was executed, the bank had dishonoured the company's cheques and the branch 
manager had told the company that its overdraft facility would be withdrawn unless the mortgage 
was given. The evidence also showed that C had not been told that the mortgage was to cover "all 
moneys owed or becoming owing" by the company to the bank. The court held in C's favour and 
declared the mortgage void. 
3.5.4.5.5 Other consumer protection and unfair contracts legislation 
Apart from the TP A there are several other State statutes whose objective is the protection of 
consumers and the striking down of unfair and unjust contracts. The most important of them in 
relation to banks are: 
• the Contracts Review Act of 1980 (NSW); 
• the Fair Trading Acts in each State which mirror the TP A provisions and apply them to 
non-corporate bodies and individuals; and 
• the Consumer Transactions Act of 1972 (SA). 
354 [1994] ATPR41-294. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
The banker-customer relationship is a relationship peculiar to banking. The general relationship 
that exists between the parties is a complex contractual relationship consisting of reciprocal 
rights and duties founded on the practices and usages prevailing among bankers. The contract is 
basically of an implied nature. In Australia (as in England) there is rarely, if ever, a written or 
even an oral contract setting out the terms and conditions of the relationship. Apart from contract, 
the legal relationship of banker and customer is that of debtor and creditor (the banker being the 
debtor and the customer the creditor) with the super-added obligation of the banker's having to 
honour the customer's cheques when there is sufficient credit in his or her account at the bank. 
There are a number of implied super-added obligations in the relationship between banker and 
customer that distinguish it from the ordinary case of a loan of money and the normal debtor and 
creditor relationship. 355 
Banks are today moving away from traditional deposit taking and lending activities into roles 
more akin to those of financial supermarkets or conglomerates. Modern Australian banking, like 
that of most Western countries, is multi-functional and multi-divisional.356 
New trends in bank liability are emerging. Apart from contract law - the foundation of the 
banker-customer relationship - banks are being sued in tort law for negligence where the pitfalls 
are greater and the scope of liability is wider. Many equitable doctrines are now often relied on 
to sue banks. Duress, economic duress, undue influence, unconscionable conduct are favourites 
especially after the High Court judgment in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio. 357 
Other risk issues confronting banks are the consumer protection legislation in each Australian 
jurisdiction. 358 
In most situations the relationship between the bank and its customers will be governed by the 
express or implied terms of a contract. Circumstances can arise where a bank may owe fiduciary 
355 See par 3 .1. 
356 See par 3.2. 
357 (1983) 151 CLR 447. See par 3.5.2.3.1. 
358 See par 3.2 and particularly the statutes referred to inn 37 and n 38. 
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duties to a customer, 359 or equitable duties of confidence. 360 
The banker's duty of confidentiality is contractual - being an implied term of the contract 
between the parties. 361 As is the case in English law, the duty is not absolute, but qualified. 
Investment advice is subject to the prohibition of misleading or deceptive conduct. 362 Where a 
misrepresentation of fact, past or future, is otherwise absent, relief may still be available where 
the advice given is not underscored by a genuine belief and where there are no reasonable 
grounds for such advice. The authority of branch managers to advise, and whether such advice 
will bind the bank, will naturally depend on the particular transaction and the facts of each case. 
General principles governing the express, implied and ostensible authority of employees, will 
also apply. In the context of current judicial decisions, a banker can incur liability towards a 
customer for negligent financial or investment advice if: 
• the customer relied on that advice and suffered loss; 
• the banker was aware or ought to have been aware that the customer was going to rely on 
such advice; 
• the advice was given in serious circumstances and not in an informal way or on an 
informal occasion (for example, in a casual telephone conversation) which would make 
it unreasonable for the customer to have relied on such advice. 363 
As in most Western countries, Australian banks and other lenders are increasingly being faced 
with claims by borrowers, guarantors and mortgagors that their contracts with the lender ought 
to be set aside on the grounds that their contract or the lender's or borrower's conduct in relation 
to the contract is unfair. 364 Australian bankers and the various Law Societies are also striving to 
find a set of procedural steps which, if followed, will make the transaction immune from later 
challenge. One of the principal elements included in such procedures is that the surety receives 
independent advice, or at least is urged to take such advice and is given a real opportunity to do 
359 See par 3.2 and the authorities quoted inn 40. 
360 See par 3.3. 
361 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461. 
362 S 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth). 
363 See par 3.4. 
364 See pars 3.5.1; 3.5.2.2; 3.5.2.3.1. 
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so.365 Sureties can obtain relief from unfair contracts from several sources. Traditionally, relief 
from unfair bargains has been obtainable in equity, notably through the doctrines of undue 
influence and unconscionable conduct. Today relief can also be obtained under statutes such as 
the Contracts Review Act of 1980 (NSW), certain sections of the TP A which proscribes engaging 
in unconscionable conduct, and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code which is based upon the 
principle of truth-in-lending which will enable borrowers through adequate disclosure to make 
informed choices when obtaining credit. Sections of the TP A are often used as an alternative 
source of relief where the unfair conduct is misleading or deceptive. In those States with Fair 
Trading Acts certain sections of the TP A are replicated as State law. In addition, the 
circumstances of a case may permit relief to be obtained on common-law grounds such as 
misrepresentation, 366 mistake, undue influence367 or failing in a duty of disclosure. 368 
While the courts will not hold a surety to a guarantee extracted from him as a result of 
unconscientious dealings or an abuse of the creditor's superior bargaining power, they have 
steadfastly refused to classify contracts of guarantee in the category of uberrimae fidei. 369 Unlike 
contracts of insurance, suretyships are not contracts of the utmost good faith requiring full 
disclosure of all material facts by both parties. At common law there is no universal obligation 
upon the creditor to disclose to the proposed surety all facts relative to his dealings with the 
principal debtor or affecting the debtor's credit. However, the intending surety is entitled to be 
informed of unusual matters in the principal transaction, which have the effect of making the 
position of the principal debtor different from that which the surety would naturally expect; this 
is especially so if those matters affect the nature and degree of the surety's responsibility.370 
Australian bankers have also taken steps from their side to improve banker-customer 
relationships. The Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman Scheme provides an independent 
mechanism for the resolution of banker-customer disputes. Offering a free service to customers, 
it was the first self-regulatory scheme operating on an industry-wide basis in Australia.371 
365 See chapter 5 for a detailed analysis of the concept of independent advice. 
366 See par 3.5.1. 
367 See par 3.5.2.2. 
368 See par 3.5.3. 
3 69 See par 3. 5 .3 .1 and the authorities quoted in n 248. 
370 See par 3.5.3.2. 
371 See par 3.5.4.2 for a discussion of the ombudsman's powers and duties. 
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The Code of Banking Practice released by the Australian Bankers Association, inter alia, 
describes standards of good practice and service, and endeavors to promote disclosure of 
information which is relevant and useful to customers . 372 
It is clear that the Australian consumer is well protected against unconscionable conduct, flowing 
from an array of common-law and statutory protection mechanisms. Confronted with the 
formidable TP A and bound by the provisions of their own Code, Australian bankers are 
effectively forced to combine full disclosure to an intending surety with a duty to refer the surety 
to an attorney for independent advice. 
From a banker's perspective, it is unlikely that suretyship will remain an acceptable form of 
security in such an environment. 
372 See par 3.5.4.3. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE BANKER'S DUTIES OF 
DISCLOSURE AND ADVICE TO CUSTOMERS AND 
SURETIES: USA 
4.1 A COMPARATIVE NOTE 
The USA has been said to possess "perhaps the most complicated legal structure that has ever 
been devised and made effective in man's effort to govern himself'. 1 Many problems have arisen 
in the USA from the complexities of the concurrence of federal and State law, and from the fact 
that both the USA and the several States possess fully equipped Court systems. 2 
Be that as it may, I believe that a study of the Restatements of the American Law Institute, 
articles produced by the American law schools and the Uniform Commercial Code, can give 
valuable insight into the determination of disclosure to and advisory duties towards an intending 
surety. Furthermore, the concept of good faith, which is growing in importance in many 
jurisdictions, has been addressed thoroughly in the case law of the USA. 
4.2 BANKING LAW: BACKGROUND 
4.2.1 The banker-customer relationship 
The banker-customer relationship in the USA is largely a matter of contract law (as embodied 
in the judicial law of the various States3) and of commercial law (as embodied in State Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) statutes and as such statutes are interpreted in State judicial decisions). 4 
This statement becomes even more meaningful when the multi-dimensions (including the 
regulatory, institutional, and operational environments) of the banker-customer relationship are 
1 Griswold Law 3. 
2 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 250. 
3 Symons 1983 Banking LJ220 at 221; Symons 1983BankingLf325. 
4 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 249-252. 
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better understood. For example, it is important to understand what in fact a "banking institution"5 
is and is not, as this may well make· a difference to how the legal relationship is viewed. In 
addition, the legal relationship may be affected by what type of consumer is involved: is it an 
individual or a wholesale depositor, a sophisticated commercial or a consumer borrower, or a 
user of other services? Further, the contractual and commercial underpinnings of the banker-
customer relationship may be overlaid with, influenced by, and reshaped by special common-law 
doctrines such as those of "special relationship",6 "good faith and fair dealings",7 and even 
possibly fiduciary duty (or quasi-fiduciary duty). 8 
Moreover, particularly in the USA, the banker-customer relationship can be affected by the 
regulatory environment applicable either to a particular banking institution (for example, deposit 
and lending regulations for federal commercial banks are not necessarily coextensive with the 
regulations for thrift institutions and credit unions) or to a particular type of customer (for 
example, a consumer requiring consumer protection).9 Further, the nature of the US judicial 
process, with its widespread use of jury trials and availability of punitive damages under various 
5 The generic term to cover institutions exercising a "depository" function, and would 
generally cover commercial banks, thrift institutions and credit unions. See Jones 1983 
Banking LJ 24 7. 
6 See, eg, Standard Wire and Cable Co v Ameritrust Corporation 697 F Supp 368 (CD Cal 
1988); Arnold v National County Mutual Fire Insurance (1987) 725 SW 2d 165 (Tex). 
7 Imposed by s 1-203; s 1-208 of the UCC; 2 205 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions apply it as a matter of common 
law. See KMC_Com v Irving Trust Company 757 F 2d 752 (6th Circuit 1985); Keffer v 
Keffer 852 P 2d 394 at 398 (Alaska 1993); Ervin v Amoco Oil Co 885 P 2d 246 at 250 
(Colo Ct App 1994); Habetz v Condon 618 A 2d 501 at 505 (Conn 1992); Abbott v 
Amoco Oil Co 619 NE 2d 789 at 795 (Ill App Ct 1993); Weldon v Montana Bank 885 P 
2d 511 at 515 (Mont 1994); Pacific First Bank v New Morgan Park Corporation 876 P 
2d 761 at 762 (Or 1994). The State of Texas limits its application to cases in which a 
special relationship between the parties is found, such as insurance contracts. See, eg, 
Natividad v Alexsis Inc 875 SW 2d 695 at 697 (Tex 1994). 
8 In regard to quasi-fiduciary relationships, see Young v United States Department of 
Justice; Young v Chemical Bank 882 F 2d 633 (2d Circuit 1989); Barnett Bank of W 
Florida v Hooper 498 So 2d 923 (Fla. 1986); Crystal Springs Trout Co v First State Bank 
ofFroidNo 85-342 (Sup Ct Mont 15 Jan. 1987). Inregard to fiduciary relationships, see 
Federal Land Bank of Spokane v Stiles 700 F Supp 106-0 (D Mont 1988); Barrett v Bank 
of America 178 Cal App 3d 960 224 Cal Rptr 76 (1986); American Spacers Ltd v Ross 
269 SE 2d 176 (Ga 1982); Deist v Wachholz 678 P 2d 188 (Mont 1984). 
9 See, eg, Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 165-166; Habetz v Condon 618 A 2d SO 1 
(Conn 1992); High v Mc Lean Financial Corporation 659 F Supp 1561 (DDC 1987); 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (s 1{)91of15 USC). 
166 
"contort"10 and bank liability theories11 can exacerbate the practical liability aspects of the 
banker-customer relationship in the United States. 12 
4.2.2 Defining a "bank" 
4.2.2.1 A legal perspective. 
Whilst banking institutions operate in significant numbers in the United States and play a 
substantial role in the US economy and financial markets, there does not appear to be any clear 
or precise definition of a "bank". 
Though the US Supreme Court has stated its views on the nature of the commercial bank on 
several occasions, 13 the legal reality is that defining a bank is essentially the function of the 
legislature. 14 However, in the United States, there are 50 state legislatures and the US Congress, 
all of which (from time to time) have employed differing definitions of "bank" in various of their 
State and federal statutes for differing purposes. 15 Today, however, the operative term is not 
solely "bank" but also "the business of banking". Recent judicial decisions have given broad 
deference to the bank regulators, such as the Comptroller of the Currency, in determining the 
10 Some US Courts have tended to confuse the contract causes of actions with tort causes 
of actions, eg in lender liability suits. The effect of this "contort" confusion has been to 
provide plaintiffs in contract causes of actions, with the means to seek tort damages, 
which is much broader than contract damages. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
generally provides for all reasonably foreseeable damages, whilst s 347 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts generally provides for the recovery of damages which 
include those that return the benefit of the bargain to the complaining party; or places the 
claimant in the position it would have occupied had the contract been performed. See 
Cranston (ed) Risk 398. 
11 See Cranston (ed) Risk 337-364. 
12 See Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 166; Many authors foresee a trend toward 
increased findings oflender liability. See, generally, Blanchard Lender Liability; Budnitz 
Lender Liability; Cappello Lender Liability; Mannino Lender Liability. 
13 See, eg, Oulton v German Savings & Loan Society 84 US (17 Wall) 109 at 118 (1873); 
United States v Philadelphia National Bank 374 US 321 at 326. 
14 See National Bank Act {12 USC s 24). 
15 Eg, separate definitions of "bank" exist under National Bank Act (s 24of12 USC), State 
banking codes, the UCC, the federal security laws, The Federal Internal Revenue Code 
(26 US Code), the Bank Holding Company Act of 195<5 (as amended) (s 1841 of 12 
USC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (105 
Stat 2236 (1991)). See Hackley 1969 Virginia LR 1421at1423nl3. 
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definitional embrace of this word and phrase. 16 
4.2.2.2 Forms of banks 
In the USA, the main forms of banking institution compnse commercial banks, thrift 
institutions, 17 and credit unions. 18 There are also bank-type institutions which are not formally 
banks, such as money market funds, life assurance companies, investment banking firms, pension 
funds, mortgage banking firms and finance companies, all regulated by some or other State 
authorities. 19 
In this thesis I shall concentrate solely on commercial banks, in particular national banks. 20 
4.2.2.3 Banking operations 
Banking institutions in the USA operate either as unit banks, branches, or as part ofbank holding 
company systems. Many banks also have significant correspondent relationships with other 
banks. The manner in which the organisational and operational structure of the bank is 
configured may often affect the regulatory structure and legal environment within which a 
particular banking institution and its customers co-exist. 21 
Unit banking involves the conduct of a bank's business operations through a centralised facility 
(with auxiliary facilities to the extent permitted by law). Unit banking results not so much from 
economic preference, but from federal and State restrictions on branch banking and geographic 
activities. There still are several States that have geographic restrictions on banking. 22 However, 
16 See, eg, NationsBank of North Carolina NA v Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co 513 
US 251 (1995); Clarke v SecuritiesindustryAssociation479 US 388 93 LEd2d 757108 
Set 750 (1987); Investment Company Institute v Camp 401US617 28 L Ed 367 91 S G 
1091 (1971 ). The operative term is not solely 11bank11 but also "the business of banking". 
17 See Friend Industry; Jones 1983 Banking LJ 24 7. 
18 On Credit Unions, see Moody & Fite Movement; Jones 1983BankingLf247. 
19 See, for background, Norton & Whitley Manuals 1.04. 
20 That is, banks chartered under National Banking Act (s 24of12 USC). 
21 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 168. 
22 See Norton & Whitley Manual Ch 17. 
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the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 199423 has significantly 
expanded geographic banking opportunities. 24 
Branch banking entails multiple office banking. Under federal law, the ability to branch is left 
essentially for federal purposes as a matter of State law and preference under the 1927 McFadden 
Act. 25 The liability of the branch is essentially imputed to that of the main banking facility, as 
there is no corporate distinction between the head office and the branch. Even though branch 
banks or offices may, in an economic sense, constitute distinct business entities or even lines of 
business, they are not separate legal entities. The parent (ie head office) bank owns the property 
of the branch, is liable for the debts of the branch, and is responsible for its operations. 26 
The primary example of group banking in the USA today is the use of bank holding companies, 
by which a parent entity may have one or more wholly-owned banking subsidiaries and one or 
more wholly-owned non-banking subsidiaries. Bank holding companies are primarily regulated 
by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as 
amended.27 Except in emergency takeover situations, this Act prohibits multi-bank holding 
companies from acquiring a bank in another State, unless the law of the State in which the bank 
is to be acquired and is domiciled expressly so provides.28 The non-banking subsidiaries of bank 
holding companies, however, operate across State lines to perform many functions closely related 
to banking.29 The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, referred 
to above, significantly expands interstate banking opportunities. 
From the above it is clear that the term "bank" is subject to legislative vagaries, and that the 
regulation of these institutions is also subject to a highly fragmented regulatory system in the 
23 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (108 Stat 2338 
(1994)). 
24 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 169. 
25 S 36 of 12 USC. 
26 See Norton & Whitley Manual Ch 17. 
27 S 1841of12 USC; Beckford Compliance. 
28 The Douglas Amendment of 1970 (s 1842(d) of 12 USC). 
29 The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (s 1843(c)(8) of 12 USC) limits the activities 
and powers of the non-bank subsidiaries to those activities closely related to banking. The 
FRB was given a broad regulatory power to define the term "banking" and it does so 
through its Regulation Y (s 225of12 CFR). 
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USA 30 The overall regulatory environment within which a US bank operates is extremely 
important in the shaping of the character and practices of the bank itself. 31 
4.3 THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP:32 CUSTOMER DEPOSITOR 
4.3.1 A relationship founded in contract33 
A general account creates a debtor-creditor relationship, 34 and a special account and a night 
deposit create a bailor-bailee relationship. The duties and liabilities of the bank and the customer 
are determined by the legal nature of the relationship.35 
The law does not require a particular procedure for the establishment of an account. However, 
the institution and the customer must mutually assent to the deposit, either expressly or 
impliedly. If the parties do not expressly agree to the terms of an account, the law will imply 
terms based on the usual banking relationship.36 The terms that govern checking and savings 
accounts are generally embodied in a signature card or passbook that a customer signs when the 
account is opened. 37 A signature card incorporates by reference the rules of the institution. 
Passbooks include printed rules38 relating to imposters, presentation of the book, cheque and 
deposit requirements. 
Contractual terms may also be included in deposit slips. If the institution and the customer have 
30 Hackley 1969VirginiaLR1421; Golembe 1967 VirginiaLR 1091; Randall 1966Law 
and Contemporary Problems 696. 
31 See, eg, Norton 1986 Oklahoma City University LR 547; Hackley 1969 Virginia LR 
14 21; Scott 1977 Stanford LR 3 0. 
32 The UCC and most cases use the term "relationship". The Restatement (Second) of 
Contract uses the term ""relation". It has been suggested that "relation" is the better term. 
See Symons 1983 Banking L.J 220nl. 
33 Symons 1983 Banking LJ 220 at 221. 
34 It does not create a trust. Sees 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts Comment e; 
Suburban Trust Company v Waller 44 Md App 335 408 A 2d 758 (Md 1979); Umbaugh 
Pole Building Co Inc v Scott 58 Ohio S Ct 2d 282 390 NE 2d 320 at 323 (1979). 
35 Norton & Whitley Manuals 11.03. 
36 Taylor v Equitable Trust Co 304 A 2d 833 (Md 1973). 
37 The relationship will generally be covered bys 4 of the UCC. 
38 See ss 3-404; 3-405; 3-406; 4-401 and 4-406 of the UCC. 
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embodied the terms of their deposit agreement in a written contract (ie a signature card or 
passbook), the contract generally is conclusive as between the customer and the institution. In 
the absence of fraud, duress or mistake, a court will be bound by the terms of the agreement, and 
may not consider extrinsic evidence. 39 The contract is formed when the institution accepts and 
acknowledges the deposit. Accordingly, the legal relationship is determined at the time the 
account is established. The money deposited is consideration for the obligation of the institution 
to repay the deposit. The contract will be interpreted so as to give effect to the intent of the 
parties. 40 The courts will generally enforce terms that impose limitations upon the institution and 
the customer. Some courts, however, will not enforce clauses exculpating the institution from 
liability for failure to exercise reasonable care. 41 
4.3.2 Creation and nature of the relationship 
The legal relationship between a banking institution and its customer is created by an express or 
implied contract. 42 If the deposit is a general deposit, title to the money passes to the institution, 
and a debtor-creditor relationship is created. Thus, the institution assumes an obligation to the 
depositor to repay the funds, and the funds become the property of the institution. 43 Some courts 
consider depositors to be beneficiaries of a fiduciary relationship with the bank or (at least) of 
a quasi-fiduciary duty resulting from a special relationship of trust and confidence. 44 Whether this 
is generally accepted is questionable. 45 
4.3.3 Duties and liabilities of the bank 
4.3.3.1 General deposits. 
When title to a general deposit passes to the banking institution, it assumes the risk of loss if the 
39 See, eg, Bennett v First National Bank 443 F 2d 518 (8th Circuit 1971). 
40 Western Nat Bank v Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co 380 F Supp 508 (D Wyo 1974). 
41 Hy-Grade Oil Co v New Jersey Bank 350 A 2d 279 (NJ 1975). 
42 Johnson v Stamets 148 NW 2d 468 (Iowa 1967). 
43 Meyer v Idaho First National Bank 525 P 2d 990 (Idaho 1974). 
44 See discussion by Miller & Harrell Payment Systems s 9.03; Mills County State Bank v 
Fisher 282 NW Zd 712 (Iowa 1979); Pigg v Robertson 549 SW 2d 597 (Mo 1977). 
45 See Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 
147; Symons 1983BankingLf220 at 221. 
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deposit is lost, destroyed or stolen. Thus, if an institution pays out funds upon presentment of a 
lost or stolen passbook, it may be liable to the account owner for the fraudulently withdrawn 
funds. In the absence of an agreement limiting the bank's liability, the courts are divided as to the 
extent of an institution's liability in these cases. Some courts hold that an institution is absolutely 
liable for payment made upon presentment of a lost or stolen passbook. Other courts impose 
liability only if the fraudulent withdrawal of funds resulted from the institution's failure to take 
reasonable care. Generally, a banking institution breaches its duty of reasonable care if it fails to 
compare the signature on the signature card with the signature on the withdrawal order. In some 
cases, where an institution's employee doubts the identity of the person making a withdrawal, 
the employee may have a duty to require identification. 46 
The duties and liabilities of a banking institution with regard to checking account transactions 
are governed by Article 4 of the UCC. Article 4 provides that an institution is liable for: 
• wrongful dishonour;47 
• failure to act promptly on a cheque or other item;48 
• ignoring a stop payment order;49 or 
• paying a forged cheque. 50 
4.3.3.2 Special deposits 
A banking institution must exercise reasonable care as bailee of a special deposit. If the 
institution exercises reasonable care, it will not be held liable for loss, destruction or theft of the 
deposit. The loss or theft of a special deposit, however, raises a presumption that the institution 
has acted negligently. Thus, the bank has the burden of proving that it exercised reasonable care. 
If the institution is acting as a gratuitous bailee, receiving no compensation for holding a special 
deposit, some courts limit liability to actions that are grossly negligent. 51 
46 S 3-501(b)(2) of the UCC. 
47 S 4-402 of the UCC. 
48 S 4-301 of the UCC. 
49 S 4-403 of the UCC. 
50 S 4-406 of the UCC. 
51 See Owosso Masonic Temple Association v State Savings Bank 263 NW 771 (Mich 
1936); Miller v Viola State Bank 246 P 517 (Kan 1926). 
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4.3.3.3 Night deposits 
If a customer leaves a deposit in a banking institution's night depository, the legal relationship 
created is that ofbailor-bailee. Therefore, the institution must exercise ordinary care to protect 
the deposit. 52 If the deposit is a general deposit, risk ofloss is not assumed by the institution until 
it takes some unequivocal act with respect to the deposit, such that a debtor-creditor relationship 
is created. An "unequivocal act" is an act or series of acts by a bank that objectively evidence that 
a deposit has been made, and that the depositor is not required to take further action (for example, 
entering the deposit in a passbook, or crediting the account of the depositor). 53 
4.3.4 Termination of the relationship 
The relationship between a bank and a customer, in the absence of a contractual provision to the 
contrary, is terminable at the will of either party. The bank may terminate the relationship by 
tendering the full amount of the deposit, and some courts require the bank to give reasonable 
notice prior to closing the account. A customer generally may terminate the relationship by 
withdrawing the funds from the account. 54 
4.4 THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP: CUSTOMER A BORROWER 
4.4.1 Legal bases oflending powers 
The lending powers of banking institutions are derived from statute, and may be expanded upon 
or defined by statutory and judicial notions of "incidental" or implied powers, or (for non-bank 
lending subsidiaries of bank holding companies) by the statutory concept of "closely related to 
banking" powers. 55 
Specifically with respect to national banks, these institutions derive their lending powers 
primarily from the National Bank Act. 56 They are empowered to discount and to negotiate 
promissory notes, drafts, bills and exchanges, and other evidence of indebtedness, and to lend 
52 Phillips Home Furnishing Inc v Continental Bank 331 A 2d 840 (Pa 1974). 
53 Bowling Corporation v Long Island National Bank 292 NYS 2d 562 (1968). 
54 Elliott v Capital City State Bank 103 NW 777 (Iowa 1905). 
55 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (s 1843(c)(8) of 12 USC). 
56 National Bank Act (s 24of12 USC). 
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money on personal security. 57 Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act of 1991, 58 the federal bank regulators are required to promulgate comprehensive real-estate 
regulations concerning such matters as loan-to-value appraisal standards, and aggregate lending 
limitations as to real estate related loans. 59 
The investment powers of banking institutions are also statutorily based, and their investment 
powers are curtailed. 60 
4.4.2 Limitations on available funds 
Banking institutions primarily derive their funds for loans and investments by accepting deposits 
and by borrowing from non-depository creditors such as central banks, other banking institutions 
and the general public. Borrowing limitations on banking institutions may be statutory, regulatory 
or supervisory. Limitations on funds available for loans and investments include reserve 
requirements, 61 liquidity requirements62 and practices, 63 permitted investment requirements, 64 
usury violations65 and legal considerations as far as commercial loans are concerned. 66 
57 12 USC 24 (Seventh). 
58 105 Stat 2236 (1991). 
59 57 Fed Reg 62, 890 (1992); 58 Fed Reg 4460 (1993). 
60 See sl of 12 CFR; Norton 1987 BL 327 et seq; Perkins 1971 Banking LJ 483; Willis 
1935 Columbia LR 696. 
61 Such as FRB reserve requirements, such as Regulation D. See s 204 of 12 CFR. 
62 Via the bank examination and supervisory processes and the formal bank "CAMEL" 
rating system. See Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 187. 
63 Such as the limitation on loans to single borrowers, see National Banking Act (12 USC 
s 84); 12 CFR s 32; Norton 1984BankingLJ122. Liability is imposed on directors of 
banks in respect of violations, see Larimore v Conover 1775 F 2d 890 (1985); reviewed 
789 F 2d 1244 (7th Circuit 1986); Tirso def Junco v Conover 682 F 2d 1338 (9th Circuit 
1982); s 410 of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (96 Stat 1469 
(1982). 
64 See, eg, Community Reinvestment Act (s 2901 et seq of 12 USC); Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (s 1691 et seq of 15 USC); the Fair Lending Initiative (59 Fed Reg 
18266)( 1994). 
65 National Banking Act (s 95of12 USC); National Banking Act (s 96of12 USC); Norton 
(ed) Guide Ch20; s 501 et seq of the Monetary Control Act ofl980 (94 Stat 132 (1980)). 
66 In regard to loans involving securities, sees 221 of 12 CFR; on anti-trust, see the Bank 
Tying Act (s 1972 of 12 USC); on interlocking directorate restrictions, see FRB 
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4.5 MULTI-FUNCTIONAL BANKING 
The general state of the law is that a lender, solely by virtue of the lending relationship, is not in 
a fiduciary position with the borrower, but is in a contractual, creditor-debtor relationship.67 
There are developments in case law68 and commentary69 in the bank-depositor area aimed at 
creating a fiduciary relationship between a bank and its customers. Other cases limit such duties 
to depositors' situations (if then, and only in special circumstances) and do not extend them to 
commercial, arm's length, lending situations. 70 This being said, however, additional facts and 
circumstances (including the nature of a pre-existing lending relationship, prior course of 
conduct, reasonable expectations of the borrowers, inordinate lender control, and ongoing 
rendering of advice to a borrower who relies on such advice) may give rise to a "quasi-fiducial" 
or "special relationship" between lender and borrower, which at minimum would create an 
implied lender duty of good faith and fair dealing71 and possibly a fiduciary duty.72 
Where a fiduciary relationship exists, the lender will be deemed to have far greater duties than 
those arising under a loan contract (for example, due care, undivided loyalty, confidentiality, fair 
dealing, material disclosure) and may be charged with the burden of showing the fairness of the 
Regulation L (s 212of12 CFR); on truth-in-lending, see FRB Regulation 2 (s 226of12 
CFR). 
67 See Okura & Co (America) Inc v Careau Group 783 F Supp 482 at 494 (CD Cal 1991); 
Peters v Sjoholm 25 Wash App 39 604 P 2d 527 (1979). It is not a trust, see Comment 
e to s 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. 
68 See, eg, Mills County State Bank v Fisher 282 NW 2d 712 (Iowa 1979); Piggy Robertson 
549 SW 2d 597 (Mo 1977); Young v United States Department of Justice;Young v 
Chemical Bank 882 F 2d 633 (2d Circuit 1989); Barnett Bank of W Florida v Hooper 498 
So 2d 923 (Fla 1986); Crystal Springs Trout Co v First State Bank of Froid No 85-342 
(Sup Ct Mont 15 Jan 1987). 
69 See Chao 1980 CaliforiaLR 153; Millhiser 1980 Wash & Lee LR 953; Tettenborn 1980 
J of Business Law 1 O; Hagedorn 1980 Willamette LR 803; Hagedorn 1978 Mo BJ 406. 
70 Lanz v Resolution Trust Corporation 764 F Supp 176 at 179 (SD Fla.1991); Bankest 
Imports Inc v !SCA Corporation 717 F Supp 1537 at 1541 (SD Fla 1989). 
71 Commercial Cotton Co v United California Bank 163 Cal App 3d 551 209 Cal Rptr 
(1985); Copesky v Superior Court of San Diego County 229 Cal App 3d 678 (Call 991 ); 
Federal Land Bank of Spokane v Stiles 700 F Supp 1060 (D Mont 1988); Deist v 
Wachholz 678 P 2d 188 (Mont 1984); Hutson v Wenatchee Federal Savings & Loan 
Association 22 Wash App 91 588 P 2d 1192 (1978). 
72 When a bank has accepted the customer's trust and confidence, it may be held to a 
fiduciary standard of conduct. See Brasher v First National Bank of Birmingham 168 So 
42 (Ala 1936); Stewart v Phoenix National Bank 49 Ariz 34 64 P 2d 101 (1937); Pigg 
v Robertson 549 SW 2d 597 (Mo 1977). 
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lender's conduct. 73 A legal issue of concern to a bank is whether a fiduciary duty exists with 
respect to the use of information submitted to it by a borrower in connection with a loan. Prudent 
counseling may require the bank to assume that a fiduciary duty does exist concerning the 
dissemination of non-public information to a third party or to another department of the bank. 
In addition, dissemination of "inside" information could have federal security-law implications. 
The fiduciary standards on "insider" loans set forth in the Financial Institutions Regulatory and 
Interest Rate Contract Act of 1978 (FIRA), 74 and implementing federal regulation, are applicable 
to commercial loan transactions. 
A bank may be given the power to act as agent or trustee for its customers and others in areas 
incidental to the ordinary business ofbanking.75 Apart from statutes governing the relationship, 
banks, when operating as a trustee, are generally subject to the common-law "prudent person" 
rule in the administration of the trust. 76 Self-dealing in such a relationship is taboo. Unless 
authorised by the instrument creating the fiduciary relationship, by State law or by court order, 
funds held in a fiduciary capacity by a national bank cannot be invested in stock or obligations 
of, or property acquired from the bank or its directors, officers, employees, or from individuals 
or organisations with which there exists a connection or interest that might affect the exercise of 
the best judgment of the bank in making the investment or acquiring the property.77 
73 A fiduciary relationship obliges the parties, essentially, to act with the utmost good faith, 
honesty and loyalty on behalf of the other. See Tepper Contracts 51; Hagedorn 1980 
Willamette LR 803 at 807; Hagedorn 1978 MO BJ 406. 
7 4 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Contract Act of 1978 (FIRA) (92 Stat 
3641 (1978)). 
75 These trust relationships will be governed by a complex of State and federal banking 
laws. See Norton & Whitley Manuals 4.03[l]{d]. 
76 See, eg, First Alabama Bank of Montgommery NA v Martin 425 So 2d 41 S (Ala 1982). 
77 S 9.12of12 CFR. 
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4.6 THE BANKER'S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
At common law, the existence of a general duty of confidentiality is by no means whole-
heartedly accepted. Perhaps the earliest recognition of the bank-customer duty of confidentiality 
is Brex v Smith18 where a government prosecutor sought the bank records of all members of the 
Newark police department. In refusing the demand, the Court stated that there is an implied 
obligation on the bank to keep the records from scrutiny. 
In general, the US Courts have easily found a duty of confidentiality where the customer deposits 
money with the bank.79 Neither the line of reasoning nor the results, however, are as consistent 
where the bank-customer relationship is one of loan. In Granery Development Corporation v 
Taksen80 the customer brought an action against his bank claiming that the implied contract of 
confidentiality had been breached as the bank had informed both another lender as well as a 
prospective credit seller of his default on a loan. The court held that because there was a loan 
relationship, not deposit, plaintiff could not expect that the information would be kept 
confidential. In Washington Steel Corporation v TW Corporation81 the circuit court refused an 
injunction for an alleged infringement of the duty of confidentiality, as there was no fiduciary 
relationship between the parties. In Humana Inc v American Medicorp lnc82 the Court indicated 
that it would support a duty not to disclose externally or to use internally the information for 
anything other than analysis of the customer's loan. Virtually all courts, other than the court in 
the Washington Stee/83 case,84 have concluded that the loan can be made only ifthe confidential 
information supplied by the target customer is not used. 85 
78 146 A 34 (NJ Ch 1929). 
79 See, eg, Suburban Trust Company v Waller 44 Md App 3 3 5 408 A 2d 7 5 8 (Md 1979) in 
which case the passage regarding the implied duty of confidentiality as stated in Toumier 
v National Provincial and Union Bank of England ( 1924) 1 KB 461 at 480 was quoted 
with approval. See, also, Peterson v Idaho First National Bank 367 P 2d 284 (1961 ). 
80 92 Misc 2d 764 400 NYS 2d 717 (1978). 
81 602 F 2d 594 (3d Circuit 1979). 
82 [1978 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed Sec L Rep 96 286 at 92 829 (SDNY 1978). 
83 602 F 2d 594 (3d Circuit 1979) 
84 For a critical discussion of this case, see Chao 1980 California LR 153; Milhiser 1980 
Wash & Lee LR 953. 
85 AmericanMedicorp Inc v Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co 77 C 3 865 (ND 
Ill Dec 3 0 1977); Humana Inc v American Medi corp Inc [ 1978 Transfer Binder] CCH 
Fed Sec L Rep 96 286 (SDNY1978); Harnischfeger Corporation v Paccar Inc 474 F 
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Because of the courts' general failure to recognize the confidentiality of financial information86 
held by the bank, Congress stepped in with legislation. The Foreign Transactions Reporting Act 
of 197087 provides that any "consumer reporting agency" must adhere to certain safeguards before 
dissembling virtually any information about individuals, and is designed, in part, to ensure that 
such agencies exercise their responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and respect for the 
consumer's right to privacy. 88 
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 197889 was passed in direct response to a Supreme Court 
case, United States v Miller, 90 a criminal case where the court held that where a prosecutor had 
seized the financial records of an accused, no Fourth Amendment right had been violated, as a 
bank customer has no individual rights to privacy in financial records held by the bank. In 1978, 
Congress expressed its determination that a bank customer has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in its financial dealings with a bank. 91 
Supp 1157 (ED Wis 1979). 
86 In 1991, eg, in Boccardo v Citibank NA 152 Misc 2d 1012 (1991). One New York 
Supreme Court Judge refused to find that Citibank had any duty of confidentiality to the 
non-defaulting holder of a line of credit. In Young v United States Department of Justice; 
Young v Chemical Bank 882 F 2d 633 (2d Circuit 1989) the US Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit surveyed many of the relevant judicial decisions both in New York and 
elsewhere. The Court concluded that the State of New York had not articulated a duty of 
confidentiality with respect to the relationship between a bank and its customers, who 
were depositors in this case, and abstained from deciding the case. 
87 S 1681 of12 USC; 84 Stat 1118 (1970). 
88 S 168 l(a)( 4) of 12 USC). 
89 S 3401of12 USC. 
90 425 us 435 (1976). 
91 Neate Bank Confidentiality 518-520. 
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4. 7 LIABILITY FOR ADVICE AND OTHER BANKER/LENDER LIABILITY 
THEORIES 
4. 7.1 Theories of lender liability 
Litigation against lenders by disgruntled borrowers or affected third parties is increasing. More 
and more actions instituted by lending banks are defended. These suits or defences may be based 
on one more of numerous innovative legal theories, the most commonly used theories being those 
discussed below.92 
4.7.1.1 Control theories 
If a bank becomes so entwined in control over the conduct of a borrower and in a manner that 
goes beyond the bounds of prudent lending practices, a bank may find itself judicially 
characterised as the principal, partner or joint venturer, alter ego, or fiduciary of the borrower. 
This, in turn, could expose the bank to liability for third-party claims against the borrower.93 In 
addition, such degrees of inordinate control could, given the proper circumstances, create lender 
liability for the bank under federal securities,94 tax, 95 and bankruptcy laws.96 
4.7.1.2. Common-law tort and fraud 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts asserts that one who aids another may be liable to the other 
for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise care to perform his undertaking if: 
• his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm; or; 
• the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking. 
92 On US lender liability generally, see Cranston (ed) Risk 3 31-412; Blanchard Lender 
Liability; BudnitzLender Liability; Cappello Lender Liability; Mannino Lender Liability. 
93 See AG Jensen Farms Co v Cargill Inc 309 NW 2d 285 (Minnl981); Krivo Industrial 
Supply v National Distillers and Chemical Company 483 F 2d 1098 (5th Circuitl973); 
James E McFadden Inc v Baltimore Contractors Inc 609 F Supp 1102 (ED Pennl 985); 
Hynesl991 Tennesee LR 635 at 635-668. 
94 S 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (s 77of15 USC). 
95 Ss 3402, 3505 and 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 US Code). 
96 Bankruptcy Co<le (s 510of11 USC). 
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Building upon this theory of legal duties, borrowers have argued that where a lender provides 
specific assistance to a debtor or assumes control (directly or indirectly) over a borrower's 
business, and the debtor relies on the creditor, the lender is liable to the borrower for any failure 
to perform such assumed duties with reasonable care.97 
In addition, in instances where a lender can be shown to have misrepresented a material fact to 
the borrower in order to coerce the borrower into some action, or can be shown to be otherwise 
in bad faith in the lending relationship, common-law actions for misrepresentational 
fraud, 98constructive fraud, 99 duress100 tortious interference, 101 or negligence, 102 may lie. 
97 AG Jensen Farms Co v Cargill Inc 309 NW 2d 285 (Minnl 981 ); Krivo Industrial Supply 
v National Distillers and Chemical Company 483 F 2d 1098 (5th Circuit 1973 ); James 
E McFadden Inc v Baltimore Contractors Inc 609 F Supp 1102 (ED Pa 1985). 
98 In regard to fraud, its requirements and evidence, see Bank of El Paso v (TO) Stanley 
Boot Co 847 SW 2d 218 at 222 (Texl992); State National Bank of El Paso v Farah 
Manufacturing Co 678 SW 2d 661 at 681 (Tex App 1984); Banco do Brasil SA v Latian 
Inc 234 Cal App 3d 973 285 Cal Rptr 870 at 896 (Cal Ct App 1991); Commonwealth 
Mortgage Corporation v First Nationwide Bank 873 F 2d 859 (5th Circuit 1989). 
Fraud is frequently alleged in connection with a bank's promises of benefits in exchange 
for security, (see Dean W Knight & Sons Inc v First W Bank & Trust Co Cal App 2d 148 
CalRptr767 (Cal Ct App 1978)), groundless threats, (seeStateNationalBankofElPaso 
v Farah Manufacturing Co 678 SW 2d 661at681 (Tex Appl984); Loyola Fed Sav & 
Loan Association v Galanes 365 A 2d 580 (Md Ct Spec App 1976)), misrepresentation 
concerning the effect of the loan documents, (see Holm v Sun Bank/Broward NA 423 So 
2d 1007 (Fla Dist Ct App 1982); Lee v The Heights Bank 446 NE 2d 248 (Ill App Ct 
1983)), failure to disclose information in order to protect its own interests, (see Merrill 
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc v First National Bank Of Little Rock Arkansas 774 F 
2d 909 (8th Circuit 1985); General Motors Acceptance Corporation v Central National 
Bank Mattoon 773 F 2d 771 (7th Circuitl985); Central States Stamping Co v Terminal 
Equipment Co Inc 727 F 2d 1405 (6th Circuit 1984)), giving improper advice to a 
borrower, (see Banco TottaeAcoresvFleet Nationa1Bank168 F Supp 943(DRI1991); 
United Companies Financial Corporation v Brown 584 So 2d 470 (Ala 1991 ); Rainsville 
Bank v Willingham 485 So 2d 319 (Ala.1986); Nie v Galena State Bank & Trust Co 387 
NW 2d 3 73 (Iowa Ct App 1986); Shogyo International Corporation v First National 
Bank of Clarksdale 475 So 2d 425 (Missl985)), and falsely representing that it has done 
or will do something for the borrower, (see Richter v Bank of America National Trust and 
Savings Association 939 F 2d 1176 (5th Circuit 1991); General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation v Covington 586 So 2d 178 (Ala 1991); First Federal Saving & Loan 
Association v Caudle 425 So 2d 1050 (Ala 1982); Frame v Boatmen's Bank 782 SW2d 
117 (Mo Ct App 1989); Commerce Savings Scottsbluff Inc v FH Schafer Elevator Inc 
436 NW2d 151 (Nebl989). 
99 Constructive fraud most commonly arises in lender liability where a confidential or 
fiduciary duty has arisen between the parties and the bank either fails to disclose material 
facts to the borrower or engages in some self-dealing or overreaching. See Greater 
Southwest Office ParkLtdv Texas Commerce Bank National Association 786 SW 2d 386 
(Tex App Houston 1st Dist 1990). Ordinarily such a special relationship does not exist 
between borrower and lender and where one has been found, it rested on extraneous facts 
and conduct. See Cara Corporation v Continental Bank (In re Cara Corporation) 148 
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4. 7.1.3 Good-faith covenant 
Section 1-203 of the UCC states: 
"Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its 
performance or engagement." 
"Good faith" under s 1-201 (19) of the UCC is, in turn, defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct 
or transaction". This contract-based duty has been held in certain cases to apply to the conduct 
of lenders in enforcing security arrangements coming within the scope of the UCC.103 If a 
"special relationship" is deemed to exist, a tort-based duty of good faith outside the UCC may 
be implied. 104 In principle, UCC bad-faith claims are contractual (and not tort) claims.105 
BB 760 (Bankr ED Pa 1992). 
100 Mirax Chemical Producers v First Interstate Commercial Corporation 950 F2d 566 at 
570 (8th Circuit 1991); Bank of El Paso v TO Stanley Boot Co 847 SW 2d 218 at 222 
(Tex 1992); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v Linn 671 F Supp 547 at 556 (ND 
Ill 1987); Spillers v Five Points Guaranty Bank 335 So 2d 851 (Fla Dist Ct App 1976) 
101 T ortious interference typically encompasses two torts, interference with contract and 
interference with prospective business relations. See State National Bank v Academia 802 
SW 2d 282 at 295 (Tex App 1990); Victoria Bank & Trust Co v Brady 811 SW2d 931 
at 93 9 (Tex 1991 ); Flintridge Station Associates v American Fletcher Mortgage Co 761 
F 2d 434 at 440 (7th Circuit 1985); Lachenmaier v First Bank Systems Inc 803 P2d 614 
at 619 (Mont 1990). 
102 The existence of a duty of care is a prerequisite to establishing a claim of negligencei 
against a lender. See Nymark v Heart Federal Savings & Loan Association 231 Cal App 
3d 1089 283 Cal Rptr 53 (1991); Larsen v United Federal Savings and Loan Association 
of Des Moines 300 NW 2d 281 (Iowa 1981 ). Lenders have incurre.d liability based on 
negligence in many instances, including negligent processing of a loan application, (see 
High v McLean Financial Corporation 659 F Supp 1561 (DDC 1987)); negligent 
appraisal, (see Hughes v Holt 435 A 2d 687 (Vt 1981); negligent inspection, (see 
Williamson v Reality Champion and First Union Mortage Corporation 551 So 2d 1000 
(Ala 1989)) negligent response to credit enquiries, ( seeMSA Tubular Products Inc v First 
Bank and Trust Co Yale Oklahoma 869 F 2d 1422 (10th Circuit 1989); Berkline 
Corporation v Bank of Mississippi 453 So 2d 699 (Miss 1984). 
103 Eg, KMC Co Inc v Irving Trust Company 757 F 2d 752 (6th Circuit 1985). 
104 Compare, eg, Kraus/Jewell v Bank of America 248 Cal Rptr 217 (1988) with Copesky v 
Superior Court of San Diego County 229 Cal App 3d 678 (Cal1991). 
105 The concept of good faith shall be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.8 below. 
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4.7.1.4 Environmental claims 
A lender may incur significant risk of liability under federal and State environmental laws with 
respect to its control over a borrower's property which impacts adversely on the environment. 106 
Lenders who secure their loans through security interests in real property are becoming 
increasingly concerned with the impact on their interests ofhazardous-waste clean-up sites under 
federal and State laws, especially under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 107 CERCLA imposes liability for the cost 
of hazardous-waste clean-up on a broad range of people, including former and current owners 
or operators of a site. Responsible parties are strictly liable, and liability is joint and several. 
Lenders, however, can take advantage of certain narrowly drawn defences to liability. 108 
4. 7 .2 More instances of banking regulation 
US banking law consists of a maze of regulations. In addition to the few statutes already 
discussed, mention should be made here of a few other regulations which play a vital role in the 
lender's ability to lend. In this regard regulation is provided for asset classification, 109 allowances 
for losses, and capital and CRA ratings. 110 
4.8 DUTIES OF DISCLOSURE AND OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES 
4.8.1 Introduction: good faith. 
In the sub-chapter on disclosure in England, chapter 2 pars 2.2.1 to 2.2.5, I have looked fairly 
extensively at the legal principles of English law. US law is, of course, part of the Anglo-
American legal family and has its roots in English law. There are important differences however, 
between US contract law and English contract law, notably in regard to the requirement of good 
106 See,eg, United States v Maryland Bank and Trust Co 632 F Supp 573 Md 1986). 
107 Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (s 
9601 et seq of 42 USC) (CERCLA). 
108 Ss 300 and 1100 et seq of 40 CPR. 
109 See Federal Reserve Board Regulation Service Locator No 3-lSOlof 1979; 38(b)(l) of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 (s 1811of12 USC). 
110 S 3 of 12 CPR. 
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faith. There is no general principle of good faith in English law. 111 As far as good faith and US 
law are concerned, it can be stated briefly that during the nineteenth century, the US common law 
was reluctant to recognize explicitly any "generalized duty to act in good faith" .112 US law now 
imposes a duty of good faith across a broad spectrum of commercial transactions. 113 For example, 
as far as bankers are concerned, it applies to commercial paper and other negotiable instruments, 
bank deposits and collections, electronic funds transfers, letters of credit, bulk transfer, 
documents oftitle, investment securities, secured transactions, and contracts including sales.114 
The UCC, 115 the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 116 and a majority of the States117 recognize 
the duty to perform a contract in good faith. 
Despite a promising beginning in the eighteenth century, the common law has traditionally been 
reluctant to recognize, at least as overt doctrine, any generalized duty to act in good faith toward 
others in social intercourse. 118 This approach was solidified with the development, "during the 
nineteenth century, of the pure theory of contract characterized by notions of volition, laissez-
f aire, freedom of contract, judicial non-intervention and bargained-for-exchange". 119 In recent 
years doctrines of promissory estoppel, unconscionability and modern theories of quasi-contracts 
have changed these rigid notions. 120 As part of the same development, modern contract law 
appears to support and promote good-faith conduct based on reasonable standards in the 
formation, performance and discharge of contracts. 121 The Uniform Commercial Code and 
111 See Atiyah Contract 266; Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 39 and the 
discussion on non-disclosure in English law in Chapter 2. 
112 Holmes 1978 University of Pittsburgh LR 3 81 at 3 84. 
113 Farnsworth 1963 University of Chicago LR 666 at 667; Eisenberg 1971 Marquette LR 1; 
Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 119-120. 
114 Eg, ss 3-302, 4-406, 5-114 of the UCC. 
115 S 1-203 of the UCC. 
116 S 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
117 Burton 1980 Harvard LR 369. 
118 Holmes 1978 University of Pittsburgh LR 381 at 384. 
119 Ibid, at 384-5. 
120 Ibid, at 389-90. 
121 Ibid, at 381. 
183 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts have been influential in bringing about this result. 122 
The concept of good faith has been applied in many areas of the law. 123 In the area of 
indefiniteness, it will be noted that where 11 a contract confers on one party a discretionary power 
affecting the rights of the other, a duty is imposed to exercise the discretion in good faith and in 
accordance with fair dealing". 124 The concept of good faith is furthermore referred to with respect 
to the termination of an agreement, illusory promises, the surrender of an invalid claim and 
output and requirements contracts. The concept is also used in the area of duress. 125 In the area 
of promissory estoppel the notion of culpa in contrahendo is based upon a duty to bargain in 
good faith. 126 
Perhaps the largest number of cases involving the topic of good faith arise in the context of an 
implied-in-fact promise or a constructive promise to act in good faith. 127 A much quoted phrase 
122 Ibid, at 384. On the UCC and Good Faith, see, also, Hillman 1981 Cornell LR l; Adler 
& Mann 1994 Akron LR 31; Summers 1982 Cornell LR 81 O; Farnsworth 1963 University 
of Chicago LR 666. 
123 The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions apply it as a matter of common law. See, eg, 
Keffer v Keffer 852 P 2d 394 at 398 (Alaska 1993); Carma Developers (California) Inc 
v Marathon Development California Inc 826 P 2d 710 at 726 (Cal 1992); Ervin v Amoco 
Oil Co 885 P 2d 246 at 250 (Colo Ct App 1994); Habetz v Condon 618 A 2d 501 at 505 
(Conn 1992); Southern Business Machines of Savannah Inc v Norwest Financial Leasing 
Inc 390 SE 2d 402 at 405 (Ga Ct App 1990); Abbott v Amoco Oil Co 619 NE 2d 789 at 
795 (III App Ct 1993); Kansas Baptist Convention v Mesa Operating Ltd Partnership 
864 P 2d 204 210-11(Kan1993); Blankv Chelmsford OBIGYN649 NE2d 1102 at 1105 
(Mass 1995); Ferrel v Vic Tanny International!nc 357 NW 2d 669 at 672 (Mich Ct App 
1984); Weldon v Montana Bank 885 P 2d 511 at 515 (Mont 1994); Perry v Jordaan 900 
P 2d 335 at 338 (Nev 1995); Planning & Design Solutions v City of Santa Fe 885 P 2d 
885 P 2d 628 at 635 (NM 1994); Dalton v Educational Testing Serv 614 NYS 2d 742 at 
743 (App Div 1994); Bicycle Transit Authority Inc v Bell 333 SE 2d 299 at 305 
(NC 1985); Pacific First Bank v New Morgan Park Corporation 876 P 2d 761 at 762 (Or 
1994); Carmichael v Adirondack Bottled Gas Corporation 635A2d1211 at 1216 (Vt 
1993); Miller v United States Bank 865 P 2d 536 at 542 (Wash Ct App 1994). Only 
Texas has expressly refused to recognize the covenant's relevance to arms' length 
contracts and limited its application to cases in which a special relationship between the 
parties is found, such as in insurance contracts. See, eg, Natividad v Alexsis Inc 875 SW 
2d 695 at 697 (Tex 1994). 
124 Perdue v Crocker National Bank 38 Cal 3d 913 216 Cal Rptr 345 702 P 2d 503 (Cal 
1985). 
125 See, in general, Calamari & Perillo Contracts 508-509; Farnsworth On Contracts 328 et 
seq. 
126 Kessler & Fine 1964 Harvard LR 401; Calamari & Perillo Contracts 509; Farnsworth 
1984 Canadian Bus LJ 426 at 427-428. 
127 Calamari & Perillio Contracts 509. 
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is "that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 11128 
Normally, the violation of such a duty is treated as a breach of contract. There is a tendency, 
however, in violations of the insurance contracts of insurers129 and in abusive discharges of at-
will employees130 to treat violations of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as torts. The 
distinction is not purely of academic interest. Characterization of the violation as a tort opens the 
doors to punitive damages and difficulties in choosing the applicable statute of limitations. 131 
Section 1-203 of the UCC states that every contract or duty within the Act imposes an obligation 
of good faith in its performance or enforcement. 132 The comment to the UCC adds: 
"This section sets forth a basic principle running throughout this Act. The principle 
involved is that in commercial transactions good faith is required in the performance and 
enforcement of all agreements or duties. 11 
Section 1-203 of the UCC does not define "good faith". However, there are two sections that do. 
Section 1-201(19) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned. "133 Since the section is in Article 1 it applies to the entire Code. It has been said that 
this definition makes negligence irrelevant to good faith, its being a subjective test also known 
as "the pure heart and the empty head test" .134 The subjective nature of this test has been severely 
128 KirkeLaShelle CovPaulArmstrongCo 263 NY 79 87 188 NE 163 at 167 (1933); s 205 
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The concept of good faith is embodied in both 
s 1-203 of the the UCC ands 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. It has been 
pointed out that "there is an express mention of 'good faith' in some fifty of the four 
hundred sections of the Code." See Farnsworth 1963 University of Chicago LR 666 at 
667. 
129 See Louderback & Jurika 1982 USFLR 187; Speidel 1983 N Kentucky LR 163. 
130 SeeMurphyvAmericanHomeProductsCorporation 58 N 2d 293 461NYS2d 232 448 
NE 2d 86 (1983). 
131 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 509. 
132 Note that this does not apply to contract formation, but it applies to a modification 
because a modification relates to the performance of a contract. Calamari & Perillo 
Contracts 509. 
133 See, also, Wendling v Cundall 568 P 2d 888 rNyo 1977). Speidel 1996 J of Legal 
Education 537 at 540pointsoutthat aproposedrevisionofs 1-201(19) of the UCC states 
that good faith means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable standards of fair 
dealing in the conduct of the transaction concerned". 
134 See Braucher 1958 Columbia LR 798: 
11 Some term it the 'white heart, empty head' test. It is not sufficient that there be 
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criticized. There is a strong feeling that the test should have an objective component. 135 
However, for sales of goods, the Code has a different definition in the case of a merchant. 
Section 2-103 states: "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. This definition 
includes the subjective test supplied by s 1-203, but adds an objective standard. 136 
The Restatement (Second) of Contract provides: "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement. 11137 In the Official Comment 
a to the section, the UCC definitions of good faith are repeated. The Comment goes on to say that 
the meaning of the phrase varies somewhat with the context. According to the Comment, 
"[G]ood faith performance or enforcement of the contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed 
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes 
a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate 
community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness". 
Comment d of the Restatement (Second) of Contract elaborates on what is good faith and what 
is bad faith. It states: "Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in 
performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes 
further: bad faith may be overt or may consist ofinaction, and fair dealing may require more than 
honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are 
among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions; evasion of the spirit of the 
bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, wilful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of 
circumstances or suspicions such as would put a careful purchaser on inquiry. We 
have traditionally held that subjective good faith is simply 'the honest belief that 
[your] conduct is rightful'". 
As held in Schluter v United Farmers Elevator 479 NW 2d 82 at 85 (Minn Ct App 1992) 
quoting Wohlrabe v Pownell 3 07 NW 2d 4 78 at 483 (Minn 1981) ); cf Utility Contractors 
Financial Services Inc V Amsouth Bank NA (Jn re Joe Morgan Inc) 985 F 2d 1554 at 
1506-61 (11th Circuit 1993) where it was recognised that Alabama applies both 
subjective and objective analyses of good faith under the UCC); Shearson Lehman 
Brothers v Wasatch Bank 788 F Supp 1184 at 1194 (D Utah 1992); Bill v Catfish Shaks 
of America Inc 727 F Supp 1035 at 1040-41 (ED La 1989); Kline v Central Motors 
Dodge Inc 614 A 2d 1313 at 1316 (Md Ct Spec App 1992). 
135 For a critical discussion, see, eg, Farnsworth 1963 University of Chicago LR <566; 
Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195; Heatherman 1993 Willamette LR 567 at 590. 
136 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 510; Heatherman 1993 Willamette LR 567 at 590; Adler 
&Mann 1994AkronLR31 at43. 
137 S 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
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a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's 
performance." This catalogue contains both subjective and objective criteria. 138 
It should be noted that Comment b states that this section does not relate to the formation of a 
contract. A fortiori it does not relate to preliminary negotiations. 139 Pre-contractual bad faith may, 
however, be redressed under rules regulating fraud, duress and promissory estoppel. 140 
The Restatement section has been quoted in detail to show that the concept of good faith is 
amorphous. 141 A wide variety of attempts to give it flesh and substance can be found in the 
literature. 142 What is or is not good faith is ordinarily a question of fact. 143 
Closely related to the topic of good faith is the doctrine of tortious bad faith breach of contract.144 
In the case of Silberg v California Life Insurance Co145 it was stated that the insurer's duty is to 
give the interest of the insured at least as much consideration as it gives to its own interest. 146 
However, another case has stated that a duty of good faith does not mean that a party vested with 
a clear right is obligated to exercise the right to his own detriment for the purpose of benefitting 
138 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 510. 
139 Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 125. There are specific instances where it 
might be said that the general requirement applies even at the negotiating stage. 
Farnsworth gives the example of the "closed-mouth negotiator". Non-disclosure may 
amount to a misrepresentation unless remaining silent is consistent with good faith and 
reasonable standards of fair dealing. See Farnsworth 1984 Canadian Bus LJ 426 at 427-
428; s 161 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
140 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 510. 
141 Burton 1981 Iowa LR l; Eisenberg 1971 Marquette LR 1. 
142 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 511; Burton 1980 Harvard LR 369; Burton 1981 Iowa LR 
l; Summers 1982 Cornell LR 810; Lillard 1992 Mo LR 1233 at 1237; Summers 1968 
Virginia LR 195; Cook 1986 Iowa LR 893. 
143 Eisenberg 1971 Marquette LR 1at15. 
144 See Louderback and Jurika 1982 USFLR 187; Speidel 1983 N Kentucky LR 163; 
Murphy v American Home Products Corporation 448 NE 2d 86 (1983); and Silberg v 
California Life Insurance Co 11 Cal 3d 452 113 Cal Rptr 711 521 P 2d 1103 (1974). 
145 11 Cal 3d 452 113 Cal Rptr 711 521 P 2d 1103 (1974). 
146 460 521P2d at 1109 113 Cal Rptr at 716-717. See, also, Holmes 1980 Cornell LR 33-0 
at 360-7. 
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another party to the contract. 147 
It is apparent that the concept of "good faith" can be used in any situation to right a wrong that 
would be created if the traditional rule were applied. 148 
4.8.2 Disclosure principles 
Information is valuable. 149 Possession of it frequently permits an individual to enter into a 
transaction that is profitable precisely because he is acting on the information possessed by him 
but not by the other party. To what extent must a contracting party share information with the 
other party when that information bears on the relative exchange of values? Poker players do not 
share information concerning the content of their hands. Calamari and Perillo pose the question 
whether this is analogous to a bargaining transaction. They find the answer to be complex. The 
kinds of information that affect values are many. Means of gathering information are multiple. 
The circumstances surrounding the negotiating parties are diverse. 150 
As a general rule, in a bargaining transaction there is generally no duty to disclose information 
to the other party. 151 This rule contains numerous exceptions. The first exception or group of 
exceptions is where a statute or regulation requires disclosure. The number of such statutes 
perhaps attests to the inadequacy of common-law disclosure niles. The Securities Act of 193 3, 152 
Truth-in-Lending legislation, 153 the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 154 and the Truth-in-
147 RioAlgom Corporation vJimco Ltd 618 P2d 497 (Utah 1980). It has been held that the 
concept of good faith may not be used to override explicit contractual terms. See Grand 
Light & Supply Co Inc v Honeywell Inc 771F2d 672 at 679 (2d Circuit 1985), but see 
Wake.field v Northern Telecom Inc 769 F 2d 109 (2d Circuit 1985) for a contrary view. 
148 S 205 of the Restatement (Second) Contracts; Fortune v National Cash Register Co 373 
Mass 96 364 NE 2d 1251 (Mass 1977); Calamari & Perillo Contracts 512. 
149 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 366. 
150 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 366. 
151 Laidlaw v Organ 15 US (2 Wheat) 178 4 L Ed 214 (1817). See generally, Keeton 1936 
Texas LR l; Williston 12 1497-99; Prosser & Keeton Torts 737-40; Berger & Hirsch 
1948 Temple LQ 368; Goldfarb 1956 Western Reserve LR 5. 
152 S 77of15 USC. See, generally, Loss Regulation. 
153 See, generally, ClontzManual. 
154 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (s 1701 of 15 USC). 
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Negotiations Act, 155 are some of the more prominent legislative steps in this field displacing the 
common law. These all involve transactions where one party is in possession of information 
which can be obtained by the other, if at all, only by extremely expensive means and where 
abuses of the information monopoly frequently take the form of false or misleading statements. 156 
A second exception to or qualification of the general rule is the distinction made between non-
disclosure and concealment. Positive action designed to hide the truth or to stymie the other 
party's investigation is deemed to constitute misfeasance that can result in liability for 
misrepresentation. 157 
A third exception is that where partial disclosure is made, lack of full disclosure (a half truth) 
may constitute misrepresentation. 158 Thus where one party reads a suggested contract to another, 
leaving out portions, he has run afoul of this exception. 159 Where a resident of the Philippines 
was offered a job in Oregon, without disclosure that the existence of the job slot was under 
review, non-disclosure was deemed fraudulent and damages were awarded when the slot was 
cancelled as of the date of the promised employment. 160 
A fourth exception is where a party has made a statement in good faith, but supervening events 
make it no longer true, or he discovers new information demonstrating to him that the statement 
was not true when made. If he knows that the other is relying upon it, he has a duty to disclose 
the truth. 161 Similarly, if one party becomes aware that the other is operating under a mistake as 
155 S 2304of10 USC. Applicable to US government contracts. 
156 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 367. 
157 See Keeton 1936 Texas LR 1at2-6;KuellingvRoderickLeanManufacturingCo183 
NY 78 75 NE 1098 2 LRA (NS) 303 (1905). See, also, s 160 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts. 
158 Norton v Poplos 443 A 2d 1 (Delaware 1982); Russ v Brown 96 Idaho 369 529 P 2d 765 
(1974); Kannavos v Annino 356 Mass 42 247 NE 2d 708 (1969);Krause v Eugene Dodge 
Inc 265 Or 486 509 P 2d 1199 (Or 1973) ("new car" had 5 000 miles of use); Williston 
12 1497 n 4. 
159 Ten-Cate v First National Bank of Decatur 52 SW 2d 323 (Tex CivApp1932). Prosser 
& Keeton Torts 73 6-40; Coral Gables v Mayer 241 App Div 340 271 NYS 662 (1st Dep't 
1934), second appeal 246 App Div 518 282 NYS 596 (1st Dep't 1935) affirmed 270 NY 
670 1NE2d 991 (1936). 
160 Elizaga v Kaiser Foundation Hospitals Inc 259 Or 542 487 P 2d 870 (Or 1971). See 
Comment b to s 159 of the Restatement (Second) Contracts. 
161 S 4 72 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (similarly where he knowingly tells an 
untruth not expecting the other to rely and discover that he is relying); Keeton 1936 Texas 
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to a basic assumption upon which he is contracting, 162 he has a duty to correct the mistake even 
if he did not cause it. 163 Under this heading come the numerous cases holding that the seller of 
goods, lands or securities is under an obligation to disclose latent defects. This is a very old 
doctrine, certainly prevalent in the early nineteenth century. 11 A sound price warrants a sound 
commodity" was the maxim. 164 But later in that century the phrase caveat emptor had thoroughly 
eradicated the earlier maxim. 165 Although the dust has not yet settled, it may safely be said that 
the older law once again prevails as to latent defects166 although some citadels of caveat emptor 
remain. 167 Thus, in Massachusetts a seller of a house need not disclose that the house is infested 
with termites, 168 although he must disclose conditions dangerous to health and safety. 169 
In most cases where the transaction involves the sale of goods, the question of non-disclosure is 
of no relevance inasmuch as the Uniform Commercial Code supplies an array of implied 
warranties granting the purchaser relief for defects in the goods, whether or not these are known 
LR 1 at 6; Williston 12 1497 and 1499; s 161(a) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts. 
162 S 161 (b) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
163 Davis v Reisinger 120 App Div 766 105 NYS 603 (I st Dep't 1907); Williston 12 s 1497 
and 1499. 
164 Horwitz 1974 Harvard LR 917 at 926; Calamari & Perillo Contracts 367. 
165 By 1873 a leading text could state that the maxim "a sound price implies a sound article" 
is peculiar to South Carolina. Calamari & Perillo Contracts 368. 
166 Neuman v Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co 356 Pa 442 51 A2d 759 (1947), 
reargument refused 356 Pa 442 52 A 2d 177 (1947); Williston 12 s 1498; Prosser & 
Keeton Torts 736-40; Goldfarb 1956 Western Reserve LR 5 at 19. 
167 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 368. 
168 Swinton v Whitinsville Savings Bank 311 Mass 677 42 NE 2d 808 ( 1942); contra, Obde 
v Schlemeyer 56 Wn 2d 449 353 P 2d 672 (1960); Williams v Benson 3 Mich App 9 141 
NW 2d 650 (1966), reversed 378 Mich 721 (1966); see, also, Weintraub v Krobatsch 64 
NJ 445 317 A 2d 68 (1974) (roaches); Greenberg v Glickman 50 NYS 2d 489 (1944), 
modified 268 App Div 882 51 NYS 2d 96 (2d Dep't 1944), second appeal denied 268 
App Div 987 51 NYS 2d 861 (2d Dep't 1944) (duty to disclose sub-surface water 
conditions); De Meo v Horn 70 Misc 2d 339 334 NYS 2d 22 (1972); Lawson v Citizens 
& Southern National Bank of South Carolina 259 SC 477 193 SE 2d 124 (1972) (filled 
earth); Ollerman v O'Rourke Co Inc 94 Wis 2d 17 288 NW 2d 95 (1980). 
169 Cutterv Hamlen 147 Mass471 18 NE 397 (1888) (child of prior tenant died of diphtheria 
because of defective drains); accord, Cesar v Karutz 60 NY 229 ( 1875) (prior tenant died 
of smallpox). 
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to the seller. 170 Thus the question whether non-disclosure constitutes a misrepresentation becomes 
significant primarily in those cases where warranties have been effectively disclaimed, 171 or 
where the non-disclosure is by a buyer rather than by a seller. 172 Although at common law there 
were no warranties attaching to a sale of real property other than those recited in the deed, there 
is a modern trend recognizing an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new housing. 173 
A fifth exception centres on the nature of the transaction. Contracts of insurance174 are 
transactions in which, by long established precedent, broad duties of disclosure are required. 
A sixth exception focuses upon the relationship of the parties. If there is a fiduciary or 
confidential relation between the parties, there is a duty of disclosure of material facts. 175 Indeed, 
the duty extends somewhat beyond such relationships. Whenever one party to a transaction 
justifiably believes the other is looking out for his interests, a duty of disclosure arises. 176 
A broad duty of disclosure appears to be desirable. 177 The US Court of Claims appears to have 
gone far toward the adoption of such a principle. A government agency is required to disclose 
information in its possession which it knew that bidders did not have and would need in order 
170 Ss 2-312 to 2-318 of the UCC. 
171 S2-316oftheUCC. 
172 It is only rarely that a buyer is held to have a duty to disclose. See generally, Goldfarb, 
1956 Western Reserve LR 5 at 26-31; Keeton 1936 Texas LR 1 at 22-27. If he fails to 
disclose material facts known to him, however, specific performance will be denied him. 
See Calamari & Perillo Contracts 369. 
173 Tassan v United Development Co 88 Ill App 3d 581 43 11 lDec 769 410 NE 2d 902 
(1980); Yepsen vBurgess269 Or 635 525 P 2d 1019 (Or1974); see Williston 12 s 1506A; 
Demko 1983 Illinois BJ 124; Moskowitz 1974 Caifornia LR 1444; Wells 1971 
University of Florida LR 626. 
174 Keeton Text 326-28; Patterson Insurance ch 10. 
175 S 161(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts; Keeton 1936 Texas LR 1 at 11-14; 
Williston 12 s 1499. This rule is closely tied to and overlaps the doctrine of undue 
influence. Calamari & Perillo Contracts 369; Village of Burnsville v Westwood Co 290 
Minn 159 189 NW 2d 392 (1971); Jackson v Seymour 193 Va 735 71 SE 2d 181 
(Va1952) (constructive fraud; could have been based on innocent misrepresentation). 
176 S 472(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts; Goldfarb 1956 Western Reserve LR 
5 at 32-34; but see, the following case where a confidential relationship was required, 
Grow v Indiana Retired Teachers Community 149 Ind App 109 271NE2d 140 (Indiana 
1971). 
177 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 310. 
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to make an intelligent appraisal of the problems and costs that would be involved in the 
performance of the proposed contract. 178 Despite the desirability of a broad rule of disclosure an 
exception must, however, be made for collateral information deliberately acquired at some cost 
in time or money such as by scientific market research or careful investment analysis. The non-
disclosure of such information is no breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 179 
4.8.3 Disclosure principles relating to suretyship 
4.8.3.1 Suretyship: introduction 
In this sub-chapter I shall analyze disclosure principles relating to the contract of suretyship. 180 
Defences based on fraud and misrepresentation are closely allied to the defence of non-
disclosure; therefore some attention will be given to these defences as well. It is not only positive 
false statements made by the creditor to the surety which will give the latter grounds for avoiding 
his contract on the basis of fraud, but any concealment or misrepresentation of material facts, at 
the time the suretyship is executed, which affects the risk of the surety and which the creditor has 
the opportunity and the duty to disclose, will also be a defence to the surety. 181 
In the best of all possible worlds, a surety fully investigates the financial condition and technical 
ability of the principal debtor and takes all steps possible to assure itself prior to issuing the 
suretyship that the principal debtor will be able to comply with all his obligations. We do not live 
in the best of all possible worlds, however, and when a principal is at times unable to perform, 
his surety must step in and arrange for completion or pay the bills. 
178 TF Scholes Inc v United States 357 F 2d 963 at 970 (1966), followed in JA Jones 
Construction Co v United States 390 F 2d 886 (1968). 
179 See Kronman & Posner Economics 116-121; L & N Grove Inc v Chapman 291 So 2d 217 
(Fla Dist Ct Appl974), dismissed 298 So 2d 412 (1974). 
180 The terms "surety" and "guarantee" are often used as being synonymous, consistent with 
their treatment in the cases on this subject and the usage established in the comment to 
s 82 of the Restatement of Security. See, also, 68 AmJur 2d Guaranty par 14; 74 Am Jur 
2d Suretyship par 2. 
181 Griswold v Hazard 141 US 260 35 L Ed 675 (1890); Copper Process Co v Chicago 
Bonding & Insurance Co 262 F 66 (1920); Northwestern Jobbers Credit Bureau v 
National Surety Corp 54 F Supp 716 (1944); Guardian Fire & Life Assurance Co v 
Thompson 68 Cal 208, 9 P 1 (1885); Hier v Harpster 76 Kan 1 90 P 817 (1907); First 
Citizens Bank & Trust Co v Sherman's Estate 294 NYS 131 (1937); Herbert v Lee 118 
Tenn 133 101 SW175 (1906). 
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Suretyship has been defined as follows: 182 
"a contractual relation resulting from an agreement whereby one person, the surety, 
engages to be answerable for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, the principal. 
The surety's obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his own 
act, but is accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. 11 
Although not quite as clear, the Restatement of Security' s183 definition is similar: 
11 Suretyship is the relation which exists where one person has undertaken an obligation 
and another person is also under an obligation or other duty to the obligee, who is 
entitled to but one performance, and as between the two who are bound, one rather than 
the other should perform. 11 
This chapter is devoted to a discussion of those situations in which a surety or the surety's 
principal attempts to rescind its suretyship or relieve himself/herself/itself of his/her/its 
obligations thereunder by asserting fraud, misrepresentation or, particularly, non-disclosure184 on 
the part of the principal debtor of the creditor, and whether and in what circumstances this 
remedy or defence is allowed. 185 
4.8.3.2 The conduct of the principal debtor 
The surety's assertion of a defence to a claim under a suretyship or performance bond on the 
ground that the principal debtor has perpetrated a fraud on the principle debtor's surety is an 
extremely difficult defence to sustain. Fraud by the principal debtor alone is not a defence to a 
claim by a creditor. 186 As a general rule, the principal' s fraud on the surety has no effect on the 
surety's obligation to the creditor unless the creditor has participated in the fraud or concealed 
182 Meek v Gratzfeld233 Neb 306 at 313 389 NW 2d 300 at 305 (1986), citing Nicklaus v 
Phoenix Indemnity Co 166 Neb 438 at 445 NW 2d 258 at 262 (1958). 
183 S 82 of the Restatement of Security. The comment to this section goes on to state that the 
suretyship situation always involves three parties. 
184 74 Am Jur 2d Suretyship par 128. 
185 Ibid, par 127. 
186 Ibid, par 133. 
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material facts from the surety when it was his duty to disclose them. 187 
It should be noted that fraud practiced on the principal by the obligee can be a defence for the 
surety. If the principal's obligation is void, the surety should be relieved of performing bec:ause 
otherwise either the principal would be made to satisfy indirectly an obligation which is voi.d or 
the surety's right of reimbursement is destroyed. 188 Either result is contrary to the principles of 
suretyship. 
4.8.3.3 Fraud, misrepresentation and non-disclosure by creditor 
4.8.3.3.1 The Restatement of Security 
A surety has virtually no defence based on a fraud perpetrated upon the surety by the principal 
debtor, but if the creditor has perpetrated a fraud or assisted in the perpetration of the fraud by 
the principal debtor upon the surety, a defence becomes more viable. 
Most cases which address the defence of fraud by a creditor adopt the Restatement rule. Section 
124 of the Restatement of Security sets forth the basic principle applicable to situations in which 
a creditor defrauds a surety: 189 
"(1) Where before the surety has undertaken his obligation the creditor knows facts 
unknown to the surety that materially increase the risk beyond that which the creditor has 
reason to believe the surety intends to assume, and the creditor has also reason to believe 
that these facts are unknown to the surety and has a reasonable opportunity to 
communicate them to the surety, failure of the creditor to notify the surety of such facts 
is a defense to the surety. 
187 74 Am Jur 2d Suretyship par 133; s 119 of the Restatement of Security. See, also, St 
Charles National Bank v Ford 39 Ill App 3d 291 349 NE 2d 430 (1976); Re Estate of 
Polevski 452 A 2d 469 (1982). 
188 S 118 of the Restatement of Security. 
189 S 124 of the Restatement of Security. See, eg, Sumitumo Bank of California v Iwasaki 
70 Cal 2d 81 73 Cal Rptr 564 447 P 2d 956 (1968); First National Bank and Trust 
Company of Racine v Notte 97 Wis 2d 207 293 NW 2d 530 (1980); Peoples National 
Bank of Washington v Taylor 42 Wash App 518 711 P 2d 1021 (1985); St Charles 
National Bank v Ford39 Ill App 3d 291349NE2d 430 (1976); St Paul Fire &Marine 
Insurance Co v Commodity Credit Corporation 646 F 2d 1064 (5th Circuit 1981); 
Georgia-Pacific Corporation (Williams Furniture Division) v Levitz 149 Ariz 120 716 
P 2d 1057 (1986); Security Bank NA v Mudd 215 Mt 242 696 P 2d 458 (1985); 
Annotation 1986 ALR 678. 
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(2) Where, during the existence of the suretyship relation, the creditor discovers facts 
unknown to the surety which would give the surety the privilege of terminating his 
obligation to the creditor as to liability for subsequent defaults, and the creditor has 
reason to believe these facts are unknown to the surety and has a reasonable opportunity 
to communicate them to the surety without a violation of a confidential duty, the creditor 
has a duty to notify the surety, and breach of this duty is a defense to the surety except in 
respect of his liability for defaults which have occurred before such disclosure should 
have been made. 11 
The comments to the Restatement emphasize that the rule is merely a special application in 
suretyship of the rule that fraud creates a defence. 190 The comments also recognize that difficulty 
is encountered in determining the materiality of the allegedly concealed facts. 191 The creditor is 
not required to investigate for the surety's benefit or take any unusual steps to make sure that the 
surety is acquainted with facts which the creditor assumes are known to both the surety and the 
creditor. 192 
11 [Even though] ... there is often considerable difficulty in ascertaining the precise degree 
of knowledge of surety and creditor and even in determining the materiality of the facts 
alleged to be concealed, the rule itself is simple. It does not place any burden on the 
creditor to investigate for the surety's benefit. 11193 
The surety himself must exercise reasonable diligence in an effort to ascertain the circumstances 
of the transaction and the principal debtor's condition, and, ifthere are suspicious circumstances, 
he should make inquiry about these. 194 
The comments then go on to set forth examples of material facts. 
190 Comment to s 124 of the Restatement of Security, at 328. 
191 7 4 Am Jur 2d Suretyship par 131. 
192 74 Am Jur 2d Suretyship par 129. 
193 Comment to s 124 of the Restatement of Security, at 328. 
194 A few cases have held that where a bond is involved, the creditor has no duty to make 
disclosure to a prospective surety unless the latter makes inquiry of him. See Couch v 
Stout 194 Ark 385 107 SW(2d) 351 (1937); Larmore v Peoples State Bank 206 Ind 66 
188 NE 317 (1934); Re Tabasinski's Estate 228 Iowa 1102 293 NW 578 (1940); Wait v 
Homestead Bldg Assn 76 WVa431 85 SE637 (1915); 74AmJur2<1Suretyship par 130. 
195 
"Among facts that are material are the financial condition of the principal, secret 
agreements between the parties, or the relations of third parties to the principal. If the 
surety requests information, the creditor must disclose it. Where he realizes that the 
surety is acting or is about to act in reliance upon a mistaken belief about the principal 
in respect of a matter material to the surety's risk, he should afford the surety the benefit 
of his information if he has an opportunity to do so." 195 
The comments state that there may be a lesser burden on an obligee to notify a compensated 
surety because compensated sureties are supposed to undertake an investigation prior to taking 
on an obligation. 196 
For the most part, the decisions which adopt the Restatement rule turn upon the information 
which the creditor failed to disclose to the principal. All discuss at some length the creditor's 
duty to a surety. 
From a banking perspective, it should be remembered that a bank may incur liability based on 
various tort theories, such as fraud. 197 If the lender's representation involves a promise to perform 
an act in the future, the borrower must prove that, at the time the bank's representative made the 
promise, the bank had no intention of performing the act. 198 The intent not to perform an act in 
the future as promised may be proven by circumstantial evidence. 199 
Finally, a representation that is literally true is actionable as fraud if it is used to create an 
impression that is substantially false. 200 
195 Comment to s 124 of the Restatement of Security, at 328-329. 
196 Ibid, at 329. 
197 See Bank of El Paso v (TO) Stanley Boot Co 847 SW 2d 218 at 222 (Texl992); State 
National Bank of El Paso v Farah Manufacturing Co 678 SW 2d 661 at 681 (Tex App 
1984). See, also, Banco do Brasil SA v Latian Inc 234 Cal App 3d 973 285 Cal Rptr 870 
at 896 (Cal Ct App 1991), where it was held that, in order to recover for fraud against a 
lender under California Law, the borrower must prove (1) that the lender made a 
representation including a promise made without the intent to perform; (2) knowledge of 
the representation's falsity; (3) an intent to defraud; that is, to induce reliance; (4) 
justifiable reliance on borrower s part; and (5) resulting damage. 
198 Bank of El Paso v (TO) Stanley Boot Co 847 SW 2d 218 at 222 (Tex 1992). 
199 State National Bank of El Paso v Farah Manufacturing Co 678 SW 2d 661 (Tex 1984) 
200 Commonwealth Mortgage Corporation v First Nationwide Bank 873 F 2<l 859 (5th 
Circuit! 989); State National Bank of El Paso v Farah Manufacturing Co 678 SW 2d 
661at681 (Tex Appl984). 
196 
Fraudulent practice typically is asserted in connection with a lender's promises of benefits in 
exchange for security, 201 groundless threats, 202 misrepresentation concerning the effect of loan 
documents,203 failure to disclose information in order to protect its own interests,204 giving 
improper advice to a borrower2°5 and falsely representing that it has done or will do something 
for the borrower. 206 
For example, in State National Bank Bank of El Paso v Farah Manufacturing Co201 allegations 
of fraud focused on the lender's representation that a default would be declared and the borrower 
bankrupted and locked up if William Farah, rather than the lender's preferred candidate, was 
elected CEO of the borrower. The failure of the lenders to explain their intention when they knew 
it was capable of two interpretations, one false (the declaration of default upon William Farah's 
election), was actionable fraudulent conduct: "[W]here a promise regarding future action is made 
with the intent that it will not be performed and is made to deceive a person, then it is actionable 
as a fraudulent representation. 11208 
201 See, eg, Dean W Knight & Sons Inc v First W Bank & Trust Co Cal App 2d 148 Cal Rptr 
767 (Cal Ct App 1978). But see Centerre Bank of Kansas City NA v Distributors Inc 705 
SW 2d 42 (Mo Ct App1985). 
202 See, eg, Loyola Federal Savings & Loan Association v Galanes 365 A 2d 580 (Md Ct 
Spec App 1976); State National Bank of El Paso v Farah Manufacturing Co 678 SW 2d 
661at 681 (Tex App1984). 
203 See, eg, Holm v Sun Bank/BrowardNA 423 So 2d 1007 (Fla Dist Ct App 982); Lee v The 
Heights Bank 446 NE 2d 248 (Ill App Ct 1985). 
204 See, eg, Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc v First National Bank of Little Rock 
Arkansas 774 F 2d 909 (8th Circuit1985); General Motors Acceptance Corporation v 
Central National BankMatoon 773 F 2d 771 (7th Circuit 1985); Central States Stamping 
Co v Terminal Equip Co Inc 727 F 2d 1405 (6th Circuit 1984). 
205 Banco Totta e Acores v Fleet National Bank 768 F Supp 943 (DRI 1991); United 
Companies Financial Corporation v Brown 584 So 2d 470 (Ala 1991); Rainsville Bank 
v Willingham 485 So 2d 319 (Ala 1986); Nie v Galena State Bank & Trust Co 3 87 NW 
2d 3 73 (Iowa Ct App 1986); Shogyo International Corporation v First National Bank of 
Clarksdale 475 So 2d 425 (Miss 1985). 
206 See eg, Richter v Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association 93 9 F 2d 1176 
(5th Circuit! 991 ); General Motors Acceptance Corporation v Covington 586 So 2d 178 
(Ala 991); First Federal Savings & Loan Association v Caudle 425 So 2d 1050 
(Alal 982); Frame v Boatmen's Bank 782 SW 2d 117 (Mo Ct App 1989); Commerce 
Savings Scottsbluff Inc v FH Schafer Elevator Inc 436 NWd 151 (Neb1989). 
207 678 SW 2d 661 at 681 (Tex App 1984). 
208 Ibid, at 682. 
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The Farah209 case involved a form of promissory misrepresentation by the lender. A lender's 
conduct may also give rise to a form of fraud known as constructive fraud. Constructive fraud 
is the breach of some legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares 
fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure public 
interests. 210 Constructive fraud most commonly arises in lender liability where a confidential or 
fiduciary duty has arisen between the lender and borrower or where the lender engages in 
overreaching. Ordinarily, however, such a special relationship does not exist between a borrower 
and a lender, and where one has been found it has rested on extraneous facts and conduct, such 
as excessive lender control over or influence in the borrower's activities. 211 
4.8.3.3.2 Material facts - relating to risk assumed 
The leading case in the USA in which a surety alleged the fraud of the principal debtor, is 
Sumitumo Bank of California v lwasaki.212 The court in this case followed the Restatement213 rule 
cited above. Here, the defendants executed a continuing guarantee agreement guaranteeing all 
future and present indebtedness ofMiku and Yo Nagayama. The plaintiff brought this action to 
recover the amounts which the Nagayamas owed on three loans, one of which was made several 
months after the defendants executed the continuing guaranty. The trial court held that the 
defendant was discharged from liability on the third loan by plaintiff's failure to disclose to the 
defendant surety that the Nagayamas needed the loan to pay their federal taxes. 214 
The appeals court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the plaintiffs failure to inform 
the defendant surety that the Nagayamas required a loan to pay their federal taxes did not 
constitute a breach of the plaintiff's duty to disclose material information so as to discharge the 
defendant surety from liability on the third loan. The court starts off by saying that: 
"In all suretyship relations, the creditor owes to the surety a duty of continuous good faith 
209 Ibid. 
210 Greater Southwest Office Park Ltd v Texas Commerce Bank National Association 786 
SW 2d 386 at 391 (Tex App1990). 
211 Cara Corporation v Continental Bank (Jn re Cara Corporation) 148 BB 760 (Bankr ED 
Pa 1992); Greater Southwest Office Park Ltd v Texas Commerce Bank National 
Association 786 SW 2d 386 at 391 (Tex App Houston 1st Dist 1990) writ denied. 
212 70 Cal 2d 81 73 Cal Rptr 564 447 P 2d 956 (1968). 
213 S 124 of the Restatement of Security. 
214 Ibid, at 958. 
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and fair dealing ... Thus, the creditor must not misrepresent or conceal facts so as to induce 
or permit the surety to enter or continue in the relationship in reliance on a false 
impression as to the nature of the risk. 11215 
But it then goes on to discuss the history of this defence, and its development in the fidelity 
suretyship context and then distinguishes the suretyship relation in the case before it from the 
fidelity suretyship situation. The court stated that in fidelity suretyship situations, American 
courts appear to have adopted the rule which imposes an absolute duty upon the creditor 
voluntarily to disclose all facts materially affecting the surety's risk on a fidelity bond.216 The 
creditor in the Sumitomo Banli211 case, however, did not owe "an absolute duty to the surety to 
disclose, without request by the surety, all facts within its knowledge which may affect the 
surety's risk" .218 
A creditor such as a bank is often in no better position than the surety to acquire information 
about the financial condition of the debtor. Particularly in those cases in which the surety 
assumes the risk at the debtor's request, rather than at the creditor's, the creditor may reasonably 
assume that the surety will acquire from the debtor himself all information which he reasonably 
believes to be relevant to the risk. 219 
The court discusses s 124 of the Restatement of Security and applied this section to the evidence 
in the case and concluded that the surety had no defence against the plaintifl's claim. 
Although the evidence established that the plaintiff knew about the Nagayamas' inability to pay 
their federal taxes without a loan, the evidence could not establish that the plaintiff had reason 
to believe that this fact materially increased the risk beyond that which defendant intended to 
assume. The evidence could not establish this condition because the evidence did not disclose 
the financial condition of the Nagayamas in July 1961, when defendant executed the guaranty. 
As a result no evidence described the risk defendant intended to assume, or indicated whether 
plaintiff had reason to know what risk defendant intended to assume. Thus the evidence could 
not support a finding that the Nagayamas' inability to pay the taxes without a loan materially 
215 Ibid, at 959. 
216 See, eg, Larmore v Peoples State Bank 206 Ind 66 188 NE 317 (1934). 
217 70 Cal 2d 81 73 Cal Rptr 564 447 P 2d 956 (1968). 
218 Ibid, at 960. 
219 Ibid, at 961. 
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increased defendant's risk. A fortiori, it could not support a finding that plaintiff had reason to 
believe this fact materially increased defendant's risk. 220 
The creditor's duty to the surety is certainly not a fiduciary duty. In fact, it appears that the 
creditor has no duty to advise a surety of facts which the creditor assumes the surety knows. 
Failure to disclose pertinent information would not seem to be the strongest basis upon which 
a surety can assert a defence. 221 
First National Bank and Trust Company of Racine v Notte222 is another decision which 
specifically adopted the Restatement rule223 and discusses at some length the creditor's duty to 
the surety. In this case, Notte, the surety, guaranteed a loan made to the principal, after the 
creditor bank had advised Notte that the principal' s credit record was good and that she had 
always paid her loans. Unknown to Notte, part of the proceeds of the loan which Notte 
guaranteed was used to pay off the principal' s indebtedness on a prior loan. The court in this case 
discussed the duty which a creditor owes to a surety. 
11 Although the creditor owes a surety a duty of continuous good faith and fair dealing, 
there is no general obligation imposed upon the creditor to disclose to the surety all 
matters which the creditor knows might affect the surety's risk. There are~ however, 
circumstances under which the creditor may be required to make disclosure and the 
failure to do so will discharge the surety. In such circumstances it is not necessary that 
the concealment or the failure to disclose facts material to the surety be willfully done by 
the creditor, or that the creditor have the intent to deceive. The motive behind the 
concealment or misrepresentation is immaterial ... Although the surety is considered 'a 
favorite of the law,' the relationship between the creditor and the surety does not in itself 
give rise to strict :fiduciary obligations. 11224 
The court differentiates the defence based on whether the creditor simply failed to disclose facts 
from that where the creditor actively concealed information and notes that if a surety specifically 
requests information from the creditor, the creditor should respond by answering fully and 
220 Ibid, at 966. 
221 Ibid, at 966. 
222 97 Wis.2d 207 293 NW 2d 530 (1980). 
223 S 124 of the Restatement of Security. 
224 Ibid, at 534. 
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truthfully. The creditor's failure to disclose to the promissor everything within his knowledge 
that is material to the matter, will be equivalent to an affirmative misrepresentation and will give 
the surety the right to avoid his agreement. 225 
In Peoples National Bank of Washington v Taylor26 the surety's defence was based on the fact 
that the creditor bank had failed to disclose to him and his agent facts which were material to his 
decision to undertake the guaranty. The surety in this case guaranteed $17,000 of a $58,888 loan 
which the creditor made to the purchaser of the surety's boat. Prior to making the loan, the 
creditor bank obtained a credit report on the purchaser. The purchaser's rating was the highest 
obtainable, although two creditors indicated that for the previous five months, the purchaser was 
30 to 60 days behind schedule. The down payment for the purchase of the boat was to come from 
the proceeds of the sale of the purchaser's house. Because the sale of the house was taking longer 
than anticipated, the creditor loaned the purchaser the down payment. This loan for the down 
payment was ultimately paid off when the house was sold. 
When the surety and creditor met to discuss the possibility of a suretyship, the creditor told the 
surety that the purchaser's down payment was to come from the proceeds of the sale of his home, 
that the percentage of the purchaser's income to be used for loan payments exceeded the 
creditor's normal credit standards, and that the creditor did not feel secure about the purchaser 
as a credit risk because the purchaser had only been living and working in the area a short while. 
The surety also badly needed to sell his boat and, if it had to be sold quickly to some other 
purchaser, it would sell for about $50,000 as opposed to the current $75,888 sale price.227 The 
purchaser eventually defaulted on the loan which the creditor had made to him; the creditor 
attempted to collect on the surety's suretyship and thus litigation ensued. The surety claimed that 
the creditor had failed to disclose the details of the transactions surrounding this guaranty, namely 
225 See, also, Cookv Heinbaugh 202 Iowa 1002 210 NW 129 (1926); Peoples State Bankv 
Hill 210 Ky 222 275 SW 694 (1925); Harrison v Lumbermen Insurance Co 8 Mo App 
3 7 ( 1879); Putney v Schmidt 16 NM 400 120 P 720 ( 1911 ); Damon v Empire State Surety 
Co 161 App Div 875 (1914); Lauer Brewing Co v Riley 195 Pa 449 46 A 71 (1900); 
Goodwin v Abilene State Bank 294 SW 883 (Tex Civ App 1927); Brillion Lumber Co v 
Barnard 131 Wis 284 111 NW 483 (1907). 
Where, however, the surety's inquiry is made of an official who has no authority or duty 
to give the information requested, and who answers falsely, the surety will not be relieved 
ofliability. See American Surety Co of New York v Pauly NO 170 US 133 42 L Ed 977 
(1897); Independent School District of Sioux City v Hubbard 110 Iowa 58 81 NW 241 
(1899); United States Fid & GuarCo v Commonwealth 31KyLRep1179 104SW1029 
(1907); Commonwealth vRamsey 314 Pa 508 171A575 (1934). 
226 42 Wash App 518 711P2d 1021 (1985). 
227 Ibid, at 1023. 
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the loan for the down payment. 
Both parties in this case cited s 124(1) of the Restatement of Security in support of their 
respective positions. The court quoted the comment to s 124 of the Restatement of Security 
concerning the creditor's duty to the surety, that is, that the creditor does not have to take any 
unusual steps to assure himself that the surety is acquainted with facts which he may assume are 
known to both surety and creditor but that if the surety requests information, the creditor must 
disclose it. 228 Here, the court said that the evidence did not establish that the creditor had reason 
to believe that loaning the principal the down payment materially increased the risk which the 
surety intended to assume. The court stated that neither the surety nor his attorney inquired as to 
the source of the down payment or the principal' s financial stability. The court emphasized that 
sureties, in particular compensated sureties, have a responsibility to inquire about the risk they 
are to undertake. There was no evidence that the creditor misrepresented or concealed facts so 
as to induce or permit the surety "to guarantee the loan in reliance on a false impression as to the 
nature of the risk". 229 
In St Charles National Bank v F ord230 the defendant surety claimed that when he guaranteed five 
loans which the creditor bank had made to the principal debtor, he was not aware or advised by 
the Bank that the principal debtor had other outstanding loans. The court found that this argument 
was without merit. 
"There is nothing in the mere nature of the contract ofsuretyship itself which requires the 
obligee to disclose to the proposed surety all the material facts affecting the risk. There 
must be a duty on the part of the obligee to make the disclosure; in the absence of such 
a duty in the circumstances of the particular case, the surety will not be released merely 
because he did not have the information which the obligee posssessed .... 
If the creditor knows that the surety is acting on a belief that there are no unusual 
circumstances by which his risk is materially increased, whereas, to the knowledge of the 
creditor, there are such circumstances, and he has opportunity to make them known, good 
faith and fair dealing demand that there should be a full disclosure if the surety is to be 
held liable. But while the obligee must act in entire good faith, the surety has no right 
ordinarily to rely for information upon the obligee' s duty to make disclosure of all the 
228 Ibid, at 1026 . 
229 Ibid, at 1028. 
230 39 Ill App 3d 291 349 NE 2d 430 (1976). 
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facts affecting the risk, but must himself make inquiry. Particularly in cases, as here, in 
which the surety assumes the risk at the debtor's request, rather than at the creditor's, the 
creditor may reasonably assume that the surety will acquire from the debtor himself all 
information which he reasonably believes to be relevant to the risk. "231 
Most of the decisions in which this defence is discussed contain similar terminology.232 Not all 
cases, however, have rejected this defence by the surety. In St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co 
v Commodiry Credit Corporation233 the creditor failed to advise the compensated sureties on a 
bond assuring performance by the principal debtor under a cooperative loan agreement, that the 
creditor had released collateral or that the principal was experiencing serious financial problems. 
The lower court had found that the sureties relied on the creditor to provide them with 
information concerning the principal' s financial condition and the sureties, in fact, had no 
knowledge of the problems. The fifth Circuit stated that although the creditor has no duty to 
disclose information to the surety which the' surety has not requested, the creditor cannot 
withhold information which the surety has requested. 234 It then went on to say that: 
"In some respects, however, the suretyship bond is fragile, easily broken 'by the conduct 
of the creditor, The validity of the contract may be vitiated ab initio by the creditor's 
actions during its creation. A creditor who, during negotiations, actively and fraudulently 
conceals pertinent facts cannot then turn to the surety for reimbursement. "235 
The court found that the sureties had no knowledge of the principal debtor's condition and that 
the creditor should have known that the sureties would not have issued their bonds had they 
known of the problems. The sureties, therefore, had a complete defence to liability.236 
Two fairly recent decisions which touch peripherally on this defence and which involve 
231 Ibid, at 434. 
232 See, also,Meekv Gratzfeld233 Neb 306 389NW 2d 300 (1986);Maine National Bank 
v Fontaine 456 A 2d 1273 (1983 Me). 
233 646 F 2d 1064 (5th Circuit 1981). 
234 Ibid, at 1072-1073. 
23 5 Ibid, at 1073 . 
23 6 Ibid, at 107 4. For other discussions relieving the surety from liability, see Securiry Bank 
NA v Mudd 215 Mt 242 696 P 2d 458 (1985); Georgia-Pacific Corporation (Williams 
Furniture Division) v Levitz 149 Ariz 120 7Hi P 2d 1057 (1986). 
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performance bond sureties should be noted. Even though Ransom v United States231 does not 
involve the defence of fraud by a creditor, it does discuss the creditor's duty to a surety in a 
contract bond situation. In this case, Ransom contracted to serve as surety on a bid bond and 
payment and performance bond submitted to the government by A Marvin Company Diversified, 
Inc, who was the lowest bidder on a contract to rehabilitate housing units located at Edwards Air 
Force Base in California. Marvin's bid was approximately $1,7 million lower than the 
government's estimate of the cost. The government, therefore, asked Marvin to confirm the bid 
price, which Marvin did in writing. The contract officer made a written request that Marvin 
confirm the bid or notify the government of a mistake. Marvin then reported an error of $496,234 
but two weeks later advised the government that the error was actually only $386,440 and 
requested that the bid be increased by that amount. The Judge Advocate concluded that there was 
a bona fide error but that there was no clear and convincing evidence as to the intended amount 
of the bid. He gave Marvin the opportunity to withdraw its bid but not to reform it. Marvin 
indicated that it would perform the contract for the originally submitted bid price and was 
awarded the contract on September 25, 1980. Ransom, apparently, was unaware of the mistake 
in the bid. Marvin received progress payments through June 8, 1981 On July 24, 1981, Ransom 
was notified that the government was concerned about default by Marvin. The government 
terminated Marvin's contract for default on October 26, 1981. Ransom took over the project and 
ultimately submitted a claim for money damages for its costs in completing the contract. Ransom 
asserted that the surety relationship between him and the government, "inherently included 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing" which the government allegedly breached when it failed 
to notify Ransom of Marvin's option to withdraw its bid.238 
The court held that Ransom had no claim against the government. 
"Ransom asserts that an express contract existed among the government, Marvin and 
Ransom, because of the written contract the government and Marvin executed creating 
implied obligations to Ransom that the government deal fairly and in good faith with 
Ransom... We conclude that on these facts no express contract was intended by the 
parties to this suit and none existed ... 11239 
Arguably, therefore, even though a suretyship agreement involves a three-party relationship, the 
creditor has very few obligations to the surety. 
237 900 F 2d 242 (Fed Circuit 1990). 
238 Ibid, at 243. 
239 Ibid, at 244. 
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InBrinderson-Newberg Joint Venture v Pacific Erectors Inc240 one of the many claims and cross-
claims among the various parties in a dispute between a general contractor and one of its 
subcontractors was the defence asserted by the subcontractor's surety that the general contractor 
had made false representations concerning the subcontractor's scope of work which induced the 
surety to bind himself The court ruled in favour of the general contractor, holding that the 
evidence upon which the surety relied to support this defence was inadmissible under the parol 
evidence rule. 241 
Both the Ransom242 and the Brinderson-Newberg243 decisions highlight the difficulties a surety 
has in successfully asserting the defence offraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure on the part 
of the creditor. In terms of the Ransom case which does seem to be an aberration, a creditor does 
not even have a duty to deal fairly and in good faith with the surety. Presumably, this defence 
would not be asserted often because the creditor usually does not provide information to the 
surety concerning the principal. Of course, this defence could be asserted in a situation where a 
creditor is aware that a principal debtor has had problems in completing other contracts with the 
creditor. In this situation, the creditor probably would have the obligation to disclose to the surety 
its problems with the principal if the surety had never written bonds for this principal and if the 
surety had inquired of the creditor as to the principal debtor's performance record as far as other 
contracts were concerned which the creditor had entered into with the principal. The creditor, 
however, would not necessarily have the obligation to advise the surety voluntarily of the 
problems. The presumption is that the surety (which in all likelihood would be a compensated 
surety) should have learned of his principal's performance record during his investigations.244 
4.8.3.3.3 Knowledge of creditor 
Where the surety makes no inquiry and the creditor makes no voluntary disclosure of facts which 
would materially increase the risk, the surety cannot escape liability unless the creditor knew that 
the surety was acting in the belief that there were no unusual circumstances and the creditor had 
240 971F2d272 (9th Cir 1992). 
241 Ibid, at 282. 
242 900 F 2d 242 (Fed Circuit) 1990). 
243 971 F 2d 272 (9th Circuit 1992). 
244 See Gallagher (ed) Suretyship 5-16. 
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an opportunity to disclose the true facts. 245 
The surety will not be discharged ifthe undisclosed facts were not known to the creditor. Fraud 
will not be imputed to the creditor because of his negligence or inattention to his own affairs 
resulting in a lack of knowledge of facts which may materially affect the suretyship risk. 246 
Of interest to the suretyship relationship where banks are involved, is the general approach of 
American Courts in terms of which they hold that the creditor is not required voluntarily to 
communicate to the prospective surety matters concerning the financial responsibility of the 
principal, unless the surety makes specific inquiries regarding the point. 247 
Where, however, a banker has a duty to disclose but fails to do so in order to protect his own 
interests, he may incur liability in tort. 248 
245 Griswoldv Hazard 141US260 35 L Ed 675 (1890);Magee vManhattanLife Insurance 
Co 92 US 93 23 L Ed 699 (1876); San Francisco v Staude 92 Cal 560 28 P 778 (1892); 
Benton County Savings Bank v Boddicker 105 Iowa 548 75 NW 632 (1898); Gano v 
Farmers Bank 103 Ky 508 45 SW 519 (1898); Lachman v Block 47 La Ann 505 17 So 
153 (1895); Bryant v Crosby 36 Me 562 (1853); Powers Dry-Goods Co v Harlin 68 Minn 
193 71NW16 (1897); Bridges v Miller Rubber Co 150 Md 1 132 A 271 (1926); State 
Savings and Trust Co v Grady 20 0 App 385 153 NE 238 (1923); Johnson v Ivey 4 
Coldw (Tenn) 608 (1867); Goodwin v Abilene State Bank 294 SW 883 (Tex Civ App 
1927); Jungk v Holbrook 15 Utah 198 49 P 305 (1897); Connecticut General Life 
Insurance Co v Chase 72 Vt 176 47 A 825 (1900);Associatedindemnity Corporation v 
Del Guzzo 195 Wash 487 81P2d 516 (1938). 
246 Anaheim Co v Parker 101Cal483 35 P 1048 (1894); Hudson vMiles 185 Mass 582 71 
NE 63 (1904); Bowne v Mt Holly Bank 45 NJ Law 360 (1883); Wayne v Bank 52 Pa 343 
(1866); Brillion Lumber Co v Barnard 131 Wis 284 111 NW 483 (1907); but see Graves 
v Lebanon National Bank 10 Bush (Ky) 23 (1873). 
247 Magee v Manhattan Life Insurance Co 92 US 93 23 L Ed 699 (1876); Hardeman v 
Harris 7 How (US) 726 12 L Ed 889 (1849); Ham v Greve 34 Ind 18 (1870); Bank of 
Monroe v Gifford 72 Iowa 750 32 NW 669 (1887); Sebald v Citizens Deposit Bank 31 
Ky L Rep 1244, 105 SW 130 (1907); First National Bank v Johnson 133 Mich 700 95 
NW 975 (1903); Molin v New Amsterdam Casualty Co 118 Wash 208 203 P 8 (1922). 
Therefore the creditor need not state that the surety is replacing another surety, or that the 
principal's property is about to be sold. See North British Insurance Co v Lloyd 10 Tex 
523 (1854); Smith v First National Bank 107 Ky 257 53 SW 648 (1899). But ifthe surety 
requests information of the creditor regarding the solvency or credit of the principal, the 
creditor must disclose all the facts affecting the risk, within his knowledge. See Benton 
County Savings Bank v Boddicker 105 Iowa 548 75 NW 632 (1898). 
248 See Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc v First National Bank Of Little Rock 
Arkansas 774 F 2d 909 (8th Circuit 1985); General Motors Acceptance Corporation v 
Central National Bank Mattoon 773 F 2d 771 (7th Circuit 1985); Central States 
Stamping Co v Terminal Equipment Co Inc 727 F 2d 1405 (6th Circuit 1984). 
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4.8.3.4 The creditor's duty of disclosure to the surety after inception of suretyship 
Because a suretyship relationship is often continuous, I consider it relevant to investigate, briefly, 
what the effect is on the duty of disclosure, of events occurring after the signing of the suretyship. 
It is interesting to look at the situation in the USA in this regard as the USA has a specific statute 
dealing with this problem. In this sub-chapter I shall analyze the State and federal cases in which 
the courts have expressly discussed a creditor's duty of disclosure to a surety after the inception 
of the suretyship, in accordance with the terms of s 124 of the Restatement of Security. 249 Section 
124(1) of the Restatement of Security speaks in terms of facts unknown to the surety that 
materially increase the risk beyond that which the creditor has reason to believe the surety 
intended to assume whiles 124 (2) speaks in terms of facts unknown to the surety that would 
entitle the surety to terminate his or her obligation as to subsequent defaults. I do not include 
cases involving fidelity bonds or other bonds not specifically issued to guarantee credit, the sub-
chapter being restricted to the continuing obligations of a creditor to one who agrees to be 
responsible for the repayment of the debts of another. 
As a general rule there is no duty of disclosure owed by a creditor to a surety, in the absence of 
unusual circumstances. 250 However, if the creditor knows that the surety is unaware of facts 
materially increasing the risk contemplated by the surety, then the creditor's duty of good faith 
and fair dealing requires full disclosure of such facts within his knowledge if the surety is to be 
held liable. 251 The cases in this sub-chapter involve the creditor's duty of disclosure after the 
inception of the suretyship according to the terms of s 124 of the Restatement of Security. 
Although, by its terms, s 124(1) of the Restatement of Security applies before the suretyship has 
been undertaken, it was intended to be used also after the inception of the suretyship in cases 
where the surety has agreed to guarantee successive extensions of credit, 252 and courts have 
applied it in this way, based on the theory that a continuing guaranty of credit is actually a 
continuing offer accepted by the creditor after each new extension of credit, resulting in a series 
of suretyship contracts. 253 In other cases involving continuing guaranties of credit, courts have 
249 Cases following the terminology of s 124 of the Restatement of Security are included, 
even if they do not expressly refer to that provision. 
250 See cases cited above; 74 Am Jur 2d Suretyship par 128. 
251 Ibid, at 129. 
252 Comment c to s 124(1) of the Restatement of Security. 
253 See, eg, Sumitumo Bank of California v Iwasaki 70 Cal 2d 81 73 Cal Rptr 564 447 P 2d 
956 (1968). 
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followed the language of s 124 (1) on the reasoning that the surety's consent to a renewal of the 
note, 254 or to a release of collateral, 255 is invalid if the creditor has breached its duty of disclosure. 
Section 124 (2) is expressly applicable during the existence of the suretyship, and imposes a 
continuous duty on the creditor to inform the surety of facts that would give the surety the 
privilege of terminating any obligation to the creditor as to subsequent defaults by the debtor, if 
the creditor had reason to believe that these facts were unknown to the surety and had reasonable 
opportunity to communicate them to the surety without violating a confidential duty. However, 
this subsection was not intended to apply to successive extensions of credit on a continuing 
guaranty, but only to suretyships containing express reservations of the surety's power to 
terminate the contract on the happening of certain events, as is generally true in fidelity bonds, 
or as may be implied from other types of surety contract. 256 Although guaranties of credit do not 
generally contain such terms, sureties have nevertheless attempted, without success, to use s 
124(2) of the Restatement of Security as a basis for a defence to liability on credit guaranties. 257 
Most courts that have considered the applicability of the terms of s 124 of the Restatement of 
Security to situations arising after the suretyship has been initiated, have recognized the 
creditor's duty of disclosure. In some circumstances, including the creditor's awareness of the 
surety's mistake, the surety's justifiable expectation regarding the use of collateral to satisfy the 
debtor's obligation, 258 and the surety's reliance on the creditor's promise to help the debtor 
obtain other financial assistance, 259 the courts have found that the duty was breached, or that a 
sufficient foundation was laid to require consideration of the issue. 260 
254 Maine National Bank v Fontaine 456 A 2d 1273 (1983 Me). 
255 McHenry State Bank v Y & A Trucking Inc 454 NE 2d 345 (1983 Ill App 2d Dist). 
256 Comment e to s 124 of the Restatement of Security. 
257 Warren v Washington Trust Bank 19 Wash App 348 575 P 2d 1077 (Wash 1978); State 
of New York v Peerless Insurance Co 67 NY 2d 845 501 NYS 2d 651 492 NE 2d 779 
(NY 1986). 
258 Security Bank NA v Mudd 215 Mt 242 696 P 2d (1985). 
259 Maine National Bank v Fontaine 456 A 2d 1273 (1983 Me). 
260 See, also, Georgia-Pacific Corporation (Williams Furniture Division) v Levitz 149 Ariz 
120 716 P 2d 1057 (1986); McHenry State Bank v Y & A Trucking Inc 454 NE 2d 345 
(1983 Ill App 2d Dist); Morris v Columbia National Bank of Chicago 79 Banker 777; 
Maine National Bankv Fontaine 456 A 2d 1273 (1983 Me); Security BankNA vMudd 
215 Mt 242 696 P 2d 458 (1985). 
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In other circumstances, 261 including inadequate showing of the risks contemplated by the surety 
at the outset, 262 and non-disclosure of immaterial facts, 263 the court held that the duty was not 
shown to have been breached. In State of New York v Peerless Insurance Co264 the court refused 
to recognizes 124 of the Restatement of Security as authority for imposing any duty of disclosure 
on the part of the creditor; however, the surety in that case, unlike those in the other cases 
referred to in this sub-chapter, was a surety company that was compensated for its bond, 265. and 
thus did not enjoy the favored status that the courts have often attributed to gratuitous sureties. 266 
Briefly, although a creditor's duty of disclosure subsequent to the formation of a suretyship 
contract has been recognized by most courts, the question whether the duty has been breached 
depends on the particular circumstances of each case. It is clear that the duty does not include a 
responsibility by the creditor to conduct an investigation for the surety's benefit, 267 but when the 
creditor is chargeable with knowledge of facts increasing the surety's contemplated risk, 
awareness of the surety's ignorance of those facts, and an opportunity to notify the surety, then 
the elements of a defence for the surety based on the creditor's non-disclosure are present. 
261 Bank of Santa Ana v Molina 1 Cal App 3d 607 81 Cal Rptr 885 (1969 4th Dist); 
American Security Bankv Clarno 151 Cal App 3d 874 199CalRptr127 (4th Dist 1984); 
Kawasaki Motors Corp USA v Navratil Ct App 3d Dist No 5-84-26 (1985 Ohio); Warren 
v Washington Trust Bank 19 Wash App 348 575 P 2d 1077 (Washl978). 
262 Sumitumo Bank of California v Iwasaki 70 Cal 2d 81 73 Cal Rptr 564 447 P 2d 956 
(1968). 
263 PeoplesNationalBankofWashington v Taylor42 Wash App 518 711P2d 1021 (1985). 
264 67 NY 2d 845 501 NYS 2d 651492NE2d 779 (NY 1986). 
265 State of New York v Peerless Insurance Co 67 NY 2d 845 501NYS2d 651492NE2d 
779 (NY 1986). 
266 See 74 Am Jur 2d Suretyship par 256. 
267 Comment b to s 124 of the Restatement of Security; Kawasaki Motor Corp USA v 
Navratil Ct App 3d Dist No 5-84-26 (1985 Ohio). 
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4.8.3.5 Disclosure: conclusion 
US courts have the advantage of legislation and the covenant of good faith to ameliorate the 
harshness of the law in regard to non-disclosure cases. However, the courts have tended to apply 
these legal tools conservatively. 
In summary, although the defence of misrepresentation or concealment by the bank can be a 
viable defence, it is one which is difficult to sustain. The surety has the burden of investigating 
its principal's condition prior to undertaking an obligation. The bank has the duty to notify the 
surety ofinformation which the bank thinks the surety should know, but does not know. In order 
to assert this defence successfully, the surety would probably have to demonstrate that it had 
sought information from the bank on a vital point regarding its decision whether to sign a 
suretyship and that it had signed in reliance upon the response received from the bank. If the 
surety did not make a specific inquiry concerning some factor, that factor would not be 
considered vital to the underwriting process. 
4.8.4 Good faith: the conjuror' s tool268 
4.8.4.1 Recognition 
Despite its widespread recognition in the USA, 269 the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
268 Grant Gilmore once stated that: "Good faith and the like are words to conjure with, 
whenever we feel like conjuring." See Gilmore 1981 Georgia LR 605 at 629. 
269 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is recognized by s 205 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts: 
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in 
its performance and its enforcement." 
It is codified bys 1-203 of the the Uniform Commercial Code: 
"Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its 
performance or enforcement." 
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions apply it as a matter of common law. See, eg, 
Keffer v Keffer 852 P 2d 394 at 398 (Alaska 1993); Carma Developers (California) Inc 
v Marathon Development California Inc 826 P 2d 710 726 (Cal 1992); Ervin v Amoco 
Oil Co 885 P 2d 246 at 250(Colo Ct App 1994); Habetzv Condon 618 A2d 501at505 
(Conn 1992); Southern Business Machines Inc v Norwest Financial Leasing Inc 390 SE 
2d 402 at 405 (Ga Ct App 1990); Abbott v Amoco Oil Co 619 NE 2d 789 795 (III App 
Ct 1993); Kansas Baptist Convention v Mesa Operating Ltd Partnership 864 P 2d 204 
at 210-11 (Kan 1993); Blank v Chelmsford OBIGYN-649 NE 2d 1102 at 1105 (Mass 
l99S);Ferrellv Vic Tanny International Inc 357 NW2d 669 at-672 (Mich Ct App 1984); 
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dealing is shrouded in mystery. Efforts to devise workable standards or relevant criteria for 
determining when the covenant has been violated have been unavailing. The doctrine has been 
criticised for being applied in an ad hoc fashion, yielding inconsistent results and depriving 
parties of the ability to predict what conduct will violate the covenant. 270 It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to analyze the concept in detail, but reference will be made here to some of the 
methods in which good faith has been conceptualised in the USA 
4.8.4.2 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been described as the residual gap-filling 
default rule of contract law. 271 It imposes limits upon one contracting party's ability to impact 
on the contract's value to the other contracting party. It determines when a party may no longer 
pursue his own self-interest, but must instead engage in cooperative behavior by deferring to the 
Weldon v Montana Bank 885 P 2d 511 at 515 (Mont 1994); Perry v Jordan 900 P 2d 335 
at 338 (Nev 1995); Planning & Design Solutions v City of Santa Fe 885 P 2d 885 P 2d 
628 at 635 (NM 1994); Dalton v Educational Testing Serv 614 NYS 2d 742 743 (App 
Div 1994);Bicycle Transit Authority Inc v Bel/333 SE 2d 299 at 305 (NC 1985);Pacific 
First Bank v New Morgan.Park Corporation 876 P 2d 761 at 762 (Or 1994); Parker v 
Byrd 420 SE 2d 850 at 853 (SC 1992); St Benedict's Development Co v St Benedict's 
Hospital 811 P 2d 194 at 199 (Utah 1991); Carmichael v Adirondack Bottled Gas 
Corporation 635 A2d 1211at1216(Vt1993);Millerv UnitedStatesBank865 P 2d 536 
at 542 (Wash Ct App 1994). 
Only Texas has expressly refused to recognize the covenant's relevance to arms' length 
contracts and limited its application to cases in which a special relationship between the 
parties is found, such as in insurance contracts. See, eg, Natividad v Alexsis Inc 875 SW 
2d 695 at 697 (Tex 1994). 
270 See Diamond & Foss 1996 Hastings LI 585 at 586. 
271 See Chrysler Credit Corporation v Marino 63 F 3d 574 at 579 (7th Circuit 1995) where 
it was held that good faith applies only as a method by which gaps are filled and that 
good faith is not applied to block the use of terms that actually appear in the contract; 
Oregon RSA No 6 Inc v Castle Rock Cellular of Oregon Ltd Partnership 840 F Supp 770 
at 778-79 (D Or 1993) where it was held that when the contract is silent as to the 
permissibility of conduct, the covenant of good faith may be used to fill the gap; Foley 
v Interactive Data Corporation 765 P 2d 373 at 389 (Cal 1988) where it was held that 
the duty of good faith is 11 a kind of safety valve that judges may tum to fill gaps 11 in the 
contract; Jacobs v Great Pacific Century Corporation 499 A 2d 1023 at 1024 (NJ Super 
Ct App Div 1985) where it was held that 11 an implied covenant can fill a gap in an 
agreement where the terms of the covenant can be inferred from the subject matter" of 
the contract; Bourgeous v Horizon Healthcare Corp 872 P 2d 852 at 856 (NM 1994) 
where the court declined to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to 
override express provisions addressed by the terms of an integrated written contract; 
Hauer v Union State Bank 532 NW 2d 456 at 464 (Wis Ct App 1995) where the court 
held that 11 as a method to fill gaps, it has little to do with the formation of contract". See, 
also, Lillard 1992 Mo LR 123 3 at 123 7 recognizing that the covenant 'Ofgood faith serves 
a gap-filling function. 
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other party's contractual interests.272 
Because it is a gap-filling default rule, the covenant applies only when the propriety of the 
conduct is not resolved by the terms of the contract273 or by another default rule. 274 That situation 
ordinarily arises when the contract is silent or ambiguous about the permissibility of the 
conduct, 275 or when the conduct is undertaken pursuant to a grant of discretion and the scope of 
272 It has been recognized that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is designed to 
foster cooperation between the parties to a contract, The requirement of good faith 
performance sets parameters for conduct and limits maximization of self-interest by one 
party when the contract is silent on the subject. As a general concept and explicit 
requirement, good faith performance is a tool used by the courts to police bargains in 
order to ensure cooperation by one party so that the other may obtain the expected 
benefits of the contract. See Jenkins 1991 Oklahoma LR 661 at 674. 
273 The covenant cannot be used to override or contradict the express terms of the contract. 
See General Aviation Inc v Cessna Aircraft Co 915 F 2d 103 8 at 1041 (6th Circuit 1990); 
Kham & Nate's Shoes No 2 Inc v First Bank of Whiting 908 F 2d 1351 at 1357 (7th 
Circuit 1990); Hubbard Chevrolet Co v General Motors Corporation 873 at 877 F 2d 
873 (5th Circuit) cert denied 493 US 978 (1989); Grand Light & Supply Co v Honeywell 
Inc 771 F 2d 672 at 679 (2d Circuit 1985); AI Transport v Imperial Premium Finance Inc 
862 F Supp 345 at 348 (D Utah 1994); VanArnem Co v Manufacturers Hanover Leasing 
Corporation 776 F Supp 1220 at 1223 (ED Mich 1991 ); Carma Developers (California) 
Inc v Marathon Development California Inc 826 P 2d 710 at 727 (Cal 1992); Wells 
Fargo Realty Advisors Funding Inc v Uioli Inc 872 P 2d 1359 at 1363 (Colo Ct App 
1994); Neiditzv Housing Authority 654 A2d 812 at 819 (Conn Super Ct 1994); affirmed 
651 A2d 1295 at 1296 (Conn 1995); Indian Harbor Citrus Inc v Poppell 658 So 2d 605 
at 606 (Fla Dist Ct App 1995); Peterson v First Clayton Bank & Trust Co 447 SE 2d 63 
at 66 (Ga Ct App 1994); Resolution Trust Corporation v Holtzman 618 NE 2d 418 at 424 
(III App Ct 1993); Waller vMarylandNational Bank 620 A2d 381at388 (Md Ct Spec 
App 1993); Murphy v American Home Products Corporation 448 NE 2d 86 at 91 ( 
1983). 
274 Even when the conduct at issue is not covered by the terms of the contract, a default rule 
other than the covenant of good faith may be used as a gap filler to determine the 
permissibility of that conduct. If so, the covenant of good faith would be inapplicable. 
For example, a dispute about whether the delivery of goods was timely would be resolved 
by the UCC default rule, which provides that delivery must be within "a reasonable time". 
See s 2-309(1) of the UCC. Similarly, if the quality of goods were in dispute, and the 
contract did not specify quality requirements, the issue would be resolved by the UCC 
default rules regarding implied warranties. Sees 2-314(2)(c) of the UCC requiring that 
goods be fit for their "ordinary purpose" to satisfy the implied warranty of 
merchantability; See s 2-315 requiring that goods be fit for the buyer's "particular 
purpose" to satisfy the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. 
275 See, eg, Continental Bank NA v Everett 964 F 2d 701 at 705 (7th Circuit); Hubbard 
Chevrolet Co v General Motors Corporation 873 F 2d 873 at 876-77 (5th Circuit); 
Beacham v Macmillan Inc 837 F Supp 970 at 975 (SD Ind 1993); Zeno Buick-GMC Inc 
v GMC Truck & Coach 844 F Supp 1340 at 1349 (ED Ark 1992); LIMD Inc v Marine 
Midland Realty Credit Corporation 789 F Supp 657 at 660 (ED Pa 1992); Rodie vMax 
Factor & Co 256 Cal Rptr 1 5 (Ct App 1989); Dave Greytak Enters v Mazda Motors Inc 
622 A 2d 14 at 22-23 (Del Ch 1992); Indian Harber Citrus Inc v Poppell 658 So 2d 605 
at 606 (Fla Dist Ct App 1995); Bowen v Heth 816 P 2d 1009 at 1011 (Idaho Ct App 
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that discretion has not been designated. 276 When, however, terms of the contract, whether express 
or derived from extrinsic sources such as usage of trade277 and admissible parol evidence, 278 
1991); Castle vMcKnight 866 P 2d 323 at 326 (NM 1992). 
276 See, eg, Chrysler Credit Corp v Marino 63 F 3d 574 at 579 (7th Circuit 1995) where it 
was held that application of the covenant of good faith is limited to instances in which 
a party is given discretion in enforcing certain provisions of the contract; Occusafe Inc 
v EG & G Rocky Flats Inc 54 F 3d 618 at 624 (10th Circuitl995) where it was held that 
a court's inquiry focuses on whether the defendant's conduct violated the contracting 
parties' justified expectations; Travelers International v Trans World Airlines Inc 41 F 
3d 1570 at 1575 (2d Circuit 1994) where it was held that "even when a contract confers 
decision-making power on a single party, the resulting discretion is nevertheless subject 
to an obligation that it be exercised in good faith"; Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum 
CommissionvNationalFootballLeague79I F2d 1356at1361 (9th Circuit 1986)where 
it was held that when one party retains a right of approval over the other party to a 
contract, "such powers must be exercised within the parameters of the duty of good 
faith"; Southwest Savings & Loan Association v Sunamp Systems Inc 838 P 2d 1314 at 
1319 (Ariz Ct App 1992) where it was held that "a contract thus would be breached by 
a failure to perform in good faith if a party uses its discretion for a reason outside the 
contemplated range" of the parties; Carma Developers (California) Inc v Marathon 
Development California Inc 826 P 2d 710 at 726-27 (Cal 1992) where it was held that 
the covenant requires the party holding discretionary power to exercise it "for any 
purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation -
to capture opportunities that were preserved upon formation of the contract"; Neiditz v 
Housing Authority of the City of Hartford 654 A 2d 812 at 819 (Conn Super Ct 1994) 
Affirmed 651A2d1295 (Conn 1995) where it was held that the covenant of good faith 
presupposes that the terms of the contract are agreed upon and what is in dispute is the 
party's discretionary application; Chemical Bank v Paul 614 NE 2d 436 at 442 (III App 
Ct 1993) where it was held that parties with unfettered discretion cannot be allowed to 
exercise that discretion in bad faith; Julian v Christopher 575 A 2d 735 739 (Md 1990) 
where it was held that if a lease does not spell out any standard for exercising discretion 
then the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should imply a reasonableness 
standard; Anthony's Pier Four Inc v HBCAssocs 583 NE 2d 806 at 820-21(Mass1991) 
where it was held that the use of a discretionary right under the contract as a pretext to 
"sweeten the deal" is a breach of the covenant of fair dealing and good faith; Weldon v 
Montana Bank 885 P 2d 511 at 515 (Mont 1994) where it was held that "when the 
discretion conferred by the contract has been misused to deprive the other party of the 
benefit of the bargain" then there is a breach of the covenant of good faith; Centronics 
Corporation v Genicom Corporation 562 A 2d 187 at 193 (NH 1989) where it was held 
that the exercise of discretion by one contracting party must be limited in so far as it is 
in accord with the parties' purpose in contracting; Uptown Heights Associates Ltd 
Partnership v SeafirstCorporation 891P2d 639 at 644 (Or 1995) where it was held that 
parties normally contemplate that discretion will be exercised for particular purposes; if 
the discretion is exercised outside these purposes then the party exercising the discretion 
has performed in bad faith; Olympus Hills Shopping Center Ltd v Smith's Food & Drug 
Centers Inc 889 P 2d 445 at 450 (Utah Ct App 1995); see, also, Burton 1980 Harvard LR 
369 at 379-84, stressing the importance of the covenant of good faith when a party 
engages in conduct allegedly pursuant to a grant of discretion; but, see National Bank v 
Linch 3 6 F 3 d 3 70 at 3 73 (4th Circuit 1994) where it was held that when the contract 
expressly gives one party "sole discretion" the implied duty of good faith cannot be used 
to renegotiate the terms of the contract. 
277 Trade usage may resolve the permissibility of conduct either by explaining an ambiguous 
contractual reference to such conduct or by adding a supplemental term. Sees 222(3) of 
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determine the permissibility of the conduct, no gap filler is needed279 and the covenant does not 
apply. 
4.8.4.3 Current approaches 
Although there is agreement that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies when the 
permissibility of conduct otherwise is unclear, 280 authorities differ about the methodology for 
determining whether conduct violates the covenant. Several approaches have been proposed by 
commentators and adopted by the courts.281 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts; s 2-202(a) of the UCC; see, also, Precision Steel 
Warehouse Inc v Anderson-Martin Machine Co 854 SW 2d 321 at 325 (Ark 1993), a case 
of trade usage explaining an ambiguous term; Varni Brothers v Wine World Inc 41 Cal 
Rptr 2d 740 at 745-46 (Ct App 1995), a case of trade usage adding a term permitting 
termination only for good cause; Hayter Trucking Inc v Shell W E&P Inc 22 Cal Rptr 2d 
229 at 241 (Ct App 1993) (explaining an ambiguous term); C-Thru Container 
Corporation v Midland Manufacturing Co 533 NW 2d 542 at 544-45 (Iowa 1995), a case 
of trade usage adding a term that seller must supply buyer with product sample to prove 
seller's capacity to produce the product. A usage of trade is defined as "a usage having 
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation 
that it will be observed with respect to a particular agreement". See s 222( 1) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
In addition to usage of trade, a prior course of dealing between the parties may be used 
to explain or supplement the parties' agreement. Sees 223 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts; s 2-202(a) of the UCC. It is also provided under s 202(a) of the UCC that 
the course of performance between the parties in the transaction at issue may be used to 
explain or supplement the parties' agreement. 
278 One source for determining the permissibility of conduct is an agreement regarding that 
conduct made by the parties prior to their contract. Such a prior agreement would only 
be admissible if it was consistent with the parol evidence rule. Under the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts version of the parol evidence rule, the admissibility of such an 
agreement depends on whether the parties' contract was "integrated". Sees 213(1)-(2) 
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The UCC parol evidence rule does not use the 
term"integrated" but resolves the admissibility of prior agreements depending on whether 
the parties intended their written contract as "final" or "complete and exclusive". See s 
2-202 of the UCC. 
279 This limitation on the application of the covenant is consistent with the general contract 
principle that in interpreting a contract, "an implication... should not be made when the 
contrary is indicated in clear and express words". Corbin Contracts 298. 
280 See, eg, Cessna Aviation Inc v Cessna Aircraft Co 915 F 2d 103 8 at 1041 (6th Circuit 
1990); Hubbard Chevrolet Co v General Motors Corporation 873 F 2d 873 at 877 (5th 
Circuit). 
281 See Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 121 et seq. It would appear as if all 
these approaches fail to provide workable guidelines for resolving good faith cases, and 
ad hoc decision making results. See Diamond & Foss 1996HastingsLf585 at 590. 
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4.8.4.3.1 The excluder approach 
One approach, introduced by Summers282 and adopted by many courts, 283 attempts to identify 
conduct that is excluded284 from the realm of good faith. This approach assumes that it is 
impossible to formulate standards285 or even relevant criteria286 for determining when conduct 
is to be excluded. Instead, the approach offers descriptive categories and anecdotal examples of 
conduct that can be excluded. These bad-faith categories include evasion of the spirit of the 
bargain, 287 lack of diligence and slacking off,288 willfully rendering only substantial 
performance, 289 abuse of a power to determine compliance, 290 and interference with or failure to 
cooperate in the other party's performance.291 However, there is no standard for determining 
when conduct falls into any of these categories. For instance, describing bad-faith conduct as an 
evasion of the spirit of the bargain, even with an anecdotal example, 292 offers little guidance on 
282 Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195. 
283 See, eg, Occusafe Inc v EG & G Rocky Flats Inc 54 F 3 d 618 at 624 (10th Circuit 1995); 
Banko/China v Chan 937 F 2d 780 at 789 (2d Circuit 1991);Kedra v Nazareth Hospital 
868 F Supp 733 at 737 (ED Pa 1994); Coca-Cola Bottling Co v Coca-Cola Co 769 F 
Supp 599 at 652 (D Del 1991 ); Kleiner v First National Bank 581 F Supp 955 at 960 (ND 
Ga 1984); Larson v Larson 636 NE 2d 1365 at 1368 (Mass App Ct 1994); Bourgeous v 
Horizon Healthcare Corp 872 P 2d 852 at 856 (NM1994); Somers v Somers 613 A 2d 
1211 at 1213 (Pa Super Ct 1992); Garrett v Bankwest Inc 459 NW 2d 833 at 845 
(SD 1990); Carmichael v Adirondack Bottled Gas Corporation 63 5 A2d 1211 at 1216-17 
(Vt 1993). 
284 Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 196, contends that good faith "is best understood as 
an 'excluder' - it is a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its own, but 
which serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith". 
285 Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 215 stating that 11 [i]f an obligation of good faith is to 
do its job, it must be open-ended rather than sealed off in a definition". 
286 Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 206 arguing that 11 criteria must vary from context to 
context". 
287 Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 234-35. 
288 Ibid, at 235-37. 
289 Ibid, at 237-38. 
290 Ibid, at 240-41. 
291 Ibid, at 241-43. 
292 Professor Summers offers this example of evasion of the spirit of the bargain; Suppose 
a seller develops and builds a market for product X and then sells his rights to 
manufacture and market it; the buyer of these rights is to pay royalties according to a rate 
based on the sales he makes. Later, the buyer develops product Y, which competes with 
X. Can the buyer keep X under his control until the market for Y has been built up and 
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how to determine the spirit of the bargain or how to evaluate when it is being evaded.293 
This approach compels the courts to resolve cases on an intuitive and ad hoc basis, without 
guidelines,294 except in those rare cases in which patterns of conduct have become generally 
recognized as violating the covenant. 295 Such an ad hoc approach has been criticised as deficient 
because it promotes capricious and unpredictable decision making296 while increasing transaction 
then safely forget X? The answer is "no" for the buyer would be evading the spirit of the 
deal and therefore would be acting in bad faith. Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 235. 
293 See Diamond & Foss 1996 Hastings LI 585 at 590-591. 
294 Summers acknowledges the ad hoc nature of his excluder approach. He states: 
"If an obligation of good faith is to do its job, it must be open-ended rather than 
sealed off in a definition. Courts should be left free, under the aegis of a statutory 
green light, to deal with any and all significant forms of contractual bad faith, 
familiar and unfamiliar." 
See Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 215; see, also, Cook 1986 Iowa LR 893 at 899-
900, criticizing Professor Summer's excluder approach on the ground that it requires ad 
hoc decisions without guidelines. 
295 Two types of conduct are most widely recognized as violating the covenant. The first 
occurs when defendant intentionally prevents a plaintiff from performing its contractual 
duties or satisfying contractual conditions. See Monotype Corporation v International 
Typeface Corporation 43 F 3d 443 at 451 (9th Circuit 1994); Crossland v Canteen 
Corporation 711 F 2d 714 at 728 (5th Circuit 1983); Sharma v Skaarup Ship 
Management Corporation 916 F 2d 820 (2d Circuit 1990); Bonanza International Inc v 
Restaurant Management Consultants 625 F Supp 1431 at 1445 (ED La 1986); Knudsen 
v Northwest Airlines Inc 450 NW 2d 131 at 133 (Minn 1990). This conduct would fall 
within Professor Summers' s broad category of interference with or failing to cooperate 
in the other party's performance. See Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 241-43. The 
second type of conduct occurs when a defendant's duty to perform is dependent on his 
personal satisfaction and he misrepresents his dissatisfaction. See Greenwood v Koven 
880 F Supp 186 at 199-200 (SDNY 1995); Mike Naughton Ford Inc v Ford Motor Co 
862 F Supp 264 at 269 (D Colo 1994 ); International Minerals & Mining Corporation v 
Citicorp NA Inc 736 F Supp 587 at 595 (D NJ 1990); Jones v Hollinqsworth 560 P 2d 
348 at 351-52 (Wash 1977). This conduct would fall within Summers s broad category 
of abuse of a power in order to determine compliance. See Summers 1968 Virginia LR 
195 at 235. 
296 "The need for predictable results is magnified by the litigiousness of society. We 
are a litigious people, but our litigiousness need not produce a mass of vague 
rules capriciously applied to produce unpredictable results. Our litigiousness 
argues instead for clear rules consistently applied to produce predictable results. 
This would discourage frivolous litigation, encourage prompt settlement of well 
founded litigation, and facilitate the just resolutions of those few lawsuits that did 
not settle." 
Per Robinson & Huber 1994 JC & UL 157 at 303; see, also, Calfee & Craswell 1984 
Virginia LR 965 at 968 stating that when parties cannot determine the legal consequences 
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costs. 297 Without a definitive rule, courts can impose unexpected burdens on either party. A 
plaintiff cannot determine when a defendant may permissibly undermine its contractual interests. 
The defendant cannot determine when he will be prohibited from promoting his own contractual 
interests. Without the ability to make those determinations, the parties cannot assess contractual 
risks298 and may find themselves with unexpected contractual obligations to which they would 
not have agreed.299 
It is said that an ad hoc system also increases the likelihood of breach and fosters litigation. 300 
It increases the likelihood of breach because, without guidance about the limits of acceptable 
conduct, a defendant will not know how to avoid a breach.301 It fosters litigation because the 
of possible courses of action because of vague or unpredictable rules, they will tend to 
overcomply or undercomply; See, also, Lillard 1992 Mo LR 1233 at 1236 recognizing 
criticism that the covenant is vague and subject to uneven results; Morant 1995 Tulane 
LR 715 at 727-28 stating that vague standards lead to inconsistent results, uncertainty, 
and insecurity among bargainers in the marketplace. 
297 Rules that are uncertain in result increase transaction costs because parties must expend 
time and resources to bargain around them. 
"The imposition of a default term whose effect is uncertain will not reduce 
transaction costs. On the contrary, it will increase them; parties will attempt to 
exclude by contract the added uncertainty of unpredictable judicial intervention." 
PerKull 1991HastingsLI1at47; see, also, Frankel 1993 BU LR 389 at 395 stating that: 
"the policies of both contract and property law include creating certainty and 
predictability to reduce the parties' planning and transaction costs." 
298 See Kronman & Posner Economics 4 stating that a contract can be viewed as an agreed-
upon allocation of risks; See, also, Kelly 1992 Wisconsin LR 17 54 at 1772 stating that: 
"[c]ontract law revolves around agreements among parties allocating the risks of 
a business transaction." 
299 See Kull 1991 Hastings LI 1 at 4 7. Even courts that justify the vagueness of the covenant 
as an unavoidable necessity concede that: 
" if contracting parties cannot profitably use their contractual powers without fear 
that a jury will second guess them under a vague standard of good faith, the law 
will impair the predictability that an orderly commerce requires." 
In Olympus Hills Shopping Centre Ltd v Smith's Food & Drug Shopping Centers Inc 889 
P 2d 445 at 450 (Utah Ct App 1994) quoting Southwest Savings & Loan Association v 
Sunamp Systems Inc 83 8 P 2d 1314 at 1319 (Ariz Ct App 1992). 
300 Diamond & Foss 1996 Hastings LI 585 at 592. 
301 Kelley 1994 S Illinois University LI 3 57 at 365 states: 
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parties cannot determine the legal consequences of conduct and may be forced to seek judicial 
resolution of resulting disputes. 302 
4.8.4.3.2 The foregone-opportunity approach 
Another approach, introduced by Professor Burton, 303 contends that the covenant is violated when 
a party attempts to recapture a foregone opportunity.304 A foregone opportunity is one that 
defendant bargained away as the price for entering into the contract. 305 Whether that opportunity 
has been foregone depends on the reasonable expectations of the parties.306 Only if the parties 
reasonably expected that defendant would not attempt to reap the benefits sought by his conduct, 
will an opportunity be deemed foregone. 307 
"Legal rules that are fixed, definite, and certain will be more effective than rules 
that are vague, indefinite and uncertain because people can better predict the legal 
consequences of fixed definite, and certain rules and thus can better conform their 
conduct to the rule" 
citing Oliver W Holmes Jr Common Law 88-90. 
302 See Kull 1991HastingLJ1 note 29, at 47 stating that "the uncertainty of outcome under 
any such [unpredictable] legal rule will encourage litigation"; see, also, Robinson & 
Huber 1994 JC & UL 157 note 28 at 303 stating that vague rules promote litigation; 
Snyderman 1988 University of Chicago LR 1335 stating that: 
" [an] unrequited cost of court interference is the wasteful litigation produced 
when courts demonstrate their willingness to rewrite contracts and create vague 
and inconsistent rules". 
See, also, Weis Jr 1992 Notre Dame LR 1385 at 1396 stating that "[t]he ability oflawers 
to advise their clients with some degree of certainty is critical in avoiding disputes". 
303 Burton 1980 Harvard LR 369 at 387-92. 
304 Ibid, at 387. 
305 Ibid, at 387. 
306 Ibid, at 390-91. 
307 For cases adopting this approach, see Hubbard Chevrolet Co v General Motors 
Corporation 873 F 2d 873 at 876 (5th Circuit) cert denied 493 US 978 (1989); Richard 
Short Oil Co v Texaco Inc 789 F 2d 415 at 422 (8th Circuit 1986); James v Whirlpool 
Corporation 806 F Supp 835 at 843 (ED Mo 1992); Three D Dep'ts Inc v K Mart 
Corporation 670 F Supp 1404 at 1408 (ND III 1987); Carma Developers (California) Inc 
v Marathon Development California Inc 826 P 2d 710 at 727 (Cal 1992); Warner v 
Konover 553 A 2d 1138 at 1141 (Conn 1989); Anthony's Pier Four Inc v HBC Assocs 
583 NE 2d 806 at 820-21 (Mass 1991 ); Centronics Corporation v Genicom Corporation 
562 A 2d 187 194 (N H 1989); cf United States National Bank v Boge 814 P 2d 1082 at 
1091 (Or 1991). 
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The difficulty with this approach is that the determination whether particular conduct represents 
such a foregone opportunity is frequently beyond the court's ability to ascertain, for the very 
reason that the conduct is not referred to in the contract. 308 When the contract does not indicate 
the permissibility of conduct, there is no agreed-upon source for determining whether the parties 
reasonably expected that the conduct would constitute a foregone opportunity. 309 Without 
guidelines, courts are forced to apply this approach on an intuitive basis with all the pitfalls of 
an ad hoc system. 310 
4.8.4.3.3 The reasonable-expectations approach 
Many courts have adopted half of Professor Burton's approach311 by focusing on the question 
whether the conduct was beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties, while ignoring the 
308 Farnsworth et al Contracts 546-47. 
309 Diamond & Foss 1996 Hastings LJ 585 at 594. 
310 Burton acknowledges the deficiencies of a pure reasonable expectations test to determine 
when conduct violates the covenant because those unfocused expectations: 
ti direct attention to the amorphous totality of the factual circumstances at the time 
of formation [of the contract], and fail to distinguish relevant from irrelevant facts 
within that realm. ti 
Burton 1980 Harvard LR 369 at 371-72. 
By directing attention to the specific issue of whether opportunities were foregone, 
Burton believed analysis would be advanced (at 391). The problem, however, is that 
even knowing the relevant circumstances existing at the formation of the contract does 
not lead to a resolution of whether particular conduct is consistent with the parties' 
reasonable expectations. 
It has been propounded that a party frequently contracts with the expectation that the 
other will be permitted to exploit his own self-interest to the extent that the contract does 
not expressly preclude such opportunistic behavior. See Gillette 1990 J of Legal Studies 
535 at 540 and 560. Frequently he expects that the other will forego his self-interest and 
engage in cooperative behavior. Whether a particular party expected one over the other 
and to what extent he expected it frequently cannot be fathomed from the circumstances 
surrounding the formation of the contract. 
"The transactional signals parties send are too ambiguous to permit uniform 
interpretation. " 
See Gillette, ibid, at 581 who feels that, despite its theoretical appeal, Burton's test 
ultimately demands resolution by intuition or individualized value judgments. 
311 Burton 1980 Harvard LR 3-69 et seq. 
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issue of foregone opportunities.312 Without a standard for determining when one party's 
expectations are reasonable, this approach suffers from the same deficiencies as the foregone-
opportunity approach. 313 
4.8.4.3.4 The justice approach 
It has been proposed that the question whether the covenant has been violated should be 
determined by judicial concepts of justice rather than by the parties' expectations.314 This 
approach, however, also suffers from the same vagueness as the previously discussed approaches. 
It does not state the criteria for determining what constitutes justice, 315 leaving courts with no 
articulated standards and little besides their intuition to resolve good-faith cases. 
4.8.4.3.5 The purpose approach 
Some courts find conduct in violation of the covenant if it is inconsistent with the parties' 
purpose for entering into the contract. 316 This approach uses the same analysis as that applied to 
312 Tidmore Oil Co v BP Oil Co 932 F 2d 1384 at 1391 (11th Circuit 1991); Big Horn Coal 
Co v Commonwealth Edison Co 852 F 2d 1259 at 1267 (10th Circuit 1988); ZenoBuick-
GMC Inc v GMC Truck & Coach 844 F Supp 1340 at 1349 (ED Ark 1992); Seal v 
Riverside Federal Savings Bank 825 F Supp 686 at 689 (ED Pa 1993 ); Flight Concepts 
Ltd Partnership v Boeing Co 153 5 at 1 S SO (D Kan 1993 ); James v Whirlpool Corp 806 
F Supp 835 at 843 (ED Mo 1992); Eis v Meyer 566 A 2d 422 at 426 (Conn 1989); Schaal 
v Flathead Valley Community College 901P2d 541 at 544 (Mont 1995). 
313 Farnsworth et al Contracts 546-54 7n40; Diamond & Foss 1996 Hastings LJ 585 at 594. 
314 Koehrer v Superior Court 226 Cal Rptr 820 at 828 (Ct App 1986) where it was held that 
"the obligations stemming from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are 
imposed by law as normative values of society"; Lowe v Feldman 168 NYS 674 at 680 
(Sup Ct 1957) where it was held that a court will "where justice and expediency demand, 
infuse the contract with the spirit of good faith and fair dealing". But see Don King 
Productions v Douglas 742 F Supp 741 at 767 (SDNY 1990) where the court 
distinguished between legal duties and ethical duties in the context of the covenant of 
good faith and indicated that only legal duties are enforceable. 
315 See Koehrer v Superior Court 226 Cal Rptr 820 at 828 (Ct App 1986); Lowe v Feldman 
168 NY S 2d 674 at 680 (Sup Ct 1957). It is unclear whether "justice" should be 
determined from the societal perspective of notions of fairness and morality, from the 
parties' perspective based on their reasons for entering into the contract, or from the trade 
perspective of business ethics. 
316 See, eg, Market StAssocs Ltd Partnership v Fey 941F2d 588 at 596 (7th Circuit 1991); 
Ford v Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corporation 831 F 2d 1520 at 1523 (9th 
Circuit 1987); Burger King Corp v Weaver 798 F Supp 684 at 688 (SD Fla 1992); Ellis 
v Chevron USA Inc 246 Cal Rptr 863 at 866 (Ct App 1988); Bonanza Inc v Mc Lean 747 
P 2d 792 at 800-01 (Kan 1987); Continental Potash Inc v Freeport-McMoran Inc 858 P 
2d 66 at 80 (NM 1993); Bicycle Transit Authority Inc v Bell 333 S 2d 299 at 305 (NC 
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determine whether conduct violates an ambiguous statute. Courts will construe a statute as 
prohibiting particular conduct if that prohibition is consistent with the legislature's purpose in 
enacting the statute.317 Unfortunately, this legislative approach is unworkable in a contractual 
context. Parties have distinct and potentially conflicting purposes for entering into a contractual 
relationship. 318 As a consequence, one party may engage in conduct that furthers his own 
contractual purpose, but undermines the other's. Frequently, in commercial contracts, each 
party's purpose is to maximize his profits, but those purposes are potentially conflicting. A 
fictional, non-existent, unitary contractual purpose cannot determine whether conduct violates 
the covenant. From the perspective of contractual purpose, a violation of the covenant should 
depend on whether defendant's promotion of his contractual purpose unduly intrudes upon 
plaintiffs contractual purpose. The purpose approach does not define when that point is 
reached. 319 
1985). 
317 Concrete Pipe & Prods Inc v Construction Laborers Pension Trust 113 S Ct 2264 at 
2281-82 (1993) reasoning that "we tum, as we would in the usual case of textual 
ambiguity, to the legislative purpose as revealed by the history of the statute, for such 
light as it may shed"; Rose v Lundy 455 US 509 51 (1982) where it was held that "where 
the statute's language seem[ s] insufficiently precise, the 'natural way' to draw the line 'is 
in light of the statutory purpose"' (quoting United States v Bacto-Unidisck 394 US 784 
at 799 (1960). 
318 Baird 1990 J of Legal Studies 583 at 583-84. 
319 See Market St Assocs Ltd Partnership v Frey 94 l F 2d 588 at 596 (7th Circuit 1991 ); 
MIA-Com Security Corporation v Galesi 904 F 2d 134 at 136 (2nd Circuit1990). Some 
courts have combined the reasonable expectations approach and the purpose approach 
by stating that conduct violates the covenant of good faith when it violates an agreed 
common purpose or is inconsistent with the parties' reasonable expectations. See 
OccusafelncvEG & G Rocky Flats Inc 54F 3d 618 at 624 (10th Circuit l995);Maljack 
Productions Inc v Motion Picture Association of America Inc 52 F 3d 373 at 375 (DC 
Circuit 1995); Cross & Cross Properties Ltd v Everett Allied Co 886 F 2d 497 at 502 (2d 
Circuit 1989); Sheck v Burger King Corporation 798 F Supp 692 694 (SD Fla 1992); 
Blue Jeans Equities West v City & County of San Francisco 4 Cal Rptr 2d 114 at 119 (Ct 
App 1992); Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding Inc v Uioli Inc 872 P 2d 13 59 (Colo 
Ct App 1994); Perry v Jordan 900 P 2d 335 at 338 (Nev 1995); First National Bank & 
Trust Co of Vinita v Kissee 859 P 2d 502 at 509 (Okla 1993); Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center Ltd v Smith's Food & Drug Centers Inc 889 P 2d 445 at 451 (Utah Ct App 1995); 
Capital Impact Corporation v Munro 642 A 2d 1175 at 1177 (Vt 1994). This compound 
approach does not appear to offer any greater clarity than either approa-ch offers 
separately. See Diamond & Foss 1996 Hastings LJ 585 at 596. 
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4.8.4.3.6 The Restatement320 approach 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has described the covenant of good faith in terms that 
combine elements of each of the foregoing approaches: 
"Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an 
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other 
party: it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' 
because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. "321 
The above language from the Restatement, to which numerous courts have referred, 322 
specifically adopts the purpose, reasonable-expectations, and excluder323 approaches. This 
approach has been criticised, as it is unlikely that the mere linking of several ad hoc approaches 
would overcome their individual deficiencies. 324 
320 Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 
123-125 for a brief discussion of this approach. 
321 S 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
322 See, eg, Hubbard Chevrolet Co v Genera/Motors Corporation 873 at 876 F 2d 873 (5th 
Circuit) cert denied 493 US 978 (1989); Savers Federal & Loan Association v Home 
Federal Savings & Loan Association 721 F Supp 940 at 945 (WD Tenn 1989); Careau 
& Co v Security Pac Business Credit Inc 212 Cal Rptr 387 at 398 (Ct App 1990); Warner 
v Konover 5 53 A 2d 113 8 at 1141 (Conn 1989); Morriss v Coleman Co 73 8 P 2d 841 at 
849 (Kan 1987); Cenac v Murry 609 So 2d 1257 at 1272 (Miss 1992); Centronics 
Corporation v Genicom Corporation 562 A 2d 187 at 191 (NH 1989); United States 
National Bank v Boge 814 P 2d 1082 at 1091 (Or 1991); Carmichael v Adirondack 
Bottled Gas Corporation 63 5 A 2d 1211 at 1216-17 (Vt 1993 ); Wilder v Cody County 
Chamber of Commerce 868 P 2d 211at220 (Wyo 1994). 
323 The comments to s 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts use examples of bad 
faith conduct drawn, nearly verbatim, from Professor Summers' s 1968 article introducing 
the excluder approach. Cf comments ( d) to ( e) to s 205 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts with Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 note 15 at 216-17. Comment (d) 
provides, in agreement with Summers' thesis, that " [a] complete catalogue of types of bad 
faith is impossible". See Summers, ibid, note 15 at 206. 
324 Diamond & Foss 1996 Hastings LJS85 at 597. 
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4.8.4.3. 7 The fruits-of-the-contract approach 
A common aphorism asserts that conduct which would destroy or injure the other party's right 
to receive the fiuits325 or benefits326 of the contract violates the covenant. This standard has been 
criticized as being over-broad to the extent that it suggests that defendant can do nothing that 
would lessen plaintiff" s anticipated contract benefits. For example, in a requirements contract a 
buyer's reduced requirements would not constitute a violation of the covenant merely because 
they reduced the seller's anticipated profits.327 Nor would a court necessarily hold that the 
restaurant franchisor who opened a new restaurant violated the covenant merely because his new 
restaurant reduced the profits of the franchisee. This aphorism ignores the fact that occasions will 
arise when defendant is entitled to injure plaintiff" s contractual interests in order to promote his 
own. 328 Defendant's conduct must unduly injure plaintiffs contractual interests in order to violate 
the covenant. However, courts have been unwilling or unable to set criteria for determining 
325 For cases that phrase the aphorism in terms of a party's right to receive the "fruits of the 
contract", see Chambers Development Co Inc v Passaic County Utilities Authority 62 F 
3d 582 at 587 (3rd Circuit 1995) quoting Bak-A-Lum of America v Alcoa Building 
Products Inc 351A2d349 at 352 (NJ 1976);Public Serv Co v BurlingtonNRR 53 F 3d 
1090 at 1097 (10th Cir l995);MIA-Com Security Corporation v Galesi 904 F2d 134 
at 136 (2d Circuit 1990); Local 3-7 International Woodworkers v Daw Forest Prods Co 
833 F 2d 789 at 795 (9th Cir 1987); Oregon RSA No 6 Inc v Castle Rock Cellular of 
Oregon Ltd Partnership 840 F Supp 770 at 776 (D Or 1993); Shannon v Keystone 
Information Systems Inc 827 F Supp 341 at 344-45 (ED Pa 1993); Ripplemeyer v 
National Grape Coop Association 807 F Supp 1439 at 1451 (WD Ark 1992) quoting 
Gallagher v Lambert 549 NE 2d 136 141(NY1989); Bank of New York v Sasson 786 
F Supp 349 at 353 SDNY 1992) quoting Kirke La Shelle Co v Paul Armstrong Co 263 
NY 79 at 87 188 NE 163 (1933); Kendallv Ernest Pestana Inc 709 P 2d 837 at 844 (Cal 
1985); Blank v Chelmsford OBIGYN 649 NE 2d 1102 at 11 OS (Mass 1995) quoting 
Anthony's Pier Four Inc v HBC Assocs 583 NE 2d 806 820 (Mass 1991). 
326 For cases that phrase the aphorism in terms of a party's right to receive the "benefits of 
the contract", see Pan Am Corporation v Delta Air Lines Inc 175 BR 438 at 508 
(SDNY1994); Waller v Truck Insurance Exchange Inc 900 P 2d 619 at 639 (Cal 1995); 
Cimino v Firs Tier Bank NA 530 NW 2d 606 at 616 (Neb 1995); High Plains Genetics 
Research Inc v J K Mill-Iron Ranch 535 NW 2d 839 at 843 (SD 1995). 
327 The Official Comments to the UCC provision governing requirements contracts state: 
"Reasonable elasticity in the requirements is expressly envisaged by this section 
and good faith variations from prior requirements are permitted even when the 
variation may be such as to result in discontinuance. A shutdown by a 
requirements buyer for lack of orders might be permissible when a shutdown 
merely to curtail losses would not. The essential test is whether the party is acting 
in good faith." 
See comment 2 (1994) to s 2-306 of the UCC). 
328 Diamond & Foss 1996 Hastings LJ585 at 598. 
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undue injury. 329 
4.8.4.3.8 The UCC approach 
According to the Uniform Commercial Code, good faith always requires honesty in fact in the 
conduct or transaction concerned.330 The UCC neither defines the meaning of the term "honesty 
in fact, 11 nor describes prohibited conduct, 331 nor indicates whether the term should be given a 
broad332 or narrow333 meaning. Judicial interpretations state that the phrase requires defendant to 
demonstrate a "white heart" even if this conduct reflects an "empty head".334 The "white heart, 
329 See, eg, Pan Am Corporation v Delta Airlines Inc 175 BR 438 at 508 (SDNY 1994); 
Waller v Truck Insurance Exchange Inc 900 P 2d 619 at 639 (Cal 1995). 
330 The UCC imposes a duty of good faith on all parties. Sees 1-203 of the UCC. Good faith 
is defined to mean "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned". Sees 1-
201(19) of the UCC. The honesty-in-fact requirement of s 1-201(19) of the UCC) is a 
baseline requirement for good faith throughout the Code. According to the Official 
Comment (1994) to s 1-201(19) of the UCC: "Good faith, whenever it is used in the 
Code, means at least what is here stated. 11 • Although special definitions of good faith can 
be found in the Code, those definitions all include the element of "honesty in fact. 11 See, 
eg, s 2-103(1)(b) ands 3-103(a)(4) of the UCC. 
331 The Official Comment to s 1-201(19) of the UCC offers no elaboration on the meaning 
of "honesty in fact" or the kinds of conduct that would be prohibited by defining good 
faith in this way. See comment (1994) to s 1-201(19) of the UCC. The Official 
Comments to the special definitions of good faith are also silent on the meaning to be 
ascribed to "honesty in fact". See, eg, comment 4 (1994) to s 2-103 of the UCC; comment 
4 to s 3-103 of the UCC). 
332 "In its broader meaning, 'dishonesty' is defined as a breach of trust, a 'lack of ... probity 
or integrity in principle', 'lack of fairness' or 'a disposition to betray"'. Quoted from 
United States v Brackeen 969 F 2d 827 at 829 (9th Circuit 1992) citing Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 650 (unabridged edition of 1986). 
333 "In its narrower meaning, however, 'dishonesty' is defined as deceitful behavior, a 
'disposition to defraud [or] deceive,' ... or a'[ d]isposition to lie, cheat, or defraud'. 11 Quoted 
from United States v Brackeen 969 F 2d 827 at 829 (9th Circuit 1992) citing Black's Law 
Dictionary 421 (5th edition of 1979). 
334 "Some term it the 'white heart, empty head' test. It is not sufficient that there be 
circumstances or suspicions such as would put a careful purchaser on inquiry. 
We have traditionally held that subjective good faith is simply 'the honest belief 
that [your] conduct is rightful'. 11 
See Schluter v United Farmers Elevator 479 NW 2d 82 at 85 (Minn Ct App 1992) 
quoting Wohlrabe v Pownell 3 07 NW 2d 4 78 at 483 (Minn 1981 ); cf Utility Contractors 
Financial Services Inc v Amsouth Bank NA (In re Joe Morgan Inc) 985 F 2d 1554 at 
1506-61 (11th Circuit 1993) where it was recognized that Alabama applies both 
subjective and objective analyses of good faith under the UCC; Shearson Lehman 
Brothers v Wasatch Bank 788 F Supp 1184 at 1194 (D Utah 1992); Bill v Catfish Shaks 
of America Inc 727 F Supp 1035 at 1040-41 (ED La 1989); Kline v Central Motors 
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empty head" terminology is amorphous, providing no meaningful guideline for identifying 
dishonest conduct. 
In limited circumstances, the UCC requires, in addition to honesty, "observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade".335 The UCC does not define the term 
"reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade". 336 If it means that each trade 
defines fair dealing, this aspect of the UCC is of minimal significance because in most trades 
there are no generally accepted and well-defined standards of fair dealing.337 If the term means 
that standards outside the trade are applicable, 338 it gives no guidelines about which standards to 
apply. Courts frequently cite the UCC language regarding reasonable standards of fair dealing 
without explaining the meaning of that language, and then announce a conclusion about whether 
the conduct at issue is prohibited. 339 Some courts cite this term and then make a selection from 
Dodge Inc 614 A 2d 1313 at 1316 (Md Ct Spec App 1992). 
335 In Article 2 (Sales): 
'"good faith' in the case of a merchant is honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." 
Sees 2-103(1 )(b) of the UCC (1994). This definition of good faith is also used in Article 
2A (Leases). Sees 2A-103(3) of the UCC (1994). In Article 3 (Negotiable Instruments), 
good faith is defined to mean "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing". See s 3-103(a)(4) of the UCC (1994). This 
definition is also used in Article 4 (Bank Collections). Sees 4-104(c) of the UCC (1994). 
336 The UCC fails to define what would constitute observance of reasonable commercial 
standards, other than to distinguish it from due care. 
Although fair dealing is a broad term that must be defined in context, it is clear that it is 
concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than the care with which an act is 
performed. Failure to exercise ordinary care in conducting a transaction is an entirely 
different concept to failure to deal fairly in conducting the transaction. See comment 4 
(1994) to s 3-103 ofthe UCC. 
3 3 7 There are few decisions in which courts have made an effort to ascertain a given trade's 
standards of fair dealing. See, however, Morgold Inc v Keeler 891 F Supp 1361 at 1368 
(ND Cal 1995) where it was held that a dealer in art must take reasonable steps to inquire 
into the title to a painting. 
338 A standard of fair dealing derived from outside the trade would be likely under the 
definitions of good faith provided in ss 3-103(a)(4) and 4 - 104(c) of the UCC because 
those definitions do not refer to standards of fair dealing "in the trade". 
3 3 9 See, eg, Rayle Tech Inc v De Kalb Swine Breeders Inc 897 F Supp 14 72 at 14 77 (SD Ga 
1995); SonfastCorporation v York International Corporation 875 F Supp 1099 at 1105-
06 (MD Pa 1995); Brookside Farms v Mama Rizzo's Inc 873 F Supp 1029 at 1.034-35 
(SD Tex l995);PotomacPlaza Terraces Inc v QSCProductsinc 868 F Supp 346 at 351-
52 (D DC 1994); Kansas Municipal Gas Agency v Vesta Energy Co Inc 840 P Supp 814 
at 820 (D Kan 1993); PSI Energy Inc v Exxon Coal USA Inc 831FSupp1430 at 1439 
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among the above described approaches in order to resolve the issue, 340 thereby incorporating the 
deficiencies of whatever approach is selected. 
4.8.4.4 Endnote 
It is clearly a difficult, if not an impossible task to devise either standards or criteria for resolving 
the problem of when conduct violates the covenant of good faith. Some US writers are of the 
opinion that a workable framework of standards can be created that will substantially reduce ad 
hoc decision making in covenant cases. 341 
(SD Ind 1993); Hodges Wholesale Cars v Auto Dealers Exch 628 So 2d 608 at 611 (Ala 
1993); Barn-Chestnut Inc v CFM Dev Corporation 457 SE 2d 502 at 508-09 (W Va 
1995). 
340 See, eg, RW Power Partners LP v Virginia Elec & Power Co 899 F Supp 149 1498 (ED 
Va 1995) where the court applied the fruits of the contract approach; Aylett v Universal 
Frozen Foods Co 861P2d 375 at 377-78 (Or Ct App 1993) where the court applied the 
reasonable expectations of the parties approach. Some cases mix UCC good-faith 
terminology with the common-law approaches, but fail to address whether the applicable 
UCC good faith entails commercial reasonableness or honesty in fact. See Bank of China 
vChan 937 F 2d 780 at 788-89 (2d Circuit1991), mixing UCC, Restatement, and purpose 
approaches; Big Horn Coal Co v Commonwealth Edison Co 852 F 2d 1259 at1267 (10th 
Circuit 1988), mixing UCC and reasonable-expectations approaches. 
341 See, eg, Boklach 1992 Oklahoma LR 647 et seq. 
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4.9 CONCLUSION: RISKS RELATED TO THE US JUDICIAL PROCESSES 
In recent years, much has been made of the risks for banking institutions under the US judicial 
system. Clearly, the environment for the banker-customer relationship (in its many forms as 
discussed above) unfolds within a highly legal environment. Add to this the propensity for 
litigiousness of US society, and one can readily understand that the risks of litigation are a real 
and significant element for banking institutions in order to do business in the USA. 342 
To exacerbate the problem, jury trials are common in civil litigation in the USA and most 
commercial litigation arises in local state (as opposed to federal) courts. Further, in non-contract 
matters punitive or exemplary damages exist and are determined by the jury (subject to judicial 
review by the court). Also, in contract-commercial matters consequential damages are similarly 
determined and can also turn into significant awards. However, the concept that a losing plaintiff 
pays a defendant's attorney fees has not crept into the US system. Although these aspects of the 
US judicial system tend to become exaggerated by outside observers, such aspects do present real 
differences from European modeled systems. 343 
Furthermore, the tendency of some US courts to confuse contract causes of actions with tort 
causes of actions ( eg in various lender liability suits) has been disturbing to banking institutions. 
The effect of this "contort" confusion has been to provide plaintiffs with a means of 
circumventing normal summary judgment procedures in contract causes of action, to "get" to the 
jury and to seek tort damages. Although, recently, the judicial trend appears to have been to limit 
this "contort" approach, the concept of the "duties" and responsibilities of banking institutions 
has expanded over the past decade of lender liability and consumer litigation. Equally important 
have been the numerous governmental suits against failed banking institutions and their 
management for negligence and breach of duty (along with numerous other alleged legal 
violations). 344 
Thus, the general nature of the US legal system, the litigious nature of US society, and the spate 
of private and government litigation over the past decade have come to embrace banker-customer 
legal relations within a judicial straitjacket, which when added to the regulatory straitjacket 
within which US banking institutions find themselves, makes the legal dimensions of the banker-
342 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 203; Cranston (ed) Risk 1. 
343 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 203-204. 
344 Cranston (ed) Risk 386. 
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customer relationship in the USA all-encompassing. 345 
345 Cranston(ed) European Banking Law 204. 
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CHAPTER 5: INDEPENDENT ADVICE: AN 
AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 
5.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
With increasing frequency in recent times, Australian courts have been setting aside, reopening 
or affording other relief in respect of guarantees, third-party securities and (to a lesser extent) 
loan contracts. 1 This relief is being afforded under equitable doctrines of unconscionable 
conduct2, undue influence3 and the special equity for wives4 and under statutory unjust contracts, 
misleading conduct or unfair conduct provisions. 5 Lenders, having become used to the spectacle 
of their guarantees, third-party securities and loan contracts proving to be impaired on the ground 
of unfairness and, even more, to such allegations appearing in defences and cross-claims in 
enforcement actions, are naturally seeking practical mechanisms for protecting their transactions 
from challenges of unfairness. 6 
1 See, eg, Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Bawn v 
Trade Credits [1986] NSW Conv R 55-290; Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation 
(Australia) v Diprose [ 1987] NSW Conv R 55-364; CommorIWealth Bank of Australia 
v Cohen [ 1988] ASC 55-681; Robinson v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 
[1990] ASC 58-890; Parkes v CommorIWealth Bank of Australia [1990] ASC 59-202. 
2 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
3 See, eg, Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312 (England); Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362; 
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Louth v Diprose 
(1992) 175 CLR (Australia). 
4 See Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649; The position of wives is now governed by the 
general principles ofunconscionability. See Barclays Bank pie v O'Brien and Another 
[1994] 1 AC 180 (England); Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155; 
National Australia Bank Ltd v Garcia (1996) 39 NSWLR 577; Gregg v Tasmanian 
Trustees Ltd (1997) 143 ALR 328 (Australia). 
5 Eg, ss 51AA and 51AB of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) (both prohibiting 
unconscionable conduct - s 51AB was formerly s 52A) and s 52, the States and 
Territories Fair Trading Act equivalents of those provisions in regard to misleading and 
deceptive conduct, the Contracts Review Act of 1980 (NSW) and the UCCC. 
6 The Banking Ombudsman has reported that third-party security problems represent a 
serious issue for banker-customer relations in the business finance area. See Australian 
Banking Industry Ombudsman's Annual Report 1993-1994 quoted in Weernsooria 
Banking Law par 14 .21. 
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The unfairness complained of commonly consists in some combination of the following factors: 7 
• The guarantor or borrower does not understand (or only imperfectly understands) the 
nature of the transaction and the documents to be signed and the liability which is being 
undertaken. This impaired understanding may be caused by lack of English-language 
facility, lack of general education or lack of business or financial sophistication. 8 
• The guarantor or borrower lacks the information necessary to evaluate the financial risk 
posed by the transaction. 9 
• The guarantor or borrower lacks the capacity to evaluate the financial risk posed by the 
transaction10 and to make a balanced judgment regarding whether or not to proceed with 
the transaction. 
• There has been some misrepresentation or misleading and deceptive conduct (including 
non-disclosure) by the lender or, in the case of a guarantor, by the borrower. 11 
• There has been undue influence or other pressure, especially in the case of guarantors 
who are pressed by a family member to give a guarantee in favour of that family member 
or a company controlled by the family member. 12 
Before discussing Australian principles in regard to independent advice, it is deemed necessary 
to look at the common-law roots of the concept. 
7 See, eg, O'Donovan 1992LIJ51-54; Richardson 1994 Charter44; Sneddon 1993JBFLP 
92; Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 6. The relevance and weighting of these factors in affording 
relief will vary according to the basis on which the reliefis sought; eg, equitable doctrines 
of undue influence or unconscionable conduct or the particular statutory provision. 
8 See, eg, Harrison v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1928) 23 Tas LR l; Wilton v 
Farnworth (1948) 76 CLR 646; Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362; Commercial Bank 
of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
9 Behan v Obelon (Pty) Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 326; Westpac Banking Corporation v 
Robinson [1990] ASC 59-027. 
10 Smith v Elders Rural Finance Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court NSW, 25 November 
1994. 
11 Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA and Another v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd and 
Another (1986) 68 ALR 77; Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd 
(1988) 79 ALR 83; David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) 
93 ALR 271; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Mehta (1991) 23 NSWLR 84. 
12 Relief has often been awarded where the guarantor is the wife or female de facto spouse 
of the debtor or of a man who controls the debtor company, or where the guarantor is the 
parent of the adult child debtor. See, eg, Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio 
(1983) 151 CLR 447; European Asian of Australia Ltdv Kurland and Another (1985) 8 
NSWLR 192; Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155. 
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5.2 COMMON-LAW BACKGROUND 
5.2.1 Introduction 
From the outset it should be clearly understood that independent advice cannot be a substitute 
for disclosure. The duty of disclosure relates to material facts, whilst advice is given in regard 
to conclusions, opinions and expectations which can be derived from these facts. A duty to 
disclose can be imposed by law and its breach is actionable. There is no general duty to give 
advice, but advice may play an important role in assessing a stronger party's contractual conduct. 
At common law, independent advice played an important role in the consideration of the 
propriety of gifts given by a weaker person to a stronger party, and at some stage it was 
considered a compulsory element in disproving undue influence in the case of a gift. 13 In more 
recent decisions the courts have been much less specific about what is required to satisfy the 
court of the propriety of the transaction. The leading case on which this view is founded is the 
advice of the Privy Council in Jnche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar, where Lord Hailsham, 
delivering that opinion, said: 14 
"Their Lordships are not prepared to accept the view that independent legal advice is the 
only way in which the presumption can be rebutted, nor are they prepared to affirm that 
independent legal advice, when given, does not rebut the presumption, unless it be shown 
that the advice was taken. It is necessary for the donee to prove that the gift was the result 
of the free exercise of independent will." 
Some judges go further and regard the onus not as a legal burden with clear consequences for the 
way the case is conducted, but merely as an initial evidentiary burden, leading (after the sifting 
of all available evidence) to the passing of the ultimate burden to the stronger party in the event 
that, at the end of the trial, the facts are still unclear. 15 
The court must be satisfied ultimately that the transaction is the "spontaneous act of the donor 
or grantor acting in circumstances which enable him to exercise an independent will and which 
justify the court's holding that the gift or transaction was the result of the free exercise of his 
13 Wright v Carter [1903] 1 Ch 27 at 60; Allison v Clayhills [1907] 97 LT 709 at 712; 
Demerara Bauxite Co v Hubbard [ 1923] AC 673; Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 686-
689. 
14 [1929] AC 127 at 133. Particular reliance was placed by Lord Bailsman on the judgment 
of Cotton LJ inAllcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 at 171 
15 See, eg, Re Craig, Meneces v Middleton [1971] Ch 95 at 104. 
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will, 1116 or, more briefly, that the plaintiff has acted with an "independent and informed 
judgment" .17 The requirement of independent advice in the case of gifts, which Spencer Bower 
regarded as a proposition of law, is no longer viewed in that way: the procuring of independent 
advice is "useful, though not essential,"18 and is only one of several ways in which it may be 
shown that the transaction is the result of a spontaneous, uninfluenced decision by the weaker 
party.19 
5.2.2 Independent advice defined 
Whatever the strict legal position, often the appropriate course for the stronger party to take will 
be to see that the weaker party has the advice of a third person entirely independent of the 
influence of the stronger party. Spencer Bower puts the matter this way:20 
"In many situations, that will be a very simple and obvious means of escaping the 
difficulties of proof, and a means which affords an excellent test of the conscientiousness 
and propriety of the transaction. This course so plainly suggests itself to an honest and 
scrupulous man, that, when proved to have been adopted by the stronger party, it goes a 
very long way, and in most cases is sufficient of itself, to sustain the validity and bona 
16 GoldsworthyvBrickel/[1987] 1 Ch378 at40l;ReBrocklehurst(Estate); HallvRoberts 
[1978] Ch 14 at 36, per LawtonLJ, citingAllcardv Skinner (1887) 36 ChD 145 at 171; 
in Australia: Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 at 119-120. The critical time is the 
making of the contract or gift: Al/card v Skinner, ibid, at 173. 
17 Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326 at 342, per Sir E Sachs. Various similar 
expressions have been used: see Zamet v Hyman [1961] 1WLR1442 at 1446; Re Craig, 
Meneces v Middleton [1971] Ch 95 at 105; Re Brocklehurst (Estate); Hall v Roberts 
[ 1978] 1 Ch 14 at 3 3; cf Re Pauling's Settlement Trust; Younghusband v Couts [ 1964] 
1Ch303 at 336. See, also, Wright v Carter [1903] 1 Ch27 at 57,per Stirling LJ ("act of 
rational consideration, an act of pure volition, uninfluenced"), citing Hatch v Hatch 
(1804) 9 Ves 292 at 297. 
18 Re Pauling's Settlement Trust; Younghusband v Couts [1964] Ch 303 at 336; Re 
Brocklehurst (Estate); Hall v Roberts [1978] Ch 14 at 42, per Bridge LJ (normally the 
only way of showing that there has been no exploitation). In Australia: Haskew v Equity 
Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1919) 27 CLR 231; Watkins and Another v 
Combes and Another (1922) 30 CLR 180 at 195-196. 
19 lncheNoriahvShaikAllieBinOmar [1929] AC 127at133 at l35;LancashireLoansLtd 
v Black [1934] I KB 380 at 412-413; Mcmaster v Byrne [1952] I All ER 1362 at 1369; 
Re Craig, Meneces v Middleton [ 1971] Ch 95 at 105; Re Brocklehurst (Estate); Hall v 
Roberts [1978] Ch 14 at 36-37. 
20 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 691-692. 
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fides of the transaction:21 whereas the omission to resort to it raises an inevitable 
suspicion that the only reason for the omission must have been a consciousness on the 
part of the [stronger] party that the transaction was unrighteous and unfair, and that any 
impartial person would so advise. A party must ordinarily be in a very dubious position 
who asks a disinterested tribunal to approve, ex post facto, the propriety of a transaction 
which he carefully refrained from submitting to the judgment of an equally disinterested 
(though an unofficial) tribunal before the transaction was entered into." 
If the critical issue is whether the transaction is the result of the exercise, by the weaker party, 
of a spontaneous and uninfluenced will, 22 then it follows as a matter of principle that there can 
be no legal rules defining what is necessary, or sufficient, when the obtaining of independent 
advice is put forward, or suggested as necessary, to justify any particular transaction.23 This, it 
may be expected, will vary considerably, depending upon the relevant circumstances, in 
particular the degree ofinvolvement the other party has previously had in the complaining party's 
affairs, and the ease with which outside advice will detach him from them. The type and quality 
of advice which meets an acceptable standard will also vary from case to case, and the courts are 
now reluctant to lay down any specific rules. 24 
The decisions reflect this diversity, and there is not even a clear rule on how far the stronger party 
must go in trying to see that there is independent advice. Sometimes it is thought to be sufficient, 
that the stronger party merely advises the weaker party that legal advice may be taken25 or refers 
the weaker party to a particular person who is likely to give it. 26 On other occasions, it may be 
21 Pratt v Barker (1826) I Sim l; Blackie v Clark (1852) 15 Beav 595 at 603; Potts v Surr 
(1865) 34 Beav 543 at 551-552; Taylor v Johnston (1882) 19 Ch D 603 at 609; Re 
Coomber, Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 at 727-728. 
22 Inche Noriah v ShaikAllie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127 at 133. 
23 Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127 at 135-136. This was a Privy 
Council decision, on appeal from Straits Settlements. Their Lordships declined to lay 
down any general rule about what type of advice should be given, "further than to say that 
it must be given with a knowledge of all relevant circumstances and must be such as a 
competent and honest adviser would give if acting solely in the interests of the donor". 
For a general description of the actions a solicitor should take, in a fairly standard case, 
see Gregg v Kidd [1956] IR 183 at 203-204. 
24 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 692. 
25 Allcardv Skinnner (1887) 36 ChD 145 at 184 at 190; Willisv Barron [19-02] AC 271 at 
284; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326 at 345. 
26 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 692. 
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important to ensure that the weaker party does receive independent advice, if necessary procuring 
it. 27 There may even be cases where the stronger party should refrain from dealing with the 
weaker party if, to the former' s knowledge, the latter has received defective advice,28 or has 
received sound advice and is acting against it, 29 but that is clearly not the general rule. 30 
Of this last suggestion, that the stronger party should refrain from dealing with the weaker party 
if, to the former' s knowledge, the latter has received sound advice but is acting against it, 
Spencer Bower observed31 that "this view seems a highly extravagant and illogical one, and it is 
not surprising to find that it has since been expressly dissented :from".32 Nevertheless, it is not 
difficult to conceive, for example, of domestic situations where the weaker party is under strong 
and unfair pressure to agree to a transaction which an independent adviser considers imprudent. 
The fact that the weaker party receives independent advice against the transaction, but decides 
not to take it, is necessarily inconsistent with the possibility of undue influence. 
5.2.2.1 Independence 
To carry weight as "independent advice", the advice should of course come from one who is 
"independent," that is "free from any taint of relationship, or of the consideration of interest 
which affects the act". 33 Advice offered by the solicitor for both parties will seldom assist, 34 and 
a solicitor who has a close professional connection with the stronger party will not be a 
27 Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326 at 345-346. 
28 See, eg, Inc he Nori ah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [ 1929] AC 127. Cf, in Ireland, Rae v Joyce 
(1892) 29 LR IR 500 at 521-522; and compare Grealish v Murphy [1946] IR 35 at 48. 
29 Wright v Carter (1903) 1 Ch 27 at 58; Powell v Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243 at 246; 
Ashbumer's EquUy 301. 
30 Re Coomber,Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 at 729-730; Brury v Edmundson 
(1915) 113 LT 1197 at 1201; Inche Noriah v ShaikAllie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127 at 
13 5. In Ireland: Provincial Bank of Ireland v McKeever [ 1941] IR 471 at 484-485; Gregg 
v Kidd [1956] IR 183 at 200-203. 
31 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 692-693. 
32 Citing Re Coomber, Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723. 
33 Re Coomber, Coomber v Coomber, ibid, at 730. 
34 See, eg, Powell v Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243 at 246-247. In Australia, see Watkins and 
Another v Combes and Another (1922) CLR 180 at 197. In Canada, seeBertolo v Bank 
of Montreal (1986) 33 DLR (4th) 610 at 618. 
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satisfactory adviser. 35 And clearly, a person who is merely called in by the weaker party for the 
express purpose of approving, and putting into legal form, what has already been determined 
upon, and from whom any dissuasive counsel or attempted exercise of judgment would be 
immediately resented, or one who is employed by, or is in the confidence of, both parties, or one 
who is not likely to act in the sole interests of the weaker party, though ordinarily a natural 
protector, by reason of some special circumstance, such as a quarrel or estrangement, is not an 
independent person in this sense. 36 
5.2.2.2 Competence 
The advice should also be "competent". This does not necessarily mean that the advice must 
come from a lawyer,37 and in one case it was suggested at first instance that the advice of a "man 
of affairs" may even be preferable.38 The adviser must at least have sufficient information about 
the weaker party's affairs39 to advise him about the wisdom of the transaction; advice merely 
about its nature and effect may not be enough. 40 
If the advice was in fact honest and independent, it can hardly be supposed that the [weaker] 
3 5 Lancashire Loans Ltd v Black [ 1934] 1 KB 3 80 at 3 99-400. 
36 ClarkvMalpas (1862) 4 De GF & J 401 at404; Tate v Williamson (1866) LR2 Ch App 
55; 1Eq528 at 539; Rae vJoyce (1892) 29 LR IR 500 at 514,per Walker LC (IR) at 
525-527,per Fitzgibbon LJ (IR); Powell v Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243 at 245-247; Willis v 
Barron [1902] AC 271at282. Demerara Bauxite Co Ltdv Hubbard [1923] AC 673 at 
682-683. 
37 O'Rorke v Bolingbroke (1877) 2 App Cas 814 at 830. 
38 Allcardv Skinner (1887) 36 ChD 145 at 159. The Court of Appeal in this case seems to 
have contemplated advice of a more legal character; see at 173, per Cotton LJ. 
39 Wright v Carter [1903] 1Ch27 at 52,54; Williams vJohnson [1937] 4 All ER 34 at 37-
38. 
40 Wright v Carter [1903] 1 Ch 27 at 52, at 58, at 62; Powell v Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243 at 
247 (England). In Australia: Adenan v Buise [1984] WAR 61 at 68. In New Zealand: 
Brusewitz v Brown [1923] NZLR 1106 at 1117. But, see Re Coomber, Coomber v 
Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 at 730 (sufficient that supposedly influenced party knew 
"nature and consequences" of her act). There is an old practice, where large gifts are 
made to a person who is not in a position of influence, of requiring that person to 
establish that the transaction is "righteous", that is to say, that the donor "knew and 
understood what he was doing": Hoghton v Hoghton (1852) 15 Beav 278 at 298-299; 
Cooke v Lamotte (1851) 15 Beav 234 at 240-241. But while this distinction between 
knowing "the nature and consequences of an act" and "knowing and understanding what 
he is doing" is sometimes helpful, in cases of undue influence at least, the one seems to 
merge imperceptibly into the other: see, eg, Willis v Barron [1902] AC 271at275-276; 
Lancashire Loans Ltd v Black [1934] 1 KB 380 at 415-416. 
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party can make the [stronger] party responsible for his want of skill, unless of course the latter 
had put the former in communication with one whom he knew to be lacking in judgment, 
sagacity, and experience, and as likely to give bad counsel as good. Nevertheless, the adviser 
should be prepared to carry out independent investigations going beyond the facts made available 
by the stronger party. 41 In summary, the adviser must know all the relevant circumstances, and 
the advice must be such as a competent adviser would give if acting solely in the interests of the 
donor or grantor.42 
Jnche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar43 is still the leading case on these principles, and it offers 
a good example of their application. The plaintiff was a feeble old woman who for some time had 
relied on the defendant for advice and the management of her affairs, both business and domestic. 
Before making the gift in question, she was advised by an independent lawyer, who acted in good 
faith throughout. Unfortunately, he obtained much of his information from the defendant, and 
he did not realize that the plaintiff was giving away practically the whole of her estate. He did 
not, it seems, bring home to her the consequences of her actions, or the fact that she might 
achieve her objectives by the more orthodox method ofleaving the defendant her property in her 
will. 44 The Privy Council held that the transaction should be set aside, independent advice in 
these circumstances being no answer to the plaintiff" s claim. It should not, however, be assumed 
that in every case the defendant is going to be answerable for shortcomings in the advice received 
by the plaintiff; there is a clear difference between the case where the appointment of an 
independent adviser severs the relationship ofinfluence altogether, and those where it continues, 
albeit in a muted form. 45 
5.2.2.3 Recent Canadian cases 
In MacKay v Bank of Nova Scotia, 46 Lederman J suggested that a bank has a positive duty to 
require that a person incurring indebtedness for another obtain independent legal advice. Relying 
41 Wright v Carter [1903] 1Ch27 at 51-52. Sometimes it may be that the advice should be 
against the transaction; Wright v Carter, ibid, at 62. 
42 lnche Noriah v SchaikAllie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127 at 136. 
43 [1929] AC 127. 
44 Ibid, at 136. 
45 Eg, WrightvCarter [1903] 1 Ch27. Tate v Williamson(l866) 2 Ch App 55 at65 (where 
material information not disclosed, defendant's suggestion to plaintiff that he should take 
independent advice was no answer to the plaintiffs claim). 
46 (1995) 20 BLR (2d) 304. 
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on this decision, numerous debtors and guarantors have brought suits seeking to avoid their 
obligations on the ground that they had not received independent legal advice. However, in each 
of these cases, the court has refused to interpret theMacKay case as mandating independent legal 
advice. Indeed, with each new decision, the MacKay case and the requirement of independent 
legal advice appears to be disappearing. 
In theMacKay case, the plaintiff had borrowed $45,000 from the Bank of Nova Scotia in order 
to finance the purchase of a trailer for her daughter and her daughter's common-law husband. The 
bank had advised the plaintiff to obtain independent legal advice, but she had declined to do so 
on the basis that it was too expensive and that she did not require it. The bank requested, and the 
plaintiff signed, a waiver of independent legal advice. 
Some two years after the plaintiff had taken out the loan, her daughter and son-in-law made an 
assignment into bankruptcy. Their secured creditors repossessed the trailer and the plaintiff was 
left liable for the entire bank loan. 
The plaintiff brought an action for a declaration that the loan was invalid and of no force and 
effect, since no-one that she had dealt with had advised her whether the loan was prudent from 
her point of view. While the bank claimed that it had met its obligations to the plaintiff by 
advising her to obtain independent legal advice, the court was of the opinion that the bank owed 
her a much higher duty: 
11 A bank, however, cannot escape its responsibility by merely recommending independent 
legal advice in this situation. It must insist on it. If a customer refuses, the obtaining of 
a waiver of independent legal advice cannot ameliorate the circumstances. The plaintiff 
should have been advised in no uncertain terms that if she did not obtain independent 
legal advice, then the bank would decline the loan. 11 
The court held that the bank's failure to ensure that the plaintiff had independent legal advice was 
fatal to the bank's position. 
Predictably, theMacKay case spurred litigation by debtors and guarantors attempting to escape 
their liability on the ground that they did not have independent legal advice. In Merchants 
Consolidated Ltd (Receiver of) v Team Sports & Trophies (J 98 4) Inc, 47 the corporate defendant's 
former principal (Brill) attempted to prevent the plaintiff receiver from realising on his (Brill' s) 
47 [1995]0JNo84. 
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personal guarantee of the corporation's indebtedness. Brill raised several defences including the 
fact that he had not received independent legal advice before executing the guarantee. He relied 
on the McKay case as support for the argument that there is an onus on the entity receiving the 
guarantee to ensure that the guarantor receives advice as to the wisdom and effect of giving such 
a guarantee. The court disallowed Brill' s claim on the grounds that he was businessman of some 
experience who appeared to have understood the nature of his obligations under the guarantee 
at the time he executed it and that he was a principal of the entity whose obligations were being 
guaranteed. 
Similarly, in Community Trust Co Ltd v Jssajenko, 48 the court held that Mrs Issajenko was liable 
under the personal guarantees she had given in respect ofloans made by the plaintiff to a private 
corporation operated by her husband. While it was conceded that Mrs Issajenko had not received 
independent legal advice before executing the guarantees, the court found that she was well 
educated and would have understood the significance of the guarantees. Accordingly, the court 
did not permit her to rely on the MacKay case to avoid her obligations under the guarantees. 
The court's willingness to enforce guarantees, notwithstanding the absence of independent legal 
advice, has not been limited to cases where the guarantor is sophisticated and/or well educated. 
In Royal Bank of Canada v Domingues and Another, 49 the defendant, Carlos Martins had signed 
a promissory note in order to secure a loan from the Royal Bank for the defendant Manuel 
Domingues. When Domingues ceased making payments and was noted in default, the Royal 
Bank proceeded against Martins on the promissory note. Martins, who could not speak or read 
English and had had only an elementary school education in his native Portugal, pleaded non est 
factum and argued, citing the MacKay case that the bank should have advised him to seek 
independent legal advice. He claimed that he had not understood the significance of his signature 
on the promissory note and that no-one had explained to him his obligations on default. 
Notwithstanding the absence ofindependent legal advice, the court held Martins liable under the 
promissory note. The evidence indicated that the Royal Bank employees had spoken with Martins 
in Portuguese and had fully explained to him his obligations under the promissory note. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Royal Bank, through its employees, had made every 
necessary disclosure to Martins, that he knew and understood his obligations and that he had 
signed the promissory note in terms of which he was being sued with a full understanding of his 
liability. Given these circumstances, the court held that it was not necessary for the bank to have 
48 [1995] OJ No 2874. 
49 (1995) 21 BLR (2<l) 79. 
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insisted that Martins obtain independent legal advice. 
The courts have therefore moved away from the attitude in the MacKay case and have correctly 
apprehended that the real issue is the knowledge, understanding and relative bargaining position 
of the guarantor and/or debtor. 
In the recent decision of Hong Kong Bank of Canada v Amormino, 50 Abbey J reconciled the more 
recent cases with the MacKay case and adopted the following approach to the issue of 
independent legal advice: 
"Putting aside circumstances in which there exists a fiduciary obligation, there is no 
general obligation on the part of a bank to require independent legal advice for a 
guarantor as a precondition of enforcing security documents executed by the guarantor. 
In certain circumstances, however, the failure to insist upon independent legal advice may 
be fatal to a bank's position in that, for example, the evidence otherwise may suggest non 
est f actum or undue influence in relation to the document in issue. Circumstances, for 
example, which suggest an inequality of bargaining position together with a manifestly 
unfair bargain may, in the absence ofindependent legal advice, give rise to a presumption 
of undue influence ... MacKay v Bank of Nova Scotia is [an] example of a case in which 
the circumstances, absent independent legal advice, were considered unconscionable and 
fatal to the bank. 11 
5.3 AUSTRALIAN CONCEPTS IN REGARD TO INDEPENDENT ADVICE 
5.3.1 Introduction 
As we have seen, for many years, English and Canadian courts have cited independent legal 
advice as a means of curing the taint of undue influence or unconscionable conduct on a 
transaction. 51 Statutory provisions also direct attention to whether independent legal or other 
advice was obtained52 and the cases under those provisions attest to the beneficial (but not 
50 [1995] OJ No 2116. 
51 Eg, MacKay v Bank of Nova Scotia (1995) 20 BLR(2d) 304 (Canada); Powell v Powell 
[1900] 1 Ch 243; Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127 (England); In 
Australia, see Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v 
Amadio (1983) 151 CLR447. 
52 Eg, the Contracts Review Act of 1980 (NSW); s 147 (2)(g)ofthe Credit Acts ofNSW, 
Vic, Qld, WA and ACT; s 5 lAB of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth). This section 
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conclusive) effect of independent legal advice in protecting a transaction. 53 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that lenders have placed their hopes upon independent advice as a key element of a safe 
lending procedure. 
Independent legal advice is not a certain protection for all guarantees and loan contracts. It can 
make those transactions safer against attack on the grounds of unfairness, but it cannot make all 
such transactions completely safe. 54 Independent legal advice is also not the only available means 
of protecting transactions. Independent financial advice may be more useful than independent 
legal advice in some cases. 55 Guarantors and borrowers can be required to certify that they 
understand the obligations and risks of the transaction. 56 Bankers themselves could provide 
explanations and warnings in order to address some of the "unfairness" factors listed above. But 
independent advice is perceived as more effective than these other methods and some bankers 
fear that giving their own explanations or warnings would open them up to claims of deficient 
or misleading explanation or warning. 57 
does not expressly mention independent advice, but such advice will be relevant to s 
5 lAB (2)( c) ("whether the consumer was able to understand any documents") and s 51 
AB (2)(d), ("whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair 
tactics were used against, the consumer"). See, also, s 44 of the Consumer Transactions 
Act of 1972 (SA). 
53 Eg, West v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 610; Collier v MorlendFinance 
Corporation (Vic) Pty Ltd [1989] ASC 55-716. 
54 Usually independent advice will be relevant at two points in the analysis of an 
unconscionable-conduct case. Firstly, actual adequate independent advice could negative 
an alleged special disadvantage. See Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 
151 CLR 447 at 476 where Deane J referred to the absence ofindependent advice as one 
factor establishing a special disadvantage. Secondly, independent advice could negative 
an alleged unconscientious taking of advantage, particularly where the creditor is 
proceeding with the transaction knowing or suspecting that the surety has a deficient 
understanding of the transaction. Seethe Amadio case, ibid, (1983) 151 CLR447 at468. 
55 Eg, where the guarantor or borrower is incapable of assessing the financial risks of the 
transaction. See Smith v Elders Rural Finance Ltd (Unreported Supreme Court NSW 25 
November 1994). 
56 The former State Bank of Victoria used such a "Guarantor's Acknowledgement". 
57 S 52 of the The Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) is a formidable weapon in a debtor's 
defence armoury. The pervasive influence of the section, supplemented by the Fair 
Trading Act, upon modern commercial activity is now notorious. Thus it is now widely 
used in cases of precontractual misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, passing 
off, false or misleading advertising, and fraudulent misrepresentation. See French 1989 
ALf 250 at 268; Clarke 1989 ABR 109. The reluctance of financial institutions to assume 
a liability or duty to advise a surety is therefore understandable. See Pengilley 1992 
Q UTLJ 3 5 et seq, on how financial institutions have already been targeted by s 5 2 
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5.3.2 Certain lender strategies in regard to unfairness 
Independent advice has figured prominently in lenders' strategies for dealing with attacks on 
transactions based on unfairness. One strategy is to recommend independent advice as part of a 
package of procedures58 to protect transactions. The Australian Code of Banking Practice59 
establishes protective procedures for taking guarantees, which involve a combination of written 
warning and disclosure by the lender, a recommendation that the prospective guarantor obtain 
independent legal advice and a stated ceiling on the guarantor's liability.60 
A second strategy, which could stand alone or could be used as part of a combination protective 
procedure as in the Code of Banking Practice, would be to require some guarantors and 
borrowers to obtain independent legal advice and to require the legal adviser to certify that advice 
and the client's understanding of it, to the lender, in a pro-forma certificate. 61 In recent times, 
' lenders have relied more on certified independent advice, which has increased demands on 
solicitors to give certificates in the various forms required by lenders. 62 
As lenders' reliance on independent legal advice has increased, there has been a growing 
awareness within the legal profession that a solicitor's professional responsibility to a client 
seeking independent advice on a guarantee transaction extends beyond merely explaining the 
documents, and includes advice on the financial propriety of entering into the transaction. 63 It 
litigation. See Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 6, and the problems discussed in the chapter on 
Australia, in regard to s 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth). 
58 See Sneddon 1993 JBFLP 92 et seq. 
59 The Code of Banking Practice was promulgated by the Australian Bankers' Association 
(ABA) on 3 November 1993 and many ofits provisions were adopted by member banks 
of the ABA by December 1994. See Weerasooria Banking Law par 15.3. The Code 
contains a specific section relating to guarantees. 
60 S 17.5 of the Australian Code of Banking Practice requires that a bank shall recommend 
that a prospective guarantor obtain independent legal advice. 
61 S 44 of the Consumer Transaction Act of 1972 (SA) requires that certain guarantees be 
executed in the presence of an independent legal practitioner and that that practitioner 
must certify in writing that he or she is satisfied that the guarantor understands the 
purport and effect of the agreement and that the guarantor has voluntarily executed the 
agreement in the practitioner's presence. 
62 See O'Donovan 1992L/J51at52. 
63 Some recent cases have also suggested that in certain, quite limited, circumstances a 
solicitor should provide warnings on the risks or financial propriety of a loan contract to 
clients who are prospective borrowers: O'Brien v Hooker Homes Pty Ltd [1993] ASC 56-
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follows that a "quick-fix" interview with a client which does not go beyond a straight explanation 
of the documents may amount to professional negligence in some cases. But the significant duties 
which the law imposes on solicitors giving independent advice are at odds with the expectations 
oflenders and of borrower and guarantor clients as to the nature of the solicitor's task, and the 
fees these clients expect to pay often do not permit recovery of costs for the quite complex legal 
service the courts require. 64 
Law societies have become greatly concerned about the potential liability of their members to 
borrower and guarantor clients for inadequate independent advice, whether certified or not.65 
Law societies are equally concerned about liability their members may incur to lenders through 
the certification process should the transaction later be successfully attacked for unfairness. The 
latter concern has led to some tension with lenders about whether solicitors should give such 
certificates at all and to lengthy debate over the wording of such certificates, including the use 
of disclaimers in the certificates. 66 The various law societies have been engaged in negotiations 
with lenders' associations seeking a solution to this difficult issue, a solution which appropriately 
balances the sometimes conflicting interests of lenders and solicitors. The Law Institute of 
Victoria (LIV) and the Australian Bankers' Association (ABA) have agreed on the form of 
certificates to be used for advice to guarantors and borrowers. 67 The New South Wales Law 
Society previously declared that the primary responsibility for explaining a guarantee lies with 
the lender and cautioned its members against advising prospective guarantors about the 
commercial aspects of the transaction. 68 That Law Society has now recommended certificates and 
217. See, also, O'Donovan 1992 LIJ 52-54 on the solicitor's duty. 
64 See O'Donovan 1992LJJ51at52-54; Sneddon 1996ABLR 5 at 7. 
65 For cases against solicitors in this regard, see Farnham v Orrell and Others [1989] NSW 
Conv R 55-443; Albury and Others v Gulror Pty Ltd and Others [1992] A & NZ Conv 
R 482; Clark and Others v Barter and Others [1989] A & NZ Conv R 212; Demetrios 
v Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 561. 
66 Eg, the Law Society of NSW issued "Guidelines Concerning Independent Solicitors' 
Certificates of Explanation of Loan Documents" July 1992. For a criticism of these 
Guidelines see Duggan Guide, which guide was prepared for the Australian Finance 
Conference and Australian Equipment Lessors Association. 
67 These forms and an accompanying Practice Note recommending their use were published 
in (1994) 68 LU 907-911 and 927 (October 1994). There is also a form of certificate for 
a translator/interpreter and a form of acknowledgment to be given by a borrower or surety 
to the certifying solicitor. 
68 This caution seems to ignore the professional duty of solicitors to advise guarantors of 
the propriety of entering into the transaction. Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 8. 
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procedures which are similar to the LIV-ABA certificates.69 The Law Council of Australia has 
published a discussion proposal for a Guarantor's Acknowledgment which requires no 
certification by solicitors. As yet there is no national approach on the issue.70 
Much of the debate among lenders, solicitors and law societies has been characterised by some 
confusion over the following issues:71 
• in what circumstances it is necessary or desirable for lenders to recommend or require 
that guarantors or borrowers obtain independent advice in order to protect transactions 
from attacks based on the Australian law of undue influence, the special equity for wives, 
the equitable doctrine of unconscionable conduct and statutory provisions proscribing 
unfair contracts or conduct; 
• the effect (if any) of the House of Lords' decision in Barclays Bank v O'Brien and 
Another12 and subsequent English Court of Appeal decisions on Australian law;73 
• the nature of a solicitor's obligations to a guarantor or borrower client who seeks 
independent advice (including the issue of whether or not a solicitor should advise on the 
propriety of the transaction for the client); 
• whether or not, and how, solicitors could effectively limit their clients under a retainer 
to provide independent advice; 
69 Law Society ofNSW Caveat No 153, 21July1995 quoted in Sneddon l996ABLR 5 at 
8. 
70 The difficulties posed by requiring independent advice and certification of that advice for 
a non-client party to a transaction are not confined to transactions within the finance 
industry. The franchise industry has adopted a code of practice which requires either that 
a franchisee produce a certificate from a solicitor certifying that the solicitor has 
explained the franchise agreement to her or him or that the franchisee sign a statement 
that the franchise agreement has been explained by a solicitor. The Victorian Solicitors 
Liability Committee has advised solicitors not to provide these certificates or, if they do 
so, to modify the certificate so that it refers only to an explanation of the general effect 
of the document and the franchisee's appearing to understand that explanation. See 
"Solicitors Liability Committee Update" Victorian Law Institute News, No 5 of 1994 
quoted in Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 8. 
71 For a summary see Sneddon l996ABLR 5 at 8. 
72 [ 1993] 4 All ER 417 
73 To a large extent this issue has been laid to rest. The fact of being a wife has been held 
not to constitute "special disability" for the purposes ofunconscionability. See European 
Asian of Australia Ltd v Kurland and Another (1985) 8 NSWLR 192 at 200; Aldns v 
National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155. The position of wives is now governed 
by the general principles of unconscionability. National Australia Bank Ltd v Garcia 
(1996) 39 NSWLR 577; Gregg v Tasmanian Trustees Ltd (1997) 143 ALR 328. 
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• the potential liability of a solicitor to a lender through a certificate of advice, and ways 
of minimising that liability, including the use of disclaimers in such certificates; 
• the level offees for independent advice and certificates and the question of who pays; and 
• protective lending strategies other than independent advice, when they should be used, 
and the relative costs and benefits to lenders of recommending or requiring independent 
advice as compared with those other protective strategies. 
These issues will be investigated hereunder. 
5.3.3 The necessity of independent advice74 
It must be stressed that the absence of independent advice does not of itself make a transaction 
unfair under the equitable doctrines or the statutory provisions. 75 The presence of independent 
advice may protect a transaction from the taint of unfairness suffered by a guarantor owing to 
other circumstances. Independent advice is therefore not needed in cases which are free of 
unfairness. If there is a hint of unfairness in a transaction, independent advice will very often be 
desirable for the guarantor, and from the lender's viewpoint, it will be desirable if unfairness 
exists and if the lender will be fixed with the consequences of that unfairness; for example, where 
the lender had notice of the borrower's undue influence over the guarantor. 76 
The need for independent advice and its curative role vary according to the basis on which a 
transaction is attacked for unfairness: undue influence, unconscionable dealing and statutory 
provisions proscribing unfair conduct or contracts. Each of these will be examined in tum. 
74 It would appear as if almost all the reported cases on the need for independent advice, 
relate to sureties. 
75 Sneddon 1990 UNSWLf 302 at 319. See, however, s 44 of the Consumer Transaction Act 
of 1972 (SA) requiring a lender to ensure that a prospective guarantor obtains a certificate 
along the lines that a· solicitor has satisfied himself that the borrower understands the 
purport and effect of the guarantee. For a discussion of this requirement, see O'Donovan 
1992 LIJ 51-54. 
76 See Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 8. 
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5.3.4 Independent advice and undue influence77 
If the borrower has procured the guarantor's consent to the transaction by exercising undue 
influence over the guarantor then the guarantor has a remedy in equity to have the transaction set 
aside as against the borrower.78 The issue is whether that remedy in equity of the guarantor will 
prevail against the lender. The relevant test to determine this issue in Australian law, drawn from 
the judgment of Dixon Jin Yerkey v Jones19 is: did the lender have reasonable grounds to believe 
that both the consent to the transaction and the execution of the relevant document were fairly 
obtained from a surety who sufficiently understood the purport and effect of the documents? If 
the lender had such a reasonable belief then the surety's remedy in equity will not prevail against 
the lender. This test was propounded in a case concerning the relationship between borrower 
husband and surety wife and was expressed to cover the equities in favour of the surety arising 
from undue influence and misrepresentation as well as the special equity principle relating to 
wives. Because of the generality ofits expression, it is submitted that the test is not confined only 
to equity principles arising between wife and husband, but applies to the equities in favour of all 
guarantors whom lenders should realise are, like wives to husbands, in a potentially vulnerable 
relationship vis-a-vis the borrower. The same generality of application is found in the English law 
of undue influence. In Barclays Bank v O'Brien and Another80 Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that 
lenders were under a similar onus where: 
• the lender has notice either that the guarantor and borrower are in an emotional 
relationship and are cohabiting or that the guarantor reposes trust and confidence 
77 An attack could be based on the lender's own undue influence on the guarantor, but this 
seems to be a rare phenomenon because the lender usually is not in a relationship of 
influence with the surety. A lender is more likely to be in a relationship of influence with 
a borrower. 
78 Allcardv Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145; Tate v Williamson (1866) LR2 Ch App 55;/nche 
Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [ 1929] AC 127 (England); Union Bank of Australia Ltd 
v Whitelaw (1906) VLR 711at720;Banko/New South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 
42; Bester v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 30 (Australia). 
79 (1939) 63 CLR 649 at 686. Yerkey v Jones, ibid, is perhaps better known for establishing 
the special equity principle for a wife who guarantees her husband's debts. This special 
equity principle has been criticised in recent times. See Warburton v Whitely [1989] 
NSW Conv Rep 55-453 at 58-287. AkinsvNationalAustraliaBank(1994) 34 NSWLR 
155, Williams l994JofContractLaw67. YerkeyvJones(1939)63 CLR649isnotcited 
here for the special equity principle, but for the test to determine when an equity in favour 
of the surety (which may be an equity arising from undue influence by the borrower as 
much as the special equity principle of wives) prevails against the lender. The criticisms 
of the special equity principle do not affect this other aspect -0f Yerkey v Jones. 
80 [1994] 1AC180; [1993] 4 AllER417. 
245 
regarding financial affairs in the borrower; and 
• the transaction was not to the financial advantage of the surety. 
The necessary reasonable belief in a lender, required by the Yerkey v Jones81 test, can be 
established other than by independent advice. The lender could undertake its own explanation 
and probe to its own satisfaction the genuineness and circumstances of the guarantor's consent. 
There are some risks for lenders in such a course of creating further exposure if their explanation 
or investigation is careless or involves a misrepresentation. 82 If independent advice is to be used 
to establish the necessary reasonable belief in the lender, the lender must have reasonable 
grounds to believe that independent advice was actually given to the guarantor and that the advice 
adequately addressed the genuineness of the guarantor's consent and adequately explained the 
purport and effect of the documents. One obvious way to ensure that the lender has reasonable 
grounds to so believe is to have the independent adviser certify these matters to the lender. 
Merely urging a guarantor to take independent advice would not of itself give the lender 
reasonable grounds83 to believe in the fairness of the obtaining of consent or in the guarantor's 
understanding of the documents under the Yerkey v Jones84 test. 85 
It has been suggested that, in most cases, certified adequate independent advice should protect 
the transaction from attacks based on the borrower's undue influence in most cases. It will not 
protect in all cases; for example, if the lender knew of other circumstances which suggested that 
undue influence arose after the advice or persisted in spite of the advice, then the transaction 
would still be vulnerable to attack. 86 
5.3.5 Independent advice and unconscionable conduct 
Relief is available in equity for unconscionable transactions if two elements are present: 87 
81 (1939) 63 CLR 649. 
82 The Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) s 52 can present massive problems for a creditor 
advising a customer or surety, if the advice is deemed misleading or deceptive. 
83 See Sneddon 1990UNSWL.f302 at 324-325. 
84 (1939) 63 CLR 649. 
85 Unlike the test in Coldunell Ltd v Gallon [1986] 1 QB 1184; [1986] 1 All ER 429. 
86 See Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 9-10. 
87 Blomley v Ryan ( 1956) 99 CLR 362 at 415; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio 
(1983) 151 CLR447. 
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(1) one party to a transaction is at a special disadvantage in dealing with the other party (for 
example, because of age, 88 physical or mental infirmity, lack of English language 
facility, financial hardship, 89 ignorance or lack of business experience, drunkenness90 
misunderstanding of the transaction); and 
(2) the other party takes unconscientious advantage of the first party's special disadvantage 
(for example, as in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio91 where the lender 
proceeded with the transaction while knowing of the guarantor's situation of disadvantage 
and did nothing to correct it). 
If these two elements are established the transaction will be set aside unless it can be shown that 
the transaction was fair, just and reasonable in all the circumstances. 92 
Again, independent advice is not essential in order to protect a transaction. If there is no special 
disadvantage or the lender has no notice of a special disadvantage then the transaction will not 
be impeachable under this doctrine. 93 If the lender does have notice of a special disadvantage, the 
lender could itself redress some types of special disadvantage, for example, by giving an adequate 
explanation of the documents and the risks of the transaction and having these translated into the 
guarantor's native language if necessary. Lenders may consider that they run more risks taking 
such a course, in view of the wide statutory protection against misleading or deceptive advice and 
unconscionability, and prefer to use independent advice. If independent advice is used, it may 
assist by negativing one or both of the above elements. First, it could neutralise an alleged special 
disadvantage. To do this there would have to be actual independent advice given which was 
adequate to counteract the special disadvantage.94 It would not be enough merely to urge that 
88 Archer v Cutler [1980] 1NZLR386; Clark v Ma/pas (1862) 4 De GF & J 401. 
89 Sturge v Sturge (1849) 12 Beav229;Familiar PtyLtdv Samarkos(I994) 115 FLR443. 
90 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362. 
91 (1983) 151 CLR447. 
92 Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312; Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873) 8 Ch App 484 
(England); in Australia, see Harrison v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1928) 23 Tas 
LR 1; Bank of Victoria v Mueller [1925] VLR 642; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd 
v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 474; Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621 at 637; 
Familiar Pty Ltdv Samarkos (1994) 115 FLR443. 
93 Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000; [1985] 2 All ER 880. 
94 Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312 at 322. 
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independent advice be taken. 95 
Secondly, independent advice could negative an unconscientious taking of advantage by the 
lender. This would depend on the nature of the alleged unconscientious taking of advantage. If 
it consisted (as in theAmadio96 case) of the lender's proceeding with the transaction, knowing 
or suspecting some element of special disadvantage (for example, a deficient understanding of 
the transaction), then there would be no unconscientious taking of advantage if the lender could 
show that it reasonably believed that the special disadvantage had been negatived by the 
guarantor' receiving adequate independent advice. If the lender reasonably believed the guarantor 
had taken independent advice which was adequate to redress the special disadvantage, it would 
not be unconscientious to proceed with the transaction. 97 
The reasonable belief could be established by having an independent adviser certify to the lender 
that the matters giving rise to the special disadvantage had been adequately addressed.98 As 
surmised above, it must be doubted whether merely urging the guarantor to take advice would 
ground the necessary reasonable belief99 
In theory, independent advice may be relevant in a third way, by helping to establish that the 
transaction was fair, just and reasonable in all the circumstances. But in practice it is difficult to 
see how independent advice could do this other than by the two methods described above: 
negativing a special disadvantage or giving the lender a reasonable belief that the special 
disadvantage had been redressed. 100 
95 Sneddon 1990 UNSWL.!302 at 325. 
96 (1983) 151 CLR447. 
97 Sneddon 1990 UNSWL.J 302 at 327-328; Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 10-11. 
98 S 44 of the Consumer Transaction Act of 1972 (SA) requires a lender to ensure that a 
prospective guarantor obtains a certificate from a solicitor certifying that the guarantor 
understands the true purport and effect of the transaction. See, also, 0' Donovan 1992 LU 
51 at 52; Nolan v Westpac Banking Corporation [1989] ASC 55-930. 
99 Sneddon 1990 UNSWL.!302 at 327-328. 
100 Overall fairness in other transactions may be established by showing that the weaker 
party received a substantial material benefit from the transaction. See European Asian of 
Australia Ltd v Kurland and Another (1985) 8 NSWLR 192. The existence of a 
substantial benefit does not automatically exclude relief See Commercjal Bank of 
Australia LtdvAmadio (1983) 151447 at 475; Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR362 at 
405. 
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It is important to note that the ordinary case in which all the lender knows is that a wife is 
guaranteeing her husband's debts (or a person is guaranteeing a relation's debts) and the 
transaction is not, on the face of it, for the guarantor's benefit, will not, by virtue of those facts 
alone, involve unconscionable conduct. To be married or otherwise related to a borrower and to 
receive no benefit from a guarantee are not factors which by themselves establish a special 
disadvantage. 101 More is needed, such as the advanced age of the guarantor, financial or business 
inexperience, misunderstanding of the transaction or poor facility in English, or some 
wrongdoing such as misrepresentation by borrower or lender. 102 
Strictly then, a guarantor in the ordinary case needs no special treatment from the lender. 
However, the risk is that the lender's officers know or have notice of more than the minimal facts 
of the standard case. Under the Amadio103 case, if the lender is aware of the possibility that a 
special disadvantage may exist or is aware of facts that would raise that possibility in the mind 
of any reasonable person, the lender still cannot proceed with the transaction without taking steps 
to redress the special disadvantage. 104 Thus a prudent lender, in devising a lending procedure, 
cannot always assume that it is dealing only with the minimal facts of the ordinary case. It needs 
to construct a procedure for taking guarantees based on the wider knowledge of which its officers 
will have actual or constructive notice. That procedure should have several levels appropriate 
to what is known by the lending officers and, hence, appropriate to the risk of the transaction 
being set aside. 105 
101 Akins v National Australia Bank [1994] 34 NSWLR 155. 
102 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Nolan v Westpac 
Banking Corporation (1989) 51 SASR 496; National Australia Bank Ltd v Nobile and 
Martelli (1988) ATPR 40-856. 
103 (1983) 151 CLR447. 
104 (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 467 per Mason CJ, at 479 per Deane J. There is authority for the 
argument that these passages ought not to be read as establishing the argument that 
constructive notice of the weaker party's disadvantage is sufficient for the doctrine of 
unconscionable conduct. There must be a dishonest, rather than a merely careless failure 
to inquire. See Privy Council authority (Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000 and Royal 
Brunei Airlines sdn bhd v Tan [l 995] 3 WLR 64), but this view is not consistent with 
most Australasian judicial interpretations of the Amadio case. See eg, Akins v National 
Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155; Broadlands International Finance Ltd v Sly 
[1987] NSW Conv R 55-342; Nichols v Jessup [1986] 1 NZLR 226; Contractors 
Bonding Ltdv Snee [1992] 2 NZLR 157. 
105 Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 11. 
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5.3.6 Independent advice and statutory relief 
The UCCC, the Contracts Review Act of 1980 (NSW), and s 51 AB of the Trade Practices Act 
of 1974 (Cth)106 require a court to weigh a variety of factors in order to determine whether or not 
a contract is unfair, or conduct unconscionable. The presence or absence ofindependent advice 
is only one of those factors. The cases thus far have established the following: 
• Independent advice is most often relevant for its curative effect. The absence of 
independent advice and the failure of a lender to recommend independent advice are 
factors which, of themselves, will not render a contract unjust. A lender is not required 
as a matter of ordinary practice to ensure that independent advice is taken by a guarantor. 
However, the absence ofindependent advice is a factor which, taken together with other 
factors, such as a borrower's undue influence over a guarantor, may lead to a conclusion 
that a contract is unjust. 107 
• If independent advice is to be used to cure a transaction, the advice must address the 
relevant vitiating factors and be adequate to redress those factors. 
• Many of the factors listed in the statutes are matters of objective fact requiring objective 
evaluation rather than an evaluation of the lender's state of mind regarding those factors 
(for example, whether the guarantor or borrower understood the documents). This means 
that ifindependent advice is to cure a vitiating factor then advice must have actually been 
given and not merely urged and must have been adequate to address the relevant vitiating 
factor. 108 
• It has been held under the Contracts Review Act of 1980 (NSW) that a lender's 
reasonable belief that adequate independent advice had been given would not necessarily 
prevent a finding that a contract was objectively unjust if in fact advice had not been 
given or was inadequate. 109 But the decision that a contract is unjust is an exercise of 
discretion based on all the facts of a case. In Younan and Bechara v Beneficial Finance 
106 The application of s 51AB (formerly s 52A) of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) to 
guarantees was confirmed in Begbie v State Bank of New South Wales [ 1994] ATPR 41-
881. 
107 For decisions under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), see West v AGC Advances 
(1986) 5 NSWLR 610; Younan and Bechara v Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd 
(Unreported, Court of Appeal, NSW, 21 November 1994). For a decision under Pt IX of 
the Credit Act 1984 (NSW), see Esanda Finance Corporation v Murphy [ 1989] ASC 55-
703. 
108 Sneddon 1990 UNSWLf 302 at 328. 
109 Collier v Mor/end Finance Corporation (Vic) Pty Ltd [1989] ASC 55-716. 
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Corporation Ltd110 a lender's reasonable belief, based on a solicitor's certificate, that 
adequate independent advice had been given (when in fact the advice was inadequate to 
negative the borrower's undue influence upon the surety) was a factor taken into account 
in determining that the contract was not unjust in all the circumstances. Even if a contract 
is objectively assessed as unjust, the court will usually exercise its discretion against 
granting relief ifthe lender's conscience was (subjectively) clear. 111 
Adequate independent advice actually given will objectively cure many vitiating factors. Even 
if the advice does not in fact address all the vitiating factors, the adviser's certificate to the lender 
can provide the lender with reasonable grounds to believe that the vitiating factors have been 
cured. 112 That reasonable belief will influence the court against granting relief even if, 
objectively, the vitiating factors were not cured. 113 
5.3. 7 Independent legal advice: the solicitor's duties in regard to independent advice 
5.3.7.1 Advice must be independent 
The advice must be independent of the interests of the lender and, where a prospective guarantor 
is being advised, of the borrower. In the case of advice to a prospective guarantor, King CJ in 
McNamara v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia114 said: 
110 Unreported Court of Appeal NSW, 21 November 1994, quoted in Sneddon 1996 ABLR 
5 at 12. 
111 Collier v Mor/end Finance Corporation (Vic) Pty Ltd [ 1989] ASC 55-716. 
112 The question of independent advice is full of pitfalls for a bank. In Guthrie v Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [ 1989] NSW Conv R 5 5-463, eg, Mrs Guthrie had 
a serious drinking problem and her marriage was not harmonious. Mr Guthrie obtained 
a loan for 15,000 Australian dollars to buy a boat and the bank wanted a mortgage over 
the Guthrie home as security. Mrs Guthrie reluctantly agreed to sign the mortgage and at 
the bank's request, she consulted a solicitor who explained the mortgage to her and 
signed the requisite certificate. The mortgage was an "all accounts" mortgage, which 
included Mr Guthrie's liability as a guarantor of the debts of his business. 
The Court found that the bank was aware of Mrs Guthrie's position of special 
disadvantage and that it should have advised her of the potential liabilities under the 
bond. In the result her liability under the mortgage was limited to 15,000 dollars. 
113 Sneddon 1990 UNSWLJ302 at 327-328; Sneddon 1996ABLR 5 at 12. 
114 (1984) 37 SASR 232 at 241. See, also, Powell v Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243 at 246-247. In 
the recent English Court of Appeal cases of Massey v Midland Bank pie [ 1995] 1 All ER 
929; Banco Exterior Internacional v Mann [1995] 1 All ER 936; Bank of Baroda v 
Rayarel (Unreported, CA, 13 January 1995 (published in The Times, 19 January 1995), 
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"It is essential that the solicitor act and be understood to act solely for the prospective 
surety ... sound professional practice requires also that the solicitor be and be seen to be 
free to advise the prospective surety unencumbered by any ties to the principal debtor. 
The solicitor, moreover, should be at pains to ensure that his client's decision is as free 
of the influence of the debtor as he can arrange .... sound professional practice requires 
that the debtor should not be present when the solicitor is advising the client and 
receiving his instructions." 
The fact that the solicitor is nominated by the lender to advise the guarantor does not, of itself, 
prevent the advice from being independent. 115 However, the advice should not be given in the 
presence of the lender or at the lender's premises. 116 
Advice which does not conform to these standards of independence may still benefit the 
guarantor and preserve the transaction if it adequately redresses the relevant vitiating factors or 
gives the lender reasonable grounds to believe they have been redressed. 117 However, the less 
independent the advice is, the less likely it is to be considered adequate to redress a vitiating 
factor (especially any influence of a party from whom the solicitor is not independent) and, if the 
lack of independence is known by the lender, the less likely it is to form a sufficient basis for a 
reasonable belief in the lender that any vitiating factors have been redressed. In addition, a 
the surety transaction was upheld because the surety received legal advice even where the 
solicitor was not independent of the borrower and advised the surety in the presence of 
the borrower. Those decisions did not endorse such conduct by solicitors and did not 
change the standards of professional conduct, leaving open the possibility of an action 
by a surety against a solicitor who does not observe proper standards of independence. 
115 See Collier vMorlendFinance Corporation (Vic) PtyLtd[l989] NSW Conv R 58-438 
at 58-443. 
116 McNamara v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia, ibid, at 241; Nolan v Westpac 
Banking Corporation (1989) 51 SASR 496. In this case a mortgage was declared void 
because the bank had pressed the plaintiff to sign the guarantee and security documents 
and had advised her only at the last minute about the need for a solicitor to be present. 
Ligertwood AJ held that in the circumstances the solicitor had not been independently 
instructed and employed. The solicitor saw the plaintiff for the first time in the branch 
manager's office and in the presence of the branch manager. He did not have an 
opportunity to explain the guarantee in his own office and without the presence of the 
branch manager. 
117 See Beneficial Finance Corporation v TAB Constructions Pty Ltd (Unreported Supreme 
Court NSW, Giles J, 11 August 1993) and on appeal in Younan and Bechara v Beneficial 
Finance Corporation Ltd (Unreported Court of Appeal, NSW 21 November 1994) with 
regard to advice to Mrs Younan, at 17 per Mahoney JA. The test of adequacy of advice 
given is whether it places the weaker party in a position of reasonable equality with the 
superior party, in terms of capacity to look after his own interests. See Commercial Bank 
of Australia Ltd v Amadio {1983) 1S1 CLR 447 at 477. 
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disgruntled guarantor might sue a solicitor who gave advice when he or she was not truly 
independent. us For all these reasons, the standards of independence outlined above should be 
observed. 
Principles ofindependence for advising borrowers are analogous to those for advising guarantors. 
If the borrower has come to the solicitor for advice, or it becomes apparent to the solicitor that 
advice on the propriety of the transaction is required even if the original retainer did not expressly 
require such advice, the solicitor is in dangerous waters if he or she is also acting for the 
lender, 119 and sound professional practice would suggest that advice to the borrower on the 
propriety of the transaction must come from a solicitor who is not acting for the lender. 120 
The relevant jurisdiction's professional conduct rules for solicitors should also be considered. 
For example, in Victoria, r 10(2) of the Solicitors' (Professional Conduct and Practice) Rules 
1984 forbids a solicitor to act for both the lender and the borrower in connection with a loan, 
unless both parties agree to this in writing. Rule 10 ( 6a) forbids a solicitor to act for a guarantor 
if the solicitor is also acting for the borrower or lender, subject to certain exceptions. 
5.3. 7.2 Contents of solicitor's advice 
A clear and understandable explanation of the main terms of the documents and the obligations 
being undertaken is required. The practical effect of those obligations should be brought home 
to the client; for example, whether the client's home may be sold to meet the obligations, whether 
the documents provide that interest rates will rise or that repayments will be accelerated upon a 
default being made, whether the liability being guaranteed is limited or unlimited and how it may 
increase. 121 
118 See O'Donovan 1992 LJJ 51at52-54; Sneddon 1996ABLR 5 at 22. The solicitor owes 
the client/guarantor a duty to exercise all reasonable care and skill in connection with the 
client's business. See Howard Ltd v Woodman Matthews & Co [1983] BCLC 117. A 
solicitor's duty in Australian law cannot be limited strictly to the scope of the retainer 
because a duty may also lie in tort, and the solicitor may be required to take positive 
steps, beyond the specifically agreed professional task or function, to~ avoid a real and 
foreseeable risk. See Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 at 579. 
119 In Powell v Powell [ 1990] 1 Ch 243 at 246-7, it was held that the advising solicitor must 
be independent of the stronger party to the transaction in fact as well as in name and 
hence cannot act for both parties. 
120 HowardLtdv WoodmanMatthews& Co [1983] BCLC 117; O'Donovan 1992L/J51 at 
54. On the solicitor's duty of care, see Waimond (Pty) Ltdv Byrne [1989] NSWLR 642. 
121 Sneddon 1990 UNSWLJ302 at 321. 
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The extent to which a solicitor should go beyond explanation to canvass the propriety of the 
transaction for the client depends upon whether the client is a prospective guarantor or borrower. 
The advice required by a borrower depends upon the nature of the solicitor's retainer. Often the 
terms of the retainer are not explicit and the scope of the retainer is then determined by the terms 
the law implies. The law on a solicitor's obligation to advise a prospective borrower regarding 
the financial propriety of the transaction is still developing and there is some conflict in the case 
law. An investigation into the duties of advice to a borrower falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. 122 
5.3.7.3 Advice to prospective guarantors: 123 advice on the propriety of the transaction. 
It is clearly established that a solicitor advising a prospective guarantor, as well as explaining the 
documents, ought to advise on the propriety of the transaction for the guarantor, that is, the nature 
and extent of the risk presented by the transaction and the wisdom of the guarantor's entering 
into the transaction. 124 This is not financial advice in the sense of advising on the suitability of 
122 For leading cases on the subject, see Hogan v Howard Finance Ltd [1987] ASC 55-594; 
Esanda Finance Corporation v Murphy [1989] ASC 55-703; O'Brien v Hooker Homes 
Pty Ltd[l993] ASC 56-217. In summary of these cases, the present law appears to be as 
follows: Unless the retainer expressly requires it, the obligation does not extend to 
canvassing a range of possible sources of finance and advising which is best. The 
principal obligation is to warn the borrower client if the proposed transaction is 
improvident or unlikely to succeed. This will involve a discussion of the borrower's 
capacity to repay given the terms of the finance and the borrower's other commitments, 
an assessment of these matters and, if necessary, firm advice against entering into the 
transaction on the terms proposed. Finally, it may be appropriate to recommend that the 
client take independent financial advice. Certainly, lenders may wish to ensure that some 
borrowers receive independent financial advice as well as independent legal advice. 
123 In Shotter v Wespac Banking Corporation and Villars [1987] BCL 352, Wylie J of the 
High Court of New Zealand created a new duty: 
11A duty of explanation, warning or recommendation of separate advice arises 
when a bank should reasonably suspect that its customer may not fully understand 
the meaning of the guarantee and the extent of the liability undertaken thereby or 
that there is some special circumstance known to the bank which it should 
reasonably suspect might not be known to the prospective guarantor and which 
might be likely to affect that person's decision to enter to the guarantor." 
This is not part of Australian law. 
124 This is clear in the case of undue influence: see Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar 
[ 1929] AC 127 at 13 5-13 6 (England); Bester v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [ 1970] 3 NSWR 
30; Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649 at 684. In regard to unconscionability, see, in 
regard to propriety, Commercial Bank of v Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 
and Guthrie v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1989] NSW Conv R 55-
463. In regard to the solicitor's duties, see McNamara v Commonwealth Trading Bank 
of Australia (1984) 37 SASR 232 at 241. 
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a range of financial options and their tax implications. It is a warning about and a discussion of: 
• the financial risk posed by the particular transaction; 
• the factors and information relevant to evaluating that risk; 
• the ability of the guarantor to cover that risk if it eventuates; 
• the right of the guarantor not to proceed; and 
• in appropriate cases, advice about whether the guarantor should sign. 125 
In Collier v Mor/end Finance Corporation (Vic) (Pty) Ltd126 independent advice was tendered 
to elderly parents (the Colliers) who were, in substance, providing a third-party security for a loan 
to their son. In form the parents sold their home to the son for a stated consideration which no 
one expected him to pay. In substance they gave him the home on the understanding that they 
would be able to live there until they died and that the son would use the property as security to 
raise a loan to finance the purchase of a business. The finance broker had told the son that the 
lender would not accept a third-party security from the Colliers and that they should transfer the 
property to the son. The son and his mother were referred to a solicitor chosen by the finance 
broker for independent advice on the "sale" of the house. The solicitor verified that the parties 
understood that the transaction was really a gift, verified the son's undertaking that the parents 
could continue to live in the house, and had them execute the contract of sale and transfer. 
Meagher JA said that the advice tendered seemed somewhat deficient: 
"There seems to have been no discussion about who would repay the mortgage and from 
what source of funds; no discussion about the sham nature of the so-called "sale"; and no 
discussion about what steps the lender might take if the mortgage were not repaid 
according to its tenor. 11127 
In other words, the risks of the transaction and its propriety for the Colliers should have been 
addressed in the advice. However, no relief was given in the Collier case because the lender was 
125 A duty to advise under this item is supported by McNamara v Commonwealth Trading 
Bank of Australia (1984) 3 7 SASR 232 at 241. In Banco Exterior Internacional v Mann 
[1995] 1 All ER 936 (England), all the members of the Court of Appeal considered that 
a solicitor should advise a surety that he or she is under no obligation to sign the 
documents,( at 944, 948 and 950). HobhouseLJ (at 948) said thatin some cases a solicitor 
may need to advise the guarantor not to sign. Bingham l\.1R. (at 950) said it was no part 
of a solicitor's duty to advise a surety not to sign and Morritt LJ did not comment on the 
point. See, also, Bester v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [ 1970] 3 NSWR 30 (Australia). 
126 [1989] NSW Conv R 55-473; A'SC 58-428. 
127 Ibid, at 5 8-443. The Judge noted that the solicitor was not called to give evidence and that 
the court was deprived of the benefit of what he would wish to say. 
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ignorant of the actions of the finance broker and the inadequacy of the advice given. The court 
held that it is not necessary to establish knowledge by the lender of the vitiating factors to entitle 
a plaintiff to relief, but lack of knowledge by the lender is relevant to the court's exercise of its 
discretion whether or not to grant relief Here the lender was considered an innocent party and 
it would not have been just to deprive him of the benefit of his contract. 128 
In Banco Exterior Internacional v Mann129 Bingham MR said: 
"It is an ordinary incident of a solicitor's duty to explain the obvious potential pitfalls of 
legal transactions to those about to take part in them and there is no clear dividing line 
between explanation and advice. If the certifying solicitor did his job with reasonable 
competence ... [the surety] would appreciate quite clearly that if the worst happened she 
could lose her rights in the house and that it was for her to decide whether she was 
willing to take that risk or not. " 
In the McNamara130 case King CJ spoke of the duty of a solicitor to a client who consults the 
solicitor for advice about signing a guarantee, as follows: 131 
"The solicitor should raise with the client questions relating to the prudence of entering 
into the guarantee and should ascertain whether the client wishes to be advised as to such 
questions. The client may, of course, indicate that he does not wish advice as to those 
matters and that he is prepared to rely upon his own judgment. But unless the client so 
instructs the solicitor, the instructions from the client should be regarded as extending to 
advice on all matters relating to it from a particular point of view. The state of the 
financial affairs of the principal debtor should be discussed as well as the extent of the 
assets of the client. A client whose assets are few and who will be putting the whole of 
his assets, perhaps including his home, at risk obviously needs careful and perhaps quite 
forthright advice. The need is even greater when, as so often is the case, the affairs of the 
principal debtor are precarious. Solicitors undertaking to advise clients in relation to 
guarantees would do well to study the cases as to the type of independent advice which 
is required to rebut a presumption of undue influence." 
128 See Sneddon 1990UNSWL.f302 at 337 for a discussion of the case. 
129 [1995] 1 All ER 936 at 950. 
130 (1984) 37 SASR 232. 
, 131 Ibid, at 241. 
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The duty set out here will require a discussion of the extent of the risk that the surety is 
undertaking as measured against the resources of the surety. Matters relevant to the extent of the 
surety's risk will include: 
• the terms of the liability set out in the documents; 
• the borrower's financial position; and 
• the viability of any business venture of the borrower which is expected to repay the 
debt. 132 
Solicitors may not have access to information about the last two matters nor the expertise to 
assess the third. In such cases, it has been suggested, solicitors have three options: 
(1) limit their advice on the propriety of the transaction to the matters about which they do 
know; advise the guarantor of the factors relevant to the risk being undertaken; advise the 
guarantor, in writing, on what information was not available for the purposes of the 
advice; advise that the guarantor may wish to make inquiries about the matters not known 
and seek independent financial advice on the viability of the borrower's business venture; 
(2) limit their retainers to avoid advising on the propriety of the transaction altogether; 
(3) seek the missing information from the lender; if it is not forthcoming, advise the client 
in writing of the lender's non-co-operation and note it on any certificate to the lender so 
that the lender will bear whatever flows from the impairment in the quality of the advice 
caused by the absence of the information. 133 
If the lender does not provide the solicitor with sufficient information to advise the guarantor 
adequately as to the risk being run, the lender will not be able to assume that the guarantor has 
received adequate independent advice.134 
132 Sneddon l996ABLR 5 at 23. 
133 Sneddon 1990 UNSWLJ 302 at 322-324; Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 23-24; Guthrie v 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1989] NSW Conv R 55-463. 
134 This was the exact situation in Levett and Others v Barclays Bank pie [1995] 2 All ER 
615 (England). InAlliedlrishBankv Byrne [1995] 1 FCR430, a woman was induced by 
her former husband's misrepresentation to open a joint account with him to be used 
solely for his benefit and to execute an all-moneys charge, expressed to secure only her 
own indebtedness, but which by virtue of the joint account secured his debts also. The 
bank sent the wife, with the charge document only, to a solicitor for independent advice. 
The solicitor was not given any information about the amount, purpose or terms of any 
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It is clear that there are real risks and dangers confronting solicitors dealing with loan security 
documentation generally and a duty to provide independent advice will add to the burden. 135 
5.3. 7.4 Limitation of solicitor's retainer 
In McNamara v Commonwealth Trading Bank, 136 King CJ stated that a solicitor who is consulted 
by a prospective guarantor should advise on all matters relating to the guarantee, including the 
prudence of entering into the guarantee from a practical point of view, unless the client instructs 
the solicitor otherwise. In other words, the retainer will be viewed as impliedly including advice 
on the propriety of the transaction. Advice on the financial propriety of a loan transaction may 
also be an implied part of a retainer from a client who has requested the solicitor to arrange 
finance or where the client's circumstances necessitate such advice. Of course, a solicitor may 
be expressly retained to give such advice. 
If a solicitor does not wish to advise on the financial propriety of a transaction, can the solicitor 
limit the retainer to exclude such advice? From the general principles of Australian contract law 
the answer should be in the affirmative because a retainer is a contract for services, the terms of 
which can be negotiated and agreed to by the parties. Thus, a solicitor and client should be able 
to agree on express limitations on the services to be provided. However, the fiduciary nature of 
the relationship would suggest that the client must be fully apprised of any such limitation and 
its effect. The limitation of the retainer must be explicit and its effect must be brought home to 
the client at the commencement of that retainer, otherwise the solicitor may be open to an action 
for professional negligence. In Collier v Mor/end Finance Corporation (Vic) Pty Ltcf31 Hope JA 
addressed this issue as follows: 
facilities to be secured by the charge, nor could he be aware from the terms of the charge 
that the woman was entering into a suretyship arrangement. It was thus impossible for the 
solicitor to advise the woman about the risk she was running. The bank ought to have 
realised that the solicitor was unlikely to have obtained this information from the wife or 
any other source and it was therefore not entitled to assume that the wife had been 
adequately advised. 
135 The following cases are illustrative ofinstances where the solicitor was sued: Demetrios 
v Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 561 (fraudulent 
misepresentation); Clark and Others v Barter and Others [1989] A & NZ Conv R 212 
(withholding from the client relevant knowledge; failure to disclose important facts); 
Albury and Others v Gulror Pty Ltd [1992] A & NZ Conv R 482 (failure to explain 
transaction and risks; acting for both lender and borrower); Farnham v Orrell and Others 
[1989] NSW Conv R 55-443 (solicitor acting for both parties; failure to advise) .. 
136 (1984) 37 SASR 232. 
137 [1989] ASC 58-428 at 58-441. 
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"[I]f a client goes to a solicitor to get independent advice about a transaction and its 
effect, the solicitor cannot limit his responsibility to give that advice by having the client 
sign a piece of paper which restricts the solicitor's retainer to giving something which is 
or may be less than appropriate independent advice, unless the solicitor makes it plain to 
the client that he will not, or will not necessarily, be giving that appropriate advice to the 
client as to the transaction and its effect." 138 
Any limitation of the retainer should be explained to the client at the outset, agreed to in writing 
by the client and reflected in any certificate which the solicitor may give to the lender about the 
advice. 
Hope JA went on to point out that advice given under an expressly limited retainer may not be 
adequate to cure a taint of unfairness in a transaction. 139 This would be true under both the 
equitable doctrines and under the statutory unfairness provisions. Thus a retainer could explicitly 
exclude advice as to the financial propriety of a transaction, but if part of the operative unfairness 
in a transaction were the fact that the guarantor or borrower lacked the capacity to fully 
appreciate and evaluate the financial risk involved in the obligations being undertaken, such 
limited advice would do nothing to cure that unfairness. In cases such as these the lender would 
need to ensure that the guarantor or borrower received advice about the financial propriety of the 
transaction from some other source, such as the lender or a financial adviser. 
5.3. 7.5 Solicitor's liability to lender on a certificate of advice 
In Australian law, concurrent liability in contract and tort may exist between parties in a 
contractual or commercial relationship. 140 A solicitor may be liable to a lender for the statements 
made in a certificate of advice if they are made negligently (on the basis of negligent 
misstatement): 141 or if they involve a misrepresentation or are otherwise misleading and deceptive 
(under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) or State Fair Trading Act equivalents). 142 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539. 
141 HowardLtdv WoodmanMatthews&Co [1983] BCLC 117 (England); WaimondPtyLtd 
v Byrne [1989] 18 NSWLR 642; O'Donovan 1992 LIJ 51 at 53-54 (Australia). 
142 S 13 nof the Fair Trading Act of 1992 (ACT); s 43 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 
(NSW); s 43 of the Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act of 1990 (NT); s 39 of the Fair 
Trading Act of 1989 (Qld); s 57 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987 (SA);s 15 of the Fair 
259 
The existence of a duty of care in tort would depend upon whether there was a sufficient 
relationship of proximity between the solicitor and lender. 143 Given that the lender is provided 
with the certificate, at the lender's request for the purpose of assuring the lender that the 
guarantee or loan is likely to withstand attack and that it concerns advice given to a prospective 
counterparty to the lender in a transaction, the requisite relationship of proximity would usually 
exist. If the statements in the certificate were negligently made and were relied upon by the lender 
in proceeding with the transaction and the transaction was later set aside or relief was given 
against the lender because of unfairness to the counter party, which the certificate would have 
led the lender to believe had been cured or no longer existed, then the solicitor would be prima 
facie liable to the lender for the loss that flowed from the lender's reliance on the negligently 
made statements. 144 
Under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth), if the statements in the certificate were 
misleading and deceptive and caused loss to the lender (usually by the lender's relying145 on them 
in order to proceed with the transaction), the lender could recover the amount of that loss by an 
action under s 82. An unincorporated solicitor not engaged in interstate trade and commerce 
might escape the reach of Pt v of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth)146 but would still be 
caught by the equivalent Fair Trading Act provisions in each State and Territory. 
Trading Act of 1990 (Tas); s 1 lA of the Fair Trading Act of 1985 (Vic); s 11 of the Fair 
Trading Act of 1987 (WA). A solicitor could also be liable in the tort of deceit for 
knowingly making false statements in a certificate. 
143 Bond Corporation Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 215; Schepis and 
Others v Elders IXL Ltd (1986) 70 ALR 729. 
144 HG & R Nominees Pty Ltd v Fava [1995] V Conv R 66- 155 at 66-200; 66-201.The 
solicitor's negligence in this case did not cause the lender any damage because the 
surety's mortgage was held to be enforceable. See, also, Waimond Pty Ltd v Byrne [ 1989] 
18 NSWLR 642. 
145 The loss must have been caused by the misleading and deceptive conduct. It is not 
necessary that the claimant itself relied on the conduct. See Janssen-Cilag Pty Ltd v 
Pfizer Pty Ltd [1992] ATPR 41-186, but in this context it is most likely that if the 
certificate causes the lender loss, it will be because the lender relied on it. 
146 Note thats 6(3) extends the application of some of the consumer protection provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth), including s 52, to catch conduct by natural 
persons involving the use of postal, telegraphic or telephone services. The mailing or 
faxing of a certificate of advice could bring a -solicitor's conduct within s 52. 
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5.3.7.6 Suggested solution of the problems for bankers and solicitors147 
There would seem to be three possible strategies for preserving the protective benefit of proven 
independent advice for the lender without exposing the solicitor to liability to the lender:148 
( 1) The solicitor certifies the advice to the lender in carefully circumscribed terms. 
(2) The solicitor certifies the advice to the lender with a disclaimer. 
(3) The guarantor or borrower certifies the advice to the lender. 
5.3.7.6.1 Certification: circumscribing the terms of the certificate 
Recent English Court of Appeal cases149 have held that a general certificate that the surety has 
been advised entitles the lender to assume that the certifying solicitor has provided all the 
necessary explanation, advice and warning, even ifthat is not the case. To avoid such a shifting 
of responsibility and risk from lender to solicitor, the certificate should carefully state what has 
and has not been advised to the client. The Law Institute of Victoria has asked its its members 
to use standard forms of certificates agreed to by the Institute and the Australian Bankers 
Association. 1s0 Almost identical certificates have been recommended by the Law Society ofNew 
South Wales. 1s1 
There is also provision for a certificate of advice to a borrower and a certificate by a 
147 The suggestions are those of Sneddon 1996ABLR 5 at 29-34. A solicitor will always be 
potentially liable to the guarantor or borrower client for professional negligence. The risk 
of negligence in giving advice is not increased by the act of certifying the advice to a 
lender. However, the risk of being sued for negligence by the client may be increased if, 
as a result of the certificate, the lender can uphold a transaction tainted with unfairness. 
The best way to minimise this risk is to treat the giving of such advice as a serious 
business, have a good set of procedures in place and keep adequate records, including a 
written record of the advice or a written acknowledgment from the client of verbal advice 
given. The Victorian Solicitors Liability Committee has published recommended 
procedures for this purpose: see Learning From Amadio (booklet published June 1995) 
and quoted by Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 29. 
148 Sneddon 1996ABLR 5 at 29; O'Donovan 1992 LIJ51at54 for a checklist. 
149 Massey v Midland Bank plc [ 1995] 1 All ER 929; Banco Exterior Internacional v Mann 
[1995] 1 All ER 936; Bank of Baroda v Rayarel [1995] 2 FLR 376. 
150 The certificates were published in 1994 LIJ 907-911 (October 1994). 
151 See Lang, Anderson & Skinner Protecting Mortgagors and Guarantors 91 for an 
example, and at 62-91 for a discussion on the aspect of explanation of loan documents 
and certificates of explanati:on. 
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translator/interpreter. For the protection of the solicitor, there is also a form of written 
acknowledgment by the borrower or guarantor client that the client has received and understood 
the advice and explanations provided. 
5.3. 7.6.2 Certification: adding a disclaimer to the certificate 
In negotiations between the ABA and the LIV, lenders have resisted the inclusion of disclaimers 
in solicitors' certificates because they believe it will reduce the value to them of the certificate. 
Lender representatives have also stated that lenders will not sue solicitors on their certificates. 152 
5.3. 7.6.3 Certification: disclaimer: liability in negligence 
In general, a properly drafted disclaimer in a certificate to another person can exclude the liability 
in negligence of the author of the certificate to the recipient, for the contents of the certificate. 153 
This is subject to one exception. Liability for negligent misstatements was originally thought to 
be based on an assumption of responsibility by the person making the statement and it was 
thought that an express disclaimer of such responsibility would then prevent a duty of care 
arising. 154 The modem Australian view is that a duty of care is imposed by law155 if information 
or advice has been sought in the course of business and the person giving the information knew 
or ought to have known that it would be relied upon by the person for whom it was intended and 
it was reasonable for that person to so rely. 156 In the modem view, a disclaimer ofliability might 
not be effective ifthe defendant should have known that the plaintiff would rely on the statement 
despite the disclaimer; for example, if the defendant was the only possible source of the 
information or advice. 157 That exception does not apply to independent solicitors' certificates. 
Any one solicitor is not the only possible source of a certificate about advice given to a 
prospective guarantor or borrower. The lender could ask the guarantor or borrower what they had 
152 Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 32. 
153 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 where the House of 
Lords held that the defendants were not liable to the plaintiffs because their advice was 
given "without responsibility". 
154 Ibid, at 486. 
155 Mutual Life and Citizens Assurance Co Ltdv Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556 at 570. 
156 L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd and Another v Parramatta City Council (No I) (1981) 
150 CLR 225; San Sebastian Pty Ltd and Another v Minister Administering 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 and Another ( 1986) 162 CLR 340. 
157 Davies 1991 UNSWLJ 171at195. 
262 
been advised or send them to another solicitor and seek a certificate from that other solicitor, 
without a disclaimer. 
Therefore, an appropriately drafted disclaimer in a solicitor's certificate should exclude the 
liability of the solicitor to the lender, for negligence. 
5.3. 7.6.4 Certification: disclaiming liability for misleading and deceptive conduct in terms 
of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act or Fair Trading Act equivalents 
In order to determine whether conduct is misleading or deceptive, the conduct must be 
considered as a whole, taking account of both the representation made and any disclaimer. A 
disclaimer might prevent persons from relying on misleading conduct and thus deprive them of 
a cause of action under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) because their loss was not 
suffered by conduct in breach of the Act. But if, as a matter of fact, the person relied on the 
misleading conduct notwithstanding the disclaimer, the disclaimer will not save the person who 
engaged in the conduct. 158 
Because the lender will in fact rely on the certificate notwithstanding the disclaimer suggested 
above (and that is the purpose of the lender's taking the certificate) the disclaimer will not 
negative reliance. Nor will it render a misleading statement in the certificate, not misleading. 
It is therefore likely that the liability of a solicitor for a misleading or deceptive statement in the 
certificate under s 52 cannot be excluded.159 The only remedy is to be careful in drawing the 
terms of the certificate and in making the statements in the certificate. Given the terms of the Law 
Institute certificate set out above, there seems little scope for misrepresentation on the part of a 
solicitor who is reasonably careful in doing what the certificate requires. 
5.3. 7. 7 Guarantor certifies advice to lender 
Another option which has been suggested, 160 is to require the guarantor or borrower to take 
independent advice and have the guarantor or borrower certify that fact and the content of that 
158 Karawi Construction Pty Ltd v Bonefind Pty Ltd [1993] ATPR 41-265. 
159 There are some other possibilities which could be explored, such as a covenant by the 
lender not to sue the solicitor or an agreement that the lender bears the risk of reliance on 
the certificate. See Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 33. 
160 By the Perth branch of the Banking Finance and Consumer Credit Committee of the Law 
Council of Australia in May 1994. See Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 35. 
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advice, to the lender. This method would give the lender a reasonable belief that independent 
advice had been obtained, with all that flows from that, without producing a direct representation 
from solicitor to lender that could be the basis for later action. If the guarantor or borrower lied 
or misstated the fact that advice had been sought or the content of the advice, this would be an 
obstacle in the path of establishing that the lender bore any liability for unfairness in the 
transaction. 161 
One problem with this alternative approach is that if the solicitor knows that the client will be 
certifying the fact that advice was sought and the content of the advice, to the lender, there is a 
possibility that the solicitor may have a duty of care to the lender to provide that client with 
reasonably careful advice. 162 If that were the case the solicitor would have to tell the client that 
the advice was given, without responsibility to the lender, and either trust the client to pass that 
disclaimer on to the lender or communicate that disclaimer directly to the lender. Obviously both 
these courses are attended by practical difficulties. Ifthere was the significant risk of a solicitor's 
owing a duty of care to a lender in such circumstances, it would seem to be safer for the solicitor 
to provide the certificate and include a disclaimer rather than to have the client provide the 
certificate, with a separate disclaimer by the solicitor trailing behind and possibly never arriving. 
In summary, each of the three methods described preserves the bene~cial effect of independent 
advice for the client and the lender while reducing the exposure of solicitors to loss-sharing with 
the lender. The "best" method or combination of methods will have to be determined in 
negotiations between lenders and solicitors' bodies. 163 
161 There remains the hard case of the wife who will execute whatever document she is told 
to execute by her husband without reading it because of his undue influence over her. 
This may be a particular risk in the case of couples from some Asian and southern 
Mediterranean cultures, In such a case, if the lender had notice of the undue influence, 
a court may hold that no document signed by the wife will assist in upholding the 
transaction. But a solicitor's certificate would not necessarily improve matters for the 
lender if the wife did what the husband said regardless of the solicitor's advice and the 
lender had notice of that degree of undue influence. In this type of hard case the lender 
is probably forced to take its chances on the transaction or reject the wife as guarantor. 
162 Authority in Victoria (Lowe R Lippman Figdor & Franck v A GC (Advances) Ltd [ 1992] 
2 VR 671 and South Australia (Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick (1994) 
Aust Torts Rep 81-243): all cases involving the liability of auditors to third parties would 
suggest that the solicitor had no duty of care to the lender in the Esanda case unless the 
solicitor intended to induce the lender to rely on the advice provided to the client and 
represented in the client's certificate. But the Lowe Lippman case has been criticised and 
may be distinguishable. See Davies 1993 Torts LI 114 who doubts whether the decision 
will have any effect as a precedent outside the narrow confines of its particular facts. 
163 Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 33-34. 
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5.3. 7.8 Payment for independent advice 
Unless someone is prepared to pay the solicitor a reasonable remuneration for the onerous 
obligations the law requires of the independent adviser and the risks involved in certifying that 
advice to a third party, solicitors will be reluctant to give independent advice and certificates at 
all or will seek to limit their retainers so as to provide much less than the courts would expect 
a solicitor to provide. 164 
The cost of independent advice to borrowers and guarantors, when required by a lender, should 
be viewed as a cost of borrowing which, like fees for property valuation and insuring the lender's 
interest in real security, will usually be paid ultimately by the borrower. Guarantors are likely to 
object to paying any fee. They are proposing to incur a liability for no return and should not have 
to pay for the privilege. Independent advice to a guarantor is of economic benefit to the lender 
and the borrower and should be paid by the lender and may be passed on to the borrower. To 
avoid conflict-of-interest problems, the lender and solicitor must agree in advance that the 
solicitor's fee will be paid for the advice, not for the certificate, and will be paid whether or not 
the advice is in favour of proceeding with the transaction, whether or not the guarantor does 
decide to proceed with the transaction and whether or not the guarantor's understanding of the 
advice and answers to questions enable the solicitor to provide a certificate in the form the lender 
wants. 165 
If the advice and certificate enable the guarantee to proceed, no doubt the cost of the advice will 
be passed on by the lender to the borrower as a cost of borrowing. If the guarantee does not 
proceed the lender may still choose to pass on the cost of the advice to the borrower or may 
choose to pass it on to all borrowers by building it into an application fee or other general fee. 166 
If the fee for certified independent advice is set at an appropriate remunerative level with a profit 
164 In Victoria, solicitors are charging between $100 and $400 with an average of $22-0 for 
independent advice on guarantees. This was quoted by the Victorian Law Institute 
Working Party at a Law Institute Seminar on Guarantees and Independent Solicitors' 
Certificates 27 October 1994. Fees at the lower end of this scale would barely cover the 
costs of opening the file, interviewing the client, providing verbal advice and executing 
the various Law Institute certificates, let alone cover the costs of written advice or any 
genuine attempt to evaluate the practical risks of entering into the guarantee. One 
Victorian solicitor is offering an independent advice video on the general nature of the 
transaction which can be supplemented with a personal interview on the specifics of the 
particular transaction. See Sneddon l996ABLR 5 at 34; O'Donovan l992LIJ5l at 54 
165 Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 34. 
166 Sneddon 1996 ABLR 5 at 34. 
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component, solicitors will not view the task as a loss-making favour to a good client or 
influential lender and will have the incentive to give the task the full time and attention it 
demands in order to be done properly. 167 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
If one summarizes the above discussion, the following stands out: 
• Independent advice to guarantors and borrowers can be an important tool for protecting 
the interests of some guarantors and borrowers and therefore for protecting bankers' 
transactions with those guarantors and borrowers. Independent advice does not give 
complete protection to all transactions, but appears to be preferable to bankers' own 
explanations and warnings. It offers the most protection when it is used as part of a 
package of protective measures such as those contained ins 17 of the Code ofBanking 
Practice, and is coupled with the assumption of a fair duty of disclosure. It is not 
necessary to require independent advice in all cases and its use should be limited to 
transactions with a high risk of impeachment for unfairness. 
• If independent advice is to be used, then to maximise its benefit lenders need some proof 
that adequate independent advice has been given to the guarantor or borrower. Merely 
urging that advice be taken is insufficient. Although the guarantor or borrower could 
certify the advice, lenders may continue to prefer independent solicitors' certificates as 
proof that advice was actually taken and was adequate. 
• The courts require independent advice to go beyond an explanation of the nature of the 
transaction and the general effects of the documents, and to warn of the practical 
implications of the transaction and to address its risks and its propriety for guarantor 
clients and, in some limited cases, for borrower clients. This full-bodied independent 
advice must be better remunerated than the "quick-fix" advice which some lenders 
currently seem to expect and some solicitors provide. The fee should reflect the 
professional task to be undertaken, and not the reverse. In the case of guarantors and 
perhaps some borrowers, the fee for the advice should be paid by the lender and later 
charged to the borrower. 
• Like any professional task, properly remunerated independent advice is not without risk 
167 Sneddon 1996ABLR 5 at 34. 
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or reward. With a proper understanding of the law on a solicitor's obligations to a client 
seeking advice, a careful advice procedure and a carefully drawn certificate, the risks to 
solicitors can be controlled. For a banker, the risk ofits transactions being later impugned 
is minimized (not eliminated) by certified independent advice and, of course, the interests 
of vulnerable guarantors and borrowers are protected. Independent advice and 
independent solicitors' certificates are not fail-safe protection mechanisms; nor need they 
be a crude loss-sharing device. Iflenders are discerning about when independent advice 
is required, if solicitors address carefully the legal and practical aspects of advice as 
required by the courts and are adequately remunerated for doing so and the certificate of 
advice is properly drafted, then independent solicitors' certificates provide all parties 
involved with a balance of benefit and risk which is superior to any of the currently 
available alternatives. 168 
168 See pars 5.3.7.1; 5.3.7.2; 5.3.7.3; 5.3.7.4; 5.3.7.5 supra. 
267 
CHAPTER 6: THE BANKER'S DUTIES OF 
DISCLOSURE AND ADVICE TO CUSTOMERS AND 
SURETIES: GERMANY 
6.1 A COMPARATIVE NOTE 
6.1.1 European legal families 
The aim of this sub-chapter is to give some background information on the legal system of 
Germany. 
Until recently it was common to divide the European legal systems into five groups - so-called 
"legal families" .1 Many authors2 distinguished on the continent: 
(I) the French legal family; 
(2) the German legal family; 
(3) the Nordic legal family; 
( 4) the Socialist legal family; and 
(5) the Anglo-American legal family. 
The British Isles and Ireland were described as countries belonging to the Anglo-American legal 
family. However, some authors have stressed that since there exist so many similarities between 
the first three-mentioned legal families - especially in comparison with the other legal families 
-it would be better to speak about a Romano-Germanic legal family with three sub-families.3 
Since developments in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 the former socialist legal systems have 
been in a period of transition. Many new statutes, influenced by regulations and ideas from other 
continental European legal systems are gradually being enacted in the former socialist countries 
and in a few years it is likely that these countries will no longer constitute a separate legal 
1 Malstrom 1969 Scandinavian Studies in Law 127 et seq. 
2 See, eg, Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 63-73. 
3 See, for instance, De Cruz Comparative Law 27-40; Arminjon et al Traite 47 et seq are 
of the opinion that modem systems oflaw should be grouped according to substance and, 
in applying such a formula, arrived at seven legal families. 
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family. 4 In this sub-chapter no remarks will be made about the codifications still in force during 
the actual transition period of these countries. Although some remarks will be made about 
procedural law, this introduction will focus primarily on civil and commercial law. 5 Studying 
European legal systems in the fields of the law of contracts, torts and property, one should realize 
that all legal systems were largely influenced by Roman law. 6 These influences are obvious in 
the continental European systems.7 Some rules can be traced back to regulations of the Corpus 
Juris Civilis of Emperor Justinian. But it should also not be forgotten that some points of 
English and Irish law have been influenced by the manner of thought of Roman law, mainly 
because during the Middle Ages judges often had an ecclesiastical background and were educated 
in the principles of canon law, which was largely influenced by principles of Roman law. 8 It can 
be said that private law in Europe is in the process of acquiring a genuinely European character. 9 
The law of the European Communities, in the form of treaty, council regulations and directives, 
plays a large role in the legal systems of the Member States today, especially in the area of 
commercial law. 10 
European Community law also indirectly influences the commercial law of non-Member States, 
since most of these States are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFT A), which 
has concluded an important treaty with the European Community on this matter, namely the 
4 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 97. 
5 For short descriptions of the procedural laws of the Member States of the EC, see 
Sheridan et al EC Legal Systems. 
6 Koschaker Europa 70 et seq; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 133-135. 
7 See Coing Einheit; Coing Grundlagen; Koschaker Europa 70 et seq; Zweigert & Kotz 
Introduction 133. 
8 Roman Law and Canon Law were quite closely connected to one another. Historian 
Maitland, quoted in Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 72, stated that: 
"The Imperial mother and her papal daughter were fairly good friends". 
On the Roman influences on the common law see Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 186 and 
194 et seq; Zimmermann in Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 75-76. 
9 Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 8. 
10 See Kramer 1988 JB 477; Muller-Graff Gemeinschaftsrecht; Remien 1992 JZ 277; 
Starck ( ed) Rechtsvereinheitlichung 90; Hommelhoff 1992 AcP 71; Ulmer 1992 JZ 1; 
Muller-Graff NJW 13-23; Flessner 1992 RabelsZ 243-260; Zimmermann & Whittaker 
(eds) Good Faith 8-10. 
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European Economic Area Treaty. 11 
In the following sub-chapters the background to German law will be investigated. 
6.1.2 The German group12 
6.1.2.1 Introduction13 
The reception of Roman law which took place during and after the Middle Ages had an important 
influence on the legal systems which belong to the German group. This was caused by the fact 
that there was no central power in the German Empire; local landlords and cities held most of 
the power. Even though there was an emperor, the court was not fixed in one place, it moved 
from town to town. Contrary to the situation in for instance France or England, no centres were 
developed where lawyers and legal academics were educated. Owing to this situation the easiest 
way to develop one's own legal system was to update Roman law14. Furthermore, the German 
emperors considered themselves as direct successors of the Roman emperors. 15 In Germany in 
particular, the so-called Pandectists tried to elaborate a scientific system of private law based on 
the principles of the Digesta (or Pandects) of the corpus iuris civilis of the Roman-Byzantian 
emperor Justinian. The school of Pandectists tried to transform the old Roman law into a 
contemporary legal system. A good example of these attempts was the important treatise of Von 
Savigny on the system of modem Roman law16 published in 1840. In particular, this treatise and 
the works of Puchta and Windscheid influenced the content of the legal systems of the German 
group and of the commentaries written on the Civil Codes, which continue the tradition of the 
Pandectists. 17 The consequence of this tradition has been that the codes of the German group are 
much more systematic than the codification within other groups. Moreover, the "general 
11 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 98 
12 Apart from Germany, Austria, Greece, and Switzerland also fall into this group. 
13 On the history ofGerman Law, see Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 132-142. 
14 Zweigert & KOtz Introduction 140. 
15 Koschaker Europa 70 et seq; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 135; Hartkamp et al (eds) 
European Code 104. 
16 System. 
17 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction l 3 8-141; Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 104. 
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principles" play a considerably more important role. 18 
6.1.2.2 Germany 
Before 1870 Germany did not exist as one State, and seven independent States existed within the 
territory of Germany. 19 Some of these States had Civil Codes in the French tradition (Baden; 
Rhineland); others knew codifications of another older tradition like Prussia ( Allgemeines 
Landrecht fur die preussischen Staaten of 1794 (General Land Law) 20 or Bavaria (Codex 
Maximilianus Bavaricus of 175621 ) • Other States again, had no codification and the received 
Roman law was applied next to local statutes ( usus modernus pandectarum) . 22 At the beginning 
of the nineteenth century there was a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of a 
codification of private law for the whole territory of Germany (Thibault and Von Savigny). A 
Uniform Commercial Code, the Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch23 had already been 
created in 1861 before the establishment of the German empire in 1870. This code was replaced 
by a new one on 1 January 1900. In 1877 a Code on Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung or 
ZPO) and a law on bankruptcy (Konkursordnung)24 were put into force, followed by a Civil Code 
(Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch) on 1 January 1900.25 This code was highly influenced by the received 
Roman law. 26 
After the decline of the German Empire in 1918 the Civil Code remained in force during the 
period of the Weimar republic and the subsequent Third Reich. After the Second World War two 
separate German States arose within the territory of Germany: the Federal Republic of Germany 
18 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 104; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 140. 
19 German law was, to a large extent fragmented. See Markesinis Torts 21-22. 
20 General Land Law of 1794. For a discussion of this Act, see Luig 1994 AcP 521; Dilcher 
1994 ZeuP 446. 
21 Codex Maximilianus Bavaricus of 1756. 
22 Medicus 1972 Int Encyclopedia of Comp Law F 1; Kokkini-Latridou ( ed) Inleiding 221-
237. 
23 Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch of 1861 (ADHGB); See Palandt BGB 2. 
24 Konkursordnung (KO). 
25 See Miinchener Kommentar BGB 8. 
26 Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 822 states that the current law of obligations (Schuldrecht) is 
composed of Roman and Germanic institutions. See, also, Schuster 1896 LQR 17; Freund 
1899-1900 Harvard LR 627. 
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and the German Democratic Republic. The Civil Code remained in force in both States, until an 
independent Zivilgesetzbuch27 was enacted in the German Democratic Republic in 1975, which 
came into force on 1 January 1976. After the reunification of Germany in 1990 the Civil Code 
came into force in the whole territory again. 28 
A special feature of the German Civil Code is the fact that it has as its first book a general part 
giving the rules applicable to the matters regulated by all the following books. The structure of 
the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch is definitely more systematic than the structure of the French Civil 
Code. Many commentaries in Germany follow the order of the articles of the Civil Code. 29 
6.2. BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP 
6.2.1. Introduction: the main legal sources 
As in other legal systems, German law also has several theories on what constitutes a 11banker-
customer relationship".3° For the purposes of this thesis, it is accepted that the relationship 
between banker and customer is not limited to one type of transaction, but is mostly a 
relationship31 which endures for a period and which can consist of several types of business 
transaction. 32 If these conditions are present, a Geschiiftsverbindung33 or business relationship 
27 ZGB. 
28 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 105. 
29 See, in general, Medicus l 972 Int Encyclopedia of Comp Law F 1; Drobnig in Kokkini-
Latridou (ed) lnleiding22l-237; Wieacker Privatrechtsgeschichte 237 et seq; Hartkamp 
et al (eds) European Code 105. 
30 See, in general, Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 3. S 1 AGB-Banken of 1993 makes it clear 
that a relationship comes into being. The text of the AGB-Banken of 1993 is contained 
as an annex.ure, inter alia, in Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 3 99. 
31 A relationship, akin to a fiduciary relationship or Vertrauensverhaltnis comes into being. 
See Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 3. 
32 Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 2-3; Sandklihler Bankrecht 9; Schwintowski & Schafer 
Bankrecht 11. 
33 Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 3.See, in general, Sandklihler Bankrecht 9-18; Fischer & 
Klanten Bankrecht 96; Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 15. This relationship is 
referred to by German lawyers as the "Geschaftsverbindung als gesetzliches 
Schuldverhaltnis ohne primare Leistungspflicht und als Grundlage einer 
'Vertrauenshaftung"'. 
Liability flowing from this relationship is neither a contractual liability nor a pure 
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comes into existence. 
The banker-customer relationship is typically based on one or more contracts concluded between 
a bank and its customer.34 Accordingly, the legal regime of this relationship is constituted by the 
principles of general contract law as found in the German Civil Code35 and Commercial Code. 36 
These codes do not contain special provisions on banking transactions. Instead, the general 
provisions on contracts, for example on credit contracts, 37 agency contracts, 38 purchase 
contracts, 39 commission contracts40 and others, as well as the general principles of good faith, 41 
delictual liability, but similar to liability for culpa in contrahendo - a fiduciary liability 
standing between both categories, and which forms the basis of a gesetzliches 
Schuldverhaltnis or statutory obligation. See Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 9, but for 
criticism see Riimker 1983 ZHR 27 at 31 et seq. Fiduciary liability, cannot arise between 
disconnected (unverbundenen) parties, but only where the parties are in a special 
relationship or Sonderverbindung, which entails a definite contact (Kontakt). This contact 
or relationship must be of a legal nature and not merely of a social nature. See Canaris 
Bankvertragsrecht 9. Canaris, ibid, is of the opinion that this fiduciary liability arises 
from partaking in the legal business sphere (Tei/name am rechtsgeschaftlichen Verkehr). 
This Schuldverhaltnis ohne primare Leistungspflicht or duty without a primary duty of 
performance which came into existence as a result of the relationship, brings about 
certain clear duties of care or Schutzpflichten, such as duties of secrecy, and duties to 
disclose and advise (die Auskunft-und die Beratungspflicht). Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 
9 points out that as these duties are not contractual, but are of a statutory nature 
(gesetzlicher Natur), they exist independent from the individual contracts which may be 
entered into between the bank and the customer, such as a loan agreement, giro 
agreement or discounting agreement. This would mean that these duties exist even before 
a contract is entered into, and may exist even after the particular contracts have been 
fulfilled. These duties therefore exist in conjunction with the Geschaftsverbindung. See 
Canaris Bankvertragsrecht IO; RGZ 122 351 at 356; RGZ 126 50 at 52; RGJW 1930 
2927 at 2928. 
34 It is generally well known that the German banks only contract with a customer on the 
basis that theAGB-Banken of1993 is of application in its agreements. See RGZ 112 253; 
BGH WM 1966973;19 70 632; Schiltz Formularbuch 3; Schonle Bank-und Borsenrecht 
par 2 I 1b2(a); Fischer & KlantenBankrecht 94-95. 
35 Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). 
36 Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB). 
37 Ss 607 et seq BGB. 
38 Ss 675 BGB, and 662 et seq BGB. 
39 Ss 433 et seq BGB; SS 373 et seq HGB. 
40 Ss 383 et seq HGB. 
41 S 157 BGB. 
273 
and on the interpretation of contracts42 are applicable. In addition, the rules and principles on pre-
contractual duties and on tort liability under the German Civil Code come into play. 43 Courts and 
legal doctrine have adapted the general provisions and principles of private and commercial law 
to the special needs and problems ofbanking transactions and have special duties and obligations 
that, as a whole, constitute the special field of private law of banking transactions.44 
This private law of banking transactions is modified and completed by special legislation on the 
protection of customers and investors. The most important laws in this regard are the law on 
General Conditions of Contracts of 1976, 45 the Law on Consumer Credits of 1990, 46 and the 
Securities Trading Act of 1994.47 The AGB-Gesetz does not focus on the banker-customer 
relationship, but deals with all kinds of general conditions of contract or standard form contracts 
as used in the various areas of commerce and industry.48 But it is true that many court decisions 
in terms of this law deal with the making of banking contracts. Equally, the Securities Trading 
Act of 1994 is not confined to banking transactions in the proper sense, but includes the wider 
subject of financial services. Only some provisions of this Act can be qualified as private law; 
the major part deals with the supervision and control of financial services. 
The prudential supervision of banks in Germany is carried out through the Federal Office for the 
Supervision of Credit Institutions (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen) in terms of the Law 
on the Supervision of Credit Institutions of 1961. 49 The law does not establish a legal distinction 
between commercial and investment banking. German banks, as a rule, are allowed to carry on, 
simultaneously, all kinds of banking transactions (under what is known as a universal banking 
system). Supervision laws, although they protect the bank customer, do not give him the right 
to bring claims against the State or supervisory office on the grounds of a violation of supervisory 
42 S 157 BGB: s 346 HGB. 
43 On pre-contractual liability or culpa in contrahendo, see Ballerstedt 1950/1951 AcP 151; 
Markesinis ( ed) Contract 65-71; RGZ 78 239; BGHZ 66 51. Delictual liability is covered 
in ss 823 (I)BGB; 823 (II) BGB and 826 BGB. 
44 On the German private law of banking transactions, see Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 1-99; 
Nobbe Bankrecht 16; Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 3-8. 
45 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen (AGB-Gesetz). 
46 Verbraucherkreditgesetz. 
47 Wertpapierhandelsgesetz. ( WpHG) 
48 Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 649 et seq. 
49 Kreditwesengesetz; Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 31-3 7. 
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duties. Thus, the German Law on the Supervision of Credit Institutions provides that the 
Supervisory Office exercises its supervision exclusively in the public interest. 50 
6.2.2 The banker-customer relationship: various contracts 
The bank customer normally enters into a number of different contracts with his bank, for 
example those relating to the opening of a bank account, a loan, the buying and selling of 
securities, or the use of a safe. The typical basic contract is on the use of a bank account for 
receiving and executing payments by remittance, cashing cheques, debit notes, or the use of 
cheque cards and credit cards. The relationship created on opening a bank account has been 
described in German law as a contract of agency. 51 
As a result, the typical banker-customer relationship can be described as a bundle of different 
contracts. 52 The role of the bank is different in each of these contracts. Sometimes the bank 
renders its services on a continuing basis when carrying out payments and receiving money for 
the customer in terms of contract relating to a bank account. A continuing and often long-term 
contractual relationship over a certain period of time is established also by a credit contract; in 
a typical consumer credit contract, repayment is to be made by instalments together with interest 
payment. In other cases, the contact between bank and customer is short-lived, for example 
when a bank buys or sells securities for its customer. In such a case the bank may act as a broker 
or as an investment adviser, or the bank may itself become the seller or buyer of the securities 
involved. The assumption of the role of investment banker may bring about specific duties for 
the bank. 53 
Besides these differences, the various contracts between bank and customer normally have some 
similarities and common features. Invariably, the bank must act in good faith, 54 must be 
50 S 6 III Kreditwesengesetz. 
51 Or Geschaftsbesorgung; s 675 BGB; BGH ZIP 1996 1079 at 1081; Fischer & Klanten 
Bankrecht 96; Nobbe Bankrecht 16 refers to a Geschajtsverbindung. 
52 Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 96; Nobbe Bankrecht 16; Schwintowski & Schafer 
Bankrecht 11. 
53 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 64-65; Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 787. 
54 In terms of s 242 BGB, a debtor is bound to perform according to the requirements of 
good faith, giving consideration to common usage. 
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reasonable, 55 and not act contradictorily56 when handling the customer's affairs. Another common 
feature of these different contracts is the fact that the banks invariably use uniform general 
conditions of contract as a basis for the contractual relationship with the customer. 57 
The common features of the different contracts existing between a bank and its customer and the 
fact that, normally, general conditions of contract are used in these contracts, have led some 
authors to develop a theory that the relationship between a customer and his bank is based on a 
so-called general banking contract. 58 This general banking contract is said to be concluded when 
the first contract between the bank and its customer takes place. The contract is seen as the source 
of duties of care and diligence and as the contractual basis for the application of the general 
conditions of contract used by banks. 59 
German private international law recognizes the principle of party autonomy, that is the freedom 
of the parties to a contract to choose the law applicable to this contract. 60 In their general 
conditions of contract, 61 the banks propose German law as the applicable law, and if the customer 
accepts these conditions, a choice oflaw to this effect is agreed. Even if these general conditions 
are not made part of the contract, an express or implicit choice of German law can often be found 
because, normally, the banks would conclude contracts only under the law of their main place 
of business. 
In the absence of an express or implicit choice oflaw, s 28 EGBGB prescribes that national law 
is applicable where the gravity of the contract can be found. The decisive criterion here lies in 
which party owes the performance characteristic for this type of contract. This normally leads 
again to the law of the German bank. 62 
55 Zumutbarkeit. See BGH WM 1956 217; BGH WM 1978 234. 
56 Venire contrafactum proprium. See BGH WM 1978 234 at 236. 
57 AGB-Banken of 1993. 
58 See, however, Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 3-4. 
59 Herold & LippischBank-und-Borsenrecht 33; Pikart WM 1957 123 8; Rumker 1983 ZHR 
147 27 at 27-28; Claussen Bank-und Borsenrecht 60 et seq; Horn in Wiegand (ed) 
Aktuelle Probleme 89 et seq; and see the discussion on the relationship and fiduciary 
liability in Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 9-10. 
60 S 27 EGBGB. 
61 S 6(1) AGB-Banken of 1993. 
62 Reithmann & Martiny Jnternationales Vertragsrecht 1066. 
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Many contracts between the bank and its customer are long-term contracts, for example, the 
contract in respect of a bank account or a loan contract. During the lifetime of such contracts, 
the need arises quite frequently to adapt them to changed market conditions or other 
circumstances. In such cases, the bank and the customer have to enter into negotiations about the 
variation of the contract. In many areas of the banking business, where one finds many thousands 
of contracts, individual negotiations about a contract variation are not feasible. Here, the General 
Conditions of Contract offer two solutions: 
(1) The bank may send information about the proposed change and ask its customer to 
contradict within a fair period of time, if he does not agree. 63 
(2) The bank may have reserved a contractual right to change unilaterally a certain condition 
of the contract, for example, the interest rate. Such an agreed right of unilateral variation 
of a contract is generally recognized.64 The party that exercises this right must respect 
general standards of fairness (nach billigem Ermessen); if these standards are violated, 
the court may be approached for relief 65 
In terms of the AGB-Banken of 1993, the banks also reserve the right to change these general 
conditions. Section 1 (2)2 AGB-Banken of 1993 determines that if a bank sends new general 
conditions to its customer, and the customer does not contradict within one month, he is deemed 
to have agreed to these new conditions. Whilst a right to such change can be recognized under 
s 315 BGB as to fees, interest, and compensation, it is doubtful whether it can be recognized as 
to the change of other contractual conditions, where an agreement of the customer other than by 
mere silence appears to be neccessary. 
A long-term contract may be terminated by a lapse of time agreed in the contract or by giving 
notice according to the conditions of the contract. In addition, it is generally recognized in 
German law that there exists, for all long-term contracts, an extraordinary right of giving notice 
when a serious change of circumstances or a misconduct by the other party makes the continuity 
of the contract unfairly burdensome for one party for the future. Such an extraordinary right to 
give notice is also contained in s 18(2) AGB-Banken of 1993 . 
63 S 2 AGB-Banken of 1993. 
64 S 315 BGB. 
65 S 315 (3) BGB; Palandt BGB 396. 
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6.2.3 The banker-customer relationship: the influence of the AGB-Banken of 1993 
The banking industry uses uniform standard conditions of contract in their contracts with 
customers and other banks. These uniform conditions have been drafted by the leading 
associations of banks and are invariably used by all members of these associations. One uniform 
set of such conditions has been drafted by the association of German private banks, 66 another one 
by the association of saving banks, 67 and a third one by the association of cooperative banks. 
These general conditions form an important legal basis for the daily business of banks. In 
addition to these general conditions used in every contract with the customer, the banks use 
general conditions confined to particular banking transactions, and standard form contracts. 68 
The banks have constantly reformed and redrafted these uniform conditions. The current set of 
rules was introduced in 1993 and is, for the first time, well structured according to the main 
activities and duties for the parties. 69 Furthermore, it was much more easily understood by the 
ordinary customer than before. The association of private banks, when drafting these new rules, 
hired linguists and public media agencies to make the new rules as transparent and 
understandable as possible. This is in line with legal doctrine promulgated by the Federal Court 
that general conditions of contract are subject to the general principle of transparency.70 
The AGB-Banken of 1993 is subject to the AGB-Gesetz. 71 This law applies also to the standard-
form contracts used by banks. The law aims at protecting not only the consumer in the proper 
sense, but the customer in general, that is every person who is confronted with a set of general 
conditions used by the other party and proposed for inclusion in a contract. The protection of the 
law extends not only to the private customer, but also to the merchant. 72 The law is aimed more 
66 Allgemeine Geschaftsbedingungen des privaten Bankgewerbes or AGB-Banken of 1993. 
(Reproduced as annexure Ila in Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 399). 
67 Allgemeine Geschaftsbedingungen der Sparkassen of 1993 (Reproduced as annexure Ilb 
in Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 413). 
68 HornAGB-Banken 1993 65-133. 
69 HornAGB-Banken 1993 65-133. 
70 See BGHZ 106 42 at 46; BGHZ 106 259 at 264; HornAGB-Banken 1993 65-133. 
71 WolfHorn Lindacher A GB-Gesetz Kommentar s 23; Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 
11-12. 
72 See S 24 AGB-Gesetz, although to a more limited extent. See Wolf Horn Lindacher 
AGB-Gesetz Kommentar s 24 at par 1 . 
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at maintaining general standards of fairness in contractual relationships than at dealing with 
special issues of consumer protection alone. 73 
General conditions of contract form part of the contract with the customer, only if this contract 
contains an express reference to these general conditions and if the customer has had an 
opportunity to inspect the text of these conditions before the conclusion of the contract. 74 Unusual 
clauses which a customer may not expect, will not become part of the contract. 75 Clauses that, 
in an unfair way, are to the disadvantage of the customer are void. 76 
In 1993, the European Union issued a Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 77 which 
is designed for consumer protection. In Germany, it was widely held that the highly developed 
jurisprudence on the German Law on General Conditions of Contract takes care of most issues 
addressed in this Directive and that little change in German legislation was needed. Nevertheless, 
a new article has been inserted into the German law on general conditions of contract. The new 
article protects a consumer against unfair conditions drafted by the other or a third party, even 
if such clauses do not form part of the general conditions of contract used in other cases. 78 
Section 9 AGB-Gesetz states that clauses in general conditions of contract are void if they place 
the other party in a disadvantageous legal position that violates the standards of fairness. An 
example of the test of fairness being applied by. the courts to the general conditions of banks is 
found in the problem of over-collateralisation ofloans. Bank loans to traders and manufacturers 
are often secured by the transfer of ownership of goods or the assignment of movables to the 
bank. In terms of a typical contract, ownership of goods in a warehouse is transferred to the bank 
(the so-called security ownership; Sicherungsiibereignung), but the borrower is allowed to sell 
the goods and replace them with new goods, so that the flow of goods necessary for trade is not 
impeded. Similarly, a borrower, may assign to the bank a certain volume of movables to be 
obtained by him in the future. This assignment is called a Globalzession. 
The Federal Court has long held that such security contracts can be illegal and void under s 138 
73 See Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 69. 
74 S 2 AGB-Gesetz. 
75 S 3 AGB-Gesetz. 
76 Ss 9-11 AGB-Gesetz. 
77 EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13/EEC: [1993] OJ L 95/29. 
78 S 24 AGB-Gesetz. 
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BGB and s 9 AGB-Gesetz, if the economic value of the security given (movables or goods) 
grossly exceeds the amount of the credit extended by the bank.79 The argument is that such over-
collateralisation reduces the borrower's capacity to obtain other loans because of a lack of 
security which might be offered to new lenders. As a legal consequence, some senates of the 
Federal Court have tightened the requirements for fair and proper clauses on the securing of 
loans. They have held that all standard clauses relating to security for loans are void if they do 
not contain a precise ceiling or Deckungsgrenze. The ceiling must reflect the bank's justified 
need for security and is therefore to be calculated as an amount of the credit extended plus a 
small margin for interest and costs. Every clause which does not contain such a ceiling is void. 80 
The ceiling must be expressed as a specific amount. 81 Moreover, the contract must contain a 
clause giving the borrower the right to ask the bank to give back any collateral in excess of the 
amount required by law. 82 These requirements are not very practical because, in a typical case, 
the amount of credit may change every day. 83 
6.2.4 The banker-customer relationship: the bank's duties 
6.2.4.1 Diligence 
Under its various contractual and pre-contractual relations with its customer, described above, 
the bank must exercise diligence when serving the customer. 84 The duties of care and diligence85 
need not be expressly agreed upon. Under German legal doctrine and jurisprudence, such duties 
follow from the pre-contractual relationship under the principle of faimess86 and, when a contract 
is concluded, are implied duties of this contract. The bank must use due diligence and care when 
handling the customer's affairs. It must provide proper information and disclosure, and must 
79 See BGHZ 72 308 at 311. 
80 See BGHZ 109 at 240-242; BGH WM 1992 813; BGH WM 1993 at 139-140. 
81 See BGH WM 1992 813. 
82 The so-called Freigabeklausel. See BGHZ 109 240 at 246; BGH WM 1992 813. The 
bank must keep the interest of the customer in mind. Nobbe Bankrecht 7; BGH ZIP 1983 
1053; s 16(2) AGB-Banken of 1993. 
83 See HomAGB-Banken 1993 121. 
84 Nobbe Bankrecht 16; Sandkiihler Bankrecht 12. 
85 Sorgfaltspflichten. 
86 S 242 BGB requires performance in good faith (Treu und Glauben) and with cognisance 
of the common morality (Verkehrssitte). See Palandt BGB 226 et seq. 
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observe strict standards of fairness. 87 In particular, it must disclose whether there is a conflict of 
interest between the bank and its customer; for example, when the customer instructs his bank 
to buy securities, the bank must make clear whether it is acting as a commission agent88 or as a 
seller of these securities. Furthermore, it must carry out the contract according to the stock-
exchange price ruling at the time when the contract is carried out and, finally, it must abstain 
from any unfair influence on the price. 89 
In Germany, banks have become increasingly active in the field of asset administration.90 The 
bank should ascertain what kind of administration the client wants, which type of investment and 
what risk he prefers. Once the bank has ascertained the customer's expectations, and which type 
of investment is suitable for him, the bank's duty is not so much a duty to give current 
information and advice as to make careful investment decisions on behalf of the customer. The 
bank must, for example, take care that a portfolio management has an adequate distribution of 
risks,91 and it must not expose too large a part of the customer's portfolio to high-risk 
investments. 92 
6.2.4.2 Confidentiality or secrecy 
As a rule, the bank must keep the customer's affairs confidential; in particular, it must not give 
information about his assets with the bank or about his plans for certain financial transactions, 
unless the customer ~as given his consent. 93 The duty does not have an express statutory basis 
87 Sandkiihler Bankrecht 12; Nobbe Bankrecht 16 et seq; Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 98. 
On so-called Nebenrechte und Nebenpflichten (accessory rights and duties) flowing from 
the requirements of good faith, see Palandt BGB 229-234. 
88 Sees 383 HGB. 
89 Such as front running, that is, a deliberate attempt to deal personally ahead of the bank's 
investment recommendations, or other manipulative practices. See Cranston ( ed) 
European Banking Law 73. 
90 Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 73. 
91 BGH WM 1994 834. 
92 OLG Hamm WM 1996 669; Horn & Balzer EWiR 1996 499 et seq; OLG Frankfurt/M 
WM 1996 665; Horn & Balzer EWiR 1996 499 at 589 et seq. 
93 BGHZ 27 241; BGHZ 95 362 at 365; Heymann & Horn-HGB no 44; s 2 of the AGB-
Banken of 1993; Sandkiihler Bankrecht 25; Dirichs Haftung 11. 
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but is derived from the contractual relationship between the bank and the customer,94 which 
implies a general fiduciary duty. 95 Bank secrecy covers all "facts the customer wants to be held 
confidentially". 96 This duty of the bank to observe bank secrecy includes the right of the bank to 
refuse testimony in a civil procedure.97 In a criminal procedure, however, the bank has no such 
right. 98 The tax authorities have a limited right to ask for information from the bank;99 in a 
procedure for tax fraud, however, the bank has an unlimited duty to inform the authorities. 100 
Various other statutes override the secrecy obligation. See, for example, the WpHG in regard to 
the prevention of insider trading, whereby insider trading is made subject to sanctions, including 
criminal prosecution. 101 The Act on the Detection of Proceeds of Crime of 1993 also makes 
provision for reporting in suspicious cases. The duty of secrecy may, conceivably, also be 
overridden by s 242 BGB, which requires good-faith performance in contract. 102 
94 Secrecy has long been acknowledged as an essential element of the banker-customer 
relationship. See Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 9; Kl.impel Kapitalmarkrecht 61 et seq; 
Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 16; Sichtermann et al Bankgeheimnis 3. The 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz aims at protecting the individual's right to determine the use 
of his personal data. To some extent, the provisions of this Act overlap with the bank's 
contractual secrecy obligation. See Neate Bank Confidentiality 287. 
95 Rehbein 1985 ZHR 139 et seq; Sichtermann et al Bankgeheimnis 111 et seq; Dirichs 
Haftung 12; Sandkiihler Bankrecht 25; Fischer & KlantenBankrecht 145; Schwintowski 
& Schafer Bankrecht 49. 
96 BGHZ 27 241 at 246. In fact, the duty consists of two elements, namely a 
Verschwiegenheitspflicht and an Auskunftsverweigerungspflicht. See Schwintowski & 
Schafer Bankrecht 5 l. 
97 S 383(1) no 6 ands 384 no 3 ZPO; Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 54-55; Neate 
Bank Confidentiality 292. 
98 S 53 StPO; Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 54-55; Neate Bank Confidentiality 292-
293. 
99 S 30a AO; Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 54-55; Neate Bank Confidentiality 293. 
100 -S 385 AO. 
I 01 W pH G s 9 requires credit institutions to report to the Federal Supervisory Authority for 
Securities Trading, every transaction in securities or derivatives which is admitted for 
trading on a stock market in the EEC. The WpHG implements, inter alia, EC Directive 
(Insider Dealing) 89/592/EEC: [1989] OJ L 334/30. See further Neate Bank 
Confidentiality 303-304. 
102 See Palandt BGB 226-228; Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 61. 
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Other exceptions to the secrecy obligation also exist. 103 The bank may be justified in disclosing 
information where there is an overriding public duty to do so, 104 or where there is an overriding 
interest of the bank to do so. 105 
It is widely used commercial practice in Germany to ask a bank to give standard information 
about a customer's general creditworthiness. This information is normally given in general terms 
without disclosing precise figures. 106 The information is only passed on to another bank 
representing the party that seeks this information. Furthermore, the information is only given if 
the customer has agreed to it. 107 Where the bank may give a bank reference, it must do so with 
the care of eines ordentlichen Kaujmanns. 108 
Business customers normally agree to such information being given in order to enhance their 
credit standing, since the refusal of a bank to give any information about that customer might 
damage his credit standing more than relatively adverse information would. 109 General consent 
to such information being given is contained in the general conditions of contract agreed between 
the bank and its customer. The general conditions make a distinction between a business 
customer and a private customer, the latter being often less inclined to disclose information about 
his wealth. The bank will not give any information about its private customer unless he expressly 
agrees to it. 110 
Besides the principle of confidentiality of banks as part of private law as described, there exists 
103 S 2(1) AGB-Banken of 1993 states that the bank may only disclose information 
concerning the customer if it is legally required to do so or if the customer has consented 
thereto or if the bank is authorized to disclose banking affairs. 
104 Neate Bank Confidentiality 288-289. 
105 NeateBankConfidentiality 290-291. Aufgrund iiberwiegender Eigeninteressen der Bank. 
See Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 61; Schraepler 1972NJW1836. 
106 S 2 (2) of the AGB-Banken of 1993 stipulates that statements of a general nature 
concerning the economic status, the creditworthiness and solvency of the customer may 
be divulged. 
107 S 2(3) AGB-Banken of 1993. 
108 The reasonable, respectable businessman. Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 161 et seq. 
109 Cranston ( e<l) European Banking Law 7 4. 
110 S 2(3) AGB-Banken; Fischer & KlantenBankrecht 160-161. 
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a particular duty under the legislation on personal data protection. 111 This protection of personal 
data is guaranteed by the German Constitution. 112 The duty of confidentiality of a bank is also 
subject to limitation in special situations of conflict of interest to be described below. 113 
If a bank breaches its secrecy obligation, the customer can claim actual damages, but not punitive 
damages, and the burden of proving damages lies with the customer. 114 
6.2.4.3. Avoidance of conflicts of interest: the multi-functional bank 
The bank must do its best to avoid any conflict between the interest of its customer and its own 
interest. If the bank sells or buys securities for its customer, acting either as a commission 
agent115 or as a trader in securities, the bank must see to it that the contract is executed under the 
conditions most favourable to the customer. The bank must not execute or sell at a higher price 
than the securities exchange rate at the time of the transaction. Under the new Securities Trading 
Act of 1994 (W ertpapierhandelsgesetz), banks and other enterprises rendering financial services 
must organise their business in such a way as to avoid conflicts of interest with their customers. 
Under the Law on the Supervision of Credit Institutions of 1961, 116 German banks are allowed 
to carry out simultaneously all kinds of financial transactions. In particular, there is no legal 
division between commercial and investment banks. As a consequence, banks sometimes not 
only lend money to a business, but also hold shares in it. In addition to owning shares in the 
company, the bank may also exercise voting rights on behalf of other bank customers who are 
shareholders of this company. Not infrequently, representatives of banks are members of the 
supervisory board of the company. As a consequence, banks have considerable internal 
information which other investors or debtors do not have. 117 The legislature has taken various 
steps to limit the danger of conflicts of interest in this respect; for example, under Article 128 
Company Law, the banks are obliged to pass on all relevant information about the shareholders' 
111 Federal Law on Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of 1990 (BDSchG). 
112 Adjudicated by the Federal Constitutional Court. (Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverfGE); 
See, also, Fischer & KlantenBankrecht 173 et seq; Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 
74. 
113 See sub chapter 6.2.4.3 infra. 
114 Neate Bank Confidentiality 286-287. 
115 Sees 383 HGB. 
116 Kreditwesengesetz. 
117 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 74-75. 
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meeting to the customer, to ask him whether he will give proxy to the bank or wishes to exercise 
his voting rights himself, and to ask him for his instructions on how to vote. 
The use of compliance and Chinese Walls in order to avoid conflicts of interest is often employed 
by German banks. 118 Spurred by the globalisation of banking business, technological progress, 
new financial instruments, various EC directives, and finally the Securities Trading Act of 1994, 
the avoidance of conflicting interests has become a most important topic. 119 The establishment 
of Chinese Walls has become a particularly important element of conflict management and is one 
of the primary organisational obligations imposed by the Securities Trading Act of 1994 s 34. 
Credit institutions have set up compliance organisations which monitor compliance with the rules 
of the Securities Trading Act of 1994 and other applicable rules. 120 
A bank, furthermore, may be involuntarily involved in a conflict of interest between two 
customers. If customer A wants to obtain payment from customer B who is no longer 
creditworthy, and both A and B are customers of the bank, and the bank knows about" customer 
B's situation, it must warn customer A, thus weighting the interest of both customers in the 
situation given. 121 
6.2.4.4 Liability of banks in respect of advisory and information duties in financial services 
A detailed discussion of a bank's duties in regard to investment banking falls outside the scope 
of this thesis. Suffice it to say that banks must give proper information and advice to their 
customers as investors when they render financial services to them. 122 
In a number of decisions, 123 the Federal Court insisted on full written disclosure of the risks of 
limited chances of profit and high risk of loss in the commodities' futures investments. Violation 
of these duties made the broker or adviser liable to the investor for damages. The violation of 
118 Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 342 et seq. 
119 Neate Bank Confidentiality 305. 
120 Ibid, at 305. 
121 SeethefactsinBGHZ 107104. OLG Hamm ZIP 1982 1061; OLG KOln WM 1990 1616. 
122 The Bank must advise the customer sorgf altig, gewissenhaft, und in dessen Jnteresse 
(with care, conscientiously and in the interest of the customer). See Fischer & Klanten 
Bankrecht 340. 
123 See, in particular, BGHZ 105 108; BGHZIP 19911207. 
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such a duty of disclosure and advice constitutes a breach of a pre-contractual duty (culpa in 
contrahendo) as described, and a delictual liability for wrongful prejudice to the investor's 
property. 124 The disclosure required in the prospectus or other printed material for sales 
promotion used by the broker or adviser or banks must point clearly to the high risks ofloss and 
small chances for a profit, and must clearly set out the additional costs resulting from the fees of 
the German broker or adviser. 125 Even if these strict disclosure requirements are fulfilled, 
however, they may not afford protection against pre-contractual and delictual liability, ifthe text 
and layout of the prospectus are designed to play down the risks and lead the customer to believe 
that the particular skills of the adviser or broker or bank would help the investor to overcome the 
risks and hence make a safe profit. 126 Section 32 WpHG prohibits the scalping of a customer as 
well as front- and parallel running. 127 
The courts will deny the existence of a contract to give advice if the customer gives the bank a 
specific order and the customer explicitly declares that he neither needs nor wants the advice of 
the bank. 128 It seems that, in considering the existence of a contract to give advice, the courts rely 
heavily on the knowledge of the customer concerned. If the customer has a certain knowledge 
in trading securities, the requirements to be met for the assumption of a contract to give advice 
seem to be higher. 129 
This is in line with the ideas underlying the new WpHG of 1994. It requires a bank to ask at the 
beginning of every relationship, for information on the customer's knowledge and the objectives 
of his investment. 130 The customer has to be informed about the risks of the class of transactions 
he wants and is able to effect. 131 
124 BGHZ 105 108 at 110; s 826 BGB. 
125 Ibid 
126 BGHZIP 1991 1207. 
127 Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 341. 
128 BGH WM 1996 906; Zeller 1996 EwiR 641. 
129 OLG Miinchen WM 1994 236; Hom 1997 ZBB 139. 
130 The advisor must know his customer. See s 31 WpHG; Schwintowski & Schafer 
Bankrecht 849-851. The advisor must have an investment plan, which must be put into 
operation with Sachkenntnis, Sorg/alt und Gewissenhaftigkeit. See Schwintowski & 
Schafer Bankrecht 853. 
131 Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 340; s 31 WpHG; Horn 1997 ZBB 139 at 149.et seq. 
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6.3 SURETYSHIP 
The BGB provides for a system of securities for creditors. It provides for only one type of 
personal security (Personalsicherheit): the contract of suretyship. 132 The surety agrees to be liable 
to the creditor, to stand in ( einzustehen) for the compliance with the obligation of the third 
party. 133 This undertaking must be in writing134 unless the surety is a merchant. 135 The surety is 
basically liable only to the extent that the principal debt for which he has stood surety actually 
exists; 136 he can use against the creditor any defences available to the third party. 137 Thus, the 
liability of the surety is made accessory (akzessorisch) to the main debt, and the liability of the 
surety is a subsidiary one. 138 A suretyship, therefore, does not always enable the creditor to 
execute swiftly on the security. Banking practice has developed, however, a type of suretyship 
where a creditor can ask for payment 11 on first written demand 11 , and the courts have recognized 
this unusual type of contract of suretyship, if a merchant is the surety. 139 
For some time, the courts have equally recognized a contract of guarantee, that is, an indemnity, 
not specifically regulated in the Civil Code. In terms of such a contract of guarantee or 
garantievertrag, the guarantor promises to pay a specified sum of money (or, in rare cases, to 
perform another duty) if a defined risk materializes. Unlike the surety, the duty of the guarantor 
is independent of the existence or amount of the underlying debt or, in terms of German legal 
doctrine, his liability is non-accessory (nicht akzessorisch). 140 This type of independent 
undertaking is also very common in today's practice of securing international trade transactions, 
and, as such, is widely recognized internationally. 141 
132 Burgschajtsvertrag. See ss 765-777 BGB; Palandt BGB 862-877. 
133 S 765 BGB; Gabler Bankrecht 590; Muller Schuldrecht 308; Palandt BGB 865-869. 
134 S 766 BGB; Palandt BGB 869-870; See, also, Gabler Bankrecht 591-592; Fikentscher 
Schuldrecht 8 622; Muller Schuldrecht 314; BGH WM 1970 816. 
135 S 350 HGB. 
13 6 Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 23 1. 
137 Ss 767 BGB and 768 BGB; PalandtBGB 870-871. 
13 8 Gabler Bankrecht 590; Muller Schuldrecht 308; Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 231; RGZ 
5911; BGHWM 1966 122; BGHZIP 1985 1257. 
139 Gabler Bankrecht 595; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 625; Fischer & KiantenBankrecht 232. 
140 Gabler Bankrecht 606; Muller Schuldrecht 321-322; BGH BB 1967 1020. 
141 Horn & Wymeersch Bank Guarantees. 
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Besides the contract of suretyship and the contract of guarantee, German legal practice uses a 
cumulative assumption of debt or Schuldbeitritt. Under such a scheme, the practical debtor finds 
another person who is willing to be liable to the creditor along with him. Finally, a common form 
of personal security in commerce occurs when a person accepts, endorses, or even draws a bill 
of exchange in order to help someone else to obtain credit. Banks themselves offer their 
customers such anAval-Kredit. 142 
In addition to personal securities, the German Civil Code provides for real security in assets. A 
discussion of this aspect of German Law falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
6.4 CONSUMER AND INVESTOR PROTECTION 
In the area of private law, the European Union has issued a number of directives and 
recommendations on consumer protection. The most important initiative in this field is the 
Directive on Consumer Credits that has been made part of national consumer credit legislation. 143 
The German legislature has enacted a law on consumer credits.144 Under this legislation, banks 
are obliged to conclude credit contracts with private customers, in writing, and to include in the 
contract certain precisely prescribed information about the most important conditions of the 
credit, in order to give the borrower a full picture of his rights and duties, and in particular, about 
the economic burden of the credit. The German Law on Consumer Credit has extended the scope 
of its application to all private credit, irrespective of the credit amount, and thus goes markedly 
beyond the scope of the EC Directive. 145 
Another important piece of legislation on consumer protection is the previously mentioned 
German Law on General Conditions of Contract (AGB-Gesetz). 146 The German law is not just 
a consumer protection law, but is aimed at protecting every customer against the restriction of 
his or her contractual freedom that would result from unilateral formulation of the contractual 
142 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 78. 
143 EC Directive (Consumer Credit) 87/102/EEC:[1987] OJ L42/48; EC Directive 
(Consumer Credit) amending the previous directive, 90/88 EEC: [1990] OJ L 61/14. 
144 Verbraucherkreditgesetz of 1990 (VKG). 
145 See Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 649 et seq for a detailed discussion of the VKG. 
In regard to its practical implications, see Bulow 1991NJW129; Canaris 1978 NJW 
1891; Claussen 1993 NJW564; Canaris 1993 ZIP 401. 
146 For a detailed discussion of the Act, see Raiser A GB ( 1961 reprint); W olfHom Lindacher 
AGB-Gesetz Kommentar; Munchener Kommentar BGB 1615 et seq. 
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conditions. 147 We have seen that under this law German courts and legal doctrine have developed 
a highly sophisticated system of customer protection against unfair or surprising general 
conditions and form contracts. The new EC Directive of 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts148 has been implemented in the German law by the insertion of a new s 24a AGB-
Gesetz . As the German Law on General Conditions of Contract already protects the consumer 
to a large extent, only a few changes were necessary to make the law applicable also to cases 
where no general conditions are used, but a contract is pre-formulated by one party, and to cases 
where the consumer is unfairly influenced when entering into the contract. 149 
The Wertpapierhandelsgesetz150 is equally inspired by EEC Law, namely the Council Directive 
of 10 May 1993, on investment services in the security field. 151 This law lays the foundation for 
a German capital-market law or securities law as a new body oflaw that is close to banking law 
but not entirely a part of it. The new law provides for a federal authority for the supervision of 
the trade in securities and it establishes a number of duties for all enterprises active in the field 
of financial services. These enterprises must exercise due diligence152 when serving the customer. 
They must organize their business in a way that enables them to render the necessary information 
and advice, and to avoid conflict ofinterest with their customers. 153 They furthermore must gather 
the necessary information about the customer, his knowledge, experience, and investment 
expectations. 154 On the basis of this information, the enterprise rendering the financial service can 
give the customer the information and advice appropriate to him and recommend those 
investments that suit his needs and expectations. These duties are established in the public 
interest and are not private law in the proper sense. But they support and underline the private-
law duties of due diligence, disclosure and advice that a bank owes to its customer and that are 
147 See Markesinis (ed) Contract 211. 
148 EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13/EEC: [1993] OJ L 95/29. 
149 See, in general, Wolf Horn Lindacher A GB-Gesetz Kommentar 51-52; Zweigert & Kotz 
Introduction 336-337; Markesinis (ed) Contract 211-214. 
150 WpHGofl994. 
151 EC Directive (Investment Services in the Security Field) 93/22/EEC: [1993] OJ Ll41/27. 
152 They must act with Sachkenntnis, Sorgfalt und Gewissenhaftigkeit. Schwintowski & 
Schafer Bankrecht 795. 
153 S 32 WpHG; Fischer & KlantenBankrecht 341; Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 801-
802. 
154 S 31 WpHG; Fischer& KlantenBankrecht340; Schwintowski& Schafer Bankrecht795. 
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a basis for its contractual and tort liability. 155 
Besides the protection granted on the level of the individual contract between the bank and its 
customer, some additional protection is provided by the supervision laws. Though the Law on 
the Supervision of Financial Services explicitly states that the supervision is carried out only in 
the public interest, the deposit guarantee funds for the protection of savings in case of a collapse 
of a bank, grant the customer at least minimal compensation. This type of fund, which has existed 
in Germany for some time, is now made mandatory at the European level, by a Council 
Directive. 156 
The aforementioned legislation as well as the jurisprudence on the liability of banks towards 
customers and investors follow two principal ideas: to protect the customer of a bank as well as 
the investor taking from a bank, and to contribute to the transparency of the markets for banking 
and other financial services. The principle of freedom of contract is maintained as a basis of a 
free-market economy. But this principle of freedom of contract is put into a new framework. In 
this respect, German law is in line with the tendencies to harmonize the legal systems of the 
members of the European Union on the basis of EEC directives and recommendations. 157 
6.5 THE BANKER'S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AND OTHER ASPECTS OF BANKER 
LIABILITY 
6.5.1 The German law of obligations 
6.5.1.1 Tort and breach of contract 
In German law the institutions known as breach of contract and delict are arranged in separate 
paragraphs of the BGB. 158 Breach of contract is usually treated under the general rules relating 
to improper compliance with an obligation. 159 An obligation (Schuldverhaltnis) is described as 
155 Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 80; Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 163 et seq; 
Schafer 1991ZIP1557; Schiereck 1996 ZBB 185. 
156 EC Directive (Deposit Guarantee Schemes) 94/19/EEC:[1994] OJ L135/S. 
157 Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 81; Hommelhoff 1992 AcP 71 et seq; Schlechtriem 
1993 ZeuP 217. 
158 Thoma Schuldrecht 15-17; Markesinis Torts 23-21. 
159 Markesinis (ed) Contract 418. 
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a relationship between a debtor and creditor, with a duty of performance (Schuld, or 
Leistungspjlicht) and a corresponding right to performance (Forderung), as content. 160 
S 242 BGB creates a general duty to perform according to the dictates of good faith (Treu und 
Glauben). This principle has been used in various ways by the courts to develop a control 
mechanism for the whole law of contract. 161 It has been said, however, that the idea as far as s 
242 BGB is concerned, is not to elevate good faith as a general measure of human relations in 
law.162 
An obligation can arise, inter alia, out of agreement. 163 The BGB only provides for two forms 
ofimproper compliance, namely causing impossibility (zu vertretenden Unmoglichkeit) and mora 
(Verzug); 164 although the courts also recognize a third form namely Schlechtleistung, also known 
as Positive (Vertrags) verletzung. 165 In terms hereof all forms of performance contrary to the duty 
of performance, such as defective or partial delivery as well as repudiation, resort hereunder. 166 
160 See s 241 BGB, in which an obligation and performance is defined. (See, also, Larenz 
Lehrbuch I 6-19; Medicus Schuldrecht I 1-4; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 19-30; Palandt 
BGB 225-226; Staudinger Kommentar s 241 140-158). 
161 See Larenz Lehrbuch I 125-129; Medicus Schuldrecht I 64-70; Palandt BGB 226-250; 
Horn et al Introduction 135-145; Ebke and Steinhauer in Beatson & Friedmann Good 
Faith 171; Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 24-26. 
162 Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 127 sees s 242 BGB as a default mechanism which only finds 
application where a higher duty of care exists in a legal relationship. Horn et al 
Introduction 13 5 considers the section a statutory enactment of a general requirement of 
good faith (see, also, RGZ 85 108 and BGHZ 58 147), a principle oflegal ethics which 
dominates the entire legal system. The content of good faith is reliance, which acts as an 
integrating element in an organized legal culture, especially reciprocal reliance, which 
takes into account the legitimate interests of others. See Fikentscher Methoden 109 et seq, 
and 179 et seq. Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 24 states that it is generally 
recognized thats 242 BGB operates as a supplement to the law. 
163 Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 64-85. The creation of a contract is regulated in ss 305-319 
BGB. See in general Cohn Manual I 111-117; Larenz Lehrbuch I 3 9-85; Medicus 
Burgerliches Recht 27-40; Palandt BGB 378-401. 
164 Unmoglichkeit is dealt with in ss 275-283 BGB; 306-309 BGB; 323-325 BGB and 
Verzuginss294-292BGB and 326BGB. See CohnManuall 120-122;Zweigert&Kotz 
Introduction 488-494; LarenzLehrbuch 13 32-3 62; MedicusBurgerliches Recht 144; 146 
and 166-179; Schuldrecht 1 135 162-169 172-180 214-223; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 
216 et seq; Palandt BGB 326-363; 384-387; 407-413; Markesinis (ed) Contract 401 et 
seq and 413 et seq. 
165 BGHZ 8 239; BGHZ 27 236. 
166 RGZ 54 98; RGZ 66 289 at 291; BGHNJW 1968 2238; BGHZ 47 312; CohnManual 
1122-123; Zweigert& Kotzintroduction494-496; LarenzLehrbuchI363-376; Medicus 
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Defective performance (Leistungsstorungen) which in the case of obligations arising from 
contract would constitute breach of contract, can therefore take one of these three forms. The 
exact consequences of breach of contract, which include a claim for specific performance, 
cancellation and damages, depend on the form of breach of contract as well as the type of 
obligation (unilateral or multilateral). 167 In general a claim for damages arises when one of the 
three types of Leistungsstorung, caused by the fault of the wrongdoer, 168 causes damage. 169 
Breach of contract, being one or the other Leistungsstorung therefore always exists in the breach 
of a contractual obligation (Leistungspflicht) or, seen from the other side, a breach of a 
contractual right to performance (Forderung) by the debtor. 170 
General liability for damages in delict, is dealt with in ss 823 BGB-853 BGB. There is no single 
general delictual ground for liability with specific liability requirements. Apart from certain 
specifically described delicts, 171 certain cases of liability without fault, 172 and the regulation of 
Burgerliches Recht 179-184; Schuldrecht 1 136; 181-187; 223-224; Fikentscher 
Schuldrecht 8 258 et seq; Palandt BGB 346-350. 
167 Ss 279 BGB-281BGB;284 BGB-286 BGB; 292 BGB; 300 BGB; 304 BGB; 320 
BGB; 322 BGB; 324 BGB-327 BGB; 336 BGB-361 BGB are devoted to these 
consequences for the differing types of situations 
168 S 276 BGB. Note that intent or negligence is required. S 279 BGB provides for liability 
without fault in the case of generic obligations. See, also, Palandt BGB 356-357. The 
parties can also agree to be bound for breach of contract without fault. See Larenz 
Lehrbuch I 278-279; Medicus Schuldrecht I 155; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 150 et seq; 
Palandt BGB 339; Schlechtriem Vertragsordnung 30. 
169 The claim for damages on the grounds of breach of contract, in the case of Unmoglichkeit 
is based upon ss 280 BGB and 325 BGB and in regard to Verzug on ss 286 BGB and 326 
BGB and in regard to Positive Vertragsverletzung, upon legal decisions. 
170 Medicus Schuldrecht I 138; Fikentscher Schuldrech 8 208 et seq. Apart from the 
principal duty to perform, the duty of performance consists also of certain ancillary duties 
or Nebenleistungspflichte, Verhaltungspflichte, being additional duties which contribute 
to making performance possible. Breach of any of these duties constitutes breach of 
contract. See Esser-Schmidt Schuldrecht I 39-40; Larenz Lehrbuch I 8-14; Palandt BGB 
229-230. Depending on the content of the duty of performance, breach can be constituted 
by an omission. See Esser-Schmidt Schuldrecht I 37; Palandt BGB 226. Unlawfulness 
in contract consists of the breach of one of these duties by the debtor. See Fickentscher 
Schuldrecht 3 17; Medicus Schuldrecht I 13 8. 
171 Namely an injury to another's creditworthiness by the publication of untruths (s 824 
BGB), and official dereliction of duty by State officials (s 839 BGB). See in general, 
CohnManuall 159167-169; MedicusSchuldrechtII 400-404; 352;353-355; Fikentscher 
Schuldrecht 8 769-772; PalandtBGB 982-984; 1006-1029; LarenzLehrbuch II 565-568; 
576-587; Esser-Weyers Schuldrecht II 491-494; 508-512. 
172 Ss 833 BGB and 834 BGB; ss 83<5 BGB; 837 BGB- 838 BGB. 
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vicarious liability173 which are dealt with in separate paragraphs, three general grounds for 
liability for unlawful causation of damage are constituted in the BGB. 
In terms of the first and, in practice, the most important general rule of deli ct, a person is liable 
for damage that he caused through his fault, and for unlawful injury to the life, body, health, 
freedom, property, or other right of another. 174 The second general rule creates delictual liability 
for unlawful causation of damage through conduct contrary to a statutory ruling that is aimed at 
the protection of other legal subjects (Schutzgesetz). 175 This last rule creates delictual liability for 
any intentional causation of damage contra bonos mores.176 
From the statutory requirements for liability (Grundtatbestdnde) that are a requisite for these 
three general delictual grounds of liability, certain general conditions for liability 
(Deliktsvoraussetzungen) manifest themselves. Firstly there must be conduct, which, in principle 
173 Being the liability of employers for delicts by their employees, (s 831 BGB) and of 
caretakers of minors, insane and physically disabled (s 832 BGB). See Cohn Manual I 
159-160; Markesinis Torts 676-686; Hom et al Introduction 157-160; Medicus 
Schuldrecht II 375-378; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 770-778; Palandt BGB 996-1001; 
Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 629-645; Larenz Lehrbuch II 571-576; Esser-Weyers 
Schuldrecht II 494-502. 
174 S 823 I BGB. See in general CohnManual 1155-157; Markesinis Torts 35 et seq; Hom 
et al Introduction 14 7-15 5; Medicus Schuldrecht II 344-363; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 
725-736; PalandtBGB 946-982; Esser-WeyersSchuldrechtII 457-469; Zweigert& Kotz 
Introduction 599-602. Sonstige recht is qualified. Only absolute rights such as ownership 
are recognized. Rights recognized as sonstiges Rechte are, amongst others, the right to 
an established business (Gewerbebetrieb) (see RGZ 58 24 at 29; BGH NJW 1959 479; 
Markesinis Torts 61-62; Medicus Burgerliches_Recht 364-368; Von Caemmerer 
Schriften 490; 565-566; Palandt BGB 949-951; Larenz Lehrbuch II 558-562; Zweigert 
& Kotz Introduction 600-601; intellectual property such as patents, trade marks and 
copyright, (Markesinis Torts 59; Palandt BGB 949); limited proprietary rights and 
possession under certain circumstances (Medicus Burgeriches Recht 361-362; 
Schuldrecht II355-357; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 734-736; PalandtBGB 949); and the 
general law of the personality (BGH NJW 1961 2059; Markesinis Torts 63-66; Medicus 
Burgerliches Recht 368-369; Schuldrecht II 360-361; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 734; 
Larenz Lehrbuch II 548-558; Palandt BGB 951 ). 
175 S 823 II BGB. This article is interpreted in such a fashion that only persons who fall 
within the class that the legislature intended to protect and the damage foreseen in the 
Act, are affected. See BGH NJW 1980 1792 BGHZ 29 100; Markesinis Torts 890-894; 
Cohn Manual I 157; Medicus Burgerliches Recht 372-374; Schuldrecht II 363-368; 
Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 761-766; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 602-603; Larenz 
Lehrbuch II 545-548; Esser-Weyers Schuldrecht II 487-488. 
176 S 826 BGB. Unlawfulness consists of conduct which is contra bonos mores, that is which 
is against the community conception of what is proper (Sittenwidrigkeit). See RGZ 48 
114 at 124 125; BGH NJW 1957 587 at 588; BGHZ 17 327 at 332; Markesinis Torts 
894-898; Medicus Schuldrecht 11371-373; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 766-769; Palandt 
BGB 985-992. 
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can consist of an act or an omission. 177 This conduct must cause damage to another. Under 
damage is understood patrimonial damage, 178 which flows from the injury to one of the protected 
rights or interests179 and non-patromonial damage which flows from personal bodily injury, injury 
to the freedom of the personality or some other injury to the personality. 180 Apart from a factual 
causal relationship between conduct and damage, a certain juridical causality is also required. 
This causal relationship, is, according to the German courts, the adequate causation 
relationship. 181 Fault, which can consist of intent182 or negligence183 is required. 184 
177 See Cohn Manual II 15 6; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 713; Medicus Schuldrecht II 3 3 7; 
Palandt BGB 985-986; Larenz Lehrbuch II 523-524; Esser-Weyers Schuldrecht II 470-
471. 
178 S 253 BGB determines that non-patrimonial damages can only be recovered in cases 
where the law specifically provides for this. 
179 Because only certain specific interests are protected by s 823 I BGB, and because a 
general right to patrimonium is not recognized as a sonstige recht(see BGHZ 41 127; 
BGH NJW 1980 1582; Medicus Schuldrecht II 358; Larenz Lehrbuch II 526; Von 
Caemmerer Schriften 289; Palandt BGB 951 ), pure economic loss flowing from an injury 
to one of the protected interests cannot be recovered in terms of this section. (BGH NJW 
1964 720; BGHZ29 65; BGHNJW 19761740;BGHNJW 1977 2208; Markesinis Torts 
48-50;266; Markesinis 1993 LQR 5-12; Horn et al Introduction 149; Fikentscher 
Schuldrecht 723; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 600). Ss 823 II and 826 II BGB do not 
limit or describe the interests that can be injured; therefore damages for pure economic 
loss can be recovered in delict. See Markesinis Torts 48. 
180 S 847 I BGB determines that non-patrimonial loss may only be recovered in a case of 
injury to the body, health, and freedom. See in regard to non-patrimonial loss Larenz 
Lehrbuch I 474-479; Lehrbuch II 601-604; Lange Handbuch 256-273; Palandt BGB 
1039-1040. 
181 SeeRGZ 105264;BGHVersR1952128;RGZ 133126;BGHNJW19521010;BGHZ 
3 261 at 267; BGH NJW 1972 904; Markesinis Torts 95-108; Horn et al Introduction 
151-152; LarenzLehrbuch II 539; Esser-Weyers Schuldrecht II 470. 
182 Which is defined as a direction of the will coupled to the knowledge that the conduct is 
unlawful. See BGH NJW 1951 597; Larenz Lehrbuch I 279; Lehrbuch II 528; Medicus 
Schuldrecht I 140-141; Schuldrecht II 342; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 322-325; Palandt 
BGB 317. 
183 Which is defined ins 276 BGB as the failure to comply with the duty of care required by 
the community (Verkehr). The required care is determined by the objective standard of 
the bonus paterfamilias. See BGH JW 1928 1049 BGH VersR 1967 808; BGH NJW 
1980 2465; Markesinis Torts 72-74; Larenz Lehrbuch I 282-293; Lehrbuch II 528; 
Medicus Schuldrecht I 141-145; Schuldrecht II 342; Esser-Weyers Schuldrecht II 475; 
Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 310-312; Palandt BGB 332 et seq; Zweigert & Kotz 
Introduction 608-609. 
184 Except in a case of s 826 BGB which expressly requires intent. 
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The last general requirement is that the conduct must be unlawful. The concept of unlawfulness 
(Rechtswidrigkeit) is not described in the BGB, but it has always been clear that an injury to the 
interests or rights which are protected in the delict articles of the BGB and which is contrary to 
the provisions of the law, will be unlawful. From the provisions of the law in relation to delictual 
liability, a general legal duty has been derived which requires each legal subject to arrange his 
affairs in such a fashion that he does not injure the protected interests of other legal subjects 
(Allgemeine Verkehrs (sicherungs) pflicht). Conduct contrary to this duty is unlawful. This 
general duty has gradually crystallized into a certain number of particular Verkehrspflichte which 
rest on legal subjects in certain situations or in certain circumstances.185 It is generally accepted 
that the allgemeine Verkehrspflicht does not compel each person to take positive action to 
prevent injury to another. An omission is therefore only unlawful if it is contrary to a legal duty 
(Rechtspflicht), which, in the circumstances, rested upon the wrongdoer. A Verkehrspflicht can 
compel a legal subject to take positive steps to prevent injury to another, for example where he 
has created a danger or risk for others through his own conduct or where he has entered into a 
certain relationship with other legal subjects. 186 It appears however, that there are two contrary 
considerations in regard to the assessment of the unlawfulness of particular conduct. According 
to the traditional, and currently still acceptable view, the unlawfulness of conduct is only 
determined with reference to the result caused. In terms hereof, each injury to a protected interest, 
which runs contrary to a general duty or in the case of an omission, a particular legal duty, is 
unlawful in the absence of a ground of justification. 187 In contrast thereto, the second view states 
that unlawfulness is not determined only by reference to the consequences of the injury to the 
interests or right, but furthermore also requires that the conduct of the wrongdoer must be 
contrary to a prescribed norm of conduct (allgemeine Sorgfaltspflicht). In the determination of 
this norm of conduct, it is not only a weighing of interests or policy considerations that plays a 
role, but also the norms of conduct in relation to the reasonable conduct in the prevention of 
damage, which traditionally resorted under the requirement of fault, more particularly 
185 Larenz Lehrbuch II 537-545; Medicus Burgerliches Recht 387; Esser-Weyers 
Schuldrecht II 471; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 740-741; Von Caemmerer Schriften 478-
489; Palandt BGB 348. 
186 This is also applicable to indirect injury to an interest (mittelbare Verletzung). See in this 
regard RGJW 19313446; RGZ 85 185; RGZ 155 161BGHNJW1986 576; BGHZ 71 
86 93; Cohn Manual I 156-157; Markesinis Torts 74-75; Medicus Burgerliches Recht 
387 399; Schuldrecht II 337-338; Esser-Weyers Schuldrecht II 473; Fikentscher 
Schuldrecht 8 715 747-749; LarenzLehrbuchII54l-545; VonCaemmerer Schriften48l-
489; Dietz Anspruchskonkurrenz 282. 
187 RGZ SO 60; RGZ 103 187; BGHZ 74 9 at 14; Cohn Manual I 155; Medicus Schuldrecht 
II 336; Larenz Lehrbuch II 537; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 295 792; Von Caemmerer 
Schrifften 547-548; Esser-Weyers Schuldrecht II 471-472. 
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negligence. 188 
A full discussion of the concurrence of delictual and contractual actions is outside the scope of 
this thesis. Briefly, in regard to the concurrence of actions, it is generally accepted that not every 
breach of contract will resort under one of the general delictual grounds of liability, because 
breach of contract does not comply with all the delictual Grundtatbestande. It is, however, 
generally recognized that, in certain circumstances, breach of contract can comply with the 
Grundtatbestande of the general liability grounds. 189 
6.5.1.2 Defects in consent 
6.5.1.2.1 Introduction. 
A contract comes into being through two or more corresponding (in terms of content) 
declarations ofwill: 190 
"Ein vertrag kommt zustande <lurch zwei oder mehrere sich inhaltlich dekkende, 
aufeinander Bezug nehmende Willenserklarungen, die von einem Handlungswillen, 
Erklarungsbewusstsein und Rechtsbindungswillen getragen sind. "191 
It is immediately clear that a modified declaration theory is used. 
Under German law the manifestation of the will (Willenserklarung) can be defective on different 
grounds. 192 German law distinguishes between a defect in the formation of the will 
(Willensbildung) in case ofan error of motive (Motivirrtum ), 193 fraud ( arglistige Tauschung), and 
threat (widerrechtliche Drohung), and a defect in the declaration of the will (ein Mangel in der 
188 BGHZ 24 21; BGH NJW 1954 913; BGH NJW 1957 785; Markesinis Torts 72-74; 
Medicus Schuldrecht II336-337; Von Caemmerer Schriften 548-549; LarenzLehrbuch 
II 538-540; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 295-296; Esser-Weyers Schuldrecht II 472. 
189 See Esser-Schmidt Schuldrecht I 18; Markesinis Torts 49; DietzAnspruchskonkurrenz 
18-19; Georgiades Anspruchskonkurrenz 81; Markesinis Contract 43-45; Eichler 1963 
AcP 401; Arens 1970 AcP 392; Van Aswegen Sameloop 239-240. 
190 Gabler Bankrecht 19-20. 
191 Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 65. 
192 S 119 BGB; Palandt BGB 83-87; Mi.inchener Kommentar BGB 800-856. 
193 Palandt BGB 86. 
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Erkliirungshandlung) which arises, for example, when the representer says something different 
from that which he intended to say; this constitutes an Erkliirungsirrtum (error in declaration). 194 
The mistaken party can rescind the contract, regardless of the behaviour of the other party.195 
However, the other party has a claim for the harm (Vertrauensschaden) he has suffered ifhe has 
justifiably relied on the promise now rescinded. 196 
The contract can also be vitiated in a case of the so-called fundamental error, Grund/age lrrtum, 
when the error affects the essence of the contract. 197 
Relating to fraud and threat, 198 German law assumes that the deceived or threatened party was 
incapable of making a free choice because his will had been completely negated. Thus the victim 
is deprived of any will and on that basis he can annul the contract. Furthermore the deceived or 
threatened party has a claim for damages. In this respect he can require to be placed in the same 
position he would have been in if the contract had never been concluded. This is called Ersatz 
des Vertrauensschadens. 199 
6.5.1.2.2 Mistake200 
Basically German law distinguishes between an error in the transaction (Erkliirungsirrtum ), 
which affects the contract201 and an error of motive (Motivirrtum) which does not affect the 
contract. 202 The distinction between these two categories is rather subtle. When the contractor has 
formed his intention quite correctly, but has made a mistake in declaring it, there is a material 
error, while in case of an error of motive, the intention itself is incorrectly formed. 
194 S 119 I BGB. 
195 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 414; Markesinis (ed) Contract 198. 
196 S 122 BGB; Gabler Bankrecht 22-24; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 415; Hom et al 
Introduction 82; Markesinis Contract 206; Munchener Kommentar BGB 862-866. 
197 Palandt BGB 83-87. 
198 S 123 BGB; PalandtBGB 89-94; MunchenerKommentar BGB 868. 
199 See s 123 BGB; Hom et al Introduction 80-81. 
200 See Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 372-380. 
201 Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 428. 
202 S 119 BGB. 
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However, the question whether the error is one in the transaction or one of motive is of no great 
importance under German law, because in terms of s 119 II BGB a contracting party may also 
rescind the contract for error in motive if it concerns qualities of the person or the thing which, 
according to standard business practice, are regarded as essential. Therefore, the circumstances 
which fall within the scope of s 119 BGB and which may allow a party to set the contract aside 
because of mistake, include situations of slips of the tongue or the pen, and the use of ambiguous 
terms or expressions, as well as misunderstandings about the essential elements of the contract. 203 
Apart from s 119 BGB a contract can be annulled because of a fundamental error when both 
parties share the same misconception about the subject matter of the contract. In cases of this so-
called fundamental error ( Grundlagenirrtum ), the error concerns a particular feature of the 
contract which according to good faith and normal commercial practice, is contemplated as the 
necessary foundation of the contract. In the absence of a specific statutory provision, this concept 
is based on the broad principle of good faith (Treu und Glauben). 204 The courts have regarded 
it as unreasonable if the contract is upheld when both parties are mistaken about the underlying 
assumption of the contract ( Geschaftsgrundlage) which in fact does not exist. The discretion that 
the courts have to determine whether or not an error is fundamental, is a broad one. As already 
mentioned, the party in error can rescind the contract irrespective of how it was evoked. As a rule 
the behaviour of the other party is irrelevant except in as far as his claim for damages after the 
rescission of the contract is concerned, ifhe has justifiably relied on the promise now rescinded. 
However, throughout German contract law gradually more attention is being paid to the 
behaviour of the contracting parties in accepting a duty of disclosure which can take precedence 
over the duty to make one's own investigations. 205 
In contracts of sale, German law in particular imposes on the vendor a duty to inform the other 
party about the qualities of the subject matter of the contract in case of material and juridical 
defects, 206 in which situations may resemble cases of error. It is the general opinion in case law 
and jurisdiction that these rules relating to material and juridical defects prevail over the rules 
concernmg error. 
The underlying principle for the duty of disclosure is the protection of the reasonable 
203 Palandt BGB 85-87; Miinchener Kommentar BGB 800-856. 
204 S 242 BGB. 
205 Eg, BGH NJW 1974 1975; AG Koln NJW 1978 2603; BGH NJW 1978 2546; BGH 
NJW 1979 1707. 
206 Ss 434 BGB and 459 BGB. 
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expectations and the justifiable reliance of the contracting parties in the context of a reasonable 
allocation of risk. 207 
6.5.1.2.3 Fraud or duress 
In German law the relationship between being mistaken and being deceived is emphasized. 208 In 
the case of fraud, however, the accent is specifically laid on the objectionable behaviour of the 
other party.209 
In terms of s 123 BGB, fraud under German law requires a deliberate deception which induces 
the misled party to enter into the contract.210 It is assumed that the free will of the deceived party 
has been fully negated and thus that his private autonomy, which is a basic element of contract 
law, is at stake. This gives him the right to invalidate the contract. It would appear that what is 
necessary is that the party who invokes the fraud has acted on purpose. Failure to speak 
constitutes fraud only when there is a duty to speak according to the principle of good faith and 
taking into account all the circumstances of the individual case.211 
To illustrate, the Bundesgerichtshof held a party liable for fraud in a case where the vendor of 
land had concealed a notice by the local authority and in another case where the vendor of a 
building did not disclose the fact that an extension to the building had been built illegally. 212 
When the deceit is practiced by someone other than the contracting party, rescission is granted 
only when the contracting party himself was aware or should have been aware of the deception 
or when the third party's behaviour is attributable to him. 213 
207 See, generally, in this particular regard, Lauer lnformationspflichten; Breidenbach 
lnformationspflichten. 
208 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 424-430. 
209 Deceit may be a tort in terms of s 826, or the contract induced by deceit may be rescinded 
under contract law in terms of s 123 BGB. 
210 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 424; Markesinis ( ed) Contract 207; Gabler Bankrecht 23-
24. 
211 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 425; Markesinis Contract 209. 
212 RespectivelyBGHWM 1976401andBGHNJW1979 2243. See, also, BGHNJW 1971 
1795; BGHNJW 19771055; BGHNJW 19791707. 
213 Horn et al Introduction 81; s 123 BGB; s 875 ABGB; s 28(2) OR; Palandt BGB 89. 
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In the case of threat (widerrechtliche Drohung) the threatened party acts as a result ofillegitimate 
pressure and therefore can annul the contract. 214 
There is neither a general rule which allows the person acting as a result of economic pressure 
to rescind the contract, nor a general concept of undue influence. However under s 13 8 BGB a 
contract is void if a fiduciary relationship exists and one party abuses another's poverty, 
dependency, irresponsibility or inexperience, which resembles cases of economic duress and 
undue influence. 215 
Recently the Bundesgerichtshof extended the scope of s 13 8 BGB in a case where a brewery lent 
money to a couple in order to furnish their cafe. The terms of the loan were very onerous. The 
couple were obliged to sell only the brewery's products for a period of 10 years and they did not 
receive any protection against the brewery's supplying another cafe in the area where they 
operated. Moreover, after the expiration of the contract they had to hand over all the customers 
without any compensation whilst another clause prevented them from subsequently operating in 
the same line of business. Thus the couple were bound hand and foot. It was held that the 
contract was void in terms of s 13 8 BGB. 216 
6.5.1.3 The duty of disclosure 
6.5.1.3.1 General principles 
6.5.1.3.1.1 Disclosure of facts (Auskunftpflicht)211 
In all business spheres, information and advice are being sought. The reason for this is the speed 
214 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 428-430; Markesinis (ed) Contract 209-211; Hartkamp 
et al (eds) European Code 146. 
215 Kempermann Vertrauensverhdltnissen 104-119; Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 
146. 
216 BGHNJW-RR 1987 628. 
217 One should be careful when discussing duties of disclosure in German law because duties 
to inform (Auskunft) and duties to advise (Rat) are closely connected. The material 
difference between advice and information lies therein that with advice one is dealing 
with a subjective utterance and in the case of information, with an objective utterance. 
Information relates to facts. See Dirichs Ha/tung 3. With advisory duties, the crux is the 
assessment of facts and reaching of a conclusion in regard thereto. See V-ortmann 
Aufklarungs- und Beratungspflichten 2; Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 101; OLG Karlsruhe 
WM 1988 411 at 412. 
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of development and daily increasing specialisation, to the extent that human general knowledge 
can no longer cope. 218 
It has been stated that the underlying principle in German law for a duty of disclosure is the 
protection of reasonable expectations and the justifiable reliance of the contracting parties in the 
context of a reasonable allocation of risk. 219 
The BGB does not prescribe a general duty of disclosure of facts. 220 Such a duty may, however, 
arise from contract or a particular Act or Gesetz. 221 
In addition, a duty of disclosure of facts can arise as a result of the concept of good faith in terms 
of s 242 BGB222 when the following requirements are present: 
• There must be a particular existing223 relationship between the parties, such as a 
contractual relationship, a legal or gesetzliches relationship or a delictual relationship. 
• The person in need of information must be, excusably, unable to obtain the information 
218 See Dirichs Ha/tung l. 
219 Breidenbach Informationspflichten. 
220 See, also, Markesinis ( ed) Contract 209 who states that there is no general duty of 
disclosure and advice; each party must enquire as to advantages and disadvantages of a 
transaction. An important exception mentioned by Markesinis is the case where the facts 
are obviously of great importance (von erheblicher Bedeutung); see Vortmann 
Aufklarungs- und Beratungspflichten 9; Nobbe Bankrecht 17; BGH ZIP 1993 1089) to 
the other party, and provided good faith and common practice require that these facts be 
disclosed. 
221 Brox Schuldrecht 73. Examples of Acts conferring a duty is s 681 BGB (mandate); s 713 
BGB (member of companies); s 1379 BGB (spouses); s 2027 BGB (trustee of deceased 
estate). 
222 Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 128 cautions: 
"Die grundsatzliche, ins ethische fiihrende Bedeutung des s 242 besteht in 
folgendem: Schulverhaltnisse sollen nicht nur irgendwie und uberhaupt erfiillt 
werden, sondern in bestimmter, niimlich anstandiger und verkehrsublicher 
Weise." 
Freely translated, the statement means that obligations must be fulfilled in a socially 
responsible manner. The bani mores therefore determine which relationships attract 
disclosure and advisory duties. See, also, Nobbe Bankrecht 17; BGH ZIP 1993 1-089. 
223 See Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 128. 
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without the cooperation of the other party. 
• The other party must be in a position, without difficulty, to disclose the facts. 
Should a party fail in the duty to so disclose, the debtor may escape liability and, in a case of 
incorrect disclosure, may even claim damages. 224 
In Germany, contract law has in recent years taken more and more note of the duty of bankers 
to inform, advise and explain. New, additional duties which create obligations for the banks are 
being developed. These include duties relating to research, supervision and notification. This 
move has its legal origins in the duty to clarify and advise. It is therefore reasonable to expect an 
expansion of the existing list of duties in regard to disclosure depending on the facts of the case, 
in future. 225 
In summary, a party who was or (having regard especially to any professional qualification) ought 
to have been aware of a fact which he knew to be of determining importance for the other 
contracting party is bound to inform the latter of that fact, provided that the latter was unable to 
discover it for himself or provided that, because of the nature of the contract, the character of the 
parties, or the incorrectness of the information provided by the other party, he could justifiably 
rely on that other to provide the information. 226 
6.5.1.3.1.2 Advice (Aujklarungs- und Beratungspflichten)221 
Under the duty to explain or advise falls the duty to inform the other contractant about recognized 
circumstances requiring consideration and decision (Entscheidungserhebliche Umstande). 228 The 
duty to explain stretches, however, only to such particulars as are unknown to the other 
contractant, and does not exist where both parties could easily inform themselves from general 
224 Brox Schuldrecht 74. 
225 Vortman Aufklarungs- und Beratungspflichten 1. 
226 Ghestin in Harris & Tallon (eds) Contract Law 166. 
227 These duties are referred to asAufklarungs- und Beratungspflichten. Both duties are pre-
contractual Nebenleistungspflichten, accessory duties of performance, that serve to 
inform the contracting party about circumstances that may lead to the derailment 
(Vereitelung) of the contract. See Vortmann Aufklarungs-und Beratungspflichten 3; 
Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 9. 
228 Nob be Bankrecht 16-17. 
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sources of information. 229 
The duty to explain or advise relates to communications to which the contractant has aligned his 
earlier behaviour. Together with explanation and advice the crux of the matter lies in the 
assessment of facts and the conclusions that might be drawn therefrom. 230 In contrast thereto the 
duty to disclose, relates to the communication of certain facts. 
The duty to explain is therefore owing when information is required which is of determining 
importance (bedeutsam) for a contractual decision. A duty to disclose relates however, to those 
facts, upon which the information receiver wishes to base his future relationship.231 
The duty to explain and the duty to advise are to be considered the same. Both duties are pre-
contractual232 additional duties that serve to inform the contracting party of circumstances which 
may lead to the frustration of the purpose of the contract. The violation of these duties can be by 
way of omission or commission. In isolated cases the border between misrepresentation and non-
disclosure is quite indistinguishable. 233 
Other duties such as the duty to comment or warn that have developed out of the duty to explain 
and the duty to advise, are special duties such as the duty of care or the duty to ward off danger. 
Their origins stem from the need, to protect the other contracting party and to ensure the 
achievement of the object of the contract.234 
As a result of the circumstances existing at the time, a contracting party must be informed against 
those circumstances of which he is unaware and of which the other party has knowledge, in order 
to prevent him from suffering damage. This duty to warn is readily recognizable in those cases 
in which the one party has a duty towards the other party, owing to the relationship between the 
229 See Emmerich Leistungsstorungen 44. 
230 Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 74-75; OLG Karlsruhe WM 1988 411 at 412; Vortmann 
Aujklarungs- und Beratungspflichten 2. 
231 VortmanAujklarungs und Beratungspflichten 3. 
232 Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 9-10 sees these duties not as contractual, but as of a 
gesetzlicher Natur, existing independent of any particular type of banking contract such 
as loan or discounting. These duties are rather to be seen as part of the banker-customer 
relationship or Geschaftsverbindung. 
233 VortmannAujklarings- und Beratungspflichten 3. 
234 Eg, notification to pay in the case of non-payment of a bill. See BGH ZIP 1989 563. 
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parties, which duty he can comply with easily and without further ado. Also, in the case of the 
duty to warn on the one hand and the duty to explain and advise on the other, the borderlines 
between them can sometimes be indistinct. 235 
A banker is, in principle, legally obliged to advise a customer truthfully and explain all the 
circumstances that are relevant to the customer's business decision. 236 However, from this 
definition it should not be concluded that a general duty of explanation and advice exists, 237 not 
even from the fact that a long relationship has been in existence between banker and client or 
where the bank has taken a H ausbankfunktion. 238 
A duty of explanation therefore only exists when the contracting party is reasonably entitled 
thereto, in accordance with the dictates of good faith (Treu und Glauben)239 and the legal 
convictions of the community, the Verkehrsauffassung. 240 
The liability of a bank based on its failure to comply with its duty to explain, advise or disclose, 
235 VortmannAujklarungs- und Beratungspflichten 4. 
236 RG WarnR 1916 227 456; BGH WM 1987 1329 at 1331. 
237 BGH ZIP 1981 962; BGH ZIP 1983 1060. 
23 8 BGH WM 1990 5 84; OLG Koln 1990 1616 at 1617 states the following in regard to the 
explanatory duties to a customer oflong standing who undertakes suretyship for another 
customer: 
"Auch in diesem Fall muss der Burge bzw. der Kunde des Kreditinstitutes 
annehmen und wissen, dass der Hauptschuldner ohne weitere Sicherungen nicht 
mehr kreditwlirdig ist und das Geldinstitut insoweit in einem 
Interessenwiderstreit steht. 
Hieruber muss die Bank den Burgen nicht besonders autklaren, fur ihn ist 
vielmehr offensichtlich, dass die Bank in diesem Fall zumindest auch ihm, dem 
Burgen, unter Umstanden entgegengestzte, eigene Interessen mit der 
Hereinnahme von Sicherheiten verfolgt." 
The surety must not expect, without further investigation, that the principal debtor is 
creditworthy, and must realise that he, the surety, stands in a situation of conflict of 
interest with the bank. The bank does not have to explain this to the surety. For a contrary 
opinion, pleading for a heavier duty on the banker in this regard, see Kondgen 
Gewahrung 4 7. 
239 S 242 BGB. 
240 RGZ 111 233; BGHNJW 1973 752 at 753; Schmeltz Verbraucherkredit 153; V-0rtmann 
Aujklarungs- und Beratungspflichten 7. 
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furthermore, remains limited to a few exceptions. 241 The exceptional circumstances in which 
these exist are where the bank itself creates, or contributes to, an economic risk242 or where the 
bank actively encourages the surety to sign, and when the bank has, in relation to the special risks 
of the business, a concrete Wissenvorsprung, 243 or where the bank has exceeded its role as 
financier in the business of the client and can be seen as a partner,244 or where the bank has a 
serious conflict of interest with the customer. 245 
6.5.1.3.2 The bankers duty of disclosure 
6.5.1.3.2.1 Disclosure to customers 
The bank does not have any general duty of disclosure to the customer, notwithstanding the 
preamble to the previous AGB-Banken.246 The customer generally has no legal claim to 
disclosure. 247 A duty of disclosure may arise out of contract, or, extraordinarily, may arise from 
Treu und Glauben248 or as a result of guten Sitten, 249 but in accepting a legal duty of disclosure 
on these grounds, extreme restraint (dusserste Zurilckhaltung) has to be used, as the banks have 
made their disavowance of such a duty clear in the 1986 AGB-Banken250 and the customer must 
241 BundschuhBankrecht 84-85; NobbeBankrecht 20. 
242 Nobbe Bankrecht 28. 
243 VortmannAujkldrungs- und Beratungspjlichten 7; Nobbe Bankrecht 21; BGH ZIP 1992 
166; BGH ZIP 1991 1956. 
244 NobbeBankrecht26;BGHZIP 1988562;BGHZIP1992166;BGHZIP 1992163. 
245 Nobbe Bankrecht 30-31; Reinking & Niessen 1991ZIP78 at 85; BGH ZIP 1992 990; 
BGH ZIP 1992 913. 
246 The preamble to the 1986 AGB-Banken stated that the banker-customer relationship is 
a fiduciary relationship. The customer may expect the bank to carry out its instructions 
with the necessary care (Sorgfalt) of eines ordentlichen Kaufmanns, and the bank must 
protect the customer's interest in the best possible manner. See, also, Sandktihler 
Bankrecht 22. This is not contained in the AGB-Banken of 1993. There are, of course, 
certain statutory duties of disclosure. Sees 402 BGB; s 666 BGB; s 840 ZPO. 
247 Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 58. 
248 S 242 BGB. 
249 S 826 BGB; OLG Hamm WM 1987 1297 at 1298. 
250 Note also the last sentence of s 10 AGB-Banken of 1986: 
"[D]ie Bank ubernimmt ferner keine Haftung aus einer etwaigen Unterla-ssung 
von Auskiinften und Raterteilungen." 1 
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be aware of the fact that such disclosure is not generally prescribed. 251 
Where the customer does ask for information, the bank should act as an ordentliche Kaufmann 
and should disclose those facts known to the bank, as far as this is material to the dispositions 
of its customer. 252 
In principle, a banker is legally obliged to advise a customer truthfully and explain all 
circumstances that are relevant to the customer's business decision. 253 
6.5.1.3.2.2 Disclosure about customers (Die Bankauskunft)254 
The question of status reports by banks is covered in s 2 of the new AGB-Banken of 1993. This 
section states that a bank may disclose information regarding the customer only if it is legally 
required to do so or if the customer has consented thereto or if the bank is authorized to disclose 
banking affairs. The general conditions differentiate between business customers and private 
customers, the latter being often less inclined to disclose information about their wealth. The 
251 Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 58-59. 
252 Sandkiihler Bankrecht 23; Gabler Bankrecht 504-505; Nobbe Bankrecht 17. 
253 RGWarnR 1916 227 456; BGHWM 1987 1329 at 1331. 
254 S 10 AGB-Banken of 1986 states: 
11Bankauskiinfte sind allgemein gehaltene Feststellungen und Bemerkungen uber 
die wirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse des Kunden, seine Kreditwlirdikeit und 
Zahlungsfahigkeit. 11 
In contrast to duties to advise, assess, or warnings, bank disclosure relates to the 
disclosure of facts, regarding the economic relations of the customer, and his 
creditworthiness. See Sandkuhler Bankrecht 22; Vortman Aufkliirungs-und 
Beratungspflichten 3. 
S 2(2) AGB-Banken of 1993 reads: 
11Eine Bankauskunft enthalt allgemein gehaltene F eststellungen und Bemerkungen 
uber die wirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse des Kunden, seine Kreditwlirdikeit und 
Zahlungsfii.higkeit; betragsmassige Angaben -Uber Kontostande, Sparguthaben, 
Depot- oder sonstige der Bank anvertraute Vermogenswerte sowie Angaben uber 
die Hohe von Kreditanspruchnahmen werden nicht gemacht. 11 
Normally the bank does not give account balances or credit limits. 
In regard to status reports generally, see Ebeling 1955 J.¥i\113-66etseq; Gaede 1972NJW 
926 et seq; Schraepler 1972 NJW 183 6 et seq. 
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bank will not give any information about a private customer without his express consent. 255 
A person in regard to whose affairs a bank makes a statement or disclosure, may have a damages 
claim against the bank. 256 The rule is that the bank, if it discloses facts about a customer, should 
state the objective truth. 257 The bank is obliged to give the information with the care or Sorg/alt 
eines ordentlichen Kaufmanns truthfully and fully. 258 
The courts take the attitude that the bank should rather refuse to make statements about its 
customer, if it is of the opinion that disclosure may be misleading, even if negative conclusions 
are drawn from its failure to disclose. 259 
If a bank makes a false statement to a third party about the customer, the bank may be held liable 
in delict to the third party.260 
The bank should normally also ensure that it does not exceed its duty of secrecy. It is submitted 
that the bank should always insist on the customer's express consent to the making of disclosure 
of its affairs to third parties. 261 Bank references are, of course, given only to another bank 
requesting the information. 262 
255 See Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 74; Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 160-161; 
Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 63. 
256 Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 72-73 
257 Gabler Bankrecht 506; Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 161; OLG Oldenburg WM 1987 
836. 
25 8 Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 161-162. No figures are usually given - only information 
of general creditworthiness. The information needs to sketch only the big picture. The 
reader is expected to read carefully and between the lines as well. See Fischer & Klanten 
Bankrecht 162. The bank also need not do an intensive investigation into the customer's 
affairs. The bank need only disclose the facts available to it at the time of the request. See 
Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 64. 
259 Gabler Bankrecht 506-507. 
260 Canaris Bankvertragsrecht 71-72; Hom et al Introduction 80; Markesinis Torts 285; 896; 
Bundschuh Bankrecht 5; Nobbe Bankrecht 46; Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 167; BGH 
WM 1972 583 at 584; BGHWM 1989 1409. 
261 Sees 2 of the new AGB-Banken of 1993; Gabler Bankrecht 507; Lanio AGB-Banken 
155; Bundshuh Bankrecht 1 ; Dirichs Ha/tung 7. 
262 Nobbe Bankrecht 45; Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 164. 
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Although the suretyship is a contract between the surety and the creditor, German law recognizes 
a contractual relationship between surety and principal debtor on the grounds of agency. 263 As 
Beauftrager, the surety may require the principal debtor to inform him of the extent of his 
liability and it is assumed that in this respect the principal debtor has released the bank from its 
duty of secrecy. 264 
6.5.1.3.3 Disclosure of facts to a surety 
Suretyship, as a particular contract, is regulated by statute. 265 As seen above where the general 
principles of suretyship were discussed, suretyship is an accessory obligation, and has a security 
character whereby it is understood that the liability is a subsidiary one.266 
An extremely important aspect of the character of German suretyship, is the fact that suretyship 
is a contract (einseitig verpflichtender Vertrag) creating liability for the surety only. It is entered 
into between surety and creditor; the co-operation of the principal debtor is not required. 267 Only 
the surety attracts liability, not the creditor. 268 This onerous view of suretyship underlies the 
reason why the German law of disclosure to a bank's surety is restricted. 
The creditor is generally not compelled to advise the surety about the risks and patrimonial 
relationships of the principal debtor. It is for the surety to inform himself in this regard. 269 Only 
in exceptional circumstances may an advisory duty arise on the grounds of good faith, for 
example where the bank has itself had an influence on the decision of the surety to bind himself 
If such an exceptional duty exists, 270 the bank must inquire whether the surety has assessed the 
263 Beauftrager. See s 662 BGB; Palandt BGB 782-784. 
264 Gabler Bankrecht 513. 
265 See ss 765 BGB - 777 BGB; Palandt BGB 862-877. 
266 Gabler Bankrecht 590; Muller Schuldrecht 308; Palandt BGB 862; Fischer & Klanten 
Bankrecht 231; RGZ 59 11; BGH NJW 1998 2972. 
267 Gabler Bankrecht 590; Muller Schuldrecht 313; Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 239. 
268 Gabler Bankrecht 5 90; Fikentscher Schuldrecht 8 621. 
269 Gabler Bankrecht 596; Bundschuh Bankrecht 84; Fischer & Klanten Bankrecht 239; 
BGHZ 125 206. In very restricted cases, a duty to advise may arise, such as where the 
principle debtor is about to go bankrupt, or where the surety has been misled about the 
risks by the creditor. SeeBGHZIP 1987 764; BGH ZIP 1987 757; BGHZIP 1989 629. 
270 VortmannAufkldrungs-und Beratungspflichten 7. 
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relationships of the principal debtor correctly. 
Under no circumstances may the creditor give false information to the surety in regard to the 
financial relationships of the principal debtor. Ifhe does, he may face a claim in terms of s 123 
BGB (arglistiger Tduschung). 271 
In principle, the creditor need not take the interests of the surety into account when taking a 
suretyship, or further suretyships. However, good faith should be observed also in this regard, 
and the creditor may not, at will, neglect or ignore the interests or position of the surety.272 
In principle, the bank does not have a general duty to explain the extent of the risks that the 
surety is undertaking. 273 This principle is valid in respect of the consideration of both the legal 
effect of the suretyship as well as its financial effect. 274 Flowing from this principle, the fact that 
the principal debtor has exceeded his credit limit needs no explanation. 275 The fact that the bank 
is also the banker of the surety, places no duty of explanation on the bank. The bank may assume 
that the surety has informed himself of all material aspects necessary for taking the decision. 276 
Any information lacking falls within the surety's own sphere of risk. 277 
This strict division of risk is due to the design of suretyship as a one-sided contract, 278 which 
confers little protection on the surety. 279 The law does allow an exception to the above ruling only 
when, through its own conduct, the bank as creditor has caused the surety to be mistaken as to 
271 Gabler Bankrecht 596; Markesinis Tort 285; 896; Hom et al Introduction 80; Markesinis 
Contract 207. 
272 Gabler Bankrecht 596. 
273 BGH WM 1983 1850; BGH WM 1986 11; BGH ZIP 1987 764; BGH ZIP 1987 1S19; 
OLG Celle WM 1988 1815; OLG Munchen WM 1989 601. 
274 BGHWM 1987 853; BGHWM 1987 1481. 
275 OLG Koln WM 1990 1616; VortmanAujkldrungs- und Beratungspflichten 82. 
276 BGHWM 1986 11; BGHNJW 1989 1605. 
277 Vortmann Aujkldrungs- und Beratungspflichten 82. 
278 Gabler Bankrecht 596; OLG Koln NW-RR 1990 755 at 756; Scholz & Lwowski 
Kreditsicherheiten 348 and 365. 
279 Vortmann A ujkldrungs- und Beratungspflichten 81. 
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an increased risk or unexpected risk. 280 Under no circumstances may the bank mislead the surety 
about the facts of the matter or attempt to trivialize the type, scope or risk of the surety's liability 
and thereby influence his decision.281 
The cause of the mistake can be a positive statement or a failure to speak by the bank.282 A duty 
to act positively or to speak arises only in exceptional circumstances in the banker-surety 
relationship. If such a duty does exist, a bank must comply with the duty and cannot hide behind 
its duty of secrecy towards the customer. 283 This duty may even require the bank to obtain from 
the customer its release from its duty of secrecy. 284 
Failure to disclose relevant information in the course of a business transaction may be actionable 
under s 826 BGB especially where the defendant's conduct constitutes an abuse of his dominant 
economic position. 285 
If a surety assumes an obligation, the amount of which exceeds by far his present and potential 
future income situation and assets, such a contract can be void under s 138 BGB, if additional 
circumstances levy a considerable burden on the surety and lead to an intolerable imbalance 
between the parties to the contract. In particular, such burdens can be caused if the creditor 
exploits the surety's inexperience in business matters or if he exploits a mental predicament, or 
in some way exerts undue influence on the surety's freedom of decision. 286 
The creditor has no duty to advise the surety continuously about the standing of the principal 
280 BGH WM 1986 11; BGH WM 1987 853; Vortmann Aujkkirungs- und 
Beratungspflichten 84. AnAujkltirungspflicht may arise where the bank has exceeded its 
role as financier and could be seen as the partner of the debtor. See BGH NJW 1988 
15 83; BGH WM 1990 920; BGH ZIP 1992 163; BGH ZIP 1992 990. The duty may also 
arise where a serious conflict of interest between the bank and its customer has arisen. 
See BGH ZIP 1988 562; BGH ZIP 1991 90; BGH WM 1990 920; BGH ZIP 1992 2146; 
Nobbe Bankrecht 26-30. 
281 BGH NJW 1994 1341. 
282 BGH ZIP 1987 1519. 
283 OLG Hamburg ZIP 1988 1538; VortmannAujkliirungs- undBeratungspflichten 86-87. 
284 OLGHammZIP 19821061; OLGHamburgZIP 1988 1538; VortmannAujklarungs-und 
Beratungspflichten 87. 
285 BGH NJW 1982 2815. 
286 BGH NJW 1994 1341. 
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debt. 287 During the existence of the suretyship, the bank need not take into account the 
patrimonial interests of the surety. It is the surety's duty to inform himself of continuing 
contractual risks. 288 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
German Law also has several theories on what constitutes a "banker-customer relationship". The 
relationship between banker and customer is not limited to one type of transaction, but is mostly 
a relationship which endures for a period and which can consist of several types of business 
transaction. 289 The legal regime of this relationship is constituted by the principles of general 
contract law as found in the German Civil Code and Commercial Code. These codes do not 
contain special provisions on banking transactions. Instead, the general provisions on contracts, 
for example on credit contracts, agency contracts, purchase contracts, commission contracts and 
others, as well as the general principles of good faith, and the rules relating to the interpretation 
of contracts, are applicable. In addition, the rules and principles on pre-contractual duties and on 
tort liability under the German Civil Code come into play. This private law of banking 
transactions is modified and completed by special legislation on the protection of customers and 
investors. The most important laws in this regard are the law on General Conditions of Contracts 
of 1976,290 the Law on Consumer Credits of 1990,291 and the Securities Trading Act of 1994.292 
The banker-customer relationship can be described as a bundle of different contracts. The various 
contracts between bank and customer normally have some similarities and common features. 
Invariably, the bank must act in good faith, must be reasonable, and not act contradictorily when 
handling the customer's affairs. 293 
The banking industry uses uniform standard conditions of contract in their contracts with 
customers and other banks. The AGB-Banken of 1993 is subject to the AGB-Gesetz. Section 9 
287 Gabler Bankrecht 596. 
288 Fischer & KlantenBankrecht 239-240; OLG Koln WM 1995 1268. 
289 See par 6.2.1 supra. 
290 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen (AGB-Gesetz). 
291 Verbraucherkreditgesetz. 
292 Wertpapierhandelsgesetz. (WpHG). See par 6.2.1 supra. 
293 See par 6.2.2 supra. 
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AGB-Gesetz states that clauses in general conditions of contract are void if they place the other 
party in a disadvantageous legal position that violates the standards of fairness. Under its various 
contractual and pre-contractual relations with its customer, the bank must exercise due diligence 
and care when handling the customer's affairs. It must provide proper information and 
disclosure, and must observe strict standards of fairness. 294 
As a rule, the bank must keep the customer's affairs confidential; in particular, it must not give 
information about his assets with the· bank or about his plans for certain financial transactions, 
unless the customer has given his consent. The duty does not have an express statutory basis, but 
is derived from the contractual relationship between the bank and the customer, which implies 
a general fiduciary duty. Various statutes override the secrecy obligation. The bank may also be 
justified in disclosing information where there is an overriding public duty to do so, or where 
there is an overriding interest of the bank to do so.295 
The bank must do its best to avoid any conflict between the interest of its customer and its own 
interest. The establishment of Chinese Walls to avoid any conflict between the interests of the 
bank and the interest of its customer has become a particularly important element of conflict 
management and is one of the primary organisational obligations imposed by s 34 of the 
Securities Trading Act of 1994.296 
As far as investment banking is concerned, banks must give proper information and advice to 
their customers as investors when they render financial services to them. 297 
The BGB provides for a system of securities for creditors. It provides for only one type of 
personal security (Personalsicherheit): the contract of suretyship. The surety agrees to be liable 
to the creditor, to stand in (einzustehen) forthe compliance with the obligation of the third party. 
This undertaking must be in writing unless the surety is a merchant. The surety is basically liable 
only to the extent that the principal debt for which he has stood surety actually exists; he can use 
against the creditor any defences available to the third party. Thus, the liability of the surety is 
made accessory (akzessorisch) to the main debt, and the liability of the surety is a subsidiary 
294 See par 6.2.3 supra. 
295 See par 6.2.4.2 supra. 
296 See par 6.2.4.3 supra. 
297 See par 6.2.4.4 supra. 
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one.29s 
The European Union has issued a number of directives and recommendations on consumer 
protection. The most important initiative in this field is the Directive on Consumer Credits that 
has been made part of the German national consumer credit legislation. Under this legislation, 
banks are obliged to conclude credit contracts with private customers, in writing, and to include 
in the contract certain precisely prescribed information about the most important conditions of 
the credit, in order to give the borrower a full picture of his rights and duties, and in particular, 
about the economic burden of the credit. Another important piece of legislation on consumer 
protection is the German Law on General Conditions of Contract ( AGB-Gesetz ), which is aimed 
at protecting every customer against the restriction of his or her contractual freedom that would 
result from unilateral formulation of contractual conditions. The Wertpapierhandelsgesetz299 
lays the foundation for a German capital-market law or securities law as a new body oflaw that 
is close to banking law, but not entirely a part of it. The new law provides for a federal authority 
for the supervision of the trade in securities and it establishes a number of duties for all 
enterprises active in the field of financial services. These enterprises must exercise due diligence 
when serving the customer. They must organize their business in a way that enables them to 
render the necessary information and advice, and to avoid conflict of interest with their 
customers. They furthermore must gather the necessary information about the customer, his 
knowledge, experience, and investment expectations. On the basis of this information, the 
enterprise rendering the financial service can give the customer the information and advice 
appropriate to him and recommend those investments that suit his needs and expectations. 300 
In German law the institutions known as breach of contract and delict are arranged in separate 
paragraphs of the BGB. Breach of contract is usually treated under the general rules relating to 
improper compliance with an obligation. An obligation (Schuldverhaltnis) is described as a 
relationship between a debtor and creditor, with a duty of performance (Schuld, or 
Leistungspflicht) and a corresponding right to performance (Forderung), as content.301 
Section 242 BGB creates a general duty to perform according to the dictates of good faith (Treu 
298 See par 6.3 supra. 
299 WpHG of 1994. 
3 00 See par 6 .4 supra. 
301 See par 6.5.1.1 supra. 
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und Glauben). This principle has been used in various ways by the courts to develop a control 
mechanism for the whole law of contract. 302 
Under German law the manifestation of the will (Willenserkltirung) can be defective on different 
grounds. German law distinguishes between a defect in the formation of the will (Willensbildung) 
in the case of an error of motive (Motivirrtum), fraud (arglistige Ttiuschung), and threat 
(widerrechtliche Drohung), and a defect in the declaration of the will (ein Mangel in der 
Erkltirungshandlung) which arises, for example, when the representer says something different 
from that which he intended to say; this constitutes anErkltirungsirrtum. The mistaken party can 
rescind the contract, regardless of the behaviour of the other party. However, the other party has 
a claim for the harm (Vertrauensschaden) he has suffered if he has justifiably relied on the 
promise now rescinded. 303 
The German principles of disclosure and advice are heavily influenced by the concept of good 
faith (Treu und Glauben). A bank must therefore contract in a manner required by good faith and 
fair dealing, taking into account the general commercial practice. 304 
Various statutes, the AGB-Banken of 1993, the legal convictions of the community 
(Verkehrsauffassung), and good faith, all play a role in determining a duty of disclosure and 
advice. 305 Perhaps the best summary as to the existence or not of a banker's duty of disclosure 
would be the following: 
A party who was or (having regard especially to any professional qualification) ought to 
have been aware of a fact which he knew to be of determining importance for the other 
contracting party is bound to inform the latter of that fact, provided that he was unable 
to discover it for himself or that, because of the nature of the contract, the character of the 
parties, or the incorrectness of the information provided by the other party, he could 
justifiably rely on that other to provide the information. 306 
302 Ibid 
303 See par 6.5.1.2.1 supra. 
304 S 242 BGB. See, also, par 6.5.1.3.1.1 supra. 
305 See pars 6.5.1.3.1.1and6.5.1.3.2 supra. 
306 See Ghestin in Harris & Tallon (eds) Contract Law 166. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE BANKER'S DUTIES OF 
DISCLOSURE AND ADVICE TO CUSTOMERS AND 
SURETIES: THE NETHERLANDS 
7.1 A COMPARATIVE NOTE 
7.1.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the chapter on German Law1, it was common until recently to divide the 
European legal systems into five groups, so-called "legal families". On the continent many 
authors distinguished: 
• the French legal family; 
• the German legal family; 
• the Nordic legal family; 
• the Socialist legal family; and 
• the Anglo-American legal family. 
The British Isles and Ireland were described as countries belonging to the Anglo-American legal 
family. 2 
The Netherlands fall within the French family3 and a brief comparative note is in order at this 
point. 
1 Chapter 6 sub par 6.1.1. 
2 See, for instance, Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 63-73. 
3 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 102; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 101-103. 
Malstrom 1969 Scandinavian Studies in Law127 at 148 classifies the Netherlands, with 
France, as part of the Latin Group of a Central Eumpean Group. 
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7.1.2 The French group 
After the French Revolution a committee was established to prepare the codification of several 
fields oflaw, which codifications were to be introduced into the whole territory of the French 
Republic. Until that time a strong Roman-law orientated system oflaw had been in force in the 
southern part of modem France (pays de droit ecrit), whereas in the northern part many different 
systems of customary laws existed that were less influenced by Roman law (pays de droit 
coutumier). 4 The committee prepared three important codes in the field of civil law, which were 
later enacted: a civil code (Code Civil of 1804), a commercial code (Code Commercial of 1807) 
and a code of civil procedure (Code de procedure civile of 1804). The Civil Code was divided 
into three books: 
( 1) law of persons and family; 
(2) law of property; 
(3) law of obligations including the law of inheritance and matrimonial property. 
These codes came into force at the time the French Republic, under the leadership of Napoleon, 
covered an important part ofWestem Europe. Therefore, these codes were immediately enforced 
in the territories of Belgium, Luxembourg, the southern part of the Netherlands as well as parts 
of Germany. In other countries of Western Europe, under the influence of France, similar codes 
were introduced, for example the Civil Code for the Kingdom of the Netherlands which was 
enacted during the reign of King Louis-Napoleon, a brother of the French Emperor. 5 
After the decline of the French Empire in 1814, the codes of the Napoleonic area stayed in force 
in France, and partly also in countries which had formerly belonged to France, or were under 
French influence. The reason for this was that the value of having the most important fields of 
law centrally codified instead of the state of affairs that existed before in most European 
countries, that is different local laws, was generally accepted. 6 
7.1.3 The Netherlands 
Since, during this period, the southern provinces of the Netherlands were part of the French 
4 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 75-76. 
5 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 102. 
6 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 99. 
316 
Empire Napoleonic legislation came into force in 1804 in these provinces. The northern 
provinces of the country constituted the Kingdom of Holland from 1806 to 1810 under King 
Louis-Napoleon. Codes following the French model were introduced in this kingdom. A Civil 
Code7 came into force in 1809. In 1810 the whole territory of the modem Netherlands became 
part of the French Empire and in 1812 the French codes came into force in the whole country. 
These codes remained provisionally in force with minor modifications in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands until separate codifications were enacted. The new Dutch codes were introduced on 
1 October 1838 into the field of private law. 8 The structure of the Civil Code differed from the 
French Code Civil, although many of the provisions were mere translations of the French 
original. Only in some matters did the codes follow its own, more traditional Dutch solutions, 
for example in the field of matrimonial property law and the area of law regarding the transfer 
of ownership. After an unsuccessful attempt in the nineteenth century to recodify private law, 
a project was started in 194 7 to do this. In that year Professor Meijers was entrusted with the 
official task of making a draft of a new Civil Code.in 1970 the first book ofthis new code (on 
the law of persons and the family) came into force, followed by a second book in 197 6 on the law 
oflegal entities. In 1991 book 8 on the law of transport was put into force. Finally the core of the 
new code (book 3 : general part of patrimonial law; book 5: law of property; book 6: law of 
obligations; parts ofbook 7: specific contracts) came into force on 1January1992. Book 4 (law 
of succession and contracts) came into force on 1 January 1992. The other parts of book 7 will 
follow in the near future. Many of the provisions of this code still show the descendence from 
the French tradition, but on other points the influences of other traditions are evident. The code 
was prepared after thorough comparative research and the Swiss, Italian and German codes, in 
particular, influenced the solutions chosen by the legislator in the Netherlands. Even Anglo-
American theories influenced certain of the Code's topics. Like the Italian Civil Code the new 
code of the Netherlands integrates civil and commercial law. When all parts of the new code are 
in force the commercial code will be abolished. 9 
7 Wetboek Napoleon voor het Koninkrijk Holland of 18-09. See Zweigert & Kotz 
Introduction 102. 
8 BW, Wetboek van Koophandel, Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering. 
9 See, in general, Hartkamp et al (eds) Eur.opean Code 102; Hondius (ed) Dutch Law; 
Hebly Evidence; Warendorf Companies; Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 102-103. 
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7.2 THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP 
7.2.1 A combination of contracts 
Under banking law is usually understood the total of the juridical aspects of the operations of 
banks, particularly general banks. 10 Apart from general banks, the Dutch banking system also has 
co-operative banks, savings and Post banks, hypothecation banks, finance companies and loan 
companies, investment banks and participation companies, as well as, of course, the central bank, 
that is the Nederlandsche Bank. 11 
Dutch law does not specifically provide for an all-encompassing "banking contract" which would 
cover the entire relationship between bank and customer. Some authors in the Netherlands12 
believe that a so-called "relation agreement" comes into existence when a customer engages the 
services of a bank for the first time. However this view is not generally held. 13 The activities that 
Dutch banks perform are extremely varied and includes the granting of credit, money lending, 
money and capital market transactions, depothandel, mandate, rekening courant, negotiable 
instruments, giraal betalingsverkeer, credit cards, documentary letters of credit, foreign exchange 
transactions, term transactions, swaps, securities and various other activities as can be expected 
from a developed country. 14 
Most people look at the relationship in a pragmatic way: a combination of qualified and 
unqualified contracts, governed by the general rules of contract law, and the General Banking 
Conditions. 15 
10 Schwintowski & Schafer Bankrecht 3; Schonle Bank- und Borsenrecht 2. 
11 See Kessenich-Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 2-3. The central Bank regulates the 
Banking Industry in terms of the Banking Act of 1948. See Rank Geld 25. 
12 See VanRavenhorstBankovereenkomst 56-62; VanRavenhorst 1990 WPNR 5941; who 
is of the opinion that the banker-customer relationship is a factual one to which the 
objective law gives effect. 
13 See, for instance, Rank Geld 221; Van DeldenHandelsrecht 711-712. 
14 Bosman Bankwezen; Van den Berge Betalingsverkeer; Rank Geld 23-25. 
15 Nieuwe Algemene Bankvoorwaarden. For discussions see Rank Geld220-221; Wessels 
1996 WPNR 6222 335; Molenaar 1988 TVVS99. 
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7.2.2 Qualified and unqualified agreements 
Under Dutch law a distinction is made between qualified (benoemde) agreements and 
unqualified ( onbenoemde) agreements. Special statutory provisions apply to a specific type of 
qualified agreement, in addition to the general rules of the law of contract which apply to all 
agreements whether qualified or not. 16 
Certain aspects of the relationship between bank and customer in the Netherlands can be seen 
as separate qualified agreements. For instance, a loan or credit granted by the bank to a customer 
and a savings deposit made by a customer with his bank can both be qualified as a loan 
agreement ( verbruikleen). 17 
When a customer gives instructions to his bank to make certain payments this can be qualified 
as a mandate (opdracht) under Dutch law. 18 Giving securities to be looked after by the bank 
constitutes a custody agreement (bewaargeving). 19 
An essential relationship is the bank account agreement (bankrekening overeenkomst). This 
agreement has elements of a mandate (ie a positive balance) and borrowing (ie maintaining an 
overdraft). In addition the bank account is a rekening-courant, (current account), in which mutual 
claims of the bank and the customer are set off against each other. The Dutch Civil Code contains 
a specific provision for continuous set-off in a current- account arrangement.20 
Usually, the entire relationship between the bank and a customer will consist of one or more 
qualified agreements combined with various unqualified elements. The relationship between 
banker and customer is determined from case to case by the type of activity that the bank is 
performing for the customer. 21 
16 Art 6.2 BW, eg, requires that debtor and creditor are obliged to treat one another 
according to the dictates of reasonableness and fairness. 
17 Art 7A.1791 BW. 
18 Art 7.400 BW. 
19 Art 7.600 BW. 
20 Art 6.140 BW; Rank Geld222; De Rooy 1980 WPNR 5520 376 at 377. 
21 Van Delden Handelsrecht 711-712; Asser-Rutten Verbintenissenrecht 42 et seq; Rank 
Geld 221; Hondius 1990 WPNR 5982 771-772. 
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In addition to the provisions applying to certain qualified agreements, the general rules of the law 
of contract apply to the relationship between bank and customer. An essential rule of Dutch 
contract law is that the contents of an agreement are not exclusively determined by what the 
parties have expressly agreed, but also by custom and by the principle of "reasonableness and 
fairness" .22 The contents of an agreement can be interpreted, supplemented23 and even, under 
certain circumstances, be set aside24 by the principle of reasonableness and fairness. Another 
important aspect of Dutch contract law is the law on general conditions. 25 These enactments have 
had and will continue to have an impact on the General Banking Conditions (Algemene 
Bankvoorwaarden) of Dutch banks. 
7.1.3 General banking conditions (Algemene Bankvoorwaarden)26 
The Algemene Bankvoorwaarden (ABV) apply to virtually all retail banking transactions in the 
Netherlands. The present text of the ABV, which has been in force since 1 February 1996, is the 
result of consultations between the Association of Dutch Banks (Nederlandse Vereniging van 
Banken) and representative consumer and business organisations. The ABV apply to general 
banks, savings banks and cooperative banks in their dealings with both private and business 
customers.27 In addition to the ABV, banks use specific conditions for certain banking products, 
such as eurocheques, foreign currency accounts, custody of securities, and so forth. 28 
22 Art 6.248 BW states that an agreement has the legal consequences which may flow, not 
only from contract, but also from statute, custom, or the dictates of reasonableness and 
fairness. Implied terms therefore play an important part in the bank's contracts. See 
Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 54-55. 
23 Aanvullende werking van de redelijkheid en billijkheid. See HR 1976-09-24 NJ 1978 
245; Rb Zuthpen 1983-07-07 NJ 1985 679; HR 1981-03-13 NJ 1981 635. 
24 Beperkende werking van de redelijkheid en billijkheid. See HR 1981-01-16 NJ 1981 312; 
HR 1982-05-07 NJ 1983 525. 
25 Algemene Voorwaarden, Arts 6.231 to 6.247 BW. See, in general, on the Dutch general 
conditions, Hondius in Brownsword et al (eds) Welfarism 253; Hondius 
Standaardvoorwaarden. 
26 Hereinafter shortened to ABV. The ABV is annexed to Tjittes & BlomAansprakelijkheid 
201. 
27 See Wessels 1996 WPNR 6222 335 at 336; Molenaar 1988 TVVS 99 atlOO. 
28 See Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 110. 
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In the ABV,29 banks have undertaken to exercise "due care" in rendering their services.30 
However, this obligation has been made subject to the proviso that a bank is not obliged to make 
use of information of which it has knowledge, but which is not in the public domain. According 
to the ABV this type of information includes price-sensitive information. 31 
The duty of care should be seen as complementing the general rule of contract law that 
agreements should be performed in accordance with "reasonableness and fairness". 32 It is, among 
other things, the basis on which a customer may expect the bank to keep information about him 
confidential. The ABV state that in exercising this due care the banks will, to the extent possible, 
take into account the interests of the customer.33 
7.2.4 The multi-functional bank 
Traditionally, banks in the Netherlands have been involved in a wide range of financial services. 
The services of these "general" banks include brokerage, investment advice and the arranging of 
new issues. 34 All general banks are Admitted Institutions of Amsterdam Exchanges NV and, as 
such, are allowed to conduct business on the Amsterdam (AEX) Stock Exchange. It is quite 
common, for instance, for a Dutch bank to have its credit department and its brokerage or new 
issues department within one legal entity. As a result, a bank may sometimes be confronted with 
a conflict of interest between its affairs and those of its customers, for instance, a customer of the 
brokerage department seeking certain information on a company which is a client of the credit 
department. In such a case the banks must choose between a customer's interest in receiving 
certain information and the bank's interest in withholding information in order to prevent insider 
dealing. To a certain extent, the setting up of "Chinese walls" within the banks might solve this 
29 Art 2 ABV. 
30 The applicability of the duty of due care to the broad field of "rendering servkes" is new 
in the 1996 ABV. The previous ABV which came into force on 1 January 1988 referred 
to due care in executing orders from customers and in performing obligations under any 
agreements and transactions with customers. See Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 
110. 
31 Art 2 ABV. See, on price-sensitive information and Chinese Walls, Van Dijk 1997 TVVS 
235-240. 
32 Art 6.248 BW. 
33 Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 111. 
34 See, in general, Bol Bankwezen; Eizenga Spaarbanken; Bosman Bankwezen; Van den 
Berge Betalingsverkeer. 
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dilemma.35 
Dutch banks have for some time now built 11 Chinese walls 11 • 36 Their use is closely connected with 
the prevention of insider dealing. The most important pieces of legislation aimed at preventing 
the use of insider information are the recently amended and extended provisions of Articles 46 
et seq of the Securities Transactions Supervision Act of 199 5. 37 The principal provision states 
that a person having insider information may not conclude or produce transactions in securities 
listed, or shortly to be listed, on a recognised stock exchange in or outside the Netherlands. There 
are a limited number of statutory exceptions to this prohibition, including a so-called "Chinese 
walls exception". In addition, the Act allows for further exemptions to be granted by ministerial 
decree. Furthermore, the Securities Transactions Supervision Act of 1995 contains provisions 
regarding the disclosure of insider information as well as certain transactions in securities, and 
requires issuing institutions to set internal regulations in accordance with ministerial guidelines. 
Several other regulations also contain rules regarding insider dealing, including the General 
Regulations and the Further Regulations for Admitted Institutions with which Admitted 
Institutions of Amsterdam Exchanges NV must comply. 38 
Under these rules, banks, as Admitted Institutions, are under an obligation to provide for 
adequate arrangements to avoid the passing of price-sensitive information from one department 
to another.39 
In view of the stock-exchange rules, the Association of Dutch Banks introduced a code of 
conduct in 1991 in respect of the separated handling of price-sensitive information. The code of 
conduct, which took effect on 1 April 1991, recommended certain action in setting up Chinese 
Walls. The code of conduct requires the banks to make a physical or, alternatively, a clear 
procedural division between its credit, issues and brokerage departments. Furthermore, the banks 
must inform their customers that Chinese Walls are in place and that as a result of the Chinese 
35 See Van Dijk 1997 TVVS 235-240. 
36 Ibid 
3 7 Wet toezicht effectenverkeer of 1995. 
38 Neate Bank Confidentiality 381; Art 7(e) General Regulations and Art 5 Further 
Regulations for Admitted Institutions. The Listing Rules for the AEX Stock Exchange 
also required listed companies to adopt internal regulations for the prevention of insider 
trading but this requirement has been repealed in view of the new Securities Transactions 
Supervision Act of 1995. See, also, Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 116. 
39 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 116. 
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Walls, certain price-sensitive information will not be conveyed to the customers and will not be 
used by banks in rendering services.40 Under the Code of Conduct banks must appoint an officer 
to enforce compliance.41 The banks' employees must be made subject to various obligations in 
order to comply with the Chinese walls and to ensure their effect. 42 
The use of Chinese walls will help banks to avoid insider trading. However, at least until the 
introduction of the "Chinese Walls exception" mentioned above, it was considered doubtful 
whether their use could always prevent banks from incurring criminal liability. 43 The new rules 
have not yet been tested. 44 
For Chinese walls to be effective in terms of a bank's position vis-a-vis its customers, a 
contractual arrangement would be necessary. The proviso discussed above to the duty of due care 
as included in Article 2 of the General Banking Conditions aims to achieve this. 45 
7 .2.5 Bank confidentiality 
There is no explicit statutory provision which imposes an obligation of secrecy on banks in the 
Netherlands.46 In Dutch civil law, such an obligation is nevertheless assumed to exist. The Dutch 
Criminal Code47 does contain secrecy provisions, but these do not apply to banks. Exceptions to 
the civil-law confidentiality obligation of banks apply when banks have to testify in proceedings 
40 Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 116; Neate Bank Confidentiality 283. 
41 This is similar to the German enactment, s 33 WpHG, requiring a Compliance 
Organisation. See Fischer-Klanten Bankrecht 342. 
42 See Van Dijk 1997 TVVS 235 at 236; Neate Bank Confidentiality 383. 
43 Neate Bank Confidentiality 384. 
44 See Van Dijk 1997 TVVS 235 at 236; Mok 1996 TVVS 343 et seq. About abuse of 
voorwetenschap in general, see Groenhuijsen Voorwetenschap. Various sets of rules 
exist in the Netherlands for the prevention of insider trading. See Neate Bank 
Confidentiality 3 79-3 83. 
45 SeeVanDijk 1997 TVVS235 at238. 
46 There are certain statutes that deal with aspects of bank secrecy, such as s 10 of the 
Constitution of the Netherlands which lays down the principle of protection against 
disclosure of personal data; ss 272 and 273 of the Criminal Code in regard to the 
disclosure of certain data; s 64 of the Banking Act of 1948 providing for the confidential 
treatment of data of the Central Bank; s 31 of the Securities Transactions Supervision Act 
of 1995 in regard to provisions in respect of data available to the Securities Board. 
47 S 273 of the Criminal Code. 
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or give information to the tax inspector. 48 Also, on the basis of the legislation on the prevention 
of money-laundering, banks have a statutory duty to report "unusual transactions". 49 
Neither any Act nor the ABV explicitly50 provides for confidentiality by banks, but an obligation 
of secrecy is generally assumed to exist. The bank's obligation to keep the information of its 
customers confidential follows from the general principle that the contents of an agreement are 
also determined by customs and "reasonableness and fairness". 51 
The duty of due care contained in the ABV is believed to be an additional basis for banks to 
assume an obligation of secrecy. The complaints committee for the Banking Business has ruled 
several times on the basis of the ABV that a bank has a basic obligation of secrecy. 52 
A civil-law obligation of secrecy is also recognised in the Dutch law of delict. A person can be 
held liable for damages resulting from a breach of a generally required duty of care (die in het 
maatschappelijk verkeer betaamt). 53 Breach by banks of their obligation of secrecy could under 
certain circumstances, be considered a breach of this duty of care and therefore tortious. 54 
The Act Concerning the Registration of Personal Data55 provides for an obligation of 
confidentiality in respect of registered personal information, that is a collection of personal 
48 See, in regard to the tax collector, s 47 of the Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen of 
1959; HR 1974-12-10 NJ 1975 178 (Re Stad Rotterdam). The duty of confidentiality of 
banks may be set aside on the basis of the rules of evidence in civil matters. See ss 17 6 
et seq Code of Civil Procedure. It would appear as if a duty of confidentiality, whether 
imposed by statute or by contract could be set aside depending on whether the 
fundamental need that justice be done outweighs the requirement that secrecy be 
maintained. See HR 1989-12-22 RvdW 1990 13 and Bartelings 1991 TVVS 91/3 at 59. 
49 , Disclosure of Unusual Transactions Act of 1993. 
50 The phrases "to exercise due care in providing services" and "to the best ability take into 
consideration the interests of the customer" contained in Art 2 of the ABV are considered 
to be indications of a duty to maintain customer data confidential. See Neate Bank 
Confidentiality 360. 
51 Neate Bank Confidentiality 360; Art 6.2 BW; Art 6.248 BW. 
52 See Case nos 8626, 8716, 8745, 8765 and A9160 of the Complaints Committee for the 
Banking Business, quoted in Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 112. 
53 Art 6.162 BW. 
54 Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 112. 
55 Wet persoonsregistraties of 1July1989. 
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information concerning vanous persons managed by automated means or, for ease of 
consultation, systematically compiled. Article 11 of the Act Concerning the Registration of 
Personal Data states that registered personal information can only be disclosed to third parties 
if such disclosure is in accordance with the purpose of the registration or required pursuant to a 
statutory provision, or when the registree has given his consent. The Dutch Association of Banks 
has adopted a Privacy Code on the basis of this Act. 56 
Under article 272 of the Dutch Criminal Code, disclosure ofa secret by a person who knows, or 
should know, that he has a duty of secrecy pursuant to his office, or pursuant to a statutory 
provision, is a criminal offence. This obligation of secrecy under criminal law has not been 
accepted by the courts in respect ofbanks. 57 In HR 197 4-12-18 NJ 197 5 441, a bank had provided 
a Dutch civil-law notary with information on the amount of credit outstanding to one of its 
customers. The Court of Appeal decided that this did not constitute a criminal offence within the 
meaning of Article 272 of the Criminal Code. 
There are exceptions to the civil-law obligations of secrecy. A person who is called to testify in 
civil or criminal proceedings in the Netherlands is, in principle, obliged to appear in court. 58 
Violation of this duty to appear and testify is a criminal offence, unless the witness has a valid 
excuse. Such valid excuse exists if the witness has a statutory right to be excused. Directors or 
employees of a bank have no such statutory right. 59 Under civil and criminal law, a statutory 
"right to be excused" exists for, among others, those who are bound to secrecy pursuant to their 
profession or office (for instance, solicitors, doctors and clergy). Case law on this point shows 
that courts in the Netherlands have so far denied bankers this right. Legal authors seem to hold 
the same view. Therefore, a banker will have to breach his obligation of secrecy if he is called 
to testify in civil or criminal court proceedings. 60 
Various other exceptions to the bank's obligation of secrecy exist under both civil and criminal 
56 Privacy Code of the Dutch Banking Association of 16 May 1995. See Neate Bank 
Confidentiality 364. 
57 HR 1974-12-18 NJ 1975 441. 
58 Artl91 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Art 218 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings. 
59 Neate Bank Confidentiality 372. 
60 Ibid. See, also, Cranston ( ed) European Banking Law 113. 
325 
law. 61 An important exception is the right of inspection by the tax authorities. Pursuant to the 
General Act on state taxes, 62 the tax inspector may require a bank to give him access in order to 
find facts for the determination of taxes to be imposed on a certain customer of the bank. The tax 
inspector may also ask the bank to give any further information which may be relevant for the 
imposition of taxes on the given customer. Since 1984, a code of practice issued by the Ministry 
of Finance, provides for guidelines to be followed by banks when the tax inspector uses his right 
of inspection. It should be noted that the tax inspector may seek access in two ways firstly by 
giving the name of the customer and secondly, by giving the bank account number. 
Another exception is the bank's duty on the basis of the Consumer Credit Act of 199063 to 
register the granting of consumer credits with the Central Office for Credit Registration. Finally, 
the courts have held that under certain circumstances the bank may have a duty to provide a third 
party who is granting security for the obligations of the customer to the bank, with information 
about the financial position of that customer. 64 
The duty of secrecy may also be breached in terms of the provisions of the prevention of money-
laundering statutes.65 The Netherlands has implemented the Money Laundering Directive66 and 
the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on money-laundering, through two 
pieces of legislation: the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions Act of 199367 and the Act on 
Identification when Providing Financial Services. 68 
61 Exceptions include the customer's consent, where disclosure is made in the interests of 
the bank, where disclosure is made within the banking group, and where disclosure is 
required by law or a duty to the public requires disclosure. See, in general, Neate Bank 
Confidentiality 364-377. 
62 Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen of28 August 1959, as amended. 
63 Wet van 4 juli 1990, Staatsblad 395, houdende regels met betrekking tot het 
consumentenkrediet. 
64 HR 1990-06-01NJ1991759;HR1994-06-03 RvdW 1994 126. 
65 Sint Truiden 1991 Bb 137-139. 
66 EC Directive (Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering 91/308/EEC:[1991] OJL166/77. See, also, Sint Truiden 1991Bb173-174. 
67 Wet melding ongebruikelijke transacties van 16 desember1993. 
68 Wet identificatie bij financiele dienstverlening van 12 desember 1993. 
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7.2.6 Liability of banks for investment advice and other lender liability aspects 
7.2.6.1 Investment advice 
Liability for incorrect advice can arise under two heads; 
(1) liability for breach of contract (wanprestatie ); and 
(2) liability for tort (onrechtmatige daad). 
Contractual liability may arise when a bank, in rendering advice, breaches a specific contract with 
a client for the rendering of advisory services.69 It is more likely however, that there will not be 
a specific contract. The bank may then be liable for a breach of its duty under the ABV and the 
general rules of the law of contract to exercise due care in its relation to its customer. 70 
The bank's incorrect advice may also constitute a delict. Under the Dutch law of delict, it is 
among other things, delictual to act in violation of a "generally required duty of care" 
(zorgvuldigheid die in het maatschappelijk verkeer betaamt) or, in other words, to be negligent. 71 
This negligence may, in addition to breach of contract, be a basis on which a bank may be sued 
for giving incorrect advice. 
It is difficult to indicate when exactly, under Dutch law, a bank will be liable for incorrect 
investment advice. It will depend on the circumstances of the case. 72 A relevant circumstance 
might be the customer's expertise or experience in respect of a contemplated action or 
transaction. 73 An inexperienced customer will require more care from the bank than an 
experienced customer. The duty of care may force the bank not only to warn a customer against 
the risks of a transaction, but even to refuse to carry out a transaction for its customer. This 
69 Art 6.81 BW. 
70 Art 6.2 and Art 6.248 BW; Asser Hartkamp II Verbintenissenrecht 307-309; Hofinann-
Abas Verbintenissenrecht 192-194. 
71 Art 6.162 BW. 
72 In order to determine reasonableness and fairness, a Dutch court must take into account 
the relationship between the parties, the justified interests of each party and the 
circumstances of each case. See Pres Rb 's Gravehage 1958-03-03 NJ 1958 386; HR 
1984-05-04 NJ 1984 670. 
73 See, for instance, HR 1990-06-01NJ1991759;HR1994-06-03 RvdW 1994 126. 
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applies in particular to high-risk transactions such as dealings in options.74 
However, the bank does not have a general obligation to prevent a customer from carrying out 
his own risky investment policy or to warn him about the risks of his investment policy.75 
Under Dutch law a party to a contract is permitted, in principle, to exclude liability for breach 
of contract and/or for tort in all circumstances except wilfulness or gross negligence. Exclusion 
by a party of liability for breach of contract or tort by its employees is permitted in all 
circumstances, even if an employee's act was wilful or grossly negligent. 76 
The ABV contain several limitations on the liability of banks. 77 These limitations are less far 
reaching than an exclusion of liability, with the exception of wilfulness or gross negligence, as 
referred to above. 
Invoking a contractual limitation or exclusion of liability may, under certain circumstances, be 
considered to violate the principle of reasonableness and fairness. Under certain circumstances, 
it might be unreasonable for a bank to invoke the exclusion in the ABV, even though the 
contractual exclusion itself is valid under Dutch law. In such case the bank will be liable 
notwithstanding the contractual exclusion. 78 
74 HR 1997-05-23 RvdW 1997 128. 
75 HR 1997-01-24 NJ 1997 260. This lacuna does not mean that a bank can hide behind a 
Chinese Wall in order not to warn a customer of a danger that it is aware of The 
possibility of liability for lack of reasonableness and fairness exists. See Van Dijk 1997 
TVVS235 at 239; Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid72; Better 1996TVVS130; 
Timmerman & Honee Dubbelrol 70; HR 1967-05-19 NJ 1967 261 at 262 (Saladin v 
Hollandse Bank Unie). 
76 HR 1967-05-19 NJ 1967 261. (Saladin v HBU). 
77 Arts 3, 27 and 31 ABV. 
78 The landmark case on the exclusion of liability by a bank is the Saladin v HB U decision 
of the Supreme Court. (See HR 1967-05-19 NJ 1967 261 ). In this case the Supreme Court 
had to consider a bank's liability for incorrect investment advice and the effect of the 
bank's contractual exclusion of liability. The bank (HBU) had, on its own initiative, 
advised Mr Saladin, who had no expertise in financial matters, to purchase certain 
securities. The transaction was recommended by the bank as very advantageous and very 
safe. Mr Saladin purchased the securities, but discovered soon afterwards that the 
transaction was very unsafe and that his investment was virtually worthless. He sued the 
bank on the basis of breach of contract and tort and claimed damages as a result of the 
transaction. In the proceedings, the question whether the bank was liable in tort never 
needed to be resolved. The bank had excluded all liability for the transaction in a letter 
of confirmation to Mr Saladin. The central question of the proceedings was therefore 
whether the bank could reasonably invoke the contractual exclusion of liability even if 
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The position of a bank in its capacity as lead manager of an issue of securities has come under 
scrutiny in recent years. A lead banker has a duty to verify the the contents of a prospectus79 in 
respect of bond issues80. 
7.2.6.2 Other aspects of banker liability 
7.2.6.2.1 Bases of liability 
7.2.6.2.1.1 Breach of contract (Wanprestatie) 
Wanprestatie81 or breach of contract, occurs where a bank fails to comply with its obligations82 
the bank had committed a tort. 
The Supreme Court decided that the answer to the question of liability depended on 
"various circumstances". One of these circumstances might be the position of the parties 
in society and their relation to each other. The Supreme Court does not decide on factual 
matters. It could therefore only decide whether the Court of Appeal had given a 
reasonable decision in denying Mr Saladin's claim on the basis of the bank's contractual 
exclusion of liability. The Supreme Court did find that the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in this case was reasonable. Mr Saladin therefore lost his case in the final 
instance. If the bank had not excluded its liability, the matter would probably have been 
decided in Mr Saladin's favour. 
79 Arts 6.194-196 BW deals specifically with misleading publicity. 
80 In the important Co-op case, (See HR 1994-12-02 NJ 1996 246) the Hoge Raad ruled on 
the responsibility of a lead manager for - and liability in respect of - a prospectus, 
based on tort. The legal framework for prospectus liability under Dutch law is formed by 
a special category of tort dealing with the providing of misleading information. (Art 
6.194 BW). In essence, a person commits a tort by publishing or making available 
misleading information in relation to goods or services offered by that individual, on his 
behalf or another person's behalf, in the course of a business or profession. 
In this case the court held that a bank which acts as a lead underwriter in the offering of 
securities is in principle responsible for the contents of the prospectus. The mere fact that 
certain statements in the prospectus do not originate from that bank, butfrom others such 
as auditors, does not discharge the lead manager from its responsibilities. ABN-AMRO' s 
claim that it was not under an obligation to verify the financial information supplied to 
it by the Co-op' s auditors was rejected, notwithstanding the fact that the prospectuses 
contained an auditor statement. The Court stated further that a lead manager should not 
be considered as having (co-) determined the contents of a prospectus if the prospectus 
states in clear and unambiguous terms that certain statements in the text are not prepared 
by it and that it does not accept responsibility for the accuracy of statements prepared by 
other persons. The responsibility statement included in the Co-op prospectuses did not 
meet such requirements. 
81 Art 6.162 BW et seq. 
82 Asser-Hartkamp I Verbintenissenrecht 250-251; Pels Rijken 1980 TP 1101 at 1104 
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to the other contracting party, and thereby causes the other party damage. The other contracting 
party, obviously, need not be a customer of the bank to create this liability. 
Agreements between bank and customer can, of course, be oral or in writing. It often happens 
that the original relationship between banker and client is contained in a written contract, but 
that later oral amendments can be agreed to, often with dire consequences. 83 
In the case of the so-called benoemde overeenkomst, the law can add certain consequences to the 
agreement, through the requirement of reasonableness and fairness which is applicable to all 
contracts. 84 
The general principles of the law of obligations and contract are applicable to the agreement. In 
addition, general conditions85 could be applicable. The Dutch Courts have found that it is not 
against good faith for a bank to rely upon these "background" conditions. 86 
A banker owes his customer a duty of care87 and has reasonably to take into account the interests 
of his customer. The banker has to deal with the customer as a reasonable banker would. This 
duty to act with care has been incorporated into law in terms of Art 2 ABV, 88 but exists even in 
cases where a particular banker is not a member of the association. 
83 Kessenich-Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 7. 
84 Art 6.2 BW. 
85 See Art 6.231 BW et seq in regard to general conditions in contracts. 
86 HR 1986-07-22 NJ 1986 767; HR 1987-01-16 RvdW 1987 27; in regard to general or 
standard terms see Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden. 
87 "Een bank is in haar doen en laten verplicht de nodige zorgvuldigheid jegens haar 
client in acht te nemen en naar de beste vermogen-voor zover redelikerwijze van 
haar te verlangen-met <liens belangen rekening te houden. Zij moet zich jegens 
hem gedragen als een redelijk handelende bank. 11 
Kessenich-Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 8; See, also, Asser-Kleijn Bijzondere 
Overeenkomsten 128; HR 1974-01-11NJ1974 179; HR 1980-02-15 NJ 1980 327. 
88 Art 2 of the ABV reads as follows: 
"The bank shall exercise due care in providing services. It will thereby to the best 
of its ability take into consideration the interests of the customer, provided 
however that it is not required to use information which is available to it but 
which is not in the public domain, including information which may affect quoted 
prices of securities. 11 
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The guideline which the bank should bear in mind is the economic interests of the customer. The 
bank should strive to serve the customer's economic interests to the best of its ability. In order 
to do this the banker should be informed to the highest level about the affairs of the customer. 
Should a client suffer damage through the failure of the bank to take into account information 
that the bank did not possess or that a reasonable bank would not have known, the bank would 
not be liable. 
Should any advice from the bank be given on any ground other than the economic interests of 
the customer, then such advice could lead to liability of the bank.89 Furthermore, the banker has 
a duty of care towards co-creditors,90 and sureties.91 
This duty of care towards the customer brings in its train an onus on the banker to behave in such 
a fashion that the economic interest of its customer is paramount. 92 
7.2.6.2.1.2 Delictual liability 
The banker's liability for delictual93 actions may be owing to a customer or to a third party, such 
as a creditor of the customer. Delictual liability arises when a bank infringes a right of the 
customer or third party, acts contrary to a legal duty, acts contrary to good faith or does not act94 
with the required zorgvuldigheid (care)95 (according to the dictates of the maatschappelijk 
verkeer (social standards))96 towards a customer or third party, and the customer or third party, 
as the case may be, suffers damage as a result thereof The bank can legally be held liable for 
89 Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid 9. 
90 Kessenich Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 19. 
91 SeeAsser-KleijnBijzondere Overeenkomsten 128;HR 1967-05-19NJ 1967 261 (Saladin 
v Hollandse Bank Unie). 
92 Kessenich-Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 9. 
93 Art 6.162 et seq BW. 
94 "Act" can mean handelen en nalaten. See Asser-Hartkamp III Verbintenissenrecht 26; 
Schut Onrechtmatige Daad 107-109. 
95 Schut Onrechtmatige Daad 46-73; Asser-Hartkamp III Verbintenissenrecht 31-50; 
Nieuwenhuis Hoofdstukken 132-136. 
96 HR 1919-01-31 NJ 1919 161 (Lindenbaum v Cohen); Asser-Hartkamp III 
Verbintenissenrecht 30-31. 
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such damage. 97 The banker's conduct in this regard should be judged without taking into account 
a possible breach of a contractual duty. 98 
In recent years it has often happened that a claim by a customer is of a dual nature, being based 
on breach of contract in the first place and then as subsidiary to that, based on delict, and often 
it is not clear on which of the two legal bases the bank is to be held liable. 99 There are, of course, 
differences in the two bases ofliability. For example, when one is dealing with delictual liability, 
the transgressor may be held vicariously liable for the actions of its personnel, 100 whilst with 
contractual liability the transgressor is liable for the actions of those involved in carrying out the 
terms of the contract on his behalf, the so-called Erftlllungsgehilfe (persons performing the 
contract on his behalf), even though these people are not strictly subservient to the contractant. 101 
In this sense the liability based on contract is wider than that flowing from delict, but in another 
sense it is narrower: in a case of contract the transgressor is liable for the actions of others 
involved in the execution of the contract; with delictual liability there must be some functional 
connection between the completion of the contract and the delict, 102 or put differently, that the 
master-servant relationship gave rise to the delict. 103 It is not necessary for the staff member to 
commit the delict in the execution of his orders. 104 
Differences between contract and delict can also be found in the differing effect of a bank's 
exemption clauses and in the difference in the burden of proof 105 
97 HR 1919-01-31 NJ 1919 161 (Lindenbaum v Cohen); Asser-Hartkamp III 
Verbintenissenrecht 30-31. 
98 Kessenich-Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 9; HR 1920-03-26 NJ 1920 476. 
99 Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid 10. 
100 Art 6.170BW. 
101 Kessenich-Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 10. 
102 Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid 10; Schut 
Verantwoordelijkheid 286. 
103 Kessenich-Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 1 O; Hofinann-Drion-Wiersma 
Verbintenissenrecht 25 8. 
104 Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid 10. 
1-05 See Hofinann-Van Opstall Verbintenissenrecht 1D; Asser-Rutten Verbintenissenrecht 
151; Den Tonkelaar Resultaatsverbintenissen 53. The difference between delict and 
contract, as far as the determination of lawfulness is concerned, is becoming smaller. 
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As the topic of concurrence of actions is too specialised to be covered fully in this thesis, one 
can say in summary, that it is trite law that not every breach of contract can be considered as a 
delict, but that only an action which is unlawful, independently of the breach of an obligation, 
simultaneously meets the requirements for both delict as well as breach of contract. 106 
In addition to the above grounds, negotiorum gestio or zaakwaarneming can be a further basis 
ofliability. 107 
7 .2.6.2.2 Specific aspects of banker liability 
7 .2.6.2.2.1 Introduction 
Most claims against banks relate to credit granted by the bank to a customer. The customer as 
well as each third party involved in the credit relationship between the bank and its customer, 
are potential plaintiffs who could sue the bank for damages flowing from the credit relationship 
and actions of the bank which may be unlawful. 108 Statutory measures do exist in the extension 
of credit, 109 but generally the agreement to extend credit is based on contract and obligations 
flowing therefrom, although general conditions may be applicable. 110 
7 .2.6.2.2.2 Duty of care towards customer and co-creditor 
Normally, a bank may be liable to its customer as a result of a breach of the contract between 
them, where applicable. In addition, an agreement whereby the bank extends credit to the 
customer, compels the bank to act with care towards a customer-debtor, as well as towards a co-
106 See HR 1926-06-11 NJ 1926 1049; HR 1955-12-09 NJ 1956 157; HR 1959-03-06 NJ 
1959 349; RB Maastricht 1979-11-11NJ1980655;HR 1983-12-02NJ 1984 367; Asser-
Hartkamp II Verbintenissenrecht 445; III Verbintenissenrecht 10 and 94; Schut 
Onrechtmatige Daad 19; Niewenhuis Hoofdstukken 131; Van Dunne Dialektiek 207; 
Kessenich-HoogendamBeroepsfouten 6; Pels Rijken 1980 TP 1101at1105; Kortmann 
1986 TPR 827 at 828; Wiersma 1960 Handelingen NJV I 224 at 238; Stolker 
Aansprakelijkheid 19. 
107 Art 6.198 BW. 
108 See, in connection with the banker's liability, Molenaar 1984 TVVS 29 et seq; Croon & 
Van Everdingen 1986 TPR 1139. 
109 The risk of a devaluation lies upon the bank. See HR 1931-01-02 NJ 1931 274 (Mark 
is Mark); HR 1957-01-18 NJ 1959 110 (Rupiah). 
110 Arts 6.231 to 6.247 BW. 
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creditor. This is true at the time of entering into the credit agreement, expanding the credit 
ceiling, limiting the credit and the termination of the agreement. 111 
7.2.6.2.2.3 Duty of care in granting and expanding credit 
Theoretically, banks have to act responsibly (nie lichtvaardig) in granting or expanding credit, 
or may face damages claims from its debtor. In practice however, this will not occur often. 
What is more likely is a claim from another creditor. Should the bank irresponsibly extend or 
expand credit, the appearance of creditworthiness is established. Creditors may be enticed into 
granting credit which may prove to be irrecoverable. 112 
Should the bank extend credit without taking into account the interests of other creditors, whose 
interests the bank must respect, the bank may be held liable in delict. The accent here would lie 
in the manner in which and the measure to which the bank acquires, and eventually realises 
security. 113 Banks normally require security when lending out money, whether it is a pledge, 
111 Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid 19. 
112 Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid 20. 
113 See HR 1957-06-28 NJ 1957 514. This is the famous Erba case. In this case the Italian 
firm Erba delivered textile goods, to the Dutch company X, and was not paid. X went into 
liquidation and it appeared that Erba would not even recover their goods, as these were 
to be transferred to the Amsterdam Bank in terms of a cession which was given as 
security for a loan by the Bank to X. Erba instituted an action against the bank in which 
it claimed, inter alia, that the bank had acted illegally against Erba by allowing X to 
maintain the sham of creditworthiness against third parties, including Erba. As a result 
of this misrepresentation or sham Erba was moved to deliver the goods to X, whilst in 
fact Erba had no chance of recovery. The bank had secured for itself a number of security 
interests, leaving no assets available for other creditors. The Rb Amsterdam granted Erba's 
claim, but on appeal their claim was dismissed. The Hoge Raad decided, in principle, that 
a claim in delict may lie where the bank created the fictional appearance of 
creditworthiness, allied to the fact that the bank acted in its own interests and consciously 
harmed the other creditors. The Hoge Raad summed up the situation as follows: 
11 [E]en eigendomsoverdracht tot zekerheid op zichzelf niet onrechtmatig is en ook 
de door het Hof genoemde omstandigheden ieder voor zich behoeven daarin geen 
verandering behoeven te brengen, maar dit niet wegneemt dat de wijze waarop 
en de mate waarin een credietgever zich goederen tot zekerheid doet overdragen, 
gelet op de verdere omstandigheden van het geval - ook omstandigheden als 
door het Hof vermeld-beschouwd in onderling verband en samenhang, kunnen 
meebrengen dat de credietgever, zo hij al niet de gegeven crediettransactie zelve 
had behoren na te laten, dan toch daarna bij de uitvoering daarvan met de 
belangen van derden in zekere mate zal moeten rekening houden of doen houden 
en zo hij dit nalaat, zal hij onder omstandigheden op grond daarvan uit 
onrechtmatige daad jegens hen aansprakelijk kunnen zijn. 11 
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hypothec, notarial bond, suretyship or cession. 114 It would appear as if the granting of credit to 
a company in difficulty constitutes a tort when the loan cannot be serviced from the added value 
produced by the activity financed with the loan proceeds. If the debtor does not produce sufficient 
added value, the credit will only create an appearance of creditworthiness and in the long run the 
deficit will only widen. In that case, the other creditors alone bear the burden of the enterprise 
risk, while the bank which has taken all the security can escape the concursus creditorum via . 
secured transactions. The credit decision would have been wrongful, not because it was 
accompanied by excessive security interests, but because it was fundamentally unhealthy in 
economic terms. m 
The agreement extending credit to the debtor may be for a fixed term or for an undetermined 
period. When no period has been determined, the credit relationship can theoretically be ended 
by notice by the bank or the debtor. Should a bank, however, suspend credit, it would have to 
consider various factors in order to comply with the requirement that the agreement must be 
executed in good faith. 116 Generally, the bank would have to consider what reasonable notice is. 
Reasonable notice would depend on the facts of each case. The period of notice would at least 
Accordingly the court considered: 
"Met name zou een bank, die een door haar aan een koopman verstrekt 
omvangrijk crediet wegens diens ongunstige financielen toestand heeft opgezegd 
en die vervolgens het crediet tot een ongeveer even groot bedrag opnieuw 
verleent, nadat op haar wens de schuldenaar zijn activa volledig of nagenoeg 
volledig aan haar tot zekerheid in eigendom heeft overgedragen of anderszins 
verbonden, de in de toekomst te verwerven goederen inbegrepen, - zo, dat de 
koopman aan nieuwe schuldeisers, die hem na het sluiten van bedoelde 
crediettransactie met de bank voor hun leveranties nog crediet geven, praktisch 
geen verhaal meer biedt, terwijl hij naar buiten den schijn van credietwaardigheid 
behoudt - dan onrechtmatig zou handelen, indien komt vast te staan dat in het 
gegeven geval de bank, in verband met het nader overeengekomene omtrent de 
omvang van crediet en zekerheidsstelling en het verloop van zaken nadien, heeft 
geweten, althans kunnen voorzien dat bij stopzetting van dit nieuwe crediet de 
nieuwe leveranciers, indien zij dan nog niet betaald waren, zouden worden 
benadeeld wegens gebrek aan verhaal en de Bank desniettemin heeft nagelaten 
zorg te dragen dat de debiteur tevoren in de gelegenheid was of alsnog werd 
gesteld deze leveranciers te betalen of de goederen terug te geven, tenzij de bank 
zelf dit alsnog doet. 11 
A general fiduciary transfer of property as security, in itself, does not constitute a tort. See 
Cranston (ed) Risk 210. 
114 HR 1983-07-01RvdW1983 138; Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid20. 
115 See Cranston ( ed) Risk 210-211; Croon & Van Everdingen 1986 TPR 1172. 
116 Art3.11BW. 
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have to be long enough to assist the debtor in avoiding unnecessary, preventable trouble. The 
imposition of a heavier burden on the debtor without its being necessary to protect the legitimate 
interests of the bank, would be senseless. In the case of a conflict of interests, a weighing of these 
interests would have to take place, to determine the period of notice. Only in exceptional cases, 
could the credit be suspended summarily. 117 
A reasonable notice period would not be required: 
• where the debtor's interests are not adversely affected;118 
• where the bank has contracted with the debtor upon such terms. In principle the bank may 
call in the credit immediately in these circumstances. The bank must, however, 
notwithstanding an agreement to this effect, keep the requirements of good faith in 
mind. 119 
• where the bank's material interests require no notice, that is in exceptional cases.120 
The bank would definitely be acting contrary to good faith if it refused to carry out a payment 
instruction prior to the termination date or if notice had not been given. In these circumstances 
the bank would be liable to pay damages. 121 The debtor could, in fact, obtain an interdict against 
the bank in terms of which the bank would be ordered to effect the payment. 122 
The bank not only owes a customer a duty of care in terminating credit, but may also owe such 
duty to another creditor of the customer if the legitimate interests of the creditor are known to the 
bank or should be known to the bank. 123 
It often happens that a creditor has given security to the bank, for example by way of pledge or 
a bond. The question as to the legality or illegality of a bank's actions in regard to the third parfy 
will often be determined by the bank's approach to the security. One of the most important 
117 Hof 's Gravenhage 1928-11-23 W 11982; Hof 's Gravenhage 1983-12-07 RvdW /KG 
1984 27. 
118 Kessenich-Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 21. 
119 Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid 22. 
120 Hof's Gravenhage 1928-11-23 W 11982. 
121 Rb Rotterdam 1927-04-6 W 11982. 
122 Hof's Gravenhage 1983-12-07 RvdW/KG 1984 27. 
123 Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid24; HR 1986--05-09 NJ 1986 792. 
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decisions in this regard by the Hoge Raad is the Erba124 case, referred to above. 125 
In determining the question whether a bank has acted unreasonably in limiting or suspending the 
credit or, eventually upon execution of its securities, there has to be a weighing of interests. Not 
only are the interests of the two main parties important, but the general interests of society also 
play a role. The public interest in a well-functioning banking system requires that the conduct of 
a bank in regard to credit granted by itself and suretyships or security obtained in terms thereof 
can, only in limited cases, be attacked by the interests of a co-creditor. It must not be forgotten 
that the banking industry is risky and that it may be contrary to public policy which prevails in 
a well-functioning banking system to make the system more difficult unless there are well 
deserving interests to be protected. 126 
7.2.6.2.2.4 The bank's dealing with security for credit 
In lending, a bank would normally take some form of security. This security can be by way of 
pledge, hypothec or notarial bond. Often a bank would take a cession, or would require personal 
security in the form of suretyship. 127 
A bank often inserts a clause in its agreement to the effect that it may call for additional security 
at some future date. Notwithstanding such a clause, the bank cannot exercise this right to call for 
additional security, unreasonably. The bank will have to carry out the credit agreement in good 
faith. 128 The bank will have to take into account the justifiable interests of the debtor in as far as 
is reasonably required of the bank. 129 As an example, reference can be made to the case of Kley 
vNMB.130 
In this matter Kley sued the Bank in order to have certain debits struck out against her account. 
The bank claimed in reconvention that Kley should furnish certain further security as originally 
124 HR 1957-06-28 NJ 1957 514. 
125 Sub par 7.2.6.2.2.2. 
126 Kessenich-Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 25. 
127 Stein Zekerheidsrechten 26. 
128 Art 3.11 BW. 
129 Kessenich-Hoogendam Aansprakelijkheid 27. 
130 HR 1983-08-10 NJ 1984 61 (Kley v NMB). 
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agreed upon. Kley did not deny these facts, but defended the claim in reconvention. Kley's case 
succeeded. The court's reasoning was that the bank had never asked Kley for additional security 
when Kley had owed a much larger amount than that which was outstanding at the stage of the 
court case. Furthermore NMB had terminated the credit relationship, and the request for 
additional security at that stage could have seriously jeopardised Kley's application for credit at 
another bank. 
The decision in this case entails the limiting of the bank in the execution of its agreed rights, by 
the covenant of good faith. Good faith also influences the manner in which the bank realises its 
security. If the manner in which the bank realises its security leads to an unequal or unfair 
treatment of the debtor it may be contrary to good faith. A debtor may even, upon application, 
apply for the stay of the· realisation of the security and claim that the status quo should remain. 
The bank may in certain circumstances even be held liable for damages. 131 
In another case, 132 the bank was removing certain office equipment from the building of the 
debtor in order to execute upon its security. The debtor applied for an interdict to stop the bank 
from doing so, because the debtor's interests and his prospects would be seriously jeopardised, 
as the debtor was involved in certain serious discussions in regard to the take-over of the debtor 
firm by another. The debtor's claim was granted. The court ordered the bank not only to refrain 
from removing the inventory from the building for a period of ten days but, in fact, ordered the 
bank to return and reinstall the already removed inventory. 
The bank cannot merely take securities and then trust that its claims will be sufficiently 
recovered. The duty of care owed by one to the other in the social and commercial world entails 
the bank's also taking into account the interests of other creditors. 133 If the bank is unreasonable 
towards a creditor, the bank may be liable to the co-creditor for damage that the latter has 
suffered through the bank's actions. 134 
7.2.6.2.2.5 Banker and surety 
A bank often obtains personal security in the form of suretyship. Briefly, the surety must comply 
131 See Rb Middelburg 1983-06-15 RvdW/KG 1983 214. 
132 Rb Zutpen 1983-03-21RvdW/KG1983 161. 
133 Kessenich-HoogendamAansprakelijkheid28. 
134 See theErba case HR 1957-06-28 NJ 1957 514 discussed above at par 7.2.6.2.2.3. 
338 
with the debtor's obligations should the debtor be in default, in other words, its liability is 
accessory. 135 
Naturally, the exact content of the obligation of the surety is determined by agreement. The 
agreement between the bank and surety must, however, be carried out in good faith. 136 In one 
case137 the two directors, sole shareholders of a company, signed personal suretyships and passed 
mortgage bonds over their homes as security for the debts of the company to the bank. In a period 
during which, to the banks knowledge, the business of the company was doing badly, the bank 
acquired a claim of another party against the company. At a later stage, at the request of the 
sureties, the bank advised them of their outstanding obligations, but without advising them of the 
ceded claim. The company went into liquidation and the bank refused to release the sureties from 
their obligation in terms of the ceded debt and refused to cancel the bonds, unless they paid the 
amounts owing in terms of the ceded claim as well. 
The court found the bank's conduct to be contrary to the requirements of good faith and ordered 
that the bonds be cancelled. 
In addition to the limiting effect of good faith and reasonableness and fairness, duties to inform, 
advise and investigate may have an influence on the banker-surety relationship, as we will see 
in the discussion on duties of disclosure infra . 
7.2.7 Forms of security 
A distinction is made between security in the form of rights in rem (beperkte rechten)138 and 
contractual security. The main difference between the two types of security lies in the creditor's 
position in case of the debtor's bankruptcy. This position is much stronger if the creditor holds 
security in the form of a right in rem: in principle, the encumbered goods do not form part of the 
bankrupt's estate and the creditor is entitled independently to enforce his security right in order 
to settle his claims. 139 
135 Suretyship is regulated by Arts 7.850 BW et seq; see Asser-Kleyn Bijzondere 
Overeenkomsten 96 et seq; Stein Zekerheidsrechten 175 et seq. 
136 Art 3.11 BW. 
137 Rb Arnhem 1982-01-26 NJ 1983 107. 
138 Art 3.8 BW. 
139 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 120. 
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The rights in rem which are most frequently used by bankers are the rights of pledge and 
mortage. A right of mortage can be created on registered goods (eg real property, ships and 
aircraft). A valid mortage requires a notarial deed which must be filed with140 the competent 
public register. 
A right of pledge can be created over all goods which do not require a mortage and can, in 
principle, take two forms: the traditional pledge (vuistpand) and the non-traditional pledge 
(bezitloos pand). A traditional pledge requires that the pledgor transfer his power over the object 
of the pledge to the pledgee or a third party, which pledge is created simply by a notarial or a 
private deed. However, a non-traditional pledge created by private deed is only valid upon filing 
of the deed in the competent register. The range of objects over which a pledge can be created 
is wide: it can be used to encumber movables, but may also be created over registered claims and 
shares in book-entry form. It can therefore be particularly helpful to banks. In this context two 
remarks should be added. First, unlike a lot of other jurisdictions, Dutch law does not recognise 
the concept of a "floating charge". In addition, more than 95 per cent of the securities listed on 
the AEX Stock Exchange are transferred by way of giro transfer pursuant to the Act on Securities 
Transactions by Giro. 141 This Act provides for specific rules for the creation of a pledge over 
securities within the giro system. 142 
Apart from the right in rem, security can be obtained through contractual arrangements. These 
include the subordination of claims, suretyship (borgtocht) and guarantee (garantie). Contracts 
of suretyship and guarantee are usually entered into by third parties' securing the obligations of 
the debtor. Unlike the guarantee, for which there are no specific statutory provisions, the contract 
of suretyship is regulated by the Civil Code. 143 One essential feature of the security is its 
accessory nature: 144 accessory, that is, to the relation between the original debtor and the creditor. 
This feature is generally unacceptable to banks and they will therefore usually demand a 
guarantee which imposes direct and independent obligations on the guarantor in their favour. To 
avoid any chance of the suretyship provisions in the Civil Code being applicable, the guarantee 
should state particularly that the arrangements are not to be considered to create rights of 
140 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 120. 
141 Wet giraal effectenverkeer of 1977. 
142 Arts 20 et seq of the Act on Securities Transactions by Giro of 1977. 
143 Art 7.850 BW. See, also, Asser-Kleijn Bijzondere Overeenkomsten 96 et seq; Stein 
Zekerheidsrechten 175 et seq. 
144 See Van Brakel Leerboek 391; Pitlo-Bolweg Verbintenissenrecht 541. 
340 
suretyship. 
7.2.8 Consumer protection 
In recent decades, consumers' rights have been the object of increasing attention. This has 
resulted in a variety of new legislation. This section will focus on two sets of legislation which 
are of particular importance to bankers and their customers: the provisions on general conditions 
in the Civil Code145 and the Consumer Credit Act of 1990. 
The Civil Code contains specific provisions with respect to general conditions. In Article 6.231 
BW, general conditions are defined as written statements which are intended to be used in a 
number of agreements. The provisions which reflect the essence of the agreement do not qualify 
as general conditions. It is understood that such essential provisions are those without which it 
is not possible to reach an agreement; for example, in a sale and purchase agreement the price 
and quantity of the goods are considered to be essential. 
A provision in general conditions may be annulled if: 146 
• such provision places an unreasonable burden on the other 
party; 147 or 
• the user of the general conditions has not offered the other 
party a reasonable opportunity to take cognisance of the 
conditions. 148 
The provisions on general conditions are intended primarily to protect individuals. The Civil 
Code therefore provides that, if used in respect of individuals who do not act in the course of a 
profession or trade, certain conditions are per se unreasonably burdensome (usually referred to 
as the "black list"). Other provisions are considered to be primafacie unreasonably onerous (the 
"grey list"). 149 As the aim of the legislation is to protect individuals against the abuse of general 
conditions it is evident that certain parties cannot invoke the protection of the statutory 
145 Arts 6.231 BW to 6.247 BW. 
146 Art 6.233 BW. 
147 Art 6.233 (a) BW. 
148 Art 6.233 (b) BW. 
149 Arts 6.236-237 BW. 
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provisions (for example, large companies) as is fully described in the Civil Code. 150 
The ABV qualify as general conditions under the Civil Code. Therefore, the banks have to 
comply with the statutory provisions, relating to standard terms and conditions, when drafting 
and updating the ABV. 
The Consumer Credit Act of 1990, 151 which, inter alia, implements the EC (Consumer Credit) 
Directive, 152 sets out the rules for professionals granting credit to consumers. A few of the 
detailed provisions of the Act will be highlighted. 
The applicability of the Act is both restricted and broad. On one hand, the Act protects 
individuals who do not act in the course of a profession or trade and only applies to credit 
transactions up to an amount ofDfl 50,000. On the other hand, the Act covers a wide range of 
credit transactions including traditional loans, purchase by instalments, mail-order credits and 
credit-card transactions, as well as certain overdraft arrangements. However, the applicability of 
the Act is subject to the condition that the consumer obtains (part of) the credit for a period of 
at least three months. 
The Act provides for a number of rules designed to protect the consumer: the giver of credit is 
obliged to make available to the consumer, without charge and in writing, the conditions on the 
basis of which he is prepared to grant the credit. Furthermore, the giver must obtain written 
information as to the creditworthiness of the consumer prior to entering into a transaction for 
credit exceeding Dfl 2, 000. In relation hereto he may obtain information from the Central Office 
for Credit Registration. Also, a credit transaction can only be entered into in writing. The Act 
contains rules as to the contents of the agreement. 
The Act provides that certain onerous provisions in a credit agreement are null and void; others 
can be annulled at the request of the consumer. Finally, the Act imposes restrictions on the 
security which may be obtained by the giver of credit. 
It follows from the above description that the Act provides elaborate protection for consumers 
150 Art 6.235 (b) BW. 
151 Wet van 4 juli 1990, Staatsblad 395, houdende regels met betrekking tot het 
consumentenkrediet. 
152 EC Directive (Consumer Credit) 87/1-02/EEC: [1987] OJ L42/48, as amended on 22 
February 1990, to EC Directive (Consumer Credit) 90/88/EEC: [1990] OJ L61/14. 
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obtaining credit. This is of particular importance as the Act covers almost all consumer credit 
transactions: more than 90 per cent of such transactions relate to credit ofless than Dtl 50, 000. 153 
7.3 THE BANKER'S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AND RELATED ASPECTS 
7.3.1 Contract law: defects in consent 
7.3.1.1 Introduction 
Under Dutch law error(dwaling), threat (bedreiging), fraud (bedrog), and abuse ofcircumstances 
(misbruik van omstandigheden) are considered vices of consent or defects of will (wilsgebreken ). 
Threat, fraud and abuse of circumstances are to be found in Book 3 of the new Dutch Civil 
Code154 and are generally applicable to all juridical acts, whereas error is treated in Art 6.228 of 
the new Dutch Civil Code and primarily concerns contracts. 
In case of a defect of consent there is a consensus ad idem between the contracting parties and 
the agreement has been expressed correctly, but the underlying will has been formed in a 
defective way. On this ground a party can rescind the contract and under certain circumstances 
can claim for damages. 155 In regard to threat, fraud and abuse of circumstances, the unlawful 
behaviour of the other party which induced the victim to enter into the contract, is emphasised. 
Moreover in cases of mistake and misrepresentation, both in the case law and under the new 
legislation, the stress has shifted from the error of judgment of the mistaken party to the 
misstatement or omission by the other party in which context the interaction between the duty 
to inform and the duty to make one's own investigations is of great importance. 156 
The Civil Code provides for common mistake - when both parties share the same 
misconception about the subject matter of the contract. Therefore both parties are in error. 157 
153 Cranston (ed) European Banking Law 125. 
154 Art 3.44 BW. 
155 To claim damages under Dutch law, it is usually required that liability should arise in 
delict. See Art 6.162 BW. Liability may, however, also be based on good 
faith/reasonableness and fairness as set out in Arts 6.2 BW and 6.248 BW. 
156 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 147-148. 
157 Art 6.228 BW. 
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7.3.1.2 Error.158 
Error or dwaling, like the other defects of consent, plays a role in the formation of the contract 
and concerns the intention of the contracting parties to create legal relations. The concept of 
dwaling under Dutch law has been developed from a traditional defect of consent where the main 
emphasis is on the misunderstanding of the mistaken party, to a legal concept with the accent 
on the false pre-contractual statement of fact made by the other party, or his failure to disclose 
information. Formerly dwaling was controlled primarily by the notion of the zelfstandigheid der 
zaak, that is to say, the subject matter of the contract. After the decisions in the leading cases 
on this subject, 159 dwaling is now placed within the legal context of the duty to make true 
statements of fact in the course of precontractual negotiations, the duty to disclose information 
and the duty of the representee to make his own inquiries before concluding the contract. 160 
Thus, in the case of Baris v Riezenkamp161 a purchaser bought the equipment for the production 
of auxiliary motors after a misrepresentation by the vendor concerning the calculation of the cost 
price. The purchaser was allowed to rescind the contract because the Hoge Raad assumed that 
generally a party could justifiably rely on the correctness of a representation by the other party 
which turned out to be false, and which had induced him to enter into the contract. 162 
In the case of Van der Beek v Van Dartel, 163 a duty to disclose relevant information was accepted 
where the vendor of a house had "forgotten" to tell the purchaser that the local authority had the 
intention to claim the occupation of the house unless - within two months - a reasonable 
proposal for the occupation of the house was received. The Hoge Raad held that there is a duty 
of disclosure which prevails over the duty to make one's own investigations. 164 However under 
15 8 Asser-Hartkamp II Verbintenissenrecht 173-198; Van Rossum Dwaling 9-53; Hondius 
Consumentenrecht 21-23. 
159 1957-11-15NJ1958 67 (BarisvRiezenkamp) and 1973-11-30NJ 1974 97 (Vander Beek 
v Van Dartel). 
160 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 148. 
161 HR 1957-11-15 NJ 1958 67. 
162 See, also, HR 1966-01-21 NJ 1966 183 (Booy v Wisman). 
163 HR 1973-11-30 NJ 1974 97 (Van der Beek v Van Dartel). 
164 Other cases include HR1979-12-7 NJ 1980 290 (Van Hensbergen v Gemeente 's-
Gravenhage); HR 1990-06-01NJ1991 759(VanLanschotvBertheBink);HR1990-12-
21NJ1991 251 (Van Geest v Nederlos). 
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Dutch law, the perception of dwaling as a defect of consent has not been discarded, although the 
emphasis has shifted. 165 
The concept of dwaling is contained in Art 6.228 BW. Although the nature of dwaling has 
changed from that in the original Dutch Civil Code, it remains a defect in consent. Whilst the 
emphasis is now placed on the precontractual statement of fact made by the representor or his 
failure to disclose, some room for common mistake remains. For an action based on dwaling to 
be successful it is necessary that the false precontractual statement of fact or the failure to 
disclose be of such importance that without this behaviour, the party in error would not- or at 
least not on the same terms - have entered into the contract. In case of common mistake the 
error of both parties must similarly be of substantial importance. 166 
Furthermore in Art 6.228 (2) BW some restrictive conditions referring to dwaling are laid down. 
The error cannot be based on future circumstances, and sometimes the error is not excusable 
because the mistaken party has a predominant duty to make his own inquiries before entering into 
the contract, especially when he is an expert or a professional party. Thus, the concept of dwaling 
under the Civil Code is treated within the context of justified allocation of risk. 167 
7.3.1.3 Fraud, threat, and abuse of circumstances168 
Under Dutch law, fraud and error are closely connected. While it is the fraud which causes the 
error, it is not the fraud itself that constitutes the defect of will, but the misconception of the 
deceived party which is effected by the fraud. Fraud exists if a representee is induced by another 
party to enter into the contract by that party's deliberately providing him with false information, 
intentionally concealing any fact he was obliged to expose, or by any other trick. In respect of 
fraud, as contrasted with error, the intention to mislead the representee is of critical importance. 
General recommendations, notwithstanding the fact that they may not be true, cannot constitute 
fraud. 169 
165 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 148-149. 
166 See Van RossumDwaling 303-331. 
167 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 149. 
168 Asser-Hartkamp II Verbintenissenrecht 199-204; 205-209; 209-2H5; Van Rossum 
Dwaling 55-14. 
169 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 147. 
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Threat occurs where one party induces another party to conclude a contract, by unlawfully 
coercing him or a third party with threats of harm to his person or his property (for example by 
blackmail). The threat must be of such a nature that a reasonable person would be influenced. For 
the rescission of a juristic act, it is necessary that the threat must have an unlawful character. 170 
The Civil Code recognizes a fourth defect of consent, namely the abuse of circumstances.171 A 
person who acts under special circumstances, such as a state of necessity or dependency, 
inexperience or mental crisis, can rescind the contract ifthe other party induces him to enter into 
the contract although the other party knows or ought to have known of the special circumstances 
or should have prevented him from concluding the contract. In most of the cases involving the 
abuse of circumstances the other party acts as a result of a mental or economic dominance. 172 
As an example, in the case of Van Elmbt v Feierabend113 an elderly widow sold her house of 
which she was very fond, to a man whom she trusted to be the person who would help her out 
of her financial problems and whom she trusted blindly. The man knew that possession of her 
house was of crucial importance to the widow. The Hoge Raad held that the contract was void 
in view of her state of mind and her dependency.174 
When the threat, fraud or abuse of circumstances is exercised by a third party, the juristic act can 
only be annulled when the other party has been aware of it. Under Dutch law economic duress 
is applied restrictively. 175 
7 .3.2 Duties of disclosure 
7.3.2.1 Introduction 
In civil-law systems, a softening of the mechanism of offer and acceptance as the exdusive test 
170 Ibid 
171 Art 3.13 BW. See Asser-Hartkamp II Verbintenissenrecht 199-204; Rijken 
Exoneratieclausules 88. 
172 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 150 . 
173 HR 1964-05-29 NJ 1965 104. 
174 See, also, HR 1992- 03-27 NJ 1992 377 (VanMeurs vCiba-Geigy BV). 
175 Eg, the case ofBrandwijkvBrandwijkHR 1979-11-02NJ1980429; HR 1987-05-01 NJ 
1987 989 (Wirtz v AS CJ; HR 1990--06-01RvdW1990 117 (Donkelaar v Unigro). 
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for the formation of contract has taken place and the duty to perform and enforce a contract in 
good faith has developed towards an overall duty to act in good faith once a legally relevant 
relationship has come into existence. This also means that the negotiating parties can be bound 
by this duty. 176 As a consequence of this overall duty to act in good faith, a duty of disclosure can 
arise - at least in certain specific situations - to provide the other party with the highly relevant 
information necessary for the conclusion of a contract by informed consent. 177 
As a background to duties of disclosure, it should always be borne in mind that in Dutch law the 
concept of good faith has a limiting influence in the sphere of contract law (beperkende werking 
van de goede trouw). 118 In addition Art 6.2 BW requires that debtor and creditor act towards one 
another according to the dictates of reasonableness and fairness, and Art 6.248 BW states that 
a contract has not only the legal consequences agreed upon, but also those which, according to 
the nature of the agreement, flow from statute, usage, or the dictates of reasonableness and 
fairness.17 9 
17 6 Van Erp in Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 119 states that there is some circular 
reasoning to be detected here. The very moment that the step is taken that contracting 
parties, by the fact of their contract negotiations, enter into a legally relevant 
relationship, good faith is their basic norm of behaviour. See HR 1957-11-15 NJ 1958 
67 (Baris v Riezenkamp). On the other hand, their relationship can be said to be legally 
relevant, because good faith governs their pre-contractual dealings. See HR 1982-06-18 
NJ 1983 723 (Plas v Va/burg). 
177 Van Erp in Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 119. 
178 See Art 3 .11 BW; See, for a more in-depth discussion on the limiting effect of good faith 
Van Dam & Fick 1991 TRW 113 at 113-137. 
179 The concept of reasonableness and fairness has a limiting as well as a supplementary role 
in contract law. It is supplementary in the sense that, where a legal relationship between 
debtor and creditor leaves a gap (leemte) various additional rights and duties may flow 
based on reasonableness and fairness. See Hondius et al Verbintenissenrecht note S; HR 
1976-09-24 NJ 1978 245; Rb Zuthpen 1983-07-07 NJ 1985 679; HR 1981-03-13 NJ 
1981 63 5. Reasonableness and fairness therefore can play a supplementary role in, eg, 
duties to consult (HR 1923-02-23 NJ 1923 802; Hof Amsterdam 1979-05-10 NJ 1980 
3 69), duties to account (Hof' s Gravenhage 1960-12-02 NJ 1961 498; Rb Alkmaar 1966-
05-12 NJ 1967 167), duties of disclosure (HR 1923-02-23 NJ 1923802;HR1964-03-13 
NJ 1964188;HR1974-01-11NJ1974179;HR1987-11-06NJ1988212;HR1988-06-
17 NJ 1988 958; Hof Arnhem 1975-05-27 NJ 1976 291), duties to make information 
available (Rb Alkmaar 1966-05-12 NJ 1967 167; Pres Rb Amsterdam 1979-04-26 NJ 
1979 623), duties to pay a monetary compensation (Rb Alkmaar 1965-03-25 BR 1965 
558; Rb 's Hertogenbosch 1971-10-15 NJ 1973 118), and duties to contract, (HR 1956-
12-21NJ1959 180; Hof Arnhem 1988-12-12 NJ 1989 444). 
In its limiting role, reasonableness and fairness may also limit rights and duties flowing 
from the statute, usage or legal act. In this sense, the Dutch refer to the beperkende 
werking van redelijkheid en billikheid. (See HR 1990-04-20 NJ 1990 526.) In this role, 
reasonableness and fairness can be determining in cases, eg, of abuse of law (HR 1990-
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In the eighties, several cases in Holland came before the Court wherein duties to disclose, inform 
and to investigate were accepted. 180 There is a developed and developing appreciation of the 
duties of disclosure and information and these duties appear to have an absorbing effect on the 
doctrines of the law of obligations. 181 Reference to this absorbing effect on a few contractual 
concepts shall be made in sub-chapters 7.3.2.2 to 7.3.2.5. 
7.3.2.2 Disclosure principles and mistake 
For a successful reliance on mistake it is not sufficient, in Dutch law, for the mistaken party 
merely to have been mistaken, even when his mistaken conception of the facts relates to material 
aspects. In principle, the mistaken party carries the risk that he has not been properly informed. 
The other party who is not aware, and need not be aware, of a mistake can accept the facts as 
presented to him. In other words he can accept the outward appearance as presented ( opgewekt 
vertrouwen). 182 This party's interest weighs heavier than the interest of the mistaken party when 
it comes to rescission of the contract. The question whether a party may rely on the appearance 
created must be answered in terms of a subtle network of rules relating to the relationship 
( onderlinge verhoudings) of advisory, informational, and investigative, duties. 183 Foremost is the 
mistaken party's own responsibility. In Art 6.228 (2) BW it has been stated as follows: 
"De vernietiging kan niet worden gegrond op een dwaling die in verband met de aard van 
de overeenkomst, de in het verkeer geldende opvattingen of de omstandigheden van het 
geval voor rekening van de dwalende behoort de blyven." 
This can imply an information gathering or investigative duty for the mistaken party. This is not 
always so, because there can also be cases wherein the matters are different from what was 
originally thought, and where informational and investigative duties would not have brought 
01-05NJ1990728;HR1990-04-20NJ 1990 526; HofLeeuwarden 1987-04-29NJ 1988 
364), in ameliorating compulsory law (dwingende wetsbepalingen) (HR 1983-07-01 NJ 
1984 149; HR 1989-01-20 NJ 1989 322), and a broad range of obligations in Dutch law. 
180 See VrankenPlichten 3. 
181 The growth in the duty to inform has been referred to as a manifestasie van de ind.ringing 
van de etiek in het recht. See Henriquez 1976 NJBfJ25. 
182 HR 1957-11-15NJ1958 67(BarisvRiezenkamp);HR1984-0l-27NJ 1984 545 at6;HR 
1981-03-27 NJ 1981 492 (ElAraichi v Roemo). 
183 VrankenPlichten 5. 
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these matters to light timeously. In principle, the risk hereof remains with the mistaken party .184 
There are two situations in which this statement is not true: firstly where wrong information was 
given to the mistaken party by the other party; 185 and secondly where the other party kept quiet 
when he had a duty to speak. In this sub-chapter, I shall limit my discussion to this second duty. 
Most cases of mistake seem to belong or relate to the situation where one party had a duty to 
speak. In substance, this duty revolves around the relationship between disclosure and 
investigative duties. The premise is the mistaken party's own investigational duty. Often this 
premise is disregarded because of a duty the other party has to inform the mistaken party, or to 
advise him. The determination of the existence of these duties is difficult. Vranken 186 asks the 
question whether one is compelled to alleviate the stupidity, inexperience, or lack of knowledge 
of the mistaken party, or whether one must lose one's own advantage or where one wishes to take 
a certain risk, whether one must show the other party or inform the other party thereof, with the 
possibility that he may decide to take the risk himself Vranken187 is of the opinion that apart 
from cases of abuse of prior knowledge, 188 the answer to the above questions should be in the 
negative. An advantage obtained through specific knowledge or through an intelligent taking of 
risk, need not be abandoned by informing the other about one's presumptions or interpretation 
of the facts and developments. Not only facts, but also relevant changes in facts which take place 
during negotiations, are normally the subject of disclosure. 189 
In summary, it may be said that the question whether a party may accept the appearance of facts 
presented to him by the other, or the question whether a party has a duty to Jnform, depends on 
184 HR 1959-06-19 NJ 1960 59 (Kantharos v van Stevensweert). 
185 See DrionDwaling 305; HR 1937-02-25 NJ 1937 1058 (Schouten v Schouten). 
186 VrankenPlichten 11. 
187 Ibid 
188 In share transactions, abuse of prior knowledge entails criminal sanctions. See Henriques 
1976 NBJ 625 at 633; Groenhuijsen Voorwetenschap; Wet toezicht effectenverkeer of 
1995. 
189 HR 1979-12-07 NJ 1980 290 (Van Henzenbergen v Gemeente 's Gravenhage); In HR 
1973-11-30 NJ 1974 97 (Van der Beek v Van Dartel) the Court held as follows: 
11 dat wanneer een partij v66r de totstandkoming van een overeenkomst aan de 
wederpartij bepaalde inlichtingen had behoren te geven ten einde te voorkomen 
dat de wederpartij zich omtrent het betreffende punt een onjuiste voorstelling sou 
maken, de goede trouw er zich in het algemeen tegen zal versetten dat 
eerstbedoelde partij ter afwering van een beroep op dwaling aanvoert <lat de 
wederpartij het ontstaan van de dwaling mede aan zichzelf heeft te wijten. 11 
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the particular circumstances of the case. 190 There is no general formula. As a rule of thumb, 
however, it may be said that no advice needs to be given in regard to expectations, guesses and 
the interpretations of facts and circumstances. Only exi&ting facts and circumstances or 
developments may in principle be taken into consideration. 191 Henriques192 suggests that the 
following guidelines should be followed: 
• A duty to speak exists where a party knows certain facts, or knows or should realise that 
these facts are relevant to the other party who may not know these facts, notwithstanding 
the fact that the other party could have obtained these facts from another source. 193 
• To the extent that a party acts more as an expert, he has a greater duty to speak. In 
contrast, where a party deals with an expert, his own duty to inform may diminish. 194 
• The more confidential the relationship, the greater the duty. 
• The more complicated a transaction or the object of the transaction becomes, the greater 
the duty to speak. 
• A duty to speak may often be in conflict with a duty to remain silent. This can often lead 
to problems in the banker-surety-customer relationship. The question that remains is, 
namely: To what extent may the bank inform a prospective surety as to the weakness of 
its customer? It is suggested that the banker should insist upon the customer's consent 
to do this. 
190 It still revolves around the question "wat partijen over en weer uit elkaars gedragingen 
en verklaringen kunnen en mogen afleiden" (what parties can deduce from one another's 
statements and conduct), where the social and cultural circle of the parties and their 
financial, social economical and intellectual capacities are relevant. See HR 1977-03-11 
NJ 1977 521(Kribbebijter);HR1981-03-13NJ1981 635(Haviltex);HR1983-11-18 NJ 
1984 345 (Shu v Lam). 
191 VrankenPlichten 15. 
192 Henriques 1976 NJB 625 at 631-632. 
193 HR 1973-11-30 NJ 1974 97 (Van der Beek v Van Dartel). 
194 Rb Dordrecht 1973-02-19 NJ 1974 539. 
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7 .3.2.3 Disclosure and abuse of circumstances 
In regard to abuse of circumstances, 195 whether or not it finds its origin in mental or economic 
duress, the protection of reliance is paramount. The party who may reasonably rely is protected. 196 
As with any other form of reliance protection, duties to disclose and inform, and investigative 
duties also play a similar role in determining when a party may reasonably rely. This is not 
unusual because the different doctrines often overlap. 197 One who, for example, signs a document 
that he does not understand or whose content he cannot perceive, can act not only on the grounds 
of mistake, but also on the grounds of a lack of consent or an abuse of circumstances. 198 This 
osmosis goes even further and also encompasses cases of breach of contract.199 
7.3.2.4 Disclosure and standard terms200 
According to current Dutch law, duties to disclose, inform and investigate can be applicable to 
standard terms. Two aspects are important in this regard. The first aspect relates to the question 
whether standard terms are applicable to the agreement and the second relates to the question 
whether one or more conditions are legal (substantive testing). In the case law it is generally 
expected that general conditions do apply to an agreement. 201 
Hondius202 suggests the following formula according to which: 
"degeen die een kontraktsdokument ondertekent aan de daarin vervatte(verwijzing naar) 
standaardvoorwaarden is gebonden, indien en voor zover hij bij de ondertekening op 
toerekenbare wijze bij de wederpartij het vertrouwen heeft opgewekt dat hij gebonden 
195 Prohibited in Art 3.13 BW. See HR 1957-01-11NJ1959 37; HR 1964-05- 29 NJ 1965 
104. 
196 Vranken Plichten 62. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid. 
199 HR 1985-11-15 NJ 1986 213 (Stavenuiter v Oosterbaan); HR 1965-12-10 NJ 1967 80 
(Vleugels v De Drie Hoeftjzers). 
200 Regulated by statute, see Art 6.23 lBW. 
201 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 391 et seq; Nieuwenhuis Beginselen 138. 
202 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 408-409. 
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wilde zijn. Het antwoord op de vraag of het vertrouwen geacht mag worden te zijn 
opgewekt,hangt af van de waardering van omstandigheden als de mate van 
akkoordverklaring, de gebruikelijkheid van de betreffende klausules in het licht van de 
kontekst en de mogelijkheid van de wederpartij om zich van de kondities bewust te zijn. 
In bijzondere gevallen zullen ook andere omstandigheden een rol spelen." 
This formula is considered to be applicable to unsigned contracts, 203 with reference to general 
conditions by way of notes, 204 and in general also in other situations. 205 
However, disclosure duties play a much lesser role in regard to the substantive control of general 
conditions than elsewhere in the law of contract, mainly by virtue of the extensive attention the 
subject receives in the Civil Code. 206 
7.3.2.5 Disclosure in pre-contractual relationships 
In Dutch law, in many respects, disclosure duties are no different in regard to contracts which do 
not come to fruition than they are to contracts where negotiations are crowned by an agreement. 
There may be some length of time between the first contact between the parties and the 
conclusion of the contract. Events occurring in this interim period may be relevant. Drion207 
demonstrates that the pre-contractual phase is important in determining whether an agreement 
was reached and what was agreed upon. Consequences of the agreement, flowing from the 
dictates of good faith, can be determined by pre-contractual events. Finally, the conduct of the 
parties in the pre-contractual phase can point to the voidability or voidness of the contract due 
to lack of consent or aspects relating to general terms according to the Civil Code. 208 
Recently, there have been developments in terms of which pre-contractual relationships are 
203 Ibid, at 422. 
204 Ibid, at 434 . 
205 Ibid, at 436-438. 
206 Art 6.231 BW-6.247BW. These duties may play a role in testing clauses in the grey list 
or the general norm, or testing clauses in commercial contracts. See VrankenPlichten 75-
86. 
207 Drion Precontractuele Verhoudingen 231. 
208 Art 6.231 BW. 
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becoming an independent basis for liability.209 It appears as if duties to disclose and inform play 
a large role in the concept. 210 
The leading Dutch case in regard to discontinued negotiations is Plas v Valburg. 211 In this case 
the Court held that, in principle, a party is free to break off negotiations without having to 
compensate another for costs incurred. There may, however, be circumstances in which the 
negotiations may only be broken off against payment of the other side's incurred costs. 
Furthermore, in certain circumstances negotiations may have reached such a stage that the 
covenant of good faith dictates that a party is no longer free to break off relations, because, owing 
to the advanced state of the negotiations, the parties may rely on this for a contract to flow from 
their negotiations. 212 It is no longer necessary to seek liability in other fields such as delict, tacit 
terms, unlawful enrichment, misrepresentation and so forth, but purely on the basis of good 
faith. 213 
7 .3.2.6 The limiting effect of good faith on contracts 
7.3.2.6.1 Three groups of situations and the role of disclosure 
Not only has the principle contained in Art 3 .11 BW214 saturated the whole law of contract and 
obligations and created new doctrines, but it has also itself grown into a doctrine of some i1!1-port: 
the exercise of certain rights can be in conflict with good faith. In order to determine the role of 
disclosure duties in regard to this doctrine, one may distinguish between three groups of cases. 
In the following sub-chapters, I shall investigate (1) the limiting effect of good faith as a 
contribution to a more comprehensive substantive testing, (2) the limiting effect as a standard of 
conduct in the execution of contracts, and (3) the limiting effect in relation to third parties. 
209 Drion Precontractuele Verhoudingen 231 et seq; Vranken Plichten 87; Hartkamp et al 
(eds) European Code 119. 
210 VrankenPlichten 88. 
211 HR 1982-06-18 NJ 1983 723 (Plas v Valburg). 
212 See, also, Zimmermann & WhiUaker (eds) Good Faith 246; HR 1996-06-14 NJ 1997 481 
(De Ruiterij v MBO); HR 1996-10-04 NJ 1997 65 ( Combinatie v De Staat); HR 1982-06-
18 NJ 1983 723 (Plas v Valburg). 
213 VrankenPlichten 95. And, it is submitted, in terms of the concept ofreasonableness and 
fairness. 
214 This is the article imposing a duty of good faith upon all contracting parties. 
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7.3.2.6.2 Good faith: a more intensive substantive test 
It often happens in Dutch law that agreements between parties that succeed the test of legality, 
fail the test of good faith. The law contains limited assistance in testing for legality. Vranken 
speaks in this regard of a verlegenheidsoplossing. 215 If one looks more closely at the case law, 
it becomes apparent that this solution was previously used to combat the abuse of exclusion 
clauses, especially when these were contained in general conditions. 
Later it grew into an instrument that would do more justice to situations where there was the 
possibility of any inequality of bargaining power or where there was a particular relationship 
between the parties, especially when it related to living (wonen) conditions and to working and 
living (!even) conditions. 216 
The checklist of circumstances which have to be weighed, when pronouncing upon legality, has 
spread, colouring the whole fabric of the law of contract and is decisive in regard to every 
doctrine. 217 Of even more importance is the way rechtsvinding operates in this context: no general 
norms are applicable, but rather viewpoints, rules of thumb, or sub-norms, to which, in each 
concrete case one or more principle may be applicable. 218 The legal-political aspect of the 
decision can be made more visible in this fashion. 
A good example of the limiting effect of good faith between the parties who stand in a particular 
relationship to one another is found in the case oftheKatwijkse boedelscheiding.219 The husband 
in this case claimed compliance with a divorce settlement in terms of which the former marital 
home was to be transferred or awarded to the wife against payment of Dfl 35,000. In the 
particular case his claim was refused as being in conflict with good faith when it appeared that 
the woman could not get finance in order to comply with the order. No such condition was 
contained in the contract. The Hoge Raad, however, took the particular relationship between the 
parties as former spouses and the duty of the wife to take care of the three children born of the 
marriage, into account. 
215 VrankenPlichten 143. 
216 See HR 1967-05-19 NJ 1967 261 (Saladin v Hollandse Bank Unie). 
217 VrankenPlichten 143: The case of Saladin vHollandse Bank Unie HR 19May 1%7NJ 
1967 261 is a good example of the use of a checklist of elements which need to be 
considered in making a good faith finding. 
218 VrankenPlichten 143; Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 185-186. 
219 HR 1981-01-16 NJ 1981 312 (Katwijkse boedelscheiding). 
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Further examples are found where there is the question of inequality of bargaining power. In 
these cases, in particular, disclosure and informational duties have been playing a growing role 
since the beginning of the 1980' s. 220 
7.3.2.6.3 Good faith: norm of conduct in exercising rights 
Good faith has a limiting effect as a standard of conduct in the execution of contractual rights, 
in various circumstances such as breach of contract, voidness, voidability, undue payment 
suspensive conditions, and so forth. For the purposes of this thesis, I shall limit this short 
discussion to its effect on suretyship. 
On the fringes of the cases which will be discussed hereunder in regard to the limiting effect of 
good faith in relation to third parties, lie the cases of disclosure duties and duties of warning in 
regard to suretyship. One example from the cases,221 is the case of Los v Autofinancier. 222 
Autofinancier repossessed a motor vehicle on the grounds of non-payment. Los was the surety 
and co-principal debtor. Four years after signing the suretyship, Los was summonsed by 
Auto financier. Los' s defence boiled down to the fact that good faith required that Auto Financier 
should have informed him of the non-payment by the principal debtor, so that, for example, he 
could have complied with the arrear payments and could have arranged for a subrogation in order 
to make his loss as small as possible. The Hoge Raad decided that there can be circumstances 
where a creditor is compelled to warn the surety when the hire-purchase purchaser does not 
comply with his obligations or threatens not to comply with his obligations. This is not always 
the case, but it will depend on the circumstances of each case whether this duty exists. 223 
The circumstances of each case is the determining factor in establishing a duty of disclosure, and 
the following factors play an important role, namely the nature of the agreement, the relationship 
of the parties, and the detriment that the one party may suffer: the surety has taken a heavy load 
upon himself without being involved in the execution of the principal agreement. In this sense 
the surety is a debtor and the creditor knows well what role he plays in the legal relationship. This 
220 Hartkamp 1981 WPNR 5559. 
221 HR 1964-03-13NJ1964188 (LosvAutofinancier). 
222 HR 1964-03-13 NJ 1964 188. 
223 See, also, HR 1961-01-13 NJ 1961 364 (Bolderman v Velthoven); HR 1980-02-15 NJ 
1980 327 (NPRC v Atlas en Milchsack). 
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creates disclosure and warning duties for the creditor in regard to the interests of the surety.224 
7.3.2.6.4 Good faith: third parties 
The area of application of this category is very limited because the Dutch system of the law of 
obligations is still dominated by the dichotomy of contract and delict.225 In this system, third 
parties are normally forced to fall back on a delictual claim. 226 As far as third parties and 
contractual good faith are concerned, the most common example is where the third party has 
relied on the existence or termination of a legal relationship between others. In the case of 
Gu liker v A G0227 the bank granted credit to Guliker on the basis of the text of a policy in terms 
of which storm damage and fire damage were covered. Later it appeared that the insurance only 
covered storm damage. The court held that the bank was entitled to rely on the text of the policy 
and need not have investigated whether the text was correct or not. The same may be relied upon 
in regard to a deed of cession or a three-party agreement: contrary agreements cannot be laid at 
the door of the third party, in principle. 228 
Once more we have a situation where reliance is protected in the event of its being justified on 
the grounds of the conduct of the original contracting parties. As far as the role of disclosure 
duties is concerned, the same factors as discussed previously229 are important and have to be 
weighed, namely the nature and content of the legal relationship, the relationship and social 
positions of the parties and the way in which the agreement was formed.230 
224 See, also, Asser-KleijnBijzondere Overeenkomsten 128; HR 1974-01-11NJ1974 179 
(Van der Ve/de v Amro Bank); Hof' s Gravenhage 1984-09-20 NJ 1985 877; Hof Arnhem 
1987-03-17NJ 19881046;HR1988-06-17NJ 1988 958 (VanBeuningenvdeBary); HR 
1989-01-16 RvdW 1989 18 (De Vor v Amro). 
225 Vranken Plichten 149. 
226 In terms of Art 6.162 BW. 
227 HR 1982-07-08NJ1983 456 (GulikervAGO). 
228 Art 3.36 BW. 
229 See HR 1967-05-19 NJ 1967 261 (Saladin v Hollandse Bank Unie) and par 7.3.2.6.3 
supra. 
230 See Asser-Hartkamp II Verbintenissenrecht nr 130; Nieskens-van der Putt 
Derdenbescherming 24. 
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7.3.2. 7 Current developments in Dutch law 
Duties to disclose and inform, and investigative duties are irrevocably bound up with recent 
developments in Dutch law. Some say that the development of these duties themselves is the 
most recent development. 231 There is a growing protection ofreliance and an amelioration of the 
exclusivity of contract. Stated otherwise, there is the origin of other forms ofliability, the closing 
of the gap between the tests for lawfulness for contract (reasonableness and fairness, good faith) 
and delict (social carefulness or maatschappelijke zorgvuldigheid), changes in the law of 
obligations, as seen in the greater stress placed on differentiation, notwithstanding the 
enlargement of scale in commerce. 232 
The rise of these duties dates from the early 1980's. It therefore does not appear in the Civil Code 
as yet, apart from the traditional rules of mistake. It remains rechtersrecht, judge-made law, par 
excellence. 233 The limits of the duties are, however, not yet clear enough for codification. 234 
The place, function and meaning of these duties may be determined from various angles. 
Vranken235 identifies at least four perspectives, namely procedural, substantive, protection of 
reliance and methodical. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
Dutch law does not specifically provide for an all-encompassing "banking contract" which would 
cover the entire relationship between bank and customer. Most people look at the relationship 
in a pragmatic way: a combination of qualified and unqualified contracts, governed by the 
general rules of contract law, and the General Banking Conditions.236 
231 Vranken Plichten 201. 
232 VrankenPlichten 201. 
233 See, eg, Hof 's Hertogenbosch 1992-05-26 NJ 1993 90 (Valkenswaard v De_Stichting 
Woninggarantie) in which case the court held that the creditor must reasonably take into 
account the interests of the surety. Amongst other things, the surety is owed a duty to be 
informed. 
234 For a general discussion see Valkhoff Onwetenschap; Wilms RW 1980-1981 489 at 
490-520. 
235 VrankenPlichten 202. 
236 Nieuwe Algemene Bankvoorwaarden. For discussions see Rank Ge/d220-221; Wessels 
1996 WPNR 6222 335; Molenaar 1988 TVVS 99; pars 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 supra. 
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Usually, the entire relationship between the bank and a customer will consist of one or more 
qualified agreements combined with various unqualified elements. The relationship between 
banker and customer is determined from case to case by the type of activity that the bank is 
performing for the customer. In addition to the provisions applying to certain qualified 
agreements, the general rules of the law of contract apply to the relationship between bank and 
customer. An essential rule of Dutch contract law is that the contents of an agreement are not 
exclusively determined by what the parties have expressly agreed, but also by custom and by the 
principle of "reasonableness and fairness". The contents of an agreement can be interpreted, 
supplemented and even, under certain circumstances, be set aside by the principle of 
reasonableness and fairness. Another important aspect of Dutch contract law is the law on 
general conditions. 237 These enactments have had and will continue to have an impact on the 
General Banking Conditions of Dutch banks. The Algemene Bankvoorwaarden (ABV) apply to 
virtually all retail banking transactions in the Netherlands. The present text of the ABV is the 
result of consultations between the Association of Dutch Banks and representative consumer and 
business organisations. The ABV apply to general banks, savings banks and cooperative banks 
in their dealings with both private and business customers. In the ABV banks have undertaken 
to exercise "due care" in rendering their services.238 
Dutch banks may sometimes be confronted with a conflict of interest between its affairs and 
those ofits customers, The Association of Dutch Banks introduced a code of conduct in 1991 in 
respect of the separated handling of price-sensitive information. The code of conduct 
recommended certain action in setting up Chinese Walls. The code of conduct requires the banks 
to make a physical or, alternatively, a clear procedural division between its credit, issues and 
brokerage departments. Furthermore, the banks must inform their customers that Chinese Walls 
are in place and that as a result of the Chinese Walls, certain price-sensitive information will not 
be conveyed to the customers and will not be used by banks in rendering services.239 
There is no explicit statutory provision which imposes an obligation of secrecy on banks in the 
Netherlands. In Dutch civil law, such an obligation is nevertheless assumed to exist. Various 
exceptions to the bank's obligation of secrecy exist under both civil and criminal law. 240 
237 Algemene Voorwaarden, Arts 6.231 to 6.247 BW. See par 7.2.2 n25 supra. 
238 See par 7.2.3 supra. 
239 See par 7.2.4 supra. 
240 See par 7 .2. 5 supra. Exceptions include the customer's consent, where disclosure is made 
in the interests of the bank, where disclosure is made within the banking group, and 
where disclosure is required by law or a duty to the public requires disclosure. See, in 
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Liability for incorrect advice can arise under two heads; 
(1) liability for breach of contract (wanprestatie); and 
(2) liability for tort (onrechtmatige daad). 
Contractual liability may arise when a bank, in rendering advice, breaches a specific contract with 
a client for the rendering of advisory services. It is more likely however, that there will not be a 
specific contract. The bank may then be liable for a breach of its duty under the ABV and the 
general rules of the law of contract to exercise due care in its relation to its customer. The bank's 
incorrect advice may also constitute a delict. Under the Dutch law of delict, it is, among other 
things, delictual to act in violation of a "generally required duty of care" (zorgvuldigheid die in 
het maatschappelijk verkeer betaamt) or, in other words, to be negligent. This negligence may, 
in addition to breach of contract, be a basis on which a bank may be sued for giving incorrect 
advice.241 
Normally, a bank may be liable to its customer as a result of a breach of the contract between 
them, where applicable. In addition, an agreement whereby the bank extends credit to the 
customer, compels the bank to act with care towards a customer-debtor, as well as towards a co-
creditor. Banks have to act responsibly (nie lichtvaardig) in granting or expanding credit, or may 
face damages claims from its debtor: In practice however, this will not occur often. What is more 
likely is a claim from another creditor. Should the bank irresponsibly extend or expand credit, 
the appearance of creditworthiness is established. Creditors may be enticed into granting credit 
which may prove to be irrecoverable. Should the bank extend credit without taking into account 
the interests of other creditors, whose interests the bank must respect, the bank may be held liable 
in deli ct. 242 
In recent decades, consumers' rights have been the object of increasing attention. This has 
resulted in a variety of new legislation. The Civil Code contains specific provisions with respect 
to general conditions. A provision in general conditions may be annulled if such provision places 
an unreasonable burden on the other party or the user of the general conditions has not offered 
the other party a reasonable opportunity to take cognisance of the conditions. The ABV qualify 
as general conditions under the Civil Code. Therefore, the banks have to comply with the 
statutory provisions, relating to standard terms and conditions, when drafting and updating the 
general, Neate Bank Confidentiality 364-377. 
241 See par 7.2.6.1 supra. 
242 See pars 7.2.6.2.2.2 and 7.2.6.2.2.3 supra. 
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ABV. The Consumer Credit Act of I990,243 which, inter alia, implements the EC (Consumer 
Credit) Directive, 244 sets out the rules for professionals granting credit to consumers. 245 
Under Dutch law error ( dwaling), threat (bedreiging), fraud (bedrog), and abuse ofcircumstances 
(misbruik van omstandigheden) are considered vices of consent or defects of will (wilsgebreken ). 
In the case of a defect of consent there is a consensus ad idem between the contracting parties and 
the agreement has been expressed correctly, but the underlying will has been formed in a 
defective way. On this ground a party can rescind the contract and under certain circumstances 
can claim for damages.246 
In civil-law systems, a softening of the mechanism of offer and acceptance, as the exclusive test 
for the formation of contract has taken place and the duty to perform and enforce a contract in 
good faith has developed towards an overall duty to act in good faith once a legally relevant 
relationship has come into existence. This also means that the negotiating parties can be bound 
by this duty. As a consequence of this overall duty to act in good faith, a duty of disclosure can 
arise - at least in certain specific situations - to provide the other party with the highly relevant 
information necessary for the conclusion of a contract by informed consent. 
As a background to duties of disclosure, it should always be borne in mind that in Dutch law the 
concept of good faith has a limiting influence in the sphere of contract law (beperkende werki,ng 
van de goede trouw). In addition Art 6.2 BW requires that debtor and creditor act towards one 
another according to the dictates of reasonableness and fairness, and Art 6.248 BW states that 
a contract has not only the legal consequences agreed upon, but also those which, according to 
the nature of the agreement, flow from statute, usage, or the dictates of reasonableness and 
fairness. 247 
Duties to disclose, inform and warn are playing an ever-growing role in contract law in Western 
Europe, as we have also seen in the discussion of the banker's duty of disclosure in German law 
above, and it is a development that South African Banks can ignore only at their own peril. 
243 Wet van 4 juli I990, Staatsblad 395, houdende regels met betrekking tot het 
consumentenkrediet. 
244 EC Directive (Consumer Credit) 87/102/EEC: [I987] OJ L42/48, as amended on 22 
February I990, to EC Directive (Consumer Credit) 90/88/EEC: [I990] OJ L6I/14. 
245 On consumer protection see par 7.2.8 supra. 
246 See par 7 .3. I. I supra. 
24 7 See par 7.3. I. I supra and particularly the authorities quoted in n 179. 
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It would appear as if the Continental systems are more generous in recognizing a duty of 
disclosure, provided that the mistaken party is unable to discover the information for himself. 
The Hoge Raad has developed a style in its grounds of judgment on the subject of good faith 
which can be regarded as a model of its kind. 248 It compels the courts to take into account a 
comprehensive 11 checklist" of elements, 249 and to include in their grounds of judgment the reason 
why, in the light of these elements, the principle of good faith requires a certain interpretation, 
or why the principle of good faith conditions, in a certain manner, the rights and obligations of 
the parties. It therefore provides some rules of thumb, which may be over-ruled, but only for 
convincing reasons. 250 
It is suggested that, as duties of disclosure can arise from good faith, these guidelines or 
checklists would be a determining factor in finding the existence of a duty or not. 251 
Anthropological perceptions have changed, and with them the interpretation of the notion of 
good faith. The notion of good faith is no longer understood as conveying the simple idea that 
one should keep one's word, but rather as a combination of a number of elements or principles 
to be balanced against one another. The most important of these principles or elements can be 
summarised as follows: 
• taking responsibility for the expectations one has created; 
• due respect for the right of self-determination; 
• maintaining a degree of proportionality between the advantages and the disadvantages 
which any action can cause the parties involved; 
• determining the rights and duties of the parties, taking into account their reciprocity; 
248 The first clear example was the case of HR 1967-05-19 NJ 1967 261 (Saladin v 
Hollandse Bank Unie), where the Hoge Raad stipulated the following elements: the 
degree of negligence, related to the nature and seriousness of the interests involved, the 
nature and remaining contents of the contract, the social position of, and mutual 
relationship between, the parties, the manner in which the clause was made and the level 
of awareness by the parties of its purpose. Similar checklists have been used in cases 
concerning many other types of clauses, as well as cases concerning misunderstanding, 
mistake, interpretation of terms and clauses and so forth. See Storme in Hartkamp et al 
(eds) European Code 185n42. In regard to good faith see par 7.3.2.1 supra. 
249 See par 7.3.2.6.3 supra. 
250 See Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 185-186; Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) 
Good Faith 194. 
251 See par 7.3.2.6.2 supra. 
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• a fair allocation of risks. 252 
252 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 185. 
362 
CHAPTER 8: THE BANKER'S DUTIES OF 
DISCLOSURE AND ADVICE TO CUSTOMERS AND 
SURETIES: SOUTH AFRICA 
8.1. BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP 
8.1.1 The cheque account 
In Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (a Bankrupt) and Others (no 3}1 Ungoed-
Thomas J stated: 
"Banking law is not a separate body oflaw, though, like innumerable other activities, it 
has statutory provisions dealing exclusively with it, and being a distinctive and important 
activity, textbooks dealing separately with it." 
Malan and Pretorius2 state that banking law is not an autonomous branch of the law, but a 
modem development which uses the concepts and techniques of the general law of obligations, 
and in consequence, the relationship between bank and customer is classified and explained in 
terms of these general principles. 
The relationship is based upon contract,3 and involves a debtor and creditor relationship.4 In 
1 [1968] 2 All ER 1073 at 1118. 
2 Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 333. 
3 See Standard Bank SA Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd l 995 ( 4) SA 510 (C) at 530; 
ABSA Bank Bpk hla Volkskas Bank v Retie/ 1999 (3) SA 322 (NC) at 339; Strydom NO 
vABSA BankBpk200l (3) SA 185 (T) at 192. 
4 In London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v MacMillan & Arthur 1918 AC 777 at 789 Lord Finlay 
LC stated: 
"The relation between banker and customer is that of debtor and creditor, with a 
superadded obligation on the part of the banker to honour the customer's cheques 
if the account is in credit." 
See, also, Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110 at 118; Hart v 
Sangster [1957] 2 All ER 708; Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (a 
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Standard Bank of SA Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another5 the Court summed up the question of 
ownership of the money as follows: 
" ... as a customer deposits money, such money becomes the property of the bank subject 
to obligation by the bank to honour validly drawn cheques by the customer. 6 
Stassen7 is of the opinion that the description of the relationship as set out in the case of 
Rousseau NO v Standard Bank of SA Ltcf is purely functional and suggests that the contract 
between banker and customer be classified. He concludes that the legal relationship consists of, 
on the one hand, mandatum, and on the other hand, mutuum. As the relationship contains 
elements of several different kinds of contracts it has often been referred to as a relationship sui 
generis. 9 
Bankrupt) and Others (no 3) [1968] 2 All ER 1073 at 1118 (England). The English 
approach is also followed in South Africa. In Rousseau NO v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 
1976 (4) SA 104 (C) at 106, Watermeyer J summed up as follows: 
"The legal relationship between a banker and its customer whose account is in 
credit, is that of debtor and creditor. The customer is a creditor who has a claim 
against the bank in the sense that he has a right to have it make payments to him, 
or to his order, on cheques drawn by him up to the amount by which his account 
is in credit. 
When a customer draws a cheque on his bank in favour of a third party (ie. the 
payee) this is an instruction to the bank to make payment to the payee. This the 
bank could do by taking the money out of its own funds and handing it either to 
the payee personally or to a collecting banker on the payee's behalf, but in 
practice where a payee hands a cheque to his banker for collection a balance is 
struck from time to time between the two banks ... " 
See, also, Estate Ismail v Barclays Bank (DC & OJ 1957 ( 4) SA 17 (T) at 26; Kearney 
v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1961 (2) SA 647 (T) at 652; Malan & Pretorius Bills of 
Exchange 333; Joubert (ed) 19 LAWSA par 154. 
5 1995 (2) SA 740 (T) at 746. 
6 See, also, Estate Ismail v Barclays Bank (DC & OJ 1957 ( 4) SA 17 (T) at 26; Kearney 
NO v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1961 (2) SA 647 (T) at 650; S v Kearney 1964 
(2) SA 495 (A) at 502-503; Western Bank Ltd v Registrar of Financial Institutions and 
Another 1915 ( 4) SA 37 (T) at 43-44; Rousseau NO v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1916 ( 4) 
SA 104 (C) at 106; GS George Consultants and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Datasys (Pty) Ltd 
1988 (3) SA 726 (W) at 735. 
7 Stassen 1980 MB 77 at 79. 
8 1976 (4) SA 104 (C) at 106, quoted supra at n4. 
9 In GS George Consultants and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Datasys (Pty) Ltd 1988 (3) SA 
726 (W) at 736 the Court states: 
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Another, and more preferable, view is that the contract between the customer and banker is that 
of a mandatum. I0 The state of the customer's account, that is, whether he is the banker's creditor 
or debtor, does not determine the nature of the contract between them, but may be seen as 
indicative of the manner in which the contract is to be performed.II 
It must be borne in mind that the above description of the banker-customer relationship is rather 
narrow, when the multi-functionality of banks is taken into account. I2 In Standard Bank of SA 
Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd and AnotherI3 the Court cautions as follows: 
" ... the relationship which exists between a banker and its customer is a collection of a 
number of complex juristic relationships which tend to vary from customer to customer, 
depending on the specific agreement which has been entered into between the customer 
and the bank. Naturally such relationship would exhibit in varying degrees certain 
features which have been recognised both in our common law as well as in various 
judicial dicta. However, in any given case, in my view, the proper course to take is not 
"That the contract is sui generis need not be doubted. Nevertheless, that 
conclusion does not exclude the proposition that the contract is fundamentally 
one of mutuum with numerous superadded features, including the banker's duty 
of secrecy." 
See, also, Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Bank of Lisbon International Ltd 1994 
(1) SA 205 (N) at 213-214; Joubert (ed) 19 LAWSA par 154; Cowen Negotiable 
Instruments 3 68; Bekker Dishonorering 11-14; Malan& PretoriusBills of Exchange 334. 
10 OK Bazaars (1929) Ltdv Universal Stores Ltd 1973 (2) SA281 (C) at 288; Joubert (ed) 
19 LAWSA par 154; Bekker Dishonorering 11-14; Goodeye Aspekte153-154. Malan & 
Pretorius Bills of Exchange 334 explains the relationship as follows: 
"However, in essence the contract between bank and customer obliges the bank 
to render certain banking services, the so-called services de caisse, to the 
customer on his instructions, and for this reason it can be classified as a contract 
of mandatum. The bank and customer relationship is based on a comprehensive 
mandate in terms of which the customer lends money to the bank on current 
account, the bank undertakes to repay it on demand by honouring cheques drawn 
on it and to perform certain other services for the customer, such as the collection 
of cheques and other instruments, and the keeping and accounting of his current 
account." 
11 Joubert (ed) 19 LAWSA par 154. See, also, Bank of Africa v Evelyn Gold Mining 
CompanyLtd(1894) 1 OR24 at27; OK Bazaars (1929) Ltdv Universal StoresLtd1913 
(2) SA 281 (C) at 288; Malan 1978 TSAR 197 at 201; Stassen 1980 MB 77 at 79; Faul 
1989 TSAR 145; Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 334. 
12 See the discussion in par 8.1.2 infra. 
13 1995 (2) SA 740 at 747. 
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to apply a rigid and pre-existing characterisation of the customer-banker legal 
relationship, but to examine the specific legal nexus which exists between a particular 
banker and its customer. Indeed, some such relationships would have strong features of 
a principal and agent; sometimes characteristics of a loan for consumption; and indeed 
sometimes such relationship is, as I have indicated earlier, one between a debtor and a 
creditor and very often the relationship would be a collection of features of each of these 
legal institutions I have referred to. 11 
8.1.2 The multi-functional bank 
8.1.2.1.Jntroduction 
The description of the banker-customer relationship as set out in the previous paragraph is of 
course a narrow one, covering only the most basic or most common relationships. between a 
banker and its customer and does not reflect the fact that banks are multi-functional. The truth 
is that there are just as many banker-customer relationships as there are different types of contract 
which a bank may conclude with the customer. 14 In principle, bankers are dealers in money. They 
are the middle-men between investors and borrowers. Apart from lending and borrowing money 
they also provide a vast array of financial and other services, 15 and various types of legal 
relationships can therefore exist between banker and customer. 16 
14 Stassen 1983 MB 80 at 81. 
15 Bankers may, eg, offer any of the undermentioned services. Some services, such as 
advice on estate planning, drawing of wills, and acting as executors of deceased estates 
formerly fell within the domain of the attorney's profession, but banks are increasingly 
active in these areas. 
Examples of other services bankers may render include; 
( 1) lending money on overdraft, other loans, credit agreements for movables, 
discounting of contracts, factoring, mortgage bonds; 
(2) foreign-exchange transactions; 
(3) being surety or guarantor; 
( 4) acting as executors of deceased estates; 
( 5) purchasing and selling of shares, giving advice and information, issuing and 
underwriting new shares and effects; 
( 6) acting as asset managers. 
16 Stassen 1983 MB 80 at 81. 
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Although the obligations between a banker and a surety arise principally by way of contract, it 
is, of course possible that obligations may also arise from delict. 17 The relationship may also be 
influenced by trade usages and the impact of foreign legal sources of banking law. 
8.1.2.2 Legal problems flowing from the multi-functionality of banks 
The emergence of the multi-functional bank raises a variety of legal issues. Prominent among 
them is that of the risk when core banking is combined with other financial activities. It is this 
concern which prompted the separation of core banking from securities activities in the US 
Glass-Steagall Act. 18 
Furthermore, there is the concentration of economic power in the multi-functional bank and the 
competition concerns associated with this. 19 
Important also is a third issue, namely the conflicts of interest thrown up in the operation of the 
multi- functional bank. Consider when an issue of securities is being underwritten by a bank or 
when a bank is a "market maker" in securities, that is, holds itself out as willing to enter into 
transactions of sale and purchase in investments in securities at prices determined by him 
generally and continuously rather than in respect of each particular transaction. If these securities 
are unsold, for example in the case of an underwriting, or the bank has taken a position as a 
market maker, the bank may be tempted to recommend these securities to customers or place 
them in accounts or funds it is managing. A variation of this example would be where the 
securities-retailing or fund-management arms of a bank were placing a company's securities at 
17 One thinks here particularly of fraud, (see Van der Merwe & Olivier Onregmatige Daad 
12 and 228; Scott 1976 THRHR 347; Scott 1977 THRHR 165) ormisrepresentation(see 
Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A); Siman and Co 
(Pty) Ltdv Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 (2) SA 888 (A); Bayer South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd v Viljoen 1990 (2) SA 647 (A)) or negligent investment advice (see Durr v ABSA 
Bank Ltd and Another 1997 (3) SA 448 (A)). 
18 S 227of12 USC. In the middle of the great Depression of the 1930s, the US Congress 
passed the Banking Act of 1933. Four provisions of this Act (ss 16, 20, 21and32) have 
become popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act. These provisions attempt to separate 
commercial banking from investment banking because affiliations between these 
institutions were perceived as the main factors which contributed to the stock market 
crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. As such, the roots of the Glass-Steagall "wall" 
are steeped in strong and broad public-policy considerations. See Norton 1987 Bus Law 
327. The Glass-Steagall Act does not, however, create an absolute barrier between 
commercial and investment banking and, because it only applies to certain banks, its 
provisions have loopholes. See s 24 of 12 USC (Seventh). 
19 See Cranston Banking Law 23. 
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the same time as its corporate-finance arm was about to undercut their value, for example, was 
about to call up the loan because of the debtor's default. A third example would be where a bank 
was tempted to trade upon or divulge to favoured customers information it has obtained about 
a corporate customer or a customer to whom it is giving financial advice. A fourth example of 
a conflict of interest would be where a bank finances a company which is bidding to take over 
another of its customers. 20 
Relevant to these and a variety of other conflicts of interest are provisions in the general and the 
regulatory law. The English law, for example, proscribes a conflict of interest if there is a 
fiduciary relationship. As for regulatory law, the English securities laws contain a variety of 
provisions compelling banks either to avoid any conflict of interest arising, or, where conflicts 
do arise, to ensure fair treatment to all its customers by disclosure, internal rules of 
confidentiality, by declining to act or otherwise.21 
8.1.2.3 South African concepts: boni mores to the rescue? 
8.1.2.3.1 Fiduciary relationships 
Our law recognises fiduciary relationships which, as a matter of law, give rise to an obligation 
to respect the confidentiality of information imparted or received in confidence, and to refrain 
from using or disclosing such information otherwise than as permitted by law or by contract. The 
fiduciary relationships that give rise to such legal duties are in some instances based on 
contract. 22 In such cases the obligation to respect the confidentiality of the information is 
generally regarded as an implied term of the contract. 23 
In other cases the relationships are based on the law of delict and the principles of Aquilian 
20 Poser 1988 MichiganYearbook of International Legal Studies 91 at 96-97. See the 
prominent case in this regard Washington Steel Corporation v TW Corporation 602 F 2d 
594 (3d Circuit 1979). 
21 See Cranston Banking Law 23; Blair et al Financial Services Regulation 231-236. 
22 Eg, the contract between employer and employee. See Beeton v Peninsula Transport Co 
(Pty) Ltd 1934 CPD 53 at 57-58; Silva's Fishing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Maweza 1957 
(2) SA 256 (A); Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter and Another 1993 (1) SA 409 0V) 
at 429; McKerronDelict 23-24. 
23 Coo lair Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg and Another 1967 ( 1) SA 686 <YI) 
referred to with approval inAtlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltdv Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) 
Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) at 190. 
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liability. 24 These aspects of the law are still in a process of development, and it appears that they 
are developing in parallel in the sense that the emerging definition of the legal duty relating to 
confidential information for the purpose of the law of deli ct is not materially different from the 
emerging definition of the implied contractual term where the relationship is based on contract. 25 
As far as English law on the subject is concerned, it is based on principles of equity, and although 
it cannot be slavishly adopted in South Africa, it can be of considerable assistance in analysing 
and solving a similar problem on Aquilian principles. 26 
In Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter and Another21 Stegmann J pointed out that no inherent 
conflict of principle or legal policy has yet emerged in the field of fiduciary relationships and 
confidentiality of information, between the broad and ample basis of Aquilian liability and 
English notions of equity. He continued by saying that when English lawyers have analysed and 
solved a problem in this field on the lines of equity, it can be of considerable assistance in 
analysing and solving a similar problem on Aquilian principles to have regard to their work. 
It is therefore my submission that in the light of the fact that in our banking law we have delved 
deep into English law for guidance, enacted legislation based on English models, and applied 
English law in many cases where English law has not been imported by way of statute, 28 we can 
look profitably at developments in English law in regard to the solutions to the problem of 
24 As an example, Stegmann J in Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter and Another l 993 
(1) SA 409 at 426, refers to the relationship between tutor and student or company 
director and company. A company director owe fiduciary duties to the company. See 
Henochsberg Companies Act 464; Treasure Trove Diamonds Ltd v Hyman 1928 AD 464; 
Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1966] 3 All ER 420; 
Harlowe 's Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co NL and Another 
(1968) 121CLR483. It has been ruled that the liability for breach of a fiduciary duty is 
not a delictual one, but one sui generis, (see Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining 
Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 at 199 and 242; Cohen NO v Segal 1970 (3) SA 702 (y{) at 706; Du 
Plessis NO v Phelps 1995 (4) SA 165 (C) at 170-171). See, however, the article of du 
Plessis 1993 THRHR 11 at 28 et seq where the author submits that the source of the 
liability should be exclusively the actio legis Aquiliae. 
25 See Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter and Another 1993 (1) SA 409 (y{) at 427. 
26 Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltdv Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 
at 179, 185 and l90;MeterSystemsHoldingsLtdv VenterandAnother 1993 (1) SA409 
(y{) at 427. English law is developing according to the principles of equity whilst our 
modem Roman-Dutch Law is developing on what Corbett J (as he then was) called,. "the 
broad and ample basis of the lex Aquilia". See Dun & Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA 
Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 (1) SA 209 (C). 
27 1993 (1) SA 409 (y{) at 427. 
28 On the importance of English law in the South African banking law, see Willis Banking 
20-21; Morice 1904 SAL/355; Malan & Pretorius 2001 THRHR 268 at 268-271. 
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fiduciary relationships in a banking context. 
In the normal banker-customer relationship, the parties do not owe one another a fiduciary duty.29 
In certain cases a particular relationship between parties may be an indication that the one party 
owes the other a duty of care. In this fashion, the existence of a contractual relationship can point 
to a legal duty of care. 30 Other examples are the relationships between policeman and citizen, 31 
policeman and prisoner,32 and, as discussed, between employer and employee.33 
It is, however, unclear whether the mere existence of a relationship is sufficient to establish a 
legal duty. 34 Every case must be measured, in view of all the surrounding circumstances, 
including the existence of a particular relationship between the parties, against the measure of 
the boni mores. 35 
A fact which may tilt the scales in favour of the recognition of a fiduciary relationship in the 
banker-customer relationship is the fact that the bank may have created the impression that it 
would look after the interests or protect the assets of the customer.36 This would be the case 
where the bank, for example, assumes a duty as adviser to the customer, or acts as its asset 
29 See Nedperm Bank Ltd v Verbri Projects CC 1993 (3) SA 214 (W). 
30 See, eg, Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 ( 4) 
SA 901 (N); Van der Merwe & Olivier Onregmatige Daad 46; Davel 1979 THRHR 214; 
Neethling et al Deliktereg 60. 
31 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A). 
32 Mtati v Minister of Justice 1958 (1) SA 221 (A); McKerronDelict 23-24; Van der Merwe 
& Olivier Onregmatige Daad 46. 
3 3 The concept of a duty of care is an established feature of the South African law of deli ct. 
The underlying theory of the duty of care facilitates the introduction of liability for pure 
economic loss as it has done in the case of recognition of liability for negligent 
misrepresentation causing pure economic loss. See Malan & Pretorius 2001 THRHR 269 
at 270; Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 620 et seq. 
34 SeeBedjordv Suid-Kaapse Voogdy Bpk 1968 (1) SA 226 (C) at 230; Van der Merwe & 
Olivier Onregmatige Daad 46; Van der Walt Delict 33; Neethling et al Deliktereg 61. 
35 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) at 596-597; Universiteit van Pretoria 
v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T) at 387; (and on appeal, see 
1979 (1) SA 441 {A); Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltdv Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 
1982 (4) SA371 {D) at 384. See, also,Hawkerv Life Offices Association of South Africa 
1987 (3) SA 777 (C) at 781; Nkumbi vMinister of Law and Order 1991 (3) SA 29 (E); 
Neethling et al Deliktereg 63. 
36 See Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Cal/guard (Pty) Ltd 1990 (2) SA 520 (W); 
N eethling et al Deliktereg 62; N eethling and Potgieter 1990 TSAR 7 63. 
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manager. The key question will concern the role which the bank has taken in the customer's 
affairs37 and whether that gives rise to a reasonable expectation on the part of the customer that 
the bank is putting the customer's interests before its own (and those ofits other customers) and 
that the customer can therefore relax its consideration of its own position in the belief that the 
bank is taking care of that. 38 
Professor (now Judge) Finn has indicated that, given the general recognition that banks are 
commercial entities with obvious self-interest in the business that they transact, he would not 
expect fiduciary duties to be owed by the bank to a customer except in three distinct situations: 
( 1) where the course of the relationship can found the expectation, not only that advice will 
be given, but that, where necessary, it will be given adversely to the bank's interests; 
(2) where the bank has created the expectation that it is advising or will advise in the 
customer's interests in a matter because its own interest therein is represented as being 
merely formal, nominal or technical; 
(3) where the bank, though expected to act in its own interest in the actual dealing inter se, 
has created the expectation that it will advise in the customer's interests, for example on 
the wisdom of an investment proposal in respect of which a loan application is made. 39 
My submission is that, as the nature of banking changes, and measured against the bani 
mores, our banking law will recognize, more and more, the fiduciary duties in the banker-
customer relationship. The aforementioned factors as propounded by Finn may be a valuable 
guide, also in South African banking law, pointing to the existence of fiduciary duties. 
37 See Austin 1986 OJLS 444 at 446. 
3 8 If one looks at English law, fiduciary duties would prevent the bank from putting its own 
interests, or the interests of another customer, over those of the customer in question. 
This will occur: 
(1) where the bank gives advice to a customer in relation to a transaction in which 
there is a serious conflict of interest between the bank and its customer, such as 
a bank guarantee to be given by one customer in relation to the existing 
indebtedness of another customer (see Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [1959] 1 QB 
55; Lloyds BankLtdv Bundy [1975] 1QB326; National Westminster Bankplc 
vMorgan [1985] AC 686); or 
(2) where a bank gives investment advice or other advice in relation to financial 
services to a customer; see LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources 
Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 (Canada); lndata Equipment Supplies Ltd (t/a 
Autofleet) v ACLLtd[1998] 1BCLC412; Law Commission Rules pars 2.4.3 to 
2.4.17). 
39 See Finn in McKendrick (ed) Fiduciary 11-12. 
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It is, of course, so that a large proportion of sureties in respect of bank loans are in fact also 
customers of the bank. One thinks, for example, of directors of companies signing as sureties for 
the debts of the company, or members signing for close corporations. Where the surety is also 
a customer of the bank, and the bank is in a fiduciary relationship with the customer/surety, the 
banker may well owe the customer/surety a duty of disclosure of all material facts. 
8.1.2.3.2 Conflicts of interest 
Perceived or real conflicts of interest, where it is thought that a bank is not acting completely in 
the interests of the customer because of its own interests or those of another customer, are 
sources of friction between banker and customer. Within the same organisation there may well 
be traditional bankers, corporate financiers, market makers, 40 brokers and fund managers. 
Potential conflicts of interest arising from the diverse activities of personnel in these areas are 
unavoidable.41 It is possible that in the development of our law, certain conduct by bankers in 
relation to customer information, may become unlawful, after determination by the boni mores 
or in terms of statute law such as the existing Insider Trading Act of 1998. 42 
Banks will have to develop grounds of justification, 43 as well as methods to avoid or manage 
conflicts of interest. By analogy to English law, 44 the following methods may be used, in order 
to prevent delictual liability: 
• the use of Chinese W alls;45 
40 As defined in par 8.1.2.2 supra. 
41 Warne Litigation 37. 
42 Act 135 of 1998. 
43 Van der Walt Deli ct 40-41 states: 
"Grounds of justification are practical examples of circumstances justifying a 
prima f acie infringement of a recognized right or interest, according to the 
fundamental criterion of boni mores or reasonableness. Although in practice they 
have developed to the full status of defences to an action in delict, they are in 
reality the expression of the result of the application of the boni mores-test to 
typically recurring circumstances in practice." See, also, van der Merwe & Olivier 
Onregmatige Daad70. 
44 See W ameLitigation 3 7; Law Commission Fiduciary Duties par 2.16; Cranston Banking 
Law 25-26; Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) [1999] 1 All ER 515. 
45 For an explanation of the term see par 1.1.3.3 supra at n 76. 
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• the use of restricted lists and watch lists; and 
• disclosure to customers of the existence of an actual or potential conflict of interests and 
the obtaining of their consent to future action. 
It is interesting to note that in terms of the new South African Code of Banking Practice, 46 
participating banks believe that they are entitled to enhance their current relations with customers 
by giving certain information about customers to their subsidiaries within their groups for 
marketing purposes, unless the customers instruct them to the contrary. 
8.2 BANK CONFIDENTIALITY47 
There is a dearth of South African authority on the subject of bank confidentiality. The banker's 
duty of confidentiality has been recognised inAbrahams v Burns, 48 Cambanis Buildings (Pty) Ltd 
46 See par 9.4.2 infra. 
47 Writers on the subject, as well as courts pronouncing on confidentiality issues refer to "a 
duty of secrecy" or "a duty of confidence" or a "duty of confidentiality". The second 
edition of Neate 's book on the subject is called Bank Confidentiality. The Review 
Committee Banking Services 34 (the Jack report) refers to a a "principle of 
confidentiality". In GS George Consultants and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Datasys (Pty) Ltd 
1988 (3) SA 726 (W) at 734-735 the Court refers to the obligation of the bank to preserve 
the confidentiality of its knowledge of its customer's affairs. Faul Bankgeheim uses the 
term "secrecy". See, also, Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 375; Smith 1979 MB 24. 
These concepts are seen as being synonymous. The Oxford Thesaurus contains the 
following entries: 
"confidence n 3 exchange confidences secret, private affair, confidentiality, 
intimacy." 
"confidential adj 1 confidential information secret, private, classified, non-public, 
off-the-record, restricted, personal, intimate, privy ... " 
"secrecy n 1 the secrecy of the information confidentiality, privateness." 
"secret adj 1 keep the matter secret confidential, private, unrevealed, undisclosed, 
under wraps, unpublished, untold, unknown ... 11 
The Penguin Dictionary describes the word confidential as follows: 
11 confidential ... adj 1 said of information; intended to be kept secret. 11 
For the purposes of this thesis it is accepted that the terms can be used interchangeably. 
48 1914 CPD 452 at 452-456. 
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v Ga/49 and GS George Consultants and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Datasys (Pty) Ltd so There are 
no other decisions in which the basis of the duty of confidentiality is analysed. st On a practical 
level, banks are aware of the fact that personal financial information about their 
customers' accounts and transactions are to be kept confidential. In practice banks do comply 
with such a duty. s2 
Because of this dearth of authority, South African lawyers rely on English law, subject to 
peculiarities of English law that have no place in our own legal system, s3 and the decision in 
Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England54 has accordingly impacted on our 
law as well. ss 
The duty of a bank to keep its customer's affairs confidential is usually an express or implied 
49 1983 (2) SA 128 (N) at 137. 
50 1988 (3) SA 726 r;v) at 735. 
51 In Cywilnat (Pty) Ltd v Densam (Pty) Ltd 1989 (3)SA 59 r;v) at 59-60 the Court 
recognised a duty of confidentiality by implication, but in this case found that there was 
a circumstance which relieved the bank of its duty. The decision of the court a quo in this 
case was confirmed in Densam (Pty) Ltd v Cywilnat (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 100 (A). The 
court of appeal found it unnecessary to analyse the legal nature of the banker-customer 
relationship and did not discuss whether a bank indeed has a duty of confidentiality and 
what the origin and extent of such duty are. The duty of confidentiality was also 
recognised by implication in Hindry v Nedcor Bank Ltd and Another 1999 (2) SA 757 
r;v) at 773. 
52 See Smith 1979 MB 24 at 26. 
53 See Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Bantu Education l 966 (1) SA 229 (N) at 237; 
Willis Banking 24. 
54 [1924] 1 KB 461. 
55 See GS George Consultants and Investments (Pty) Ltdv Datasys (Pty) Ltd 1988 (3) SA 
726 r;v) at 735. InDensam (Pty) Ltdv Cywilnat (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 100 (A)BothaJA 
remarked as follows in regard to the bank's duty of secrecy: 
" ... For the purposes of deciding this appeal I shall simply assume ... [but] I must 
make it plain, without deciding, that the Bank was contractually obliged to [its 
client] to maintain secrecy and confidentiality about its affairs, in accordance with 
the decision in Tournier's case." 
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term of the contract between bank and customer. 56 Malan and Pretorius57 state: 
"Since this contract can be classified as an instance of mandate, the bank's duty of 
secrecy can be characterized as an example of a mandatary' s duty to perform his mandate 
in good faith." 
Faul58 sums up the situation as follows: 
"In South African law, the banker-customer relationship can be based on mandatum (in 
the case of a current account holder) or usually mutuum. The ordinary principles of 
mandatum gives rise to a banker's duty of confidentiality. In the case of mutuum the duty 
is regarded as an implied term in the contract between banker and customer, which 
reflects the sui generis character of the contract in this case as one based on 
confidentiality. "59 
In South African law a banker's duty of secrecy exists before, during and after the existence of 
the contract between banker and customer. 6° Faul61 sees a further foundation of a banker's duty 
of secrecy in delict. Banks have an absolute duty to keep all confidential information secret 
56 TourniervNationalProvincialandUnionBankofEngland[I924] 1 KB461 at474,481 
and 484 (England); Abrahams v Burns 1914 CPD 452 at 456; GS George Consultants 
and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Datasys (Pty) Ltd 1988 (3) SA 726 (W) at 736-737 (South 
Africa); Paget's Banking Law JO 254; Smith 1979 MB 24; Malan & Pretorius Bills of 
Exchange 376. 
57 Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 376. The authors refer to De Wet & Yeats 
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 341; Faul Bankgeheim 440-443; Aubert et al Secret 32-36. 
58 Faul Bankgeheim v. 
59 In GS George Consultants and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Datasys (Pty) Ltd 1988 (3) SA 
726 (W) at 736 Stegmann J states: 
"That the contract [between banker and customer] is sui generis need not be 
doubted. Nevertheless, that conclusion does not exclude the proposition that the 
contract is fundamentally one of mutuum with numerous superadded features, 
including the banker's duty of secrecy." 
60 Faul Bankgeheim 466-467; Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 377. 
61 Faul Bankgeheim 4 72-4 73. The bank must take reasonable care to protect its systems and 
information from penetration by unauthorised third parties. The ordinary principles of 
delict are to be applied to the breach of the banker's duty of secrecy. 
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whether it relates to a customer62 or to anyone else. 63 Malan and Pretorius64 state: 
"Thus, a bank is under a duty to respect the financial and personal privacy of its 
customers and other members of the public, and not to injure their creditworthiness or 
personal integrity by disclosing confidential information." 
A juristic person has a comparable right to privacy.65 
In GS George Consultants and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Datasys (Pty) Ltcf'6 Stegmann J stated: 
"There are circumstances in which a banker may be relieved of the duty of secrecy owed 
to his customer, and circumstances in which he can be compelled to disclose the 
confidential information in his possion, Some of the circumstances are considered in 
Toumier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England (supra)." 
In Toumier v National Provincial and Union Bank of Englancl'1 the court referred to the 
following grounds of justification: 
• where disclosure is under compulsion by law; 
• where there is a duty to the public to disclose; 
• where the interests of the bank require disclosure; 
62 Cambanis Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Gal 1983 (2) SA 128 (NC) at 137; GS George 
Consultants and Investments (Pty) Ltdv Datasys (Pty) Ltd 1988 (3) SA 726 (W) at 736. 
63 Faul Bankgeheim 321 et seq; Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 377. 
64 Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 377. The authors refer to California Bankers 
Association v Schultz 1974 US 94 SCT 1494;39 L Ed 812 where it was said: 
"In a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examining them the 
agents get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social 
connections, religious affiliation, educational interests, the papers and magazines 
he reads and so on ad infinitum. " 
65 FaulBankgeheim 348 et seq; Dhlomo NO v Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1989 (1) SA 945 
(A) at 953; CaxtonLtdvReevaForman (Pty) Ltd 1990 (3) SA 547 (A) at 560;Financial 
Mail (Pty) Ltdv Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) at 461 et seq. 
66 1988 (3) SA 726 (W) at 736. 
67 [1924] 1 KB 461 at 473. These grounds of justification apply to South African law as 
well. See Faul Bankgeheim 480-481. 
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• where the disclosure is made by the express or implied consent of the customer.68 
Banking secrecy is founded on legislation, contract and the protection of privacy. 69 
Statutory measures relating to a banker's duty of confidentiality provide no general foundation 
for its protection in South African law. As Fourie70 points out, several legislative enactments 
apply to banking secrecy and expressly or impliedly give recognition to it. 71 The new South 
African Code of Banking Practice also contains a clause informing the customer that its personal 
information will be treated as private and confidential and will not be disclosed other than in four 
exceptional cases "permitted by law" .72 
Large inroads have recently been made into the duty of confidentiality, particularly where 
disclosure is compelled by law.73 The prevention of money laundering, in particular, is an area 
where disclosure is increasingly required. 74 
68 See, also, Cywilnat (Pty) LtdvDensam (Pty) Ltd 1989 (3) SA 59 (W);Densam (Pty) Ltd 
v Cywilnat (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 100 (A) at 110-111. In England, see Barclays Bankplc 
(Trading as Barclaycard) v Taylor [ 1989] 1 WLR 1066; Robertson v Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce [1995] 1 All ER 824. 
69 Faul 1989TSAR145; Faul l989DeJure 312; Faul 1986TSAR180; Itzikowitz 1989BML 
225; Scott 1989 SA Mere Lf 248; Smith 1979 MB 24; Faul Bankgeheim 2- 4; Fourie 1990 
South African Banker 20 at 48; Review Committee Banking Services ch 28 et seq. 
70 Fourie 1990 South African Banker 20 at 48. 
71 See, eg, s 236( 4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; s 31 of the Civil Proceedings 
Evidence Act 25 of 1965; s 78 (13) of the Attorneys Act 53of1979; s 33 of the South 
African Reserve Bank Act 90of1989; s 74 of the Income Tax Act 58of1962; s 87(2) 
of the Banks Act 94 of 1990; Insolvency Act 24 of 193 6. 
72 Sees 4.1. l of the Code of Banking Practice. 
73 See the examples quoted inn 71 supra. Neate Bank Confidentiality 205 points out that 
the Jack Committee (Review Committee Banking Services) identified at least nineteen 
statutory exceptions to the duty of confidentiality in England in 1987. Neate states that 
various new additions have reached the statute books since then. Malan & Pretorius Bills 
of Exchange 377 state: 
"Banking secrecy has come under considerable pressure in recent times and 
disclosure of confidential information in appropriate circumstances in the public 
interest is increasingly required." 
7 4 Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 3 78 use as an example the money laundering 
provisions in the South African Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 which make 
it an offence to acquire any property knowing it to be the proceeds of a defined crime, or 
to convert property "while he knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect" that it is the 
proceeds of a defined crime. In addition, a duty is placed on directors, managers and 
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Disclosure of the customer's information to banking subsidiaries within the bank's group only, 
appears to be permissible. 75 
Banks often obtain status opinions on the creditworthiness of third parties by addressing a request 
to the bank of the third party.76 The provisions of the Code of Banking Practice deal specifically 
with the question of confidentiality. The Code promises the customer that its affairs shall be kept 
private and confidential, with the usual common-law exceptions. 77 As far as credit reference 
agencies are concet:ned, the Code reserves the bank's rights to disclose information about a 
customer's debt owing to the bank, where the customer has fallen behind with payments and has 
not made satisfactory arrangements for repayment, or where the customer has consented to 
disclosure. Where a cheque of the customer has been referred to drawer, that information is 
disclosed to a cheque verification service. 78 The Code promises that no other information will 
be given to the credit reference agencies without the customer's prior written consent. 79 
Once it is clear that a bank is authorised to supply information to third parties, the question of 
the potential delictual liability of the bank supplying the reference to third parties, is raised. Our 
courts recognise a delictual action for damages where a negligent misrepresentation causes pure 
executive officers of financial institutions to report to the authorities if they have reason 
to suspect that any property they have acquired, is the proceeds of a defined crime. A 
failure to do so is an offence. See, also, the South African Prevention of Organised Crime 
Act 24 of 1999. S 7 of this Act compels institutions to report suspicions regarding the 
proceeds of unlawful activities. See, also, Van Jaarsveld 2001 SA Mere LJ 580 for a 
discussion of the proposed Financial Intelligence Centre Bill. 
75 BankofTokyoLtdvKaroon [1987] AC 45 at 53-54; [1986] 3 AllER468; Blair Allison 
Palmer Richards-Carpenter Financial Services Act 134 et seq (England); Faul 
Bankgeheim 180 et seq;Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 378; s 2.8.1 of the South 
African Code of Banking Practice. 
76 InParsonsvBarclayandCoLtdandGoddard(1910) 103LT 196, the Court referred to 
the very wholesome and useful habit whereby one banker in confidence answers, 
honestly, the query of another banker, with the customer's permission. See, also, Royal 
Bank Trust Co (Trinidad) Ltd v Pampellone [1987] 1 Lloyds Rep 218 (England); 
Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 ( 4) SA 747 (A) (South 
Africa); Holden Practice 10-51 et seq; Faul Bankgeheim 508 et seq; Malan & Pretorius 
Bills of Exchange 3 78; N eate Bank Confidentiality 13-14; 
77 S 4.1 of the Code of Banking Practice. Importantly, s 4.1.1 states that disclosure will be 
made at the customer's request or with the customer' written consent. 
78 S 4.2.1 of the Code of Banking Practice. 
79 S 4.2 of the Code of Banking Practice. 
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economic loss. 80 Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Lttf1 is a good example 
of the application of the delictual principles that applies where a bank has given an inaccurate 
or misleading status opinion about a customer.82 
A banker should constantly keep in mind that he owes his customer a duty of confidentiality. 
80 SeeAdministrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A); Siman and 
Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 (2) SA 888 (A); Lillicrap Wassenaar 
and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A); International 
Shipping Co (Pty) Ltdv Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A); Bayer SA (Pty) Ltdv Frost 1991 
(4) SA 559 (A) at 568; Beck 1985SALf222; Boberg Delict 193 et seq; Boberg 1985 
SAL! 213; Burchell 1980 SAL! I; Hutchinson & Visser 1985 SAL! 587; Neethling & 
Potgieter 1980 De Rebus 179; Pretorius 1986 De Jure 57. 
81 Case no 12673/89 WLD (19 3 92), overruled on appeal in 1994 (4) SA 747 (A). 
82 In this case the court had to decide whether and under what conditions a bank incurred 
liability for a banker's inaccurate and misleading reference or status opinion concerning 
a customer. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages allegedly suffered as a result 
of a negligent misstatement made by the defendant. Liability for negligent misstatement 
or negligent misrepresentation is accepted as part of our law. In Administrateur Natal v 
Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk it was established that a delictual action for damages is 
available to a plaintiff who can establish: 
• that the defendant, or someone for whose actions the defendant is vicariously 
liable, has made a misstatement to the plaintiff; 
• that in making this misstatement the person concerned has acted; (1) negligently 
and (2) unlawfully; 
• that the misstatement has caused the plaintiff to sustain loss; and 
• that the damages claimed represent proper compensation for such loss. 
In Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Limited 1994 (4) SA 747 (A) 
the Appellate Division found that the report given in that case was inaccurate and 
misleading. On the question of negligence the Appellate Division held that, given the 
comprehensive and intimate knowledge the defendant's officials had of the affairs of the 
customer (the defendant was the banker of the customer), a skilled banker, acting 
reasonably, would not have given the report in question. Corbett CJ said (at 762-763): 
"It seems to me, therefore that the bank had either to give a true report [that is a 
report which truly reflected its knowledge of the position] or decline to give a 
report." 
The court (at 764-765) found a causal connection, both factually and legally, between the 
loss suffered and the misrepresentation contained in the report, the loss being reasonably 
foreseeable. As far as unlawfulness is concerned, the court held (at 769 et seq) that this 
case was not of the kind that "raises the spectre of limitless liability or places an undue 
or unfair burden upon the bank11 : the defendant could have refused to give the report or 
it could have disclaimed liability for negligence. The court rejected (at 773 et seq) the 
defendant's contention that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent and gave 
judgement (at 774 et seq) for delictual damages in a foreign currency, being the currency 
in which the loss was "felt" and which was foreseeable as such. 
379 
When dealing with a surety, it would be preferable for the bank to obtain the customer's consent 
in order to make full disclosure to the surety. 
8.3 THE BANKER'S LIABILITY FOR ADVICE AND OTHER LENDER LIABILITY 
ASPECTS 
8.3.1 Liability to customer 
Although a discussion of the banker-customer relationship as far as bills, cheques and notes are 
concerned, is outside the scope of this thesis, the bank has two important duties that bear 
mention. 
An important consequence of the banker-customer relationship is the banker• s duty to honour 
his customer's cheques. The duty of the banker to pay is subject to certain conditions, which arise 
by implication from the contract between the customer and the banker and has been defined by 
Malan and Pretorius83 as follows: 
"It is the duty of a bank to pay cheques drawn by the customer that are in all respects 
genuine and complete, on demand, provided sufficient funds or credit for their payment 
are available in the customer's account." 
Where a bank dishonours a cheque it is bound to pay, it commits a breach of contract and, in 
certain circumstances, also a delict, which renders it liable to its customer under either or both 
these heads for loss suffered by him. 84 
As a result of the bank• s breach the customer is entitled to claim not only general damages, 85 but 
83 Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 348. For authority, the authors refer to Bate v 
Heywood (1882) 2 EDC 153; Trull v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd (1892) 4 SAR 
203; Bank of Baroda Ltd v Punjab National Bank Ltd [ 1944] All ER 83 at 87; (1944) AC 
176 at 184 (England); Kircos v Standard Bank of Southern Africa Ltd (1958) ( 4) SA 58 
(SR); Volkskas Beperk v Van Aswegen 1961 (1) SA 493 (A); Kearney NO vStandard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd 1961 (2) SA 647 (T); Stapelberg NO v Barclays Bank (DC & 
0) 1963 (3) SA 120 (T); Trust_Bankof AfricaLtdvMarques 1968 (2) SA 796 (T);Karak 
Rubber Co Ltd v Burden (2) [1972] 1 All ER 1210 at 1229 (England). 
84 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Budree 1996 (1) SA 971 (N) at 981-982; 
Cowen Instruments 3 94-415; Van der Merwe 1964 THRHR 31 O; Chorley & Smart Cases 
129; Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 371; Joubert (ed) 19 LAWSA par 155. 
85 This means damages "that flow naturally and generally from the kind of breach of 
contract in question and which the law presumes that the parties contemplated would 
380 
also, if he is a trader or businessman, special damages for injury to his creditworthiness86 or 
goodwill. 87 Special damages must be specifically pleaded. 88 
Various factors have been taken into account by the courts in determining the amount of special 
damages. 89 It must be borne in mind that the plaintiffs claim is directed at obtaining damages for 
result from such a breach". See Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 (2) SA 
545 (A) at 550; Jonker v Boland PKS Bpk 2000 (1) SA 542 (0) and see Van der Merwe 
et al Contract 304 et seq. In First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Budree 1996 (1) 
SA 971 (N) at 981 it was held that a customer whose cheque had been dishonoured by 
his bank in breach of its contractual obligations was entitled to recover from the bank 
such patrimonial loss as was occasioned by the breach and was within the contemplation 
of the parties to the contract. 
86 See Van der Merwe 1964 THRHR 310. 
87 In Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Marques 1968 (2) SA 796 (T) 98 the following was held: 
"It is clear ... that it is not in every case that a customer, whose cheque has been 
dishonoured, is entitled to recover damages for injury to his credit. He is only so 
entitled where he is a business man or trader." 
Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 372 n 211 also refer to Freeman v Standard Bank 
of South Africa Ltd 1905 TH 26 at 3 0-31; WitbankDistrict Coal Agency v Barclays Bank 
1928 TPD 18 at 23;Barclays Bankv Giles 1931TPD31at34; VanAswegen v Volkskas 
Bpk 1960 (3) SA 81 (T) at 82-83; Klopper v Volkskas Bpk 1963 (1) SA 930 {T) at 933 
and 1964 (2) SA 421 {T) at 424-425; First National Banko/ South Africa Ltdv Budree 
1996 (1) SA 971 (N) at 980-981. 
88 In Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Marques 1968 (2) SA 796 (T) at 798-799 the court 
indicated that it must be alleged that the customer conducted a business with the 
knowledge of the bank in order to show that the damages claimed fell within the 
contemplation of the parties. In Lavery v Jungheinrich 1931 AD 156 at 162 it was said 
that: 
"Not only must the contract be entered into 'with the knowledge and in view of 
these special circumstances' ... but... it must also be 'so far in the mind and 
contemplation of the parties as virtually to be a term of the contract' that such 
damages are to be recoverable .... " 
See Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltdv Kalovyrnas 1976 {2) SA 545 (A) 552 where the above 
passage from Lavery v Jungheinrich was cited with approval and see First National Bank 
of South Africa Ltd v Budree 1996 (1) SA 971 (N) at 980; Joubert (ed) 19 LA WSA par 
155; Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 372. 
89 See Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 313 and the cases that they refer to in the 
footnotes. Some of these factors are the fact that the plaintiff was a well-regarded 
inhabitant of a certain town whose cheques had never been dishonoured; the 
inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff; the number of people who came to know of the 
dishonour; the words placed on the cheque when it was dishonoured and the size of the 
plaintiffs business; the fact that the holder was an influential person on whom the 
plaintiff depended; the seriousness of the injury to the plaintiff's creditworthiness; and 
the unyielding attitude of the bank as well as the fault of the plaintiff 
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injury to his creditworthines,90 therefore, once the breach of contract is proved, loss is presumed 
and no proof of actual damage is required.91 
Malan and Pretorius identify another ground upon which a customer can base his claim against 
his bank for the wrongful dishonouring of a cheque, namely on the wrongful and culpable 
infringement of his right to the goodwill of his business. 92 If this is the case, the two actions, 
namely, in delict and for breach of contract, will be cumulative, but ifhe sues in delict he has to 
prove fault on the part of the bank. 93 
The dignity or privacy of the customer may also be injured by the wrongful dishonouring of a 
cheque, but94 to succeed with the actio iniuriarum he has to prove that the cheque was 
90 In Barclays Bank v Giles 193 1 TPD 31 at 3 5 it was stated: 
"Whenever it can be established that the occupation of a person is such that credit 
is an essential element in the conduct of his business, a bank which injures his 
credit by refusing to honour cheques when funds are available would be liable in 
damages without proof of actual loss. 11 
See Witbank District Coal Agency v Barclays Bank 1928 TPD 18 at 23; Van der Merwe 
1964 THRHR 310 at 313; Bekker Dishonorering 7 4; First National Bank of South Africa 
Ltd v Budree 1996 (1) SA 971 (N) at 981. 
91 See the authority quoted in the previous footnote. In an earlier Natal case nominal 
damages were awarded. See Hodges v Standard Bank of SA Limited 1916 NPD 91. The 
concept of awarding nominal damages has, however, been rejected. See First National 
Bank of South Africa Ltd v Budree 1996 (1) SA 971 (N) at 980. 
92 Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 3 73. See, also, Goldsmith vBank of Africa ( 1882) 
1 HCG 53 at 5 5; Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Marques 1968 (2) SA 796 (T) at 799; First 
National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Budree 1996 (1) SA 971 (N) at 982; Bekker 
Dishonorering 119-131. 
' 93 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Budree 1996 (1) SA 971 (N) at 981-982; 
Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 373. Cumulation has been described by Van 
Aswegen Sameloop 3 88 as follows: 
"In stede van een van die samelopende moontlikhede voor te skryf ofuit te kies, 
word voorgestel dat die eise of eisgronde naas mekaar in dieselfde geding 
aangewend word. 11 
Freely translated, this means that instead of prescribing or selecting one of the cumulative 
possibilities, it is recommended that the claims be pleaded alternatively in the same case. 
94 Goldsmith v Bank of Africa (1882) 1 HCG 53; Leon v Natal Bank (1899) 6 OR 177; 
Bekker v Standard Bank (1900) 15 EDC 6. 
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dishonoured animo iniuriandi. 95 
A bank dishonouring a cheque may also be liable for defamation if it uses defamatory words or 
expressions to indicate the fact of dishonour. 96 Malan and Pretorius submit that the test for 
liability would appear to be the intimation that the drawer has defaulted as to the time for 
performance, being payment on presentation. 97 
In terms of s 78( 4) and s 81 of the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964, the possessor of a lost or 
stolen cheque can be held strictly liable to the owner. Section 78 ( 4) provides that if a bank on 
which a cheque is drawn pays it contrary to the provisions of the subsection, it will be liable to 
the owner for any loss he may suffer as a result of the cheque having been paid. In terms of s 81, 
the possessor of a lost or stolen cheque that has been crossed and marked "not negotiable" can, 
provided certain conditions are met, incur liability to the true owner.98 Malan and Pretorius 
95 In First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Budree 1996 (I) SA 971 (N) at 981-982 
Page J states: 
"Although the pleading under attack in the present matter is expressly confined 
to breach of contract as a cause of action, I must make it clear that nothing I have 
said is intended to deny the client the right to claim, in addition to patrimonial 
loss for breach of contract, those forms of damages which are recoverable by way 
of the actio ex lege Aquilia and/or the actio iniuriarum or an action for 
defamation, subject only to two provisos. The first is that the conduct of the bank 
in dishonouring the cheque answers to the requirements for liability under these 
respective actions, viz wrongfulness and culpa for the lex Aquilia and 
wrongfulness and animus iniuriandi for the actio iniuriarum or defamation. The 
second is that, if claims based upon one or more of these causes of action are 
brought in the same proceedings as a claim for breach of contract, they should be 
entirely separately pleaded, since the requirements for liability for each and the 
type of damages recoverable under each are different." 
See, also, Brenner v Botha 1956 (3) SA 257 (T) at 261; Taljaard v S & VA Rosendorf! 
& Venter 1970 (4) SA 48 (0) 53; Bekker Dishonorering 102; Cowen Instruments 412; 
Sharrock & Kidd Cheque Law 49; Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 374. 
96 Eg, using the words "not provided for". See Haine v De Nederlandsche Bank voor Zuid 
Afrika 1924 WLD 139 and see Van Aswegen v Volkskas Bank Bpk 1960 (3) SA 81 (T); 
Klapper v Volkskas BankBpk 1963 (1) SA 930 (T); 1964 (2) SA421 (T); Trust Bank of 
Africa Ltd v Marques 1968 (2) SA 796 (T). Bekker Dishonorering 3; Joubert (ed) 19 
LA WSA par 15 5; Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 3 7 4; Burchell Defamation 7 et seq. 
For all the elements of defamation, see Neethling Persoonlikheidsreg 125. 
97 Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 374. As authority, the authors refer to Baker v 
Australia and New Zealand Bank 1958 NZLR 907. 
98 Joubert (ed) 19 LAWSA par 160 
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submits that in neither of these two cases is fault a requirement for liability.99 
A collecting banker can also be held liable under the extended lex Aquilia for negligence to the 
true owner100 of a cheque, provided all the elements or requirements of Aquilian liability have 
been met. 101 In addition to unlawful conduct, the bank has to be negligent as well in order to incur 
liability. When the liability of a professional is in question, the standard of care against which 
his conduct has to be measured is that which may reasonably be expected of a person engaged 
in that profession. 102 
In the matter of Durr v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another103 the question of a banker's investment 
advice to a customer, came under scrutiny. In this case, the regional manager of the brokering 
division of a bank, professing investment skills, offered expert investment advice to the plaintiff. 
The manager failed to investigate the creditworthiness of the institutions in which he had 
recommended the investment. In addition, the manager had, in fact, not been entitled to venture 
into a field in which he professed certain skills (which he did not have), and to give assurances 
to the plaintiff about the soundness of the investments, which he had not been qualified to give. 
The Court found, in this instance, that the manager was negligent in engaging voluntarily in a 
potentially dangerous activity without the skill and knowledge usually associated with the proper 
99 Malan & Pretorius Bills of Exchange 427. See, also, Barlow Motors Investments Ltd v 
Smart 1993 (1) SA 347 (W) at 350; Joubert (ed) 19 LAWSA par 160; Cowen Negotiable 
Instruments 206. 
100 The duty extends only to the true owner of the cheque. See Strydom NO v ABSA Bank 
Bpk 2001 (3) SA 185 (T). 
101 See Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A) at 797 
followed inKwaMashu Bakery Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1995 ( 1) SA 3 77 
{D). See, also, Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Bankorp Ltd 1994 (2) SA 399 (W); Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 
1997 (2) SA591 (W);PowellandAnothervABSABankLtdtla VolkskasBank 1998 (2) 
SA 807 (SE) at 815; Columbus Joint Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 (2) SA 491 (W); 
ABSA Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd 2001 (I) SA (A) 372; Malan & 
Pretorius 1994 SA Mere LJ218; Nagel 1995 De Jure 217. 
102 See Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 at 444; Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 at 121-122 (England); Rhostar (Pvt) Ltdv Netherlands 
Bank of Rhodesia Ltd 1972 (2) SA 703 (R) at 717; Randaree NNO v WH Dixon and 
Associates 1983 (2) 1 (A) at 4; Durr v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another 1997 (3) SA 448 
(SCA) at 460; Powell andAnother v ABSA Bank tla Volkskas Bank 1998 (2) SA 807 (SE) 
at 819; Pretorius 1987 MB 56 at 57; Joubert (ed) 19 LAWSA par 160. 
103 1997 (3) SA 448 (A). 
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discharge of the duties connected with such an activity. 104 
8.3.2 Liability to third parties 
As we have seen under the sub-chapter on bank confidentiality, 105 a bank often provides other 
banks with status opinions on the creditworthiness of a client. A bank can attract delictual 
liability towards third parties to whom credit references are given, if negligent misstatements or 
negligent misrepresentations are made by the banker. 106 
8.3.3 Suretyship defences 
A surety enjoys various defences and benefits in terms of South African law. Firstly, the General 
Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956107 provides that no contract of suretyship entered into after the 
commencement of the Act, shall be valid unless the terms thereof are embodied in a written 
document signed by or on behalf of the surety. 
This piece of legislation has led to much litigation in regard to what terms should be embodied 
in the contract, 108 the oral variation of the contract, 109 rectification, 110 the signing111 of blank 
104 See, also, Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438; Joubert (ed) 8 LAWSA par 94. Malan & 
Pretorius 2001 THRHR 268 at 270 states: 
"In the context, the investor was entitled to accept that the adviser was skilled to 
advise her on her investments and as one backed by a major financial 
organisation." 
105 Sub-chapter 8.2. 
106 See Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A); Siman and 
Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 (2) SA 888 (A); Lillicrap Wassenaar 
and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A); Standard 
Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 ( 4) SA 747 (A). 
107 S 6 of Act 50of1956 as amended bys 34 of the General Law Amendment Act 80 of 
1964. 
108 Swiftair Freight CC v Singh 1993 (1) SA 454 (D); Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Cohen (J) 
1993 (3) SA 846 (SECL); Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison 1977 (1) SA 333 (A); 
Sapirstein and Others v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 ( 4) SA 1 (A). 
109 Oceanair (Natal) (Pty) Ltdv Sher 1980 (1) SA317 (D);Plascon-EvansPaints (Tvl) Ltd 
v Virginia Glass Works (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 465 (O); Ferreira v SAP DC (Trading) Ltd 
1983 (1) SA 235 (A). 
110 Trust Bank of AfricaLtdvFrysch 1976 (2) SA337 (C);Neuhoffv York TimbersLtd1981 
( 4) SA 666 (T); Kroukamp v Buitendag 1981 (1) SA 606 0N) at 609; Standard Bank of 
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spaces, 112 and the presence or not of the signature of a co-surety. 113 
A surety may rely upon and plead all the defences which the principal debtor has against the 
creditor, except those defences that are purely personal to the principal debtor. 114 Examples of 
the defences attaching to the principal obligation itself are illegality, fraud, mistake, duress, and 
payment. After the decision in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas andAnother115 
in which the exceptio doli genera/is was banished, our courts were flooded with matters where 
defences were raised that suretyship agreements or certain of their clauses were contrary to public 
policy. Most of the these defences were turned down, and where it was found that a certain clause 
in an agreement was against public policy, it was held to be severable from the rest of the 
agreement. 116 
From the fact that the obligation between creditor and surety is contractual, it follows necessarily 
that a surety can rely on and plead any defence, whether in rem or in personam, generally 
available to a contracting party. 117 
SA Ltdv Cohen (2) 1993 (3) SA 854 (SECL). 
111 African Life Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Score Food Holdings Ltd 1995 (2) SA 230 
(A). 
112 Fourlamel (Pty) LtdvMaddison 1977 (1) SA333 (A); Standard Bank of SA LtdvJaap 
De Villiers Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1978 (3) SA 955 (W); Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 
927 (A); Progress Knitting & Textiles Ltd_v Nefic Investments (Pty) Ltd 1992 ( 4) SA 105 
(N). 
113 Nelson v Hodgetts Timbers (East London) (Pty) Ltd 1973 (3) SA 37 (A); Industrial 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v See Bee Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1978 ( 4) SA 136 (C) 
at 137; Societe Commerciale de Moteurs v Ackermann 1981 (3) SA 422 (A). 
114 Pothier Obligations pars 380-381; Hastie v Dunstan (1892) 9 SC 449; Eaton Robins & 
Co v Nel (2) (1909) 26 SC 624; Worthington v Wilson 1918 TPD 104; Ideal Finance 
Corporation v Coetzer 1970 (3) SA 1 (A); Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment 
(Pty) Ltd 1984 (2) SA 693 (C); Barclays National Bank Ltd v Von Varendorff 1985 (2) 
SA 544 (D) at 549. 
115 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
116 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A); Conshu Holdings Ltd v Lawless (1992) 
CLD 275 (W); Volkskas Bank Bpk v Theron 1992 CLD 336 (T); Standard Bank 
Financial Nominees (Pty) Ltdv Bamberger 1992 CLD 308 (W);PangbourneProperties 
Ltd v Nitor Construction (Pty) Ltd 1993 ( 4) SA 206 (W); First National Bank of SA Ltd 
v Sphinx Fashions CC 1993 (2) SA 721 (W); Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Wilkinson 1993 
(3) 822 (C). 
117 Joubert (ed) 26LAWSA par 202; Forsyth & Pretorius 1993SAMercLJ187-189; Kotze 
1995 Stell LR 105. 
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In addition, a surety is entitled at common law to a number of defences or benefits peculiar to the 
contract of suretyship, such as the benefit of excussion, the benefit of cession of actions, and the 
benefit of division. 118 A bank would, however, normally require a surety to renounce these 
benefits, and I do not intend discussing this aspect in detail. 
8.4 THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL FACTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
LAW OF CONTRACT 
8.4.1 Liability for misrepresentation 
The general norm or yardstick used to test for unlawfulness in a case of delictual 
misrepresentation is the boni mores. 119 The boni mores test is an objective test of 
reasonableness, the central question being whether the delinquent has, in view of all the 
circumstances of the case, reasonably or unreasonably infringed the rights of the injured party 
according to the "legal convictions or feelings of the community11 • 120 
In determining whether conduct is of such a nature as to be determined unlawful, the court must 
carefully balance and evaluate the interests of the concerned parties, the relationship of the parties 
and the social consequences of the imposition of liability in that particular type of situation. 121 
118 See Joubert (ed) 26 LAWSA pars 203-205. 
119 See, eg, Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A);Universiteit van Pretoria v 
Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T); (and on appeal 1979 (1) SA441 
(AA); Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A); Marais 
v Richard 1981 (1) SA 1157 (A); Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltdv Strachan Construction 
Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 371 (D); Scultz v Butt 1986 (3) SA 667 (A). 
120 Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 371 (D) 
at 380. In Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Cal/guard (Pty) Ltd l 990 (2) SA 520 
(W) at 528-529 Van Zyl J shows that the boni mores yardstick is linked to the concept 
of good faith in our common law, and continues: 
"This indicates that the community's perception of the boni mores is closely 
linked to the concept of good faith in community relations. These concepts, again, 
are similarly associated with the community's perception of justice, equity, good 
faith and reasonableness. This has been recognised not only in historical and 
comparative context, but in the contemporary decisions of our own Courts ... From 
this it appears that public policy, in the sense of boni mores, cannot be separated 
from concepts such as justice, equity, good faith and reasonableness, which are 
basic to harmonious community relations and may indeed be regarded as the 
purpose of applying public policy considerations. 11 
121 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) at 596-597; Universiteitvan Pretoria 
v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 ( 4) SA 376 (T) at 387; Coronation Brick (Pty) 
Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 ( 4) SA 3 71 (D) at 3 84. See, also, Hawker 
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As far as contractual misrepresentation is concerned, it would appear as if our courts have 
generally accepted that a misrepresentation in contrahendo must also be treated as a delict. 122 
One would expect that the test for the existence of a duty to disclose facts to another contracting 
party would be the boni mores as well. However, that is not always the case123 and, furthermore, 
there is a difference in opinion as to what the correct test is. 124 
8.4.2 Misrepresentation by silence 
The pertinent question raised by disclosure is: when does silence, which by itself, does not as a 
general rule, give rise to a remedy in law, 125 come within the rules of non-disclosure? The answer 
is simply that disclosure is called for when there is a legal duty to disclose. 126 
In Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality127 it was held that because 
v Life Offices Association of South Africa 1987 (3) SA 777 (C) at 781. 
122 See, eg, Ranger v Wykerd 1977 (2) SA 976 (A); Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd 1979 (2) 
SA 116 (W) 149-150. Van der Merwe et al Contract 78 is of the opinion that a 
representation which occurs during the course of contractual negotiations will therefore 
be wrongful if it infringes a norm protecting a contracting party against being misled. 
In our modern SA law of contract, the party to whom a representation is made is under 
no obligation to ascertain whether it is a misrepresentation, and may rely on it without 
making further enquiries even if the ascertainment of the truth would be a simple matter 
and he was negligent in not ascertaining it. See Wiley v African Realty Trust Ltd 1908 TH 
104 at 111-112; Symons and Moses v Davies 1911NPD69 at 82-83; Sampson v Union 
and Rhodesia Wholesale Ltd 1929 AD 468 at 4 79-480; Strydom v Scheepers 1942 GWL 
73 at 84; Oranje Benefit Society v Central Merchant Bank Ltd 1976 ( 4) SA 659 (A). 
123 English law draws a clear distinction between misrepresentation and non-disclosure. See 
Fox vMackreth (1788) 2 CoxEq Cas 320 at 320; Walters vMorgan (1861) 3 De GF & 
J 718 at 723-724; Turnerv Green [1895] 2 Ch205; Bellv Lever Brothers Ltd[l932] AC 
161 at 227. 
124 See Christie Contract 311-312 for the test of involuntary reliance; Kerr Principles 221 
for a good-faith test. 
125 See Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 781; Millner 1957SALJ177. 
126 MeskinNO vAnglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd and Another 1968 (4) SA 793 (W) 
at 796; Gollach & Gomperts (J 967) (Pty) Ltd v Universal Mills & Produce Co (Pty) Ltd 
and Others 1978 (1) SA 914 (A) at 924; Kerr Principles 221. 
127 1985 (1) SA 419 (A). 
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duties to disclose material128 facts exist only exceptionally, they could not be said to arise ex fide 
bona, that is on account of the norm of good faith applicable to contracts generally. The duty 
to disclose, it was said, arises ex lege when circumstances demand it. 
In a considered obiter dictum, Jansen J inMeskin v Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltcf29 
propounds a different view, according to which good faith serves as a criterion for evaluating the 
conduct of the parties to a contract in respect of its antecedent negotiation: 
"Where a contract is concluded the law expressly invokes the dictates of good faith and 
conduct inconsistent with those dictates may in appropriate circumstances be considered 
to be fraud." 
Jansen J accepted130 that good faith was "a concept of variable content the in light of changing 
mores and circumstances" which "as an objective standard must rest largely upon an ethical 
basis", and furthermore accepted that ethical ideals had, in the application of the norm of good 
faith, to be tempered by the "practicalities with which the law is faced". Using this approach, the 
norm of good faith does not require a general duty to disclose, as Joubert JA in the case of 
Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality131 seemed to think. This point 
is important because the contractual test of bona fides may well require a consideration of 
circumstances not encompassed by the general test for delictual liability for omissions. 132 
In certain circumstances the case law has already established that silence may amount to a 
128 The requirement that a misrepresentation must be material is sometimes expressed on the 
basis that the representation must be such as would have persuaded a reasonable man to 
enter into the contract. This postulates an objective test. See Christie Contract 312; Van 
der Merwe et alia Kontraktereg 80; Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd 
(Under Judicial Management) 1965 (3) SA410 (W) at 416; Orban v Stead 1978 (2) SA 
713 (W) at 717; Novickv Comair Holdings Ltd 1979 (2) SA 116 (W) at 149; Standard 
Bank of SA Ltd v OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 382 (W). In Qilingele v South 
African Mutual Life Assurance Society 1993 (1) SA 69 (A) a distinction was created 
between two different tests for materiality, depending on whether the misrepresentation 
was by way of omission (in which case it would be governed by the common-law 
position, namely an objective test) or by way of commission (in which case a subjective 
test for materiality would apply). This case is discussed further in this paragraph, infra. 
129 1968 (4) SA 793 (W) at 802. 
130 Ibid, at 804. 
131 1985 (1) SA 419 (A). 
132 See Farlam & Hathaway Contract 337. 
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misrepresentation, 133 or at least requires a duty of disclosure, for example, where part of the truth 
has been told, but the omission of the remainder gives a misleading impression; 134 where a true 
representation has been made, but before the making of the contract the facts have changed;135 
where a party, not necessarily with a dishonest motive, has done something which has had the 
effect of concealing facts which would otherwise have been apparent to the other party; 136 where 
a party presents for signature to the other a standard term contract without drawing attention to 
an unusually onerous clause, in circumstances where he must have known that the signatory 
would not read the contract and discover the clause. 137 Certain rules in regard to the duty of 
disclosure in contracts of sale have also crystallised, 138 but the disclosure principles relating to 
sales fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
Our law also recognizes the duty of a prospective insured to disclose facts material to the risk to 
be taken by the insurer. 139 Much controversy exists in insurance law in regard to the test to be 
applied to determine materiality of a non-disclosure or misrepresentation. At common law, the 
insured is required to disclose all material facts to the insurer. Failure to do so renders the 
insurance contract voidable at the option of the insurer. The insurer has to prove that the non-
disclosed fact was material. Materiality of a non-disclosure is judged objectively from the point 
of view of the average prudent person or reasonable man. 140 The effect of a misrepresentation as 
to a material fact has a similar effect. 141 
133 See Christie Contract 309. 
134 Marais v Edelman 1934 CPD 212. 
135 Viljoen v Hillier 1904 TS 312 at 315-316; Cloete v Smithfield Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1955 (2) 
SA 622 (0) at 626-627. 
136 Dibley v Furter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C); Knight v Hemming 1959 (1) SA 288 (FC). 
137 Kempston Hire (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 1988 ( 4) SA 465 (T). 
138 Van der Merwe v Meades 1991 (2) SA 1 (A); Truman v Leonard 1994 (4) SA 371 (SE). 
139 See Iscor Pension Fund v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1961 (1) SA 178 (T); 
Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality 1985 ( 1) SA 419 (A); 
Gordon v AA Mutual Assurance Association Ltd 1988 (1) SA 398 (W); Trust Bank van 
Afrika Bpk v President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1988 (1) SA 546 (W). 
140 See Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality 1985 (1) SA 419 
(A) at 435; President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk en 'n 
Ander 1989 (1) SA 208 (A) at 216; Pillay v South African National Life Assurance Co 
Ltd 1991 (1) SA 363 (D) at 367. 
141 Christie Contract 312; Van der Merwe et al Kontraktereg 80. 
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In terms of the common-law position, insurers had a double onus, namely to prove not only 
materiality, but also inducement, or causation in a delictual context. 142 Insurers therefore devised 
a method of overcoming this burden. In Clifford v Commercial Union Insurance Co of SA Lttf 43 
Schutz JA explained their method as follows: 
"Long ago insurers discovered a way of lightening the load of this double onus. The 
method used was to exact a warranty from the prospective insured, in which he warranted 
the truth and materiality of his representations and assented to their inclusion as essential 
terms of the policy, The effect of this was that all the insurer had to prove was the 
incorrectness of the insured' s statement. That done there was a breach of warranty, giving 
the insurer a contractual right to repudiate liability. Once the insured had warranted that 
the answers to questions in the proposal form would be the basis of the insurance contract 
there was no question of materiality left, ... " 
Needless to say, this resulted in inequity ands 63 (3) of the Insurance Act 27of1943 was enacted 
in order to prevent this. It read as follows: 
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contairled in any domestic policy or any 
document relating to such policy, any such policy issued before or after the 
commencement of this Act shall not be invalidated and the obligations of an insurer 
thereunder shall not be excluded or limited and the obligations of the owner thereof shall 
not be increased, on account of any representation made to the insurer which is not true, 
whether or not such representation has been warranted to be true, unless the incorrectness 
of such representation is of such a nature as to be likely to have materially affected the 
assessment of the risk under the said policy at the time of issue or any reinstatement or 
renewal thereof" 
The effect of the section was that misrepresentations which impacted materially on the insurer's 
assessment of the risk of insuring the insured, would render the insurance contract voidable at 
the option of the insurer. The section applied only to positive misrepresentations and not to non-
disclosures which continued to be regulated by the principles of the common law. 
142 See Cliffordv Commercial Union Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1998 (4) SA 150 (A) at 
156. 
143 Ibid, at 156-157. 
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In Qilingele v South African Mutual Life Assurance Society144 the wording of the section was 
interpreted as creating a subjective test of materiality. Questions of objective reasonableness did 
not enter the picture - all that was relevant was the particular insurer and how it was likely to 
have reacted had it known the truth. This subjective approach stands in contrast to the earlier 
decisions as to the test of materiality in non-disclosure cases. 145 
In the Qilingele146 case a distinction was made between misrepresentation by silence and 
misrepresentation by making a false statement, and it was this distinction that that was used as 
the basis for deviating from the earlier decisions starting with the Oudtshoorn141 case. The 
reasoning of the Court was that the Qilingele148 case dealt with a positive misstatement as 
opposed to non-disclosure dealt with in the Oudtshoorn149 case. The Oudtshoorn case was 
governed by the common law whilst the Qilingele case was concerned with the proper statutory 
interpretation of the word "materiality" as used withins 63 (3) of the Insurance Act 27of1943. 
The Qilingele case therefore created a distinction between two different tests for materiality, 
depending on whether the misrepresentation was by way of omission or by way of commission. 
This distinction was followed in Theron v AA Life Assurance Association Ltd 1995 (4) SA 361 
(A).150 The distinction between the two types of misrepresentation has been criticized by many 
academic writers. 151 
144 1993 (1) SA 69 (A) at 74-75. 
145 See Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality 1985 (1) SA 419 
(A) at 435; President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk en 'n 
Ander 1989 (1) SA 208 (A) at 216; Pi/lay v South African National Life Assurance Co 
Ltd 1991 (1) SA 363 (D) at 367. 
146 1993 (1) SA 69 (A) at 73. 
147 1985 (1) SA 419 (A). 
148 1993 (1) SA 69 (A). 
149 1985 (1) SA 419 (A). 
150 1995 (4) SA 361 (A). In this case the divergent tests were adopted and applied to 
different aspects of the case. See Havenga 1996 THRHR 339 for a critical discussion. 
151 See, eg, Reinecke 1993 TSAR 771; Madhuku 1994 SAL! 477; Havenga 1995 SA Mere LJ 
90; Havenga 1996 THRHR 339; Madhuku 1997 SAL! 759; Barrett 1998 JBL 124; 
Schulze 1998 SA Mere LJ 248; Schulze 2001 De Rebus 46. The decision in the Qilingele 
case 1993 (1) SA 69 (A) was followed in Joubert v ABSA Life Ltd 2001 (2) SA 322 (yV) 
as the Court was bound by it. The Court applied a subjective, particular insurer, test as 
formulated in the Qilingele case, but found that, even if it had applied an objective test 
to the facts: 
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The decision in the Qilingele case has also received judicial criticism, albeit obiter in Clifford 
v Commercial Union Insurance Co of SA Ltd 152 Schutz JA found that the words "the assessment 
of risk under the said policy" were capable of a different interpretation, consistent with the 
common-law test of materiality, 153 and invoked the presumption against changing the common 
law in support of his interpretation, stating that the court in the Qilingele case did not give any 
reasons as to why the legislature could have intended to "cast the well-tried common-law concept 
of materiality out of the window" and to change the law in such a drastic yet subtle way. 154 A 
further criticism leveled against the Qilingele case by Schutz JA (at 156-157) concerns the fact 
that the court in the Qilingele case (at 75) incorrectly treated the question of materiality and 
inducement as a single concept. Schutz JA concludes: 
"The manifest purpose of the provision [s 63 (3)] is to improve the lot of the insured, not 
to worsen it or to give with the one hand and take away with the other. An interpretation 
of the provision which involves an apparent amelioration of the insured' s position but 
brings with it a benefit for the insurer which the common law steadfastly refused to give 
him is, in my view, inherently suspect. For these reasons I consider that the decision of 
Didcott Jin Pi/lay v South African National Life Assurance Co Ltd 1991 ( 1) SA 363 (D) 
at 367A-E, conferring the common law meaning on the materiality referred to in the 
subsection, is correct. 11 
Unfortunately, Schutz JA' s judgement does not in itself terminate the controversy, as his 
statements were made obiter. The statements were, however, strong statements and appear to be 
supported by Marais and Howie JJA. 155 It is submitted that the decision can serve as a basis for 
"The average reasonable man or prudent person would have considered that that 
particular information should have been disclosed to the [insurer]. 11 
Schulze 2001 De Rebus 46 at 47 states that the fact that the Court deemed it necessary 
also to apply the objective test to assess the materiality of the undisclosed facts, is a good 
indication that it too had an uneasy feeling about the correctness of the decision in the 
Qilingele case. 
152 1998 (4) SA 150 (A). 
153 Ibid, at 158. In regard to the distinction made between non-disclosure and positive 
misrepresentation, Schutz JA states (at 157): 
"However the distinction has arisen, it is an extraordinary one in a system of law 
which gets by without drawing artificial distinctions between falsity by silence 
and falsity by express statement. ... " 
154 Ibid, at 157-158. 
155 Clifford v Commercial Union Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1998 ( 4) SA 150 (A) at 162-163. 
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ending the artificial and confusing distinction between misrepresentations by omission and 
misrepresentations by commission. New legislation156 has not resolved the issue and in the 
interests of clarity, the legislature should clearly provide that the objective test applied in this 
regard, and bring to an end the distinction between misrepresentation by omission and by 
commission. 157 
Stepping aside from the insurance cases, the question that arises is whether outside these special 
cases a general test can be established for deciding whether in any particular case silence amounts 
to a misrepresentation. In this regard the decision in Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust 
Ltd158 is important. Relating to a share sale agreement, Vieyra J held in this case: 
"There is here 'an involuntary reliance of the one party on the frank disclosure of certain 
facts necessarily lying within the exclusive knowledge of the other such that, in fair 
dealing, the former's right to have such information communicated to him would be 
mutually recognized by honest men in the circumstances'." 
It has been said159 that the test of involuntary reliance applied here is in accordance with the 
principle underlying the requirement of disclosure of material facts in contracts ofinsurance. The 
insured must disclose all material facts because the insurer involuntarily relies on him for 
information on such facts: it might theoretically be possible to ascertain these facts by other 
means, but it would not be practical in the business sense. 160 There is ample authority for this 
explanation in respect of contracts of insurance, 161 and the fact that there appears to be no 
authority for a similar explanation in respect of contracts of partnership or agency does not 
matter. It is difficult to imagine any basis for the rule that partners and agents must make full 
156 Sees 59 (1) of the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of1998; s 53 of the Short-term Insurance 
Act 53of1998. 
157 Van Niekerk 1999 TSAR 584 is of the opinion that the legal position in the South African 
law of insurance in connection with non-disclosure, misrepresentation and breach of 
warranty, is unsatisfactory. He calls for the scrapping of all existing legislation in this 
respect and suggests that a fresh new start should be made to regulate the legal position 
afresh. 
158 1965 (3) SA 410 (W). 
159 Christie Contract 310. 
160 Christie Contract 310. 
161 BodemervAmericaninsurance Co 1960 (4) SA428 (T) at433-434;Iscor Pension Fund 
v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1961 (1) SA 178 (T) at 185; Perreira v Marine 
and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1975 (4) SA 745 (A) at 755G. 
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disclosure, other than that their co-partners and principals are, by the very nature of their 
relationship, in a position of involuntary reliance on them - it would not be practical in the 
business sense for them to obtain information on material facts known to their partners or agents 
by making inquiries elsewhere. 162 
Christie163 is of the opinion that this general test of involuntary reliance conforms with prevailing 
ideas of business morality, because it draws the line between taking advantage of another's 
ignorance of facts which that person could reasonably be expected to ascertain for himself, and 
taking advantage of his ignorance of facts which he could not reasonably be expected to ascertain 
from any source other than from the person with whom he is contracting (which an honest 
business man would surely regard as overreaching). The concept of dealing at arm's length can 
well be described as incorporating the doctrine of involuntary reliance. 164 
8.4.3 Disclosure and advisory duties: conclusion 
I believe that the answer lies therein that the test for a duty of disclosure of facts between 
contracting parties should be same test as the test for wrongfulness in our law of contract, 165 as 
well as for wrongfulness in our law of delict, 166 namely the test of the boni mores . 
Factors such as materiality, involuntary reliance and dealing at arm's length should be considered 
as factors which may contribute to a finding of whether a duty of disclosure exists in accordance 
with the legal convictions of the community. 167 The standard of good faith can play an important 
162 Christie Contract 310. 
163 Christie Contract 312. 
164 Christie Contract 312. 
165 Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltdv Ellis 1984 (4) SA874 (A); Sasfin (Pty) Ltd 
v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A); Botha (now Griessel) andAnother v Finanscredit (Pty)Ltd 
1989 (3) SA 773 (A). 
166 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) at 597; Universiteit van Pretoria v 
Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T) at 387; Administrateur Natal v 
Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) at 833-834; Marais v Richard 1981 (1) 
SA 1157 (A) at 1168; Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltdv Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 
1982 (4) SA 371 (D) at 380; Schultz v Butt 1986 (3) SA 667 (A) at 679; Van der Walt 
Delict 22-23; Boberg Delict 33 et seq; Neethling Persoonlikheidsreg 57-58; Van der 
Merwe & Olivier Onregmatige Daad 58 et seq. 
167 See, in this vein, the remarks of Van Zyl J, inMcCann v Goodall Group Operations Ltd 
1995 (2) SA 718 (C) at 726: 
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role in determining public policy in this regard. 
If good faith in a South African context is to mean that a contracting party should show a 
measure ofrecognition of, and respect for, the interests of the other contracting party, 168 factors 
such as involuntary reliance, materiality and dealing at arm's length will serve to determine the 
extent of the standard of good faith, and accordingly whether or not a duty of disclosure exists. 
The "legal convictions of the community", should be read as the "legal convictions of the 
community's policy makers, such as legislator and judge" .169 In South Africa the faces of these 
policy makers are changing from those of a white dominated nationalist movement to those of 
a socialist, black dominated movement. The concept of the boni mores is expected to change 
dramatically as these new policy makers start putting their stamp on things. 
The duty of disclosure shall receive further attention in Chapter 9 of this thesis. 
8.5 CONSUMER PROTECTION 
8.5.1 Introduction 
Prior to the industrial revolution, most consumers were able to inspect goods for themselves and 
determine their quality. With the growth of modern technology, however, an information gap has 
developed and consumers are no longer equipped to make decisions concerning the quality of 
goods and products. Many modern products involve complicated manufacturing procedures, and 
even foodstuffs are often processed, pre-wrapped or hidden in tins or boxes. 17° Furthermore, 
advertisers often fail to inform consumers about products and merely appeal to their emotions 
or create unnecessary wants. 171 Matters are further compounded because many consumers are 
11 A duty to disclose a material fact arises when the fact in question falls within the 
exclusive knowledge of the defendant and the plaintiff relies on the frank 
disclosure thereof in accordance with the legal convictions of the community. 11 
168 See Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 7 at 20; and SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations 
14. 
169 See Van der Merwe and Olivier Onregmatige Daad 58 n 99; Schultz v Butt 1986 (3) SA 
667 (A) at 679. 
170 Cf Langenberg Voedsel Bpk v Sarculum Boerdery Bpk 1996 (2) SA 565 (A) 572. 
171 See McQuoid-Mason Consumer 7; Cranston Consumers 2. 
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ignorant of their rights and unwilling or unable to enforce them. 172 Standard-term contracts are 
usually presented to a consumer on a "take it or leave it" basis. A consumer awareness study in 
South Africa has shown that consumer awareness factors such as bargain hunting, product 
knowledge, information search, price consciousness and general consumer knowledge, vary 
according to the demographic characteristics of the consumers concerned in respect of age, 
income, education, area and gender. 173 
The development of consumerism has been a slow process both in Europe and the US. One of 
the problems is that because there are so many consumers, they are a "disparate mass11174 and 
difficult to unite, with no clear identity as consumers. Business organizations, on the other hand, 
have a profit motive and are able to lobby in their own self-interest. 175 It has been pointed out, 
however, that consumers share identifiable interests, such as: 
"Economic efficiency, diversity of purchasing choice, avoidance of monopoly profits and 
consumer frauds, optimal purchasing information, and good quality products and 
services in relation to price. 11176 
In the United Kingdom and the US, consumer groups have worked towards these goals by 
undertaking comparative testing of products and employing consumer advocates. Governments 
have also discovered that it pays to protect the interests of consumers because such protection 
may lead to more competition, fewer restrictive trade practices and less inflation. 177 
In the United Kingdom there are several consumer bodies that look after the interests of 
172 See McQuoid-Mason Consumer 1. This aspect is related to the general ignorance of 
people concerning the law and applies not only abroad, but also in South Africa. It was 
ignorance of the law that prompted the Association of Law Societies of the Republic of 
South Africa to sponsor the current 11 Street law" programme which is aimed at teaching 
secondary school children and community organizations about the law and the legal 
system in South Africa. See McQuoid-Mason 1987 De Rebus 395. 
173 See McQuoid-Mason Consumer 1; Rousseau & Venter 1996 J of Industrial Psychology 
26 at 27. 
174 Cranston Consumers 11. 
175 Cranston Consumers 11. 
176 See McQuoid-Mason Consumer 1; Cranston Consumers 12. 
177 Cranston Consumers 12. 
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consumers. 178 Although, however, there are bodies such as the Consumer Union in the US, most 
of the US consumer lobbying is done through consumer advocates. 179 
In South Africa, however, the consumer movement is still very much in its infancy. 
Organizations such as the Housewives' League, the South African National Consumer Union and 
the National Black Consumer Union have existed for several years, but have had a limited 
lobbying influence on government. 180 
In 1972 the government established the South African Co-ordinating Consumer Council as an 
umbrella body to co-ordinate consumers' interests. In the past the South African Co-ordinating 
Consumer Council came in for much criticism for being too closely connected with the interests 
of business and the government's financial departments, 181 but at the time of its dissolution it was 
playing an increasingly important role in consumer affairs. 182 In South Africa, the newspapers 
have also played an important role in protecting consumers and drawing consumer abuses to the 
attention of the public. 183 Likewise, several professional associations provide protection for 
consumers, but generally these are less effective than independent consumer protection 
agencies. 184 
Sociological studies in other countries have indicated that the poor pay more when it comes to 
consumer purchases. 185 The poor pay more not only in respect of prices, but also as a result of 
exploitation by members of the business community. In South Africa the vast majority of poor 
people are from previously disadvantaged communities and there is no doubt that they are 
subjected to the same consumer abuses as poor people in other countries. 
Caplovitz' s study in the US showed that price levels in comparable stores in high-income and 
178 See, generally, Harvey & Parry Consumer 51-59; and McQuoid-Mason Consumer 8 for 
the protection bodies in the UK. 
179 Cranston Consumers 1415. 
180 McQuoid-Mason Consumer 8. 
181 McQuoid-Mason Consumer 8. 
182 The functions of the Council have devolved to the Provincial Departments of 
Consumer Affairs. 
183 McQuoid-Mason Consumer 8. 
184 McQuoid-Mason Consumer 8. 
185 See Caplovitz The Poor Pay More. 
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low-income neighbourhoods were similar, but that prices were higher in the small businesses 
common in low-income areas. Even though large numbers of poor people go outside their 
neighbourhoods to shop, many buy from the smaller stores despite their higher prices. 186 This is 
probably also true in South Africa, where for many years under apartheid, restrictions on 
commercial activity in the townships prevented the development of supermarkets. 187 Even though 
there is considerable "leakage" from the townships into the central and suburban business 
districts of the major cities, many townships residents still conduct consumer transactions in the 
informal economy of the townships. 188 
The main reason for the leakage is that trade and service facilities are concentrated in the central 
and suburban business districts where township dwellers work and find shopping convenient. 
Also, the central and suburban business districts generally offer a greater variety of goods and 
services at prices lower than those in the townships. Thus the higher-income groups often tend 
to shop in those areas. 
The exploitation of unsophisticated consumers is a world-wide phenomenon. This exploitation 
of developing countries is being partly addressed by the formation of international consumer 
bodies and inter-governmental agreements. 189 
8.5.2 Who is a consumer? 
It is clear that there is no longer such a thing as a single law of contract. Different rules apply 
to different contractants, notably in the case where one of the contractants is a "consumer". It is 
therefore imperative to be able to define a consumer. In the broad sense everybody in society is 
a consumer. 190 This includes citizens entering into exchange relationships with institutions such 
as hospitals, libraries, police forces and various government agencies as well as with 
businesses. 191 Certain bodies in the USA adopt a very wide definition of consumer - someone 
186 Caplovitz The Poor Pay More 17; National Consumer Council For Richer or for Poorer 
9-14 quoted in McQuoid Mason Consumer 9. See, also, generally, Sackville Law and 
Poverty in Australia Chapter 4. · 
187 See Rycroft (ed) Race 190 at 197. 
188 McQuoid-Mason Consumer 9. 
189 McQuoid-Mason ConsumerlO. 
190 McQuoid-Mason Consumer 1. 
191 Cranston Consumers 7. 
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who is equated to a citizen. 192 In the narrow sense a consumer can be regarded as any person who 
buys or hires goods or services, or any person who uses such goods or services. In the broad 
sense a consumer can be said to include any person who is affected by the use of goods or 
services, whether or not he or she bought, hired or used them. 193 
A consumer is a "user of products or purchaser of goods or services" 194 or "one who uses a 
commodity or service". 195 Consumers have also been referred to as "those who buy, obtain and 
use all kinds of goods and services". 196 In legal and commercial dictionaries consumers are 
referred to as "individuals who purchase, use, maintain, and dispose of products and services",197 
or as "a member of that brand or class of people who are affected by pricing policies, financing 
practices, quality of goods and services, credit reporting, debt collection, and other trade 
practices" .198 
The word "consumer" includes people who buy or hire goods or services, people who use such 
goods or services and people affected by their use. Consumers in the first category usually enter 
into contractual relationships with the providers of the goods and services, and are able to rely 
on contractual remedies for any harm arising from a breach of contract. 199 
Consumers in the second and third categories do not have a contractual relationship with the 
providers of the goods or services and have to rely on delictual remedies. 200 
Where consumers enter into contractual relationships that are governed by statute the word 
"consumer" is occasionally defined in the relevant Act. In South Africa the term is defined in a 
192 Cranston Consumers 8, referring particularly to Ralph Nader. 
193 McQuoid-Mason Consumer I. 
194 The Oxford Dictionary (1978). 
195 Random House Dictionary of the English Language {1966) quoted in McQuoid -Mason 
Consumer I. 
196 Walker Companion 281. 
197 West's Law and Commercial Dictionary in Five Languages: A-J (1985) 330 quoted in 
McQuoid-Mason Consumer 1. 
198 Ibid. 
199 McQuoid-Mason Consumer 16-61. 
200 See McQuoid-Mason Consumer 64-109. 
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number of statutes, for example, the Trade Practices Act 76of1976, the national Consumer 
Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 71 of 1988, water legislation201 and the provincial 
Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7of1996. Thus in the Trade Practices Act 
"consumer" is defined as including "any person who makes use of any service",202 while in the 
national Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 71 of 1988 "consumer" means "a 
person to whom any commodity is offered, supplied or made available". 203 The provincial 
Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7of1996 defines a "consumer" as a person; 
"(a) to whom any commodity2°4 is offered, supplied or made available; or, 
(b) from whom is solicited, or who supplies or makes available, any investment. 11205 
In commenting on who is a consumer in the context of regulations206 issued in terms of the Trade 
Practices Act 76of1976, the Appellate Division has described a "consumer" as: 
"a person to whom or for whom goods or services are to be supplied". 207 
In the case of credit agreements under the Credit Agreements Act 7 5 of 1980 the courts have 
taken the narrow view that the word "consumer" should be restricted to transactions where credit 
receivers use the goods and do not sell or lease them. 208 In Standard Credit Corporation v 
201 Eg, s 107 of the Water Act 54of1956 states that a "consumer" means a person supplied 
or entitled to be supplied with water by a water board or local authority. 
202 S 1 of the Trade Practices Act 76of1976. 
203 S 1 of the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 71 of 1988. 
204 "Commodity" is defined as "(a) any property, whether corporeal or incorporeal and 
whether movable or immovable, including any make or brand of commodity; or .... (b) any 
service, excluding service due in terms of a contract of employment." (Sees l(v)). 
205 S l(vi) of the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7of1996. 
206 Trade Practices Act Regulations promulgated in GG 6880of14 March 1980 in respect 
of "pyramid selling" schemes (reg 1). 
207 Caxton Ltdv Reeva Forman (Pty) Ltd 1990 (3) SA 547 (A) at 576-577 Corbett CJ 
went on to say: 
"Linguistically it is more correct to speak of supplying goods to consumers 
and supplying services for consumers." 
208 See Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Strydom 1991 (3) SA 644 (W) at 651. 
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Strydom209 the court suggested that "the underlying idea behind the Act was to protect the 
consumer and not the persons trading". 210 
It has been submitted211 that the words used ins 1 of the South African Trade Practices Act 76 
of 1976 ands 1 of the national Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act71 of 1988 are 
broad enough to be interpreted to include business transactions. The Trade Practices Act 76 of 
1976 simply defines "consumer" as including "any person who makes use of any service", and 
this could be interpreted to mean a small business that uses services provided by wholesalers or 
retailers (for example, providing suitable packaging for or the final preparation of goods for sale 
to customers of such small business). Likewise the national Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business 
Practices) Act 71 of 1988 defines "consumer" as "a person to whom any commodity is offered, 
supplied or made available" which clearly includes small businesses that are supplied with goods 
for resale purposes. A similar definition is found in s 2( 1 )(a) of the Gauteng provincial Consumer 
Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7of1996. 
Given the large numbers of small businesses trading in the informal sector of South Africa's 
economy, it has been submitted212 that our courts should not adopt a restrictive meaning when 
interpreting the word "consumer" for the purposes of any contract-law protection legislation,213 
and should preferably include all natural persons, close corporations, and small traders in the 
definition of "consumer". 
8.5.3 Statutory consumer protection bodies 
In South Africa there are a limited number of statutory consumer protection bodies. These 
include the Business Practices Committee, the Competition Board, the provincial government 
departments of Consumer Affairs, the Bureau of Standards, the statutory professional bodies and 
the Public Protector.214 
209 1991 (3) SA 644 (Jr). 
210 Ibid, at 651. 
211 See McQuoid-Mason Consumer 4. 
212 McQuoid-Mason Consumer 7. 
213 As has been mentioned above, the courts have taken a more restrictive approach when 
dealing with credit agreements under the Credit Agreements Act 75of1980 (cf Standard 
Credit Corporation Ltdv Strydom 1991 (3) SA 644 0N) 651). 
214 McQuoid-Mason Consumer 327. 
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In regard to unfair contract terms, the Consumer Affairs Committee, which is responsible for the 
administration of the national Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 71 of 1988, is 
expected to play a larger role in the prohibition or control of business practices that prejudice 
consumers. 
Furthermore, the provincial departments of Consumer Affairs will become the main 
governmental agencies responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection legislation in 
South Africa.215 Consumer affairs is a provincial competency in terms of the Constitution.216 
Therefore, with the dissolution of the South African Co-ordinating Consumer Council, its 
functions were devolved to the nine provinces together with the Department of Trade and 
Industry.217 Thus, many of the functions of the Department of Trade and Industry, such as 
policing the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980, the Usury Act 73 of 1968, and the Sale and 
Service Matters Act 25 of 1964, have been devolved to the provincial Departments of Economic 
Affairs and Touring under the Directorate of Tourism, Trade and Industry which, in some 
provinces, includes consumer affairs, tourism and small, medium and minor enterprises. 218 
It may, of course, happen that a totally new structure may be born out of the activities of the 
South African Law Commission. 219 
8.6 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the test for a duty of disclosure of facts between contracting parties should 
be the same test as the test for wrongfulness in our law of contract, as well as wrongfulness in 
our law of delict, namely the test of the boni mores. 220 
215 See McQuoid-Mason Consumer 334, quoting from an interview with Mr Siva Naidoo, 
Acting Executive Director SA Interim Co-ordinating Consumer Council, 22 August 
1996. 
216 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 200 of 1993 Schedule 6; Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 Schedule 4 Part A. 
217 Department of Trade and Industry Annual Report 1995 11, quoted in McQuoid-Mason 
Consumer 334. 
218 Department of Trade and Industry Annual Report 1995 8 and 10-11, quoted in McQuoid-
Mason Consumer 334. 
219 SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations. 
220 See par 8.4.3 supra. 
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Factors such as materiality, involuntary reliance and dealing at arm's length should be considered 
as factors which may contribute to a finding of whether a duty of disclosure exists in accordance 
with the legal convictions of the community. The standard of good faith can play an important 
role in determining public policy in this regard. 
Strong consumer tendencies, 221 and a change of policy makers in South Africa, convince me that, 
notwithstanding the fact that it may not strictly be faced with a duty of disclosure to an intending 
surety, a bank should approach the issue much more openly, disclose material facts freely and 
insist upon the debtor's obtaining independent advice, when the possibility of undue influence 
or a lack of understanding is present, particularly when dealing with consumers . 
More detailed discussions on proposals for reform will appear in the following chapter. 
221 See par 8.5.3 supra. 
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CHAPTER 9: ANTICIPATED REFORMS IN THE 
BANKER-CUSTOMER AND 
RELATIONSHIP 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
BANKER-SURETY 
In this chapter, the trends in international and national contract law are summarized. Suggestions 
about what direction the efforts of the SA Law Commission should take, 1 fall outside the scope 
of this thesis. However, in this chapter certain assumptions will be made as to future reformative 
steps to be taken by the legislature. 
Certain proposals will be made about how bankers can take the lead in a reform process of the 
banker-surety relationship, thus ensuring, firstly, the legality of their contract and secondly, 
ensuring the future utilisation of suretyship as a relatively cheap and effective form of security. 
9.2 INTERNATIONAL TRENDS REGARDING UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS 
9.2.1 General criteria of fairness in contract 
A common pattern among most Western jurisdictions is that they are either already using a 
general fairness provision or, having lacked such a provision initially, and upon reflection, they 
are now developing one.2 The general provision of the United States provides that a court may 
refuse to enforce an unfair contract, may enforce the fair part of a contract, or may limit the effect 
of any unfair contract. A court may issue such an order if it finds as a matter of fact that the 
contract or any part thereof was unconscionable at the time when it was made. 3 Parties are 
1 That is, in their search for a general criterion of fairness in contract law. 
2 In the USA, see the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC); in Australia, the Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code of 1996, the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth), the various Fair 
Trading Acts in the States and Territories; in England, the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 
1977 and the Consumer Credit Act of 1974; In Germany, the AGB-Gesetz of 1976; in 
Israel, the Standard Contracts Act of 1982; in Sweden, the Act to Prohibit Improper 
Contract Terms of 1971; and in the EEC, the EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts) 93/13/EEC:[1993] OJ L95/29. 
3 S 2-302(1) of the UCC. 
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afforded a reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence as to the commercial setting, the purpose 
and the effect of the contract to aid the court in making a determination when it is claimed or 
when it appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable. 4 The 
general provisions of the Swedish,5 Israeli,6 and Australian7 legislation correspond substantially 
to the American provision, since the unfairness or unreasonableness of the clause is the criterion 
which is used for interference with the contract. The English legislation8 is aimed only at certain 
types of terms, but grants the courts a discretion in this regard on the basis of reasonableness. 
English law, at least as far as consumers are concerned, also has to comply with the Directive of 
the EC in regard to unfair contract terms.9 
Under German law, terms in standard form-contracts are void where the other party is 
excessively prejudiced if regard is had to the requirement of good faith. 10 If doubt arises, a term 
is deemed to be excessively prejudicial where: 
• the term is incompatible with the fundamental principle of the statutory measures (ie, 
the regulatory law) departed from; or 
• substantial rights and obligations arising out of the nature of the contract are limited in 
such a way as to jeopardise the realisation of the object of the contract. 
A standard term is void under the Dutch algemene voorwaarden if it is unreasonably prejudicial 
in view of: 11 
• the nature and the remaining content of the contract; 
4 S 2-302 of the UCC. 
5 Act to Prohibit Improper Contract Terms of 1971. 
6 Standard Contracts Act of 1982. 
7 Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) and UCCC. 
8 Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. 
9 The Directive has been implemented in Britain by the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations of 1994. 
10 S 9 AGBG. 
11 Art 6.233 BW. 
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• the way in which the contract came about; 
• the other circumstances of the case; and 
• the fact that the other party was not granted a reasonable chance to take note of the 
standard term. 
The European Parliament adopted the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer 
Contracts (hereinafter referred to as "the EC Directive") on 5 April 1993 12 by which consumers 
have a choice ofbeing bound or not to standard-form contracts which contain unfair terms. Such 
a contract is in fact binding upon the parties if it is capable of continuing without the unfair 
terms. A standard term which has not been individually negotiated is unfair if, contrary to the 
requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations 
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.13 
Unfairness is determined by good faith, significant imbalance between the supplier and the 
consumer, the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded, and by 
having regard to all the circumstances surrounding the contract as well as to all the other terms 
of the contract or to any other contract on which it is its dependent. Furthermore, unfairness is 
not to be determined by reference to the subject matter of the contract, nor by the adequacy of 
the price and remuneration. The danger is thus avoided of asserting that the contractual terms are 
unfair merely because the goods or services are overpriced. 14 The preamble to the EC Directive 
contains the following guidelines for the assessment of good faith: 15 
"[I]n making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength 
of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to 
agree to the term and whether goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order 
of the consumer . . . the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or 
supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate 
interests he has to take into account." 
12 EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13/EEC: [1993] OJ L 95/29. 
13 Sees 3 (1); see, also, Dean 1993 MLR 581 at 581-590 for a discussion; Ogilvie 1996 
Canadian Business LI 439; Hondius 1994 Journal of Contract Law 34. 
14 Dean 1993 MLR 581at585. 
15 Dean 1993 MLR 584. 
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9.2.2 Control over unfair contract terms in South Africa 
It is outside the scope of this thesis to dwell on future control measures relating to unfair 
contracts. 16 For the immediate future, it is expected that our courts will be the primary control 
institution in regard to unfair contract terms. 
It is, however, expected that, as consumer protection agencies grow in stature and the Provincial 
Departments of Consumer Affairs find their feet in the constitutional dispensation, and as the 
public become more aware of these bodies, 17 a larger portion of control, particularly preventative 
control, should shift from the courts to these control bodies. 
Of interest to the banking community is the appointment in South Africa of a Banking 
Adjudicator. 18 There is no statutory obligation on banks to submit to the jurisdiction of an 
adjudicator; therefore participating banks will submit to the Adjudicator's jurisdiction 
voluntarily. 
The purpose of the Adjudicator will be to provide customers of participating banks with a dispute 
resolution mechanism which is easily accessible, informal, quick, affordable and effective, 
without affecting the right of the customer to resort to litigation at any time. 
The powers and functions of the Adjudicator are set out in his "Terms of Reference", which are 
binding on all participating banks in terms of the articles of the Company. 
Briefly, the Adjudicator's jurisdiction is limited to complaints by individuals, partnerships, trusts 
and juristic persons whose turnover for the last financial year was less than R3 million. The 
Adjudicator may consider claims up to RS00,000. 
As to its operation, the adjudicator must in the first instance refer complaints to the bank 
involved, in an effort to settle the matter. If the matter cannot be settled the Adjudicator should 
16 See, in this regard, Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 65 at 70 et seq; SA Law Commission 
Unreasonable Stipulations 24 and 49 (South Africa); Goldring et al Consumer 33-34; 
Terry 1982 ABLR 311 (Australia). 
17 Particularly the activities of the Consumer Affairs Committee of the Consumer Affairs 
(Unfair Business Practices) Act 71 of 1988. 
18 The Banking Adjudicator's office shall be constituted as as 21 Companies Act 61 of 
1973 company called "The Office of the Banking Adjudicator". 
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make a ruling19 or a recommendation. 20 
A bank will not be bound to accept a recommendation, but if it does not do so, the Adjudicator 
will have the power to publish the recommendation and the fact that the bank has refused to abide 
by it. The bank will be bound to accept a ruling although an appeal process is provided for. 21 
The extent to which this mechanism will curtail litigation between banker and customer remains 
to be seen. Furthermore, it will be interesting to see what legal effect the Code will have on our 
courts' interpretation of the banker-customer relationship, in view of the statement in the Code 
that none of the provisions of the Code will be justiciable in a court of law, or may be used to 
influence the interpretation of the legal relationship between a customer and the bank, or will 
give rise to a trade custom or tacit contract or otherwise between a customer and the bank. 22 
Schulze23 comments as follows: 
11 A client of a bank may therefore not rely on the provisions of the Banking Code to prove 
a banking practice or trade usage. However, I believe that the mere fact that a particular 
banking practice or trade usage has been acknowledged and explained in the Code in the 
first place, is already a strong indication that it qualified or existed as a banking practice 
or trade usage on its own right before its inclusion in the Code. Further, because the 
Banking Code is not incorporated by reference in the banker-customer contract (and does 
not for that reason qualify as a consensual term of the contract), it is doubtful whether the 
Banking Code can operate extra-contractually to exclude the inclusion of a term implied 
by trade usage. 11 
Schulze24 cites Cranston25 as authority for the fact that in spite of a similar provision excluding 
19 If the law of the case is reasonably certain, and the Adjudicator is not relying on the Code 
of Banking Practice, he should make a ruling on how the matter should be settled. 
20 If the law is uncertain or the Adjudicator is relying on the Code, he should make a 
recommendation. 
21 S 18 of the founding recommendations. 
22 This question is also posed by Melville Adjudicator 26. Melville asks the further question 
as to how serious the banks are in implementing the provisions of the Code. 
23 Schulze 2000 SA Mere LJ38 at 40. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Cranston Banking Law 169 n 96. 
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the British code as evidence of trade usage, the British courts have regard to the code's provision 
in formulating legal principles. 
9.2.3 The growth in consumer protection 
In Chapter 8 above, I have briefly surveyed consumerism in South Africa and I shall not dwell 
further on that aspect save to state that there is an overall international trend towards consumer 
protection. 26 
The exploitation of unsophisticated consumers is a world-wide phenomenon. This exploitation 
of developing countries is being partly addressed by the formation of international consumer 
bodies and inter-governmental agreements.27 
The abuses perpetrated against consumers in the First and Third world have led to a number of 
international developments concerning consumer protection, and various bodies have been 
established to prevent abuse, such as the establishment of Consumers International, the proposed 
Code of Conduct of the Inter-governmental Working Group's Commission on Transnational 
Corporations, and the United Nations Guidelines on Consumer Protection. It is outside the scope 
of this thesis to discuss the activities of these agencies. For purpose of summary, however, 
reference must be made to the list of consumer rights that Consumer International has adopted. 28 
The following rights are recognised: 
• the right to satisfaction of basic needs - to have access to basic, essential goods and 
services: adequate food, clothing, shelter, health care, education and sanitation;29 
• the right to safety - to be protected against products, production processes and services 
which are hazardous to health and life; 
• the right to be informed - to be given the facts needed to make an informed choice and 
to be protected against dishonest or misleading advertising and labeling; 
• the right to choose - to be able to select from a range of products and services, offered 
at competitive prices with an assurance of satisfactory quality; 
26 Cranston Consumers 2 (England); McQuoid-Mason 1987 De Rebus 395 (South Africa); 
Harvey & Parry Consumer 51-59 (England). 
27 McQuoid-Mason Consumer 10. 
28 On the CI, see Warne in Gaedeke & Etchison (eds) Consumerism 1718. 
29 These rights are consistent with s 26 (housing), s 27 (health care, food, water, and social 
security), and s 29 (education) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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• the right to be heard - to have consumer interests represented in the making and 
execution of government policy and in the development of products and services; 
• the right to redress - to receive a fair settlement of just claims, including compensation 
for misrepresentation, shoddy goods or unsatisfactory services; 
• the right to consumer education - to acquire the knowledge and skills needed to make 
informed, confident choices about goods and services, while being aware of basic 
consumer rights and responsibilities and how to act on them; and 
• the right to a healthy environment - to live and work in an environment which is non-
threatening to the well-being of present and future generations. 30 
Most Western jurisdictions protect consumers in commerce in some way or another. It may be 
that normal contract principles differ depending on whether or not the one party is a "consumer" 
or other protected entity. The law of contract is sometimes divided into consumer law and 
commercial law. This differentiated treatment of parties to a contract may affect the bank's duty 
of disclosure. Although the bank and the surety may not be in a fiduciary relationship, the fact 
that the surety is a consumer, will be one of the factors to be taken into account in establishing 
a legal duty of disclosure of material facts by a banker. 
9.2.4 Addressing the problem of standard-term contracts 
The process of mass production and distribution which has largely supplemented, if not 
supplanted, individual effort, has introduced the mass contract31 - uniform documents which 
must be accepted by all who deal with large-scale organisations, 32 including banks. These 
agreements are extremely prevalent. 33 Such documents are not in themselves novelties: in 
England the classic lawyer of the mid-Victorian years found himself struggling to adjust his 
simple conceptions of contract to the demands of such powerful bodies as the railway 
30 See South African Consumer Council Annual Report (1993/4) 6 quoted in Mcquoid-
Mason Consumer 14. 
31 In other words a concept contract, drawn in abstracto in order to be utilized in a series 
of future transactions with hitherto unknown parties. 
32 Raiser AGB 16 et seq. 
33 See Slawson 1971 Harvard LR 529 (USA); Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden 16 (The 
Netherlands); Raiser AGB 29; Held 1973 BB 573; Wolf Hom Lindacher AGB-Gesetz 
Kommentar 16-33; Munchener Kommentar BGB 1615-1621; Ulmer Brandner Hensen 
A GB-Gesetz Einl 4; Bunte 1980 BB 325 at 326 (Germany); Turpin 1965 SAL! 144 at 144-
145; Harker 1981SAL!15 at 16 (South Africa). 
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companies. 34 
In the present century many corporations, public and private, have found it useful to adopt as the 
basis of their transactions, a series of standard forms with which their customers can do little but 
comply.35 
In England, Lord Diplock36 pointed out that standard forms of contracts are of two kinds. The 
first, of very ancient origin, are those which set out the terms on which mercantile transactions 
of common occurrence are to be carried out. Examples are bills oflading, charterparties, policies 
of insurance, and contracts of sale in the commodity markets. The standard clauses in these 
contracts have been settled over the years by negotiation by representatives of the commercial 
interests involved and have been widely adopted because experience has shown that they 
facilitate the conduct of trade. Contracts of these kinds affect not only the actual parties to them 
,but also others who may have a commercial interest in the transactions to which they relate, as 
buyers or sellers, charterers or shipowners, insurers or bankers. If fairness or reasonableness were 
relevant to their enforceability the fact that they are widely used by parties whose bargaining 
power is fairly matched would raise a strong presumption that their terms are fair and reasonable. 
The same presumption, however, does not apply to the other kind of standard form contract. This 
is of comparatively modern origin. It is the result of the concentration of particular kinds of 
business in relatively few hands. The ticket cases in the 19th century provide what are probably 
the first examples. The terms of this kind of standard form contract have not been the subject of 
negotiation between the parties to it, or approved by any organisation representing the interest 
of the weaker party. They have been dictated by that party whose bargaining power, either 
exercised alone or in conjunction with others providing similar goods or services, enable him to 
say: "If you want these goods or services at all, these are the only terms on which they are 
obtainable. Take it or leave it." 
It has, however, to be added that even in Lord Diplock' s second class there are good as well as 
bad reasons for the adoption of standard-form contracts. In many cases the actual conclusion of 
the contract is in the hands of relatively junior personnel, who are not trained in contract 
negotiation and drafting and it should prove tremendously economical for the company or bank 
34 Cheshire Contract 21; Parker v South Eastern Railway 46 LJ (1877) QB 768 at 772; 
Richardson & Spence v Rowntree 1894 HL (E) 217 at 219. 
35 See Cheshire Contract 21; Wolf Horn Lindacher AGB- Gesetz Kommentar 16-17; 
Miinchener Kommentar A GB-Gesetz 1616-1617. 
3 6 In A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay (Formerly Inst one) [ 197 4] 3 All ER 
616 at 624. 
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if it employs one (or at most a few) standard form(s) of agreement.37 As regards the first class, 
we should note that large areas of commercial practice are governed by the prevalent standard 
forms which exist in a symbiotic relationship with the courts, so that a historical analysis of the 
development of a particular form would show that the clauses represented a response to decisions 
in the past. 
In the complex structure of modern society the device of the standard-form contract has become 
prevalent and pervasive. French, but not English lawyers, have a name for it. The term contrat 
d'adhesion is employed to denote the type of contract whose conditions are fixed by one of the 
parties in advance and are open to acceptance by anyone. The contract, which frequently contains 
many conditions is presented for acceptance en bloc and is not open to discussion. 38 
The use of standard terms of contract is a common phenomenon in modem contractual practice, 
which has created considerable problems. These contracts are useful in rationalising business 
operations, tailoring contracts for specific purposes and providing for new developments where 
the common law has proven inadequate. 39 These positive aspects are, however, clouded by the 
inclusion of very harsh and unreasonable terms by means of the standard-term mechanism. 40 
Despite this, a modem economy and a banking environment without standard terms are virtually 
unthinkable. 
The traditional contract theory has been unable to cope with the problems caused by the use of 
unconscionable standard terms. There is a definite difference between standard terms and terms 
which have been the object of bargaining, but this difference has not been clearly recognised in 
South African law. 
Theoretically, standard· terms are treated in exactly the same way as individually bargained terms. 
The courts have up to this stage been loathe to control the unconscionability caused by standard 
37 Macaulay 1966 Vanderbilt LR 1051 at 1059 (USA); Yates Exclusion Clauses 2-3 
(England); Kliege Rechtsprobleme 18-19; Munchener Kommentar BGB 1616-1617; 
Fischer 1957 BB 481 (Germany). 
38 Amos et al French Law 152; Atiyah Contract ch 1. 
39 Silberberg 1968RhodesianL.f89 at 90 (Zimbabwe); Kliege Rechtsprobleme 48; Raiser 
AGB 92; WolfHornLindacher AGB-Gesetz Kommentar 16-17 (Germany). 
40 KliegeRechtsprobleme 21-22; Raiser AGB 21 (Germany); Macaulay 1966 Vanderbilt 
LR 1051 (USA). 
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terms because of the immense influence of the freedom-of-contract doctrine. 41 The courts 
therefore usually rely on rules of interpretation to control standard terms. 42 Freedom of contract 
has different meanings, which are used for different purposes. 43 The doctrine has never been an 
absolute principle, but is subject to definite limitations.44 An analysis of the relationship between 
freedom of contract in its different meanings and contractual justice, shows that the latter 
principle is the more important despite being neglected. 45 There can therefore be no objection to 
control ifthe object of that control is to re-establish contractual justice. 
Although the standard-term problem is mostly seen as a result of the unequal bargaining strength 
between parties46 or as a problem relating solely to consumer law, 47 a closer analysis leads one 
to the conclusion that it is a problem in its own right. 48 The root of the problem is found in the 
way in which the sheer bulk of terms, the size of the print49 and typographical outlay, the 
41 See, eg, Linstrom'v Venter 1957 (1) SA 125 (SWA) at 127-E; Western Bank v Sparta 
Construction Co 197 4 (1) SA 83 9 <YV) at 840; Nedbank v Van der Berg and Another 1987 
(3) SA 449 <YV) at 452. 
42 There is always a danger that such rules ofinterpretation can be abused. See Raiser AGB 
271 (Germany); Ga/loon v_Modern Burglar Alarms (Pty) Ltd 1973 (3) SA at 647 (C); 
Devenish 1979 De Rebus 72; Beck 1982 SAU 203 at 206 (South Africa). 
43 Aronstam Protection 13-14 (South Africa); Feenstra & Ahsman Contract 5-7 (The 
Netherlands); Hippel 1967 ICLQ 591at592-593; Raiser AGB 303 (Germany). 
44 See, eg, Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 324 et seq;and generally, Hondius 
Standaardvoornaarden (The Netherlands); Jacobs 1985 ICLQ 297; Williston 1921 
Cornell LQ 379; Kessler 1943 Columbia LR 629 (USA). 
45 See, eg, Schmidt-Rimpler 1941 AcP 130 at 131; Raiser 1958 JZ 1 at 5; Schmidt-Salzer 
1971 NJW5 at 8; Hackl Vertragsfreiheit 18; Gluck 1979ICLQ 72 at 75-76 (Germany); 
Wilson 1965ICLQ 174;Kessler 1943 ColumbiaLR629at640;HenningsenvBloomfield 
Motors Inc 32 NJ 358 161A2d 69 (NJ 1960). 
46 Deutch Unfair Contracts 41 et seq; Murray 1969 University of Pittsburgh LR 1 et seq; 
Leff 1967 University of Pennsylvania LR 485 et seq; Rakoff 1983 Harvard LR 1174; 
Kessler 1943 Columbia LR 629-642; Bolgar 1972 Am J of Comp L 53 (USA); Raiser 
AGB 302 (Germany). 
4 7 Silberberg 1968 Rhodesian Lf 89 at 101-107; AronstamProtection 16-24 (South Africa); 
Lindacher 1972 BB 296; Eith 1974NJW10 at 17; Bernitz 1974 ZHR 336 (Germany); 
Deutch Unfair Contracts 117-118 (USA). 
48 Krause 1955 BB 265; Raiser 1958 JZ 1 at 7. 
49 Mellinkoff 1953 Stanford LR 418 at 419 (USA); Hondius Standaardvoornaarden 302 
(The Netherlands); Aronstam Protection 23; Van den Bergh Leesbare 
Verbruikerskontrakte 1 (South Africa). 
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complexity and technically of the language50 and the psychological effect of printed matter51 hide 
the true content of the standard terms. The severity of the crisis thus caused for the maintenance 
of contractual justice is amplified by the absence of bargaining. 
Western jurisdictions are not alone in facing problems in regard to standard contracts. An 
empirical look taken at the incidence and impact of the phenomenon on the South African law 
of contracts demonstrates that it suffers equally from this crisis. Courts have up to now applied 
several indirect methods to try and cope with these problems, amongst these rules relating to 
inclusion, interpretation, illegality, bona fides and the exceptio doli. 52 
Although not everybody likes them, 53 many modern, unfair contract term statutes do contain 
(apart from a general clause) a list of terms which aims at giving the general clause some 
clarification. 
German legislation contains two sets of guidelines on standard terms, namely, a so-called 
blacklist of terms (which simply nullifies those terms) and a grey list of terms (rendering those 
terms assailable). 54 
The EC Directive on Unfair Contract Terms55 contains a schedule, consisting of two parts, in 
which unfair terms are set forth. The first list contains 17 terms that are regarded as unfair, and 
the criterion that is used is whether those terms have a certain aim or effect. The second list 
contains five exceptions to this rule. This schedule is regarded as a list of so-called grey terms. 
These terms can be judged against the circumstances of each case, although it is not likely that 
50 Speidel 1970 University of Pittsburgh LR 359; Macaulay 1966 Vanderbilt LR 1051 
(USA); Raiser A GB 21; Kliege Rechtsprobleme21; Fausel Schutz 7; Weber 1970 Betrieb 
2355 at 2360 (Germany); Van den BerghLeesbare Verbruikerskontrakte 51; Silberberg 
1968 Rhodesian LJ 89 at 104 (South Africa). 
51 Raiser Gerichtliche Kontrolle 158; Fausel Schutz 7-8; Lindacher 1972 BB 296 at 297; 
Schmidt-Salzer AGB 15; Weber 1970 Betrieb 2355 at 2360 (Germany); Hondius 
Standaardvoorwaarden 1 (The Netherlands). 
52 SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations 21-47. 
53 Trade and Industry often see such lists as unwanted patronising - see UNICE in Alpa 
& Bessone (eds) Contratti 220 and 223. The Scandinavian countries consider lists useless 
in their control system of Consumer Ombudsmen - see Wilhelmsson 1992 European 
Consumer Lf 11at87. 
54 Ss 11and10 AGBG. 
55 EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13/EEC: OJ L95/29. 
415 
they will be found to be fair. Nor is the list exhaustive: member states may add further terms to 
it. 56 In the schedule, terms are identified which will seldom pass the test of fairness and which 
consequently are in effect void, whilst the other tests as set forth in ss 3 and 4 of the EC Directive 
are to be applied to other terms. 57 
In Australia, the following guidelines for determining whether a term is assailable evolved from 
legislation and the judicature: a party's poverty or any indigence; poor health; advanced age; 
gender; physical or psychological defect; drunkenness; illiteracy; lack of legal assistance or 
advice, if assistance or advice is necessary. 58 The Australian consumer, of course, is protected 
by a lethal array of weapons against unfairness in contract, particularly the Trade Practices Act 
of 1974 (Cth) (together with the Fair Trading Acts of the States and Territories), Contracts 
Review Act of 1980 (NSW) and UCCC, as discussed in Chapter 4 above. 
Courts in America have laid down guidelines for fairness, namely: the relative bargaining 
positions of parties; the relative experience and knowledge of parties; the commercial framework 
of or circumstances surrounding the transaction; the nature and pattern of previous commercial 
transactions; the transfer of commercial risks from one party to the other; deceit or fraud; 
oppressive terms; exorbitant price; denial of fundamental remedies and defences to the detriment 
of the opponent; and the use of adhesion contracts. 59 
The following guideline was given by the Swedish Minister of Justice60 in making a case for the 
Swedish legislation61 on unfairness: 
56 Dean 1993 MLR 581 at 587. 
57 See Hondius 1994 Journal of Contract Law 34 at 39-41 (The Netherlands); Ogilvie 
1996 Canadian Business LJ 439 (Canada). 
58 S 70(2) of the UCCC provides a "shopping list" of factors which are to' be taken into 
account in determining if a transaction is unjust. 
59 SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations 28; see, also, in regard to 
unconscionability, Leff 1967 Universtty of Pennsylvania LR 485; Cellini & Wertz 1967 
Tulane LR 193; Blumberg 1986 Am J of Comp L 99; Anderson 1972 Notre Dame Lawyer 
879 at 888 et seq; Ellinghaus 1969 Yale LJ151; Mair 1984 Pacific LJ241 (USA). 
On adhesion contracts, see Bolgar 1971 Am J of Comp L 53; Dauer 1962 Akron LR 1; 
Ehrenzweig 1953 Columbia LR 1072; Sales 1953 M LR 318; Slawson 1971 Harvard LR 
529; Schmitthoff 1968 ICLQ 551. 
60 Bernitz 1973 Scandinavian Studies in Law 11 at 45. 
61 Act to Prohibit Improper Contract Terms of 1971. 
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11 A contract term may be considered improper to consumers if, in deviating from non-
mandatory law, it gives entrepreneurs an advantage or deprives consumers of a right and 
thereby causes such one-sided relations in the parties' rights and obligations under the 
contract that a reasonable balance between the parties no longer exists. 11 
Israel has an open-ended list of presumptions according to which terms are prima facie unfair. 62 
The Dutch legislation contains two lists of guidelines, one consisting of terms which are, per se, 
unreasonably oppressive63 and the other of terms presumed to be unreasonably oppressive. 64 
In my opinion, the publication of lists of prima facie unfair terms can certainly assist in 
obtaining legal certainty. The Working Committee of the SA Law Commission65 is, however, 
against the enactment of such guidelines as it believes that the laying down of guidelines may 
result in the Courts considering themselves bound exclusively by those guidelines, 
notwithstanding the so-called open-ended list of unfairness factors that can be supplemented by 
the circumstances. The Working Committee foresees that the danger of enacting guidelines may 
be that, if unfairness factors exist within a set of facts not covered by the guidelines, the term in 
question will not be found to be unfair. I fear that the Working Committee is seriously 
underestimating our courts' ability to make use of guidelines, and the advantages of legal 
certainty which guidelines will entail, outweigh the Working Committee's objection by far. 
One can only hope that lessons can be learnt from the highly developed systems discussed earlier 
on in this sub-chapter, 66 and that guidelines will be part and parcel of the South African battle 
against unfairness in contract law, whilst preserving an adequate measure of legal certainty. 
9.2.5 Expected South African legislative reforms 
Although it is unclear what legislative reforms will take place in the field of unfair contract 
terms, one cannot ignore the draft Bill which the Working Committee of the SA Law 
62 S 4 of the Standard Contracts Act ofl 982. See, also, Comment 1966 Columbia LR 1340. 
63 Art 6.236 BW. 
64 Art 6.237 BW. 
65 SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations 31-32. 
66 Sub-chapter 9 .2.4. Notably the systems of Western Germany, the Netherlands and the EC 
are worthy of consideration. 
417 
Commission proposes be presented to the Minister of Justice. 67 
The Working Committee of the SA Law Commission suggests the following provision for 
inclusion in an Act of Parliament to be entitled the Unfair Contractual Terms Act:68 
"(1) If a court, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including the relative 
bargaining positions which parties to a contract hold in relation to one another and the 
type of contract concerned, is of the opinion that the way in which the contract between 
the parties came into being or the form or content of the contract or any term thereof or 
the execution or enforcement thereof is unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive, the 
court may rescind or amend the contract or any term thereof or make such other order as 
may in the opinion of the court be necessary to prevent the effect of the contract being 
unreasonably prejudicial or oppressive to any of the parties, notwithstanding the principle 
that effect shall be given to the contractual terms agreed upon by the parties. 
(2) In deciding whether the way in which a contract came into existence or the form or 
content of the contract or any term thereof is contrary to the principles set out above, 
those circumstances shall be taken into account which existed at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract. 
3. (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to all contracts concluded after the 
commencement of this Act. 
(2) Any agreement or contractual term purporting to exclude the provisions of 
this Act or to limit the application thereof shall be void." 
The standards contained in this proposal, if it becomes law, could be ignored by a banker only 
at his peril, when drafting suretyships and mortgage bonds. 
67 Keeping in mind that these proposals are not final yet and the SA Law Commission is 
still entertaining comments in this regard. 
68 SA Law Commission Discussion Paper 26-27. 
418 
9.2.6 The anticipated role of good faith in contract law 
9.2.6.1 Introduction 
Notwithstanding severe problems in defining and describing the concept of good faith,69 it is 
clear that the concept, whether as a standard or a norm, will play an important role in contract 
law, internationally. Even in England, staunch opponents of the concept of good faith will have 
to contend with the concept in consumer contracts as a result of their membership of the EU.70 
9.2.6.2 The USA 
During the nineteenth century, the US common law was reluctant to recognize explicitly any 
"generalized duty to act in good faith" .71 US law now imposes a duty of good faith across a broad 
spectrum of commercial transactions. 72 For example, it applies to commercial paper and other 
negotiable instruments, bank deposits and collections, electronic funds transfers (wire transfers), 
letters of credit, bulk transfers, documents of title, investment securities, and secured 
transactions. 73 
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 74 the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 75 and a 
majority of the states76 recognize the duty to perform a contract in good faith. The Uniform 
Commercial Code states that: 
"Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its 
69 See the discussion on the various approaches to the concept in chapter 4, dealing with the 
USA, above. 
70 See Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1994. 
71 Holmes 1978 University of Pittsburgh LR 381at384; Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) 
Good Faith 119. 
72 Farnsworth 1963 University of Chicago LR 666 at 667; Eisenberg 1971 Marquette LR l; 
Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 118-120. 
73 See ss 3-302; 4-406; 4A-105; 5-114; 6-107; 7-206; 8-406 & 9-SD4 of the UCC (1992). 
74 S 1-203 of the UCC. 
75 S 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
76 See Burton 1980 Harvard LR 369. 
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performance or enforcement. "77 
The Restatement provides that: 
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement. "78 
Neither the Code nor the Restatement provisions deal with good faith in the negotiation and 
formation of a contract.79 Rather, they apply to the performance and enforcement of contracts. 
The duty of good faith may not be disclaimed by the parties. 80 They may, however, determine by 
agreement the standards by which the performance of this obligation is to be measured if the 
standards are not manifestly unreasonable. 81 
The UCC defines good faith generally to be "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concemed".82 This definition applies a subjective standard: the reasonableness of a person's 
belief is irrelevant to good faith. 83 
In the case of sales or leases of goods by a merchant (a person who or entity that deals in goods 
77 S 1-203 of the UCC. 
78 S 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
79 Summers 1982 Cornell LR 810 at 824 n61: 
"This Section, like Uniform Commercial Codes 1-203, does not deal with good 
faith in the formation of a contract." 
See comment c to s 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
80 S 1-102 of the UCC. 
81 Ibid. 
82 S 1-201(19) of the UCC. 
83 Since the section is in Article 1, it applies to the entire Code. Braucher 1958 Columbia 
LR 798 points out that the test is subjective and refers to the test as the rule of "the pure 
heart and the empty head". The subjective nature of the test has been severely criticized 
as there is a strong feeling that the test should have an objective element. See Farnsworth 
1963 University of Chicago LR 666; Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195; Calamari & Perillo 
Contracts 510. 
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of the kind involved in the contract )84 a more rigorous standard of good faith applies. Good faith 
in these transactions means not only honesty in fact ,but also the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. 85 This definition includes both the subjective 
and the objective tests. 86 
The Restatement goes beyond the Code by imposing a duty of good faith and fair dealing -
which includes both the subjective and objectives tests - on all parties, not just merchants.87 
When the test of good faith involves the objective standard of fair dealing the courts can police 
against subterfuges and evasions even though the party engaging in the challenged conduct 
believed it to be proper. 88 
In applying the obligation of good faith, the courts have recognized that the concept of good faith 
is broad, nebulous, and variable. 89 As the comments to the Restatement observe, good faith is 
used in a variety of contexts and its meaning varies somewhat with the context. 90 The comments 
further explain that good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness 
to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.91 
Moreover, bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more 
than honesty. 92 
In an extremely influential article, Summers concluded that good faith is an "excluder".93 He 
maintained that: 
84 S 2-104 of the UCC. 
85 S 2-103(1)(b) of the UCC. 
86 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 510; Anderson Uniform Commercial Code 107; s 1-201 
of the UCC. 
87 S 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See Summers 1982 Cornell LR 810 at 
824-25. 
88 Comment d to s 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
89 Eisenberg 1971 Marquette LR 1 at 3-4. 
90 Comment a to s 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
91 Ibid 
92 Comment d to s 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
93 Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 262. 
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"[i]t is a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves instead to 
exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith. "94 
The Restatement has endorsed this approach,95 stating that good faith excludes a variety of 
conduct characterized as "bad faith" because these forms of conduct violate community standards 
of decency, fairness, or reasonableness.96 
Thus, the obligation of good faith and fair dealings has amorphous proportions and varies from 
context to context. 97 In applying the obligation of good faith to the performance of contracts, the 
courts have identified a set of behaviours as bad faith, including evasion of the spirit of the 
bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, wilful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of 
a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to co-operate in the other party's 
performance. 98 
Most states apply good-faith requirements to contract enforcement. As described in the 
Restatement of Contracts: 
" [ t ]he obligation of good faith and fair dealing extends to the assertion, settlement and 
litigation of contract claims and defences. "99 
94 Ibid, at 201-02. 
95 Burton 1984 Iowa LR 497 at 498-99. 
96 Comment a to s 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
97 Calamari & Perillo Contracts 511; Eisenberg 1971 Marquette LR 1; Kunz 1990 Wm 
Mitchell LR 1105 at 1110, has observed that the UCC provisions on good faith serve one 
or more of the following functions: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
restrict the exercise of one-sided power in a contract, in order to avoid unfair or 
unexpected results; 
restrict the range of possible responses to defective performance or to an 
unexpected event, in order to salvage the contractual relationship or preserve the 
parties' negotiating positions; 
impose a duty to mitigate losses, in order to avoid giving the aggrieved party a 
windfall beyond the expectations of the contract; and 
protect the innocent third party buyer or purchaser against claims of the original 
owner and other claimants. 
98 Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 232-42; Comment d to s 205 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts. 
99 Comment e to s 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contract. 
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The Restatement offers a number of examples where the courts have found bad faith in the 
enforcement of contractual enforcement terms: conjuring up a pretended dispute; asserting an 
interpretation contrary to one's own understanding; falsification of facts; harassing demands for 
assurances of performance; rejection of performance for unstated reasons; wilful failure to 
mitigate damages; and abuse of a power to determine compliance or to terminate the contract. 100 
9.2.6.3 Europe and England 
The principle of good faith and fair dealing is known as a guideline for contractual behaviour in 
all EC countries. There is, however, a considerable difference amongst the legal systems in the 
matter of how far and how powerful the penetration of the principle has been. At one end of the 
spectrum is a system such as the one in Germany, where the principle has revolutionized the 
contract law and added a special feature to the style of that system. At the other end we find 
systems such as those in England and Ireland, which do not recognize a general obligation of the 
parties to conform to good faith in the performance of a contract, but which in many cases, by 
specific rules, reach the results which the other systems reach by the principle of good faith. 101 
The other systems within the EC range between these two opposites. They recognize a principle 
of good faith and fair dealing as a general clause, but have not given it the importance that it has 
in German law. In respect of the German concept of good faith, there has been what certain 
authors102 calls a "moralization" of contractual relationships in Germany. 103 Section 242 BGB 
states in general terms that everyone must perform his contract in the manner required by good 
faith and fair dealing (Treu und Glauben) taking into consideration the general commercial 
practice. 
This provision has been used to qualify the rigorous individualism of the original contract laws 
100 Ibid See Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 243-52 for a discussion of many forms of 
bad faith contracting. 
101 This is not so surprising as English law has been influenced by Roman law to a larger 
extent than admitted. See Gorla & Moccia 1981 J of Legal History 143; Gordley Origins; 
Gordley 1993 ZeuP 498. Continental legal systems are far more practice oriented than 
might seem, (see Frier 1991MichiganLR220l, who points out at 2213-4 that a code like 
the continental codes result in what he calls an "expanded interpretive community": the 
judiciary, the bar and (academic) legal authors) and English law did develop general 
concepts in equity. 
102 See Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 150. 
103 Ibid, at 156. 
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of the BGB.104 It has operated as a "superprovision" or "supernorm" which may modify the effect 
of other statutory provisions. 105 Based on s 242 BGB, the German courts have developed new 
concepts and have created a number of obligations to ensure the loyal performance of a contract; 
such as the duty of the parties to co-operate, to protect each other's interests, to disclose 
information, and to submit accounts. 106 
There is, however, one important limitation to the operation of the good-faith principle. It does 
not permit the courts to establish a general principle of fairness and equity. A court may not 
replace the effects of a contract or of a statutory provision by an outcome which it believes to be 
more fair and equitable. 107 
Among the concepts created by the courts that rely on the good faith principle, the following 
should be mentioned: 
(1) A change of circumstances (Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage) which makes the 
performance of the contract extremely onerous for one party and may lead to the 
modification or termination of his contractual obligation. 108 
(2) The limitation or loss of a party's right if enforcing it would amount to an abuse of that 
right. 109 The abuse of a right is found in the following typical cases: 110 
(a) Dishonest behaviour. A party cannot acquire a right in this way (exceptio doli 
specialis). m 
(b) Breach of a party's own duty. A party will lose a right in this way. 
( c) Claiming a performance which one will soon have to return to the obligor. A party 
104 It is generally recognized thats 242 BGB operates supplendi causa. See Zimmermann 
& Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 24. 
105 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 207; Horn et al Introduction 86-87. 
106 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 206. 
107 See Soergel-Siebert BGB 242. 
108 See Markesinis Contract 510 et seq; Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 206; 
Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 26-27. 
109 Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 150; Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 24-25. 
110 Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 206. 
111 Palandt BGB 231-233; Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 25. 
424 
cannot claim a right in this way .112 
( d) Relying on behaviour which is inconsistent with one's earlier conduct. A party 
cannot rely on behaviour in this way (venire contra factum proprium ). 113 
(3) The ending of contractual obligations which extend over a period oftime. These 
obligations may be ended for compelling reasons even though this is not supported by a 
statutory or contractual provision. The right to end these obligations may be limited by 
the contract, but it may not be completely excluded. 114 
As far as England is concerned, English common law does not recognize any general obligation 
to conform to good faith and fair dealing in the performance of a contract. m Consumers are 
protected against unfair contract clauses by the EC Council Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts)116 implemented in England117 and which prescribes the dictates of good faith. 
UNIDROIT principles will be incorporating good faith into its principles for international 
commercial contracts, and this may affect English contract law. 
However, many of the results which in other legal systems are achieved by requiring good faith 
in performance have been reached under English and Irish law by more specific rules. For 
example, the courts have limited the right of a party who is the victim of a slight breach of 
contract to terminate the contract on that ground when the real motive appears to be the desire 
to escape a bad bargain. 118 Conversely, the victim of a wrongful repudiation is not permitted to 
ignore the repudiation, complete his own performance and claim the contract price from the 
112 Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 25. 
113 Ibid 
114 See, in regard to the above aspects, Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 206-207; 
Zweigert & Kotz Introduction 150; Hedemann 1950 JR 1; Zimmermann & Whittaker 
(eds) Good Faith 26. 
115 In a recent case, the House of Lords made it unequivocally clear that the introduction of 
good faith in English contract law would not, and even could not happen. See Walford 
v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 at 138. Recourse has, however, been had in English law to 
"piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness" See lnterfoto 
Picture Library Ltd v Stilletto Visual Programmes Ltd [ 1989] QB 43 3 at 43 9. 
116 EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13/EEC: [1993] OJ L95/29. 
117 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1994. 
118 Hoenig v Isaac [1952] 2 All ER 176 and Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki 
Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26. 
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repudiating party, unless the victim has a legitimate interest in doing so. 119 There are many 
examples of the courts interpreting the terms of a contract in such a way as to prevent one party 
from using a clause in circumstances in which it was probably not intended to apply. The clearest 
examples of this occur in relation to exclusion clauses, 120 but other terms have been construed 
similarly121 where, for example, it was held that an architect under a construction contract could 
not exercise a power to order work to be omitted simply in order to give the same work to 
another contractor, who was prepared to do it for less. Thus to some extent the good faith 
principle merely articulates trends already present in English law. But the English approach based 
on the construction of the agreement is a weak one as it cannot prevail against clear contrary 
provisions in the agreement. 122 
Good faith plays an important role in the other EC systems as well. Statutory provisions laying 
down a principle of good faith in the performance of the contract are to be found in: France -
see Civil Code Article 1134 (3); the Netherlands - see BW Article 6. 2 and, Article 6.248; as 
well as in several other European codes - see, for example, Article 13 7 5 and Article 117 5 of 
the Italian Civil Code. 
The Dutch BW uses powerful language. Good faith will not only supplement obligations arislii.g 
from contract ( aanvullende werking), but may also modify and extinguish them ( beperkende 
werking) .123 An obligor and obligee must act in their mutual relationship in accordance with the 
119 Attica Sea Carriers v Ferrostaal Poseiden Bulk Reederei GmbH; The Puerto Buitrago 
[1976] 1 Lloyds Rep 250. 
120 Coote 1970CambridgeLf221; Chitty Contract 636. 
121 See, eg, Carr v JA Berriman Pty Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 327. 
122 See Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [ 1980] AC 827, (exclusion clauses); 
BungeCorporationvTradaxExportSA [1981] 1WLR711 (righttoterminateforbreach 
which might not have any serious consequences). 
123 Hondius et al (eds) Verbintenissenrecht note 20. The concept of reasonableness and 
fairness has a limiting as well as a supplementary role in contract law. It is supplementary 
in the sense that, where a legal relationship between debtor and creditor leaves a gap 
(leemte) various additional rights and duties may flow based on reasonableness and 
fairness. See 5; HR 1976-09-24 NJ 1978 245; Rb ZuthpenHR 1981-03-13NJ1981 635; 
1983-07-7 NJ 1985 679. Reasonableness and fairness therefore can play a supplementary 
role in, eg, duties to consult, (HR 1923-02-23 NJ 1923 802; Hof Amsterdam 1979-05-10 
NJ 1980 369) duties to account, (Hof 's Gravenhage 1960-12-02 NJ 1961 498; Rb 
Alkmaar 1966-05-12 NJ 1967 167) duties of disclosure, (HR 1923-02-23 NJ 1923 802; 
HR 1964-03-13 NJ 1964 188; HR 1974-01-11NJ1974 179; HR 1987-11- 06 NJ 1988 
212; HR 1988-06-17 NJ 1988 958; Hof Arnhem 1975-05-27 NJ 1976 291) duties to 
make information available, (Rb Alkmaar 1966-05-12 NJ 1967 167; Rb Amsterdam 
1979-04-26 NJ 1979 623) duties to pay a monetary compensation, (Rb Alkmaar 1965-03-
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requirements of reasonableness and equity. Under art 6.2(2) BW a rule which binds the parties 
by virtue oflaw, usage or legal act shall not apply to the extent that under the circumstances this 
would be unacceptable under the standards of reasonableness and equity. Art 6.248 BW which 
applies to contracts, provides that a contract has not only the effects agreed to by the parties ,but 
also those which according to the nature of the contract result from law, usage and the 
requirements of reasonableness and equity. 124 
Since the coming into force of the current BW, the Hoge Raad has developed its own style in 
arriving at judgments on the subject of the notion of good faith, which can be regarded as a 
model ofits kind. It compels courts to take into account a comprehensive "checklist" of elements, 
and to include in their grounds for judgment the reason why, in the light of these elements, the 
principle of good faith requires a certain interpretation, or conditions in a certain manner the 
rights or obligations of the parties. It provides for certain - but not many - indications 
regarding the relative value of these elements. It introduces some rules of thumb which may be 
overruled, but only for convincing reasons. 125 
In France, the courts have not given the rule expressed in Article 1134 (3) of the Code Civil the 
same importance it has in Germany and the other above-mentioned countries. However, similar 
results have often been reached without a reference to good faith, for instance by using the well-
established theory of an abuse of right. 126 In the last two decades the courts have openly used the 
25 BR 1965 558; Rb 's Hertogenbosch 1971-10-15 NJ 1973 118) and duties to contract, 
(HR 1956-12-21NJ1959 180; Hof Arnhem 1988-12-12 NJ 1989 444). 
In its limiting role, reasonableness and fairness may also limit rights and duties flowing 
from the statute, usage or legal act. In this sense, the Dutch refer to the beperkende 
werking van redelijkheid en billikheid. (See HR 1990-04-20 NJ 1990 526.) In this role, 
reasonableness and fairness can be determining in cases, eg, of abuse of law, (Hof 
Leeuwarden 1987-04-29 NJ 1988 364; HR 1990-01-5 NJ 1990 728; HR 1990-04-20 NJ 
1990 526) in ameliorating compulsory law or dwingende wetsbepalingen, (HR 1983-07-
01 NJ 1984 149; HR 1989-01-20 NJ 1989 322) and a broad range of obligations in Dutch 
law. 
124 See Sande Bakhuijzen WPNR 5387 248-9; Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 
55. 
125 For a classic example of this style see HR 1967-05-19NJ 1967 261 (Saladin v Hollandse 
Bank Unie). The elements taken into account by the HR in this case were the degree of 
negligence related to the nature and seriousness of the interests involved, the nature and 
remaining contents of the contract, the social position of, and mutual relationship 
between the parties, the manner in which the clause was made and the level of awareness 
by the parties of its purpose. See further Storme in Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 
185-186. 
126 See Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 34-35. 
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good-faith principle in the determination of the parties' obligations. 127 The writers invoke this 
principle in order to impose upon the parties a duty of mutual loyalty, of information and co-
operation, and to restrict the operation of clauses exempting a party from liability for breach of 
contract. 128 
In the Commission of European Contract Law and in UNIDROIT, the good- faith principle has 
been established. The UNIDROIT Principles129 provide that "each party must act in accordance 
with good faith and fair dealing in international trade". The UNIDROIT principle applies to all 
the subjects covered by the Principles. The PECL which has hitherto dealt only with the 
performance of the contract provides that "in exercising his rights and performing his duties each 
party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing" .130 
9.2.6.4 South African developments 
In the majority decision in Bank of Lisbon & South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Another, 131 it 
has once more been confirmed that the South African law of contract does not allow a judicial 
discretion concerning the enforcement of an unfair contract or contract term. According to the 
majority decision, neither Roman-Dutch law nor South African law offers a point of contact for 
a general substantive defence based on fairness. 132 The acceptance that contracts today, as in 
Roman-Dutch law, are regulated by good faith, 133 does not, according to the Court, imply such 
a judicial discretion of fairness. 134 Joubert JA points out that135 the Dutch Courts, unlike the 
English Courts until the Judicature Act of 1873 became operative in 1875, did not administer a 
system of equity as distinct from a system of law. Roman-Dutch law is itself inherently an 
127 Ibid, at 37. 
128 Malaurie & Aynes Obligations 614; Marty & Raymaud Obligations no 246; 
Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 39. 
129 10th consolidated version, Articles 1.8. and 2.14. 
130 See, in general, Hartkamp et al (eds) European Code 208-209. 
131 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
132 Bank of Lisbon v De Ornelas and Another 1988 (3) SA 580 (A), per Joubert JA, at 605, 
606 and 609-610. 
133 Ibid, at 599, 601 and 605. 
134 Ibid, at 605-606 and 609-610. 
135 Ibid, at 605-606. 
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equitable legal system. In administering the law the Dutch Courts paid due regard to 
considerations of equity ,but only where equity was not inconsistent with the principles of law. 
Equity could not override a clear rule of law. That is also the position of our courts as regards 
their equitable jurisdiction. 
It is, however, unlikely that the decision in Bank of Lisbon will remain the last word on the 
matter of good faith and contract law. 136 As Jansen JA pointed out in his minority judgment, 137 
the twin concepts of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda have, in the course of this 
century, come increasingly under assault as a result of, inter alia, rampant inflation, monopolistic 
practices giving rise to unequal bargaining power, and the large-scale use of standard-form 
contracts. The heyday of extreme individualism was short-lived and thus we are witnessing today 
all over the world, a transition from freedom of contract to social responsibility. In a broader 
context, the development can be described as a return to the ethical foundations of the earlier ius 
commune. 138 
136 See,\eg, Van der Merwe v Meades 1991 (2) SA 1 (A) confirming the existence of the 
replicatio doli; See, also, Kerr Principles 483 and 488. 
In a recent Appellate Division decision, Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk 
v Saayman NO 1997 (4) SA 302 (A), Olivier JA in a minority judgement, at 318, 
concluded that the appeal in that case had to be dismissed on the basis of the application 
of the bona fides principle. 
Olivier JA held that where a surety was, as in this case, obviously physically weak and 
confused and possibly unable to understand fully the contents of the suretyship, or where 
the surety was, to the knowledge of the creditor, the debtor's spouse or elderly parent, 
public policy requires that the creditor ensure that the surety has understood the full 
import of the agreement and of any consequent cessions. This could be achieved by 
insisting that the surety obtain independent legal advice or by having the creditor explain 
to the surety the full implications of the agreement and any related documents. In casu, 
Olivier JA held, at 330, that what had happened fell short of these requirements. In the 
circumstances the bona fides required that the surety agreement and cession not be 
enforced against the surety. 
137 De Ornelas case, ibid, at 613. 
138 See Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 256; On the topic of equality in 
exchange, see Gordley 1981 California LR 1587 et seq; Zimmermann Obligations 851, 
873, 885 et seq. The principle of good faith is.rooted deep in the Roman-Dutch tradition 
and history of our law. However, as an abstract concept it will add little to the resolution 
of specific issues. It cannot - and does not profess to - resolve specific problems. The 
circumstances of a case may be such that a duty to inform or warn a surety or to advise 
him to take independent advice is imposed on a creditor. To deduce specific rules from 
bona fides in the abstract and without reference to the circumstances would distort it and 
destroy its systematising and corrective value. See Malan & Pretorius 2001 THRHR 268 
at 287-288. 
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Many of the doctrines designed to accommodate this concern for substantive justice have been 
abandoned; 139 the will theories of contract replacing them have now turned out to be deficient in 
many ways. 140 
In certain fields the South African legislature has intervened to readjust the balance. Particularly 
important in this regard are the Credit Agreements Act 7 5 of 1980, the Usury Act 73 of 1968, and 
the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. Section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act 15 of 1962 
gives the courts power to reduce a penalty found to be excessive to such "extent as it may 
consider equitable in the circumstances". 141 
However, the perception has been gaining ground that the problem of unfair contract terms will 
have to be tackled in a more fundamental, less fragmentary manner. 142 According to some 
writers, 143 the doctrine of undue influence has paved the way for the recognition of "abuse of 
circumstances" as a general ground for the rescission of contracts. 
As an alternative, a more enlightened approach to the construction of contracts has been 
advocated to avoid the inequity which has arisen in cases like Bank of Lisbon and South & Africa 
Ltdv De Ornelas andAnother144 and Rand Bank v Rubenstein. 145 One cannot, however, assume146 
that this is the only remaining problem area for which, after the demise of the exceptio doli, 
another route to contractual equity, has to be devised. 147 Others have argued that a change of 
139 See, for instance, the clausula rebus sic stantibus. See Zimmermann Obligations 519 et 
seq: Furthermore, the doctrine of laesio enormis was formally abolished by s 25 of the 
General Law Amendment Act 32 of 1952. See Hahlo 1952 SAL! 392; Farlam & 
Hathaway Contract 387. 
140 Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 256. 
141 On these and other statutory enactments levelling the playing ground between contracting 
parties, see Aronstam Protection 49 et seq. 
142 See Van der Walt 1986 SAL! 646 et seq; SA Law Commission Unreasonable 
Stipulations 8-21; Van der Merwe et al 1989SAL.f235-242; Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 7 at 20; 
Carey Miller 1980 SAL! 531 at 536. 
143 See Van Huyssteen Onbehoorlike Belnvloeding 127 et seq. 
144 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
145 1981 (2) SA 207 (W). See, on a new approach to construction, Lewis 1990SAL.f26 et 
seq. 
146 But see Lewis 1990 SAL.!26 at 33. 
147 Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 256. 
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circumstances may effectively render a contract unenforceable; and they have based their 
argument on the concept of good faith in contract law. 148 There are, however, no signs of this 
kind of renaissance of the clausula rebus sic stantibus in South African case law. 
It has also been submitted that legislative intervention will be necessary to enable South African 
courts openly to perform their duty of policing unfair contract terms. 149 A rather sweeping 
proposal along these lines has been submitted to the South African Law Commission.150 Its 
framework of reference is not confined to standard-form contracts; a statutory provision is 
recommended according to which the courts may either declare invalid or modify any contract 
or any clause within a contract which, in the light of all the circumstances, does not conform to 
the standard of good faith. If adopted, this provision would effectively overrule the decision in 
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Another. 151 
It is my opinion that as far as South Africa is concerned, our law has developed a "super control 
norm". Public policy, the bani mores has been recognised explicitly by our Appellate Division 
as the Grundnorm for determining illegality in contract, 152 and in delict. 153 Several standards are 
taken into account when adjudicating policy aspects, such as the protection of the sanctity of 
contract, prevention of an abuse of right, prevention of an abuse of superior bargaining power 
and the protection of the public interest. 
148 Van Huyssteen & van der Merwe 1990 Stell LR 244; Farlam & Hathaway Contract 773 
et seq. 
149 Carey Miller 1980 SAL! 531; Van der Walt 1986 SAL! 646 at 647; 1988 THRHR 333; 
1991THRHR367; 1993 THRHR 65; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 157. 
150 VanderWalt 1991THRHR361;1993 THRHR65. 
151 Ibid. 
152 MagnaAlloysandResearch (SA) (Pty) LtdvEllis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A); Sasfin (Pty) Ltd 
v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A); Botha (now Griessel) and Another v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 
1989 (3) SA 773 (A). 
153 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) at 597; Universiteit van Pretoria v 
Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T) at 387; Administrateur Natal v 
Trust Bank vanAfrikaBpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) at 833-834;MaraisvRichard 1981 (1) 
SA 1157 (A) at 1168; Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltdv Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 
1982 (4) SA 371 (D) at 380; Schultz v Butt 1986 (3) SA 667 (A) at 679; Van der Walt 
Delict 22-23; Boberg Delict 33 et seq; Neethling Persoonlikheidsreg 57-58; Van der 
Merwe & Olivier Onregmatige Daad 58 et seq. 
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In my opinion, good faith is one154 of these standards, 155 namely that standard which imports into 
contractual dealings the requirement that the parties should take into account the legitimate 
interests of one another. 156 Furthermore, good faith serves as a technique to fend off bad faith in 
contractual dealings. 157 
Be that as it may, if European and American trends are anything to go by, the concept of good 
faith will play a decisive role in the future of South African contract law. It may also be the ideal 
vehicle by which to import the spirit of constitutionality158 and affirmative action into contract 
law.159 
9.3 Th1PACT OF TRENDS ON THE BANKER'S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE, OR 
ADVISORY AND INFORMATION DUTIES IN THE BANKER-SURETY 
RELATIONSHIP 
9.3.1 The future of suretyship as a form of security 
In discussions of the modem law of suretyship the creditor is sometimes depicted as an 
unscrupulous villain, a Shylock, taking advantage of an artless surety who has guaranteed the 
154 As Van der Merwe et al 1989 SAL.I 235 at 241-242, point out, good faith, whatever 
substance it may be given by the law, is not the only value that gives structure and 
substance to contracts. Good faith is one factor, the other factors being individualism, 
economic goals and certainty. 
155 Farlam & Hathaway Contract 391 states that the ethical principle of good faith fulfils a 
controlling function within the law of contract which is subordinate to the substantive 
law. 
156 See Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 7 at 20; SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulationsl4. 
157 See Summers 1968 Virginia LR 195 at 262 concluding that good faith is an "excluder"; 
Occusafe Inc v EG & G Rocky Flats Inc 54 F 3d 618 at 624 (10th Cir 1995); Bank of 
China v Chan 937 F 2d 780 at 789 (2d Cir 1991); Kedra v Nazareth Hosp 868 F Supp 
73 3 at 73 7 (ED Pa 1994); Coca-Cola Bottling Co v Coca-Cola Co 769 F Supp 599 at 652 
(D Del 1991); Kleiner v First Nat'l Bank 581 F Supp 955 at 960 n.5(ND Ga. 1984); 
Larson v Larson 636 NE 2d 1365 at 1368 (Mass App Ct 1994); Bourgeous v Horizon 
Healthcare Corporation 872 P 2d 852 at 856 (NM1994); Somers v Somers 613 A 2d 
1211 at 1213 (Pa Super Ct 1992); Garrett v Bankwest Inc 459 NW 2d 833 at 845 
(SD1990); CarmichaelvAdirondackBottledGasCorporation635A2d1211at1216-17 
(Vt 1993). 
158 See Mort NO v Chiat [2000] 2 All SA 515 (K). 
159 It has been said that good faith serves to dispel the creeping danger of fossilization to 
which the law is always vulnerable. Teubner 1982 ZHR 625. 
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principal debtor's obligation because offriendship or family ties. 160 The surety, on the other hand, 
has long been a favoured creditor in the eyes of the law, and the courts have developed a plethora 
of technical principles on which a surety can be relieved of his obligation.161 The escape routes 
of the surety, especially if he is a consumer as well, on new grounds of public policy, 
unconscionability, good faith or unreasonableness, are growing. 
In an illuminating article entitled "He that Hateth Suretyship is Sure", 162 O'Donovan, a professor 
at the University of Western Australia has sketched a nightmarish obstacle course a banker faces 
in order to rely on his suretyship, in a country where extensive legislative consumer protection 
has been enacted. 
Assuming that the drafter of the suretyship has inserted the usual clauses to protect the creditor 
from the common traps, and that the creditor has not acted fraudulently or has not been a party 
to undue influence or duress applied to the principal debtor, 0 'Donovan points out how the bank 
must satisfy the requirements of various concepts and principles in order to rely on its guarantee. 
The scope of this thesis does not allow a full examination of each aspect and reference is made 
only to the following concepts, where problems may arise: 163 
• the process of offer and acceptance; 
• the problems in regard to conditions precedent and the parol evidence rule; 
• compliance with the requirement of consideration; 
• determination of the scope of the guarantee; 
• factors affecting the validity of the contract, such as undue influence, disadvantaged 
parties, inequality of bargaining power, common-law unconscionability, the duty of 
disclosure, innocent misrepresentation, non est factum, mistake, the treatment and effect 
of exclusion clauses and indemnity clauses; 
• a vast array of statutory enactments, such as the Trade Practices Act of 197 4 (Cth), the 
160 O'Donovan 1992 AL! 641. 
161 The surety has defences available to him connected with the principal obligation, such 
as fraud, illegality, duress, as well as defences peculiar to the suretyship obligation. In 
addition the surety enjoys various benefits, such as the benefit of excussion, division, and 
cession of actions. Pothier Obligations pars 3 80-3 81; Hastie v Dunstan ( 1892) 9 SC 449; 
Eaton Robins & Co v Ne! (2) (1909) 26 SC 624; Ideal Finance Corporation v Coetzer 
1970 (3) SA 1 (A); Bankorp Ltd v Leipsig 1993 (1) SA 247 (W). In regard to the benefits, 
see Joubert (ed) LAWSA 26 pars 203, 204 and 205. 
162 0 'Donovan 1992 AL! 64 l. 
163 For a detailed and insightful discussion, see the article of O'Donovan, quoted above. 
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UCCC of 1996, the Contracts Review Act of 1980 (NSW) and the Consumer 
Transactions Act of 1972 (SA). 164 
While in many instances sureties deserve the sympathy of the courts and the attention of law 
reformers, one should not ignore the plight of the creditor who acts innocently in taking a 
guarantee and advancing money in reliance upon it. The factors which have been highlighted in 
this thesis show that the law of suretyship can be a minefield for such a creditor. Certainly he can 
strengthen his position by inserting appropriate provisions in the guarantee itself, but even an 
astute draftsman might have difficulty avoiding all the pitfalls. 
9.4 SUGGESTED PROPOSALS FOR VOLUNTARY REFORM BY BANKERS 
9.4.1 Introduction 
The trends affecting modem contract law and suretyships in particular, make it clear that bankers 
will have to take a pro-active approach in regard to their suretyships, in future, in order to prevent 
unconscionability or non-disclosure findings. 
South African Bankers seem to have taken note of the pro-active steps taken by their Australian, 
UK and New Zealand brethren in establishing a code of banking practice. Voluntary acceptance 
of an appropriate code of conduct towards the surety may prevent more onerous legislative steps. 
9.4.2 A code of banking practice 
Fruitful lessons can be learnt from the codes of banking practice in the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and particularly that of Australia. 
Both the UK and the New Zealand codes, like the Australian code, are bank codes. The UK code 
is subject to review once every two years. It (1) applies to banks as well as building societies and 
card issuers; (2) covers electronic funds transfers as well; and (3) contains a glossary of banking 
terms. 
The New Zealand code is also to be reviewed "at least every two years". It is slightly wider than 
the UK code although it is limited to banks. It is in three parts. The first part deals with banks and 
their personal customers, the second with card issuers, and the third with complaints. It also 
164 These statutory protection measures were discussed in some detail in Chapter 7 above in 
the sub-chapter on Australia. 
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contains a glossary of banking terms and a list of statutes that govern personal banking services 
and which enable third parties to have access to customer information held at banks. 
The Australian code is far wider in both content and coverage than its UK and New Zealand 
counterparts. Also, in Australia, a separate code applies to "card issuers" and EFT transactions. 
The Australian code, however, contains no glossary of commonly used banking terms. 
The Australian CBP is divided into two sections - a preamble and the code itself The preamble 
is the code's spirit. It says that the code seeks to foster good relations between banks and their 
customers and promote good banking practice by formalising standards of disclosure and conduct 
for banks to observe when dealing with their customers. 
A full discussion of any of these codes falls outside the ambit of this thesis. Germane to this 
thesis, however, is the Australian Code's treatment of Bank Guarantees. In this context, the 
following provisions of the CBP ( ss 17-17. 7) are of practical importance, namely: 
(1) A bank can only accept a guarantee ifthe amount of the guarantor's liability is limited 
to a specific amount plus other liabilities (for example, interest, recovery costs) described 
in the guarantee. 
(2) The bank must give written warning to the prospective guarantor that he may become 
personally liable for the borrower's indebtedness and the guarantor must be shown a copy 
of the relevant documentation. 
(3) The bank must recommend that the prospective guarantor obtain independent legal 
advice. 
( 4) With the borrower's approval the bank must, on request, inform the guarantor about the 
borrower's account. 
( 5) A guarantor may at any time extin~ish his liability to the bank under the guarantee by 
paying the sum then due or by making other arrangements satisfactory to the bank. 
The Banking Council of South Africa has also accepted a Code of Banking Practice. The Code 
professes to deal with the banks' relationship with personal and small business customers. 
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What is immediately striking is the fact that the Code's preamble165 specifically states that none 
of its provisions: 
• will be justiciable in a court of law; or 
• may be used to influence the interpretation of the legal relationship between a customer 
and the bank; or 
• will give rise to a trade custom or tacit contract or otherwise between a customer and the 
bank. 
The Code is couched in promissory fashion and it will be interesting to see how the courts are 
going to interpret the promises made against the clear disclaimer. 
The Code is more of a handbook and guide to the "consumer" customer and an explanation of 
services available. A discussion of the full text is not relevant to this thesis. 
As far as suretyship is concerned, the Code informs the customer that the surety is entitled to the 
customer's confidential financial information, and that the banks will do the following: 
• Encourage sureties to take independent legal advice to make sure that they understand 
their commitment and the potential consequences of their decision. All the documents 
that the surety will be requested to sign will contain this recommendation as a clear and 
prominent notice. 
• Advise and caution sureties that by giving the surety or other security, they may become 
liable instead of or as well as the customer. 
• Advise the surety whether it is a limited (and the maximum value) or unlimited 
suretyship. 
Although the adoption of the Code is laudable, the question remains as to its effect on the 
common law of the banker-customer relationship. 
9.4.3 Education: compliance with legislation 
9.4.3.l Ensuring procedural fairness 
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate the legal pitfalls that await the unwary taker of 
165 Code of Banking Practice 1. 
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suretyships. The law of suretyship is complex and escape routes for debtors are plentiful and 
growing day by day. 
Drafting an enforceable suretyship cannot be left in the hands of legally uneducated staff 
members, but should preferably be done by staff well trained in the basics of contract law, the 
banking environment in general, and in suretyship especially. 166 To assist these staff members, 
bankers should invest time and effort in compiling a detailed, step-by-step manual dealing 
specifically with suretyship aspects, once a decision has been taken to accept suretyship as 
security. 167 
The main purpose of drafting a manual or banking code should be to prevent unconscionability, 
mistakes and actionable non-disclosure. In order to prevent, or at least minimize the risk of a 
finding in regard to unconscionability, these manuals or codes should contain guidelines to two 
aspects168 which I believe are of the utmost importance and assistance in combating procedural 
unconscionability findings in suretyship, namely those of independent legal advice, and the 
bank's duty of disclosure of material facts to the surety. These two issues will be referred to 
further hereunder. 
Briefly, the banker's conduct towards the surety should at all relevant times be imbued with good 
166 In Australia, banks specifically employ "compliance lawyers", whose principal duty it is 
to ensure compliance with all common-law and statutory prescriptions in regard to a 
bank's conduct towards a customer. This trend is being followed to a growing extent in 
South Africa. 
167 Prins v ABSA Bank 1998 (3) SA 904 (C) is a classic example of a suretyship contract 
gone wrong. The surety had intended to sign a deed of suretyship which was limited both 
as to amount and as to duration, which would provide security for bridging financing of 
a project by the principal debtor. 
The bank drafted an unlimited suretyship. When the surety came into the bank to sign, 
he saw only the back page of the document and under the mistaken belief that the 
document set out the terms he had previously agreed upon, he signed the document. 
The court held, at 911, that it behoved the bank to alert the appellant to the true nature 
of the document. This it had failed to do, where, in the circumstances, there was a duty 
upon the bank to have ensured that the prospective surety had been under no 
misunderstanding as to the true nature of the obligations which he was undertaking. 
168 Other aspects, of course, could deal with ascertaining that the bank's promotional 
literature conforms with the business that it is in and that it does not oversell what it will 
do for customers. The bank should also ensure that persons authorised to give advice to 
customers are properly trained and aware of the role they are playing in the bank's 
transactions with the customer. Contractual documentation with the customer should 
exclude liability for pre-contractual representations. 
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faith, in the sense that the banker should recognize the legitimate interests of the surety. In 
particular, a banker should carefully evaluate his own bargaining position and that of his intended 
sureties; he should recognize high-risk situations and personalities, discern in particular 
consumers and men of business, and in those high-risk cases disclose all material facts fully. 
Furthermore, should the bank be of the opinion that the intended surety is in need of clarification 
or advice in regard to the intended suretyship, it should insist upon the surety's obtaining 
independent legal advice, unless the bank is prepared to undertake such duties of clarification and 
advice itself, and at its own risk. 
9.4.3.2 Ensuring substantive fairness 
In order to ensure substantive fairness, legally educated staff, well versed in practical banking 
law, should be employed. The function of this compliance staff would be continuously to monitor 
trends in the development of contract law. As the legal convictions of the community change, 
adaptations to standard-term contracts may be required. 169 
Various barometers can be consulted in this regard. For the South African banking lawyer, a good 
start would be a consideration of certain terms highlighted by the investigating team of the SA 
Law Commission. 17° Furthermore, the black lists and grey lists in the German AGB-Gesetz of 
1976, the EC Directive on Unfair Consumer Contracts, 171 (which applies to English Consumers 
as well)172 as well as in the Dutch BW, should give a fair indication as to trends in our major 
trading partners. 
The compliance staff should continuously evaluate its contract terms, assess whether they are 
strictly necessary, and above all, endeavour to accommodate any amendments suggested by the 
customer or surety. 
The duties of the compliance staff will not be easy. Drafting an unbreakable contract, as most 
lawyers are painfully aware, is almost impossible. A party may challenge a contract on a number 
of issues. The contract of suretyship is almost always at the forefront of new defences and is 
169 This is, of course, easier said than done. Unfortunately, if a bank considers a suretyship 
to be security, it will have to comply with the trends in contract law. 
170 SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations 30-31; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 65 
at 80-81. 
171 EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13/EEC: [1993] OJ L 95/29. 
172 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1994. 
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particularly susceptible to challenges owing to the judicial tendency to favour borrowers and 
sureties over lenders. One commentator173 wrote that many of the suretyship cases: 
"[M]ay be reconciled only by concluding that when confronted by a guarantor who elicits 
sympathy, the courts are willing to find numerous reasons to abrogate the guarantee 
contract." 
The approach to drafting an enforceable guarantee differs widely. At one end of the spectrum is 
the "short and simple" approach, producing a guarantee which contains a brief description of the 
scope of the guaranteed obligations and broad waivers of common suretyship defences. At the 
other end of the spectrum is the "hell or high water" approach, 174 producing a guarantee which 
contains a broad, all-encompassing description of the scope of the guaranteed obligations and 
waivers of all conceivable suretyship defences. Both approaches have serious flaws. The short-
and-simple approach may result in the court's refusal to enforce ambiguous waiver provisions 
or a court's admission of parol evidence because of the vagueness and uncertainty of the 
guarantee instrument. The hell-or-high-water approach may result in a court's refusal to enforce 
onerous and or vague waiver provisions or the guarantee itself, in the United States, on the 
grounds that it is a contract of adhesion. 
The drafting of an enforceable guarantee therefore requires careful planning and continuous 
updating. 
9.4.3.3 Assuming duties to disclose, advise and inform: relationships and bargaining 
positions 
9.4.3.3.1 England and Europe 
In English law, a contracting party does not have a general duty on grounds of good faith or on 
any other ground, to disclose facts known to him ,but not to the other party, even ifhe is awar~ 
that a knowledge of those facts would deter the other from entering into the contract. 175 This 
173 Alces 1983 N Carolina LR 65 5 at 660. 
17 4 Heitner & Frank 1990 California Real Property Journal 1. 
175 Carterv Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1910; Cornfoot v Fowke (1840) 6 M & W358 at 
380; Turner v Green (1895) 2 Ch 205 at 208; Banque Financiere de la Cite SA v 
Westgate Insurance Co Ltd sub nom Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) 
Insurance Co Ltd [1991] 2 AC 249 and Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War 
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principle is, however, mitigated in a number of different ways, notably through the use of implied 
terms, 176 through an extensive interpretation of what constitutes a representation, 177 the 
recognition of a duty of disclosure in certain specific instances such as contracts uberrimae 
fidei, 178 insurance contracts, 179 and in fiduciary relationships. 180 Of course, the legislature has set 
certain disclosure requirements. 181 
Apart from the protection of consumers in terms of the EC Directive against unfair contract 
terms, 182 English law relating to disclosure seems to diverge from European trends. In regard to 
a general duty of disclosure in the pre-contractual stage, the principle laid down in Smith v 
Hughes183 still applies. 
The present position of English law is quite clear, as was recently affirmed in the case of Banque 
Financiere de la Cite SA v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd sub nom Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v 
Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [ 1991] 2 AC 249184 and Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual 
War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd 185 Basically, the principle as laid down in Smith v 
Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd [1991] 2 WLR 1279; Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 
3. 
176 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597; Atiyah Rise 469-476; Nicholas 1974 Tulane LR 
946; Sale of Goods Act of 1979. 
177 Keeton 1936 Texas LR 1 at 20 (USA); Ward v Hobbs (1878) 4 App Cas 13 (England); 
Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 45. 
178 Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161. See Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 89; 
Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 46. 
179 IonidesvPender(1874) LR9 QB 531; Yorkev Yorkshire Insurance CoLtd[l918] 1 KB 
662; Rozanes v Bowen (1928) 32 Lloyds Rep 98; Glicksman v Lancashire and General 
Insurance Co Ltd [ 1927] AC 13 9; Jester-Barnes v Licences and General Insurance Co 
Ltd (1934) 49 Lloyds Rep 231. 
180 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 304; Sealy 1962 Cambridge LJ 69; Re Coomber, 
Coomber and Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723; Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 
46-47. 
181 See, eg, the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. 
182 EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13/EEC:[l993] OJ L95/29. 
183 (1871) LR 6 QB 597. The principle is set out in the following paragraph. 
184 [1991] 2 AC 249. 
185 [1991] 2 WLR 1279. Both of these decisions concern a duty to inform in the case of an 
insurance contract. 
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Hughes186 still applies generally to contracts, with some exceptions, for example, insurance 
contracts.187 In the words of Cockburn CJ: 188 
111 take the true rule to be, that where a specific article is offered for sale, without express 
warranty, or without circumstances from which the law will imply a warranty - as 
where, for instance, an article is ordered for a specific purpose - and the buyer has full 
opportunity of inspecting and forming his judgment, if he chooses to act on that 
judgment, the rule caveat emptor applies. 11 
Or, as Blackbum J put it in even stronger words: 189 
11 
••• whatever may be the case in a court of morals, there is no legal obligation on the 
vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under a mistake, not induced by the act of the 
vendor. 11 
English and Anglo-Canadian authors appear to be supportive of the approach taken by the House 
of Lords. Nicholas certainly seems to be sustaining the English piecemeal acceptance of a duty 
of disclosure. 190 Similarly, Waddams191 also favours the incremental approach, based on the 
further development of existing situations192 where a duty to disclose has been accepted; this 
approach 11has more to recommend it than the revolutionary". Lord Steyn has observed that there 
is no need for English law to introduce a general duty of good faith as it is unnecessary as long 
186 (1871) LR 6 QB 597. 
187 See, also, Cartwright Bargaining 90 et seq. Two further recent decisions underlining the 
approach taken by the House of Lords are Barclays Bank pie v Khaira and Another 
[ 1992] 1 WLR 623 and Barclays Bank pie v O'Brien and Another [ 1993] 4 All ER 417. 
In the latter case, Purchas LJ, in the House of Lords, on the one hand refused to 
categorise the existing case law in this area, but on the other hand did rephrase the 
authorities by putting forward what he called 11propositions11 • 
188 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 at 603. 
189 Ibid, at 606-7. 
190 Nicholas in Harris & Tallon (eds) Contract Law 166 et seq. 
191 Waddams in Cane & Stapleton (eds) Essays 256. See, also, Waddams 1991 Canadian 
Business LJ349 and the comments on Waddams' article by Farnsworth 1991 Canadian 
Bus LI 3 51. As was the case with the introduction of a general concept of good faith, it 
seems that Australian contract law is more receptive towards a general duty of disclosure 
than its English and Anglo-Canadian counterparts. See Finn (ed) Torts 150 et seq. 
192 Such as undue influence. See Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith 44. 
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as the courts respect the reasonable expectations of the parties "in accordance with [English 
law's] own pragmatic tradition". 193 
On a practical level, in particular in regard to suretyship, a duty of disclosure may arise in certain 
circumstances. The obligation is to reveal anything in the transaction between the banker and the 
surety, which will have the effect of making the position of the surety different from that which 
the surety would normally expect, particularly if it affects the nature or degree of the surety's 
responsibility. 194 In Levett and Others v Barclays Bank plc195 the principle was stated as being 
that the bank has imposed on it a duty to disclose what in general terms can be described as the 
unusual features which are unknown to the surety. 
Looking at French, German and Dutch law, one cannot but conclude that there is an unmistakably 
different attitude to be found. It is argued by authors like Ghestin and Legrand196 that a general 
duty of disclosure of essential information necessary for an informed consent to contract does 
exist in French law. Ghestin summarizes French law in the following way; 
"To sum up, a party who was or (having regard especially to any professional 
qualification) ought to have been aware of a fact which he knew to be of determining 
importance for the other contracting party is bound to inform the latter of that fact, 
provided that he was unable to discover it for himself or that, because of the nature of the 
contract, the character of the parties, or the incorrectness of the information provided by 
the other party, he could justifiably rely on that other to provide the information." 
A conclusion which, no doubt, could also have been formulated for German law. 197 
Thus, it can be said that the Continental law systeins are more generous in recognizing a duty of 
disclosure, provided that the mistaken party was unable to discover the information for himself 
Some guidelines for the determination of the existence of a duty of disclosure are: the nature of 
193 Steyn 1997 LQR 442. 
194 Commercial Bank of AustraliaLtdv Amadio (1983) 151CLR447 at 457. 
195 [1995] 2 All ER 615 at 628. 
196 Ghestin& Goubeaux Traite 502 et seq; Legrand 1986 OJLS331 and also 1991 Canadian 
Bus LJ3 l 8 at 332-3. See, also, for a comparison of French-Canadian with American law, 
Legrand 1989 Ottawa LR 585 discussing, inter alia, the opposite of a duty of disclosure: 
the right to remain silent about certain secrets. 
197 Larenz Lehrbuch I 110 et seq. 
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the contract, the standing of the parties, their relationship and their safety. 
9.4.3.3.2 The USA 
As far as the USA is concerned, we note that good faith198 plays a role in determining a duty of 
disclosure ,but, by and large, the determination of such a duty takes place piecemeal and 
incrementally. 199 
The general principles in regard to the duty of disclosure in a suretyship context have already 
crystallized from court decisions200 and have been summarised as follows: 
(1) In all suretyship relations, the creditor owes the surety a duty of continuous good faith 
and fair dealing.201 
198 S 161 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts sums up the law as follows: 
"When Non-disclosure is Equivalent to an Assertion. A person's non-disclosure of a fact 
known to him is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist in the following 
cases only: 
... (b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the 
other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the contract 
and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in 
accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing ... 11 
Clearly the formulation in terms of good faith and fair dealing poses as many questions 
as it answers. 
It would appear as if current commercial practice and judicial attitudes, which may vary 
over time, determine the limits of good faith and fair dealing. Thus Comment 1 to s 551 
Restatement (Second) of Torts determines: 
"There are indications ... that with changing ethical attitudes in many fields of 
modern business, the concept of facts basic to the transaction may be expanding 
and the duty to use reasonable care to disclose the facts may be increasing 
somewhat." 
199 On the incremental approach to disclosure see, also, Waddams 1991 Canadian Bus LI 
349; Nicholas in Harris & Tallon (eds) Contract Law 166 et seq. 
200 Notably Sumitomo Bank of California v Iwasaki 73 Cal Rptr 564 447 P 2d 956 (1968); 
St Charles National Bank v Ford 39 Ill App 3d 291 349 NE 2d 430 (1976); First 
National Bank and Trust Company of Racine v Notte 97 Wis 2d 207 293 NW 2d 530 
(1980);People'sNationalBankofWashingtonv Taylor42 Wash App 518 711P2d1021 
(1985). 
201 Sumitomo Bank of California v Iwasaki 73 Cal Rptr 564 447 P 2d 956 at 959 (1968). 
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(2) The creditor must not misrepresent or conceal facts so as to induce or permit the surety 
to enter or continue in a relationship in reliance on a false impression as to nature of 
risk.202 
(3) A creditor's fraud, which may consist of intentional or negligent misrepresentatioq or 
active suppression of the truth, will discharge a surety from any subsequently incurred 
liability. 203 
( 4) A creditor, such as a bank, does not owe an absolute duty to a surety to disclose, without 
request by the surety, all facts within its knowledge which may materially affect the 
surety's risk. 204 
(5) Particularly in those cases in which a surety assumes risk at a debtor's rather than the 
creditor's request, the creditor may reasonably assume that the surety will acquire from 
the debtor himself all information which the surety reasonably believes to be relevant to 
the risk. 205 
( 6) The creditor owes the same duty of disclosure in the course of a suretyship relationship 
as he does at its inception. 206 
9.4.3.3.3 South African projections 
After consideration of the trends in regard to good faith and disclosure, it would appear as if the 
test for the existence of a duty of disclosure, at least for South African contract law, is correctly 
described by Van Zyl J in McCann v Goodall Group Operations Ltd2°1 as follows: 
"A duty to disclose a material fact arises when the fact in question falls within the 
202 Ibid 
203 S 124 of the Restatement of Security. 
204 Sumitomo Bank of California v Iwasaki 73 Cal Rptr 564 447 P 2d 956 at 960 (1968). 
205 St Charles National Bankv Ford39 Ill App 3d 291349NE2d 430 (1976). 
206 See par 4.8.3.4 supra. 
207 1995 (2) SA 718 (C) at 726. 
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exclusive knowledge208 of the defendant and the plaintiff relies on the frank disclosure 
thereof in accordance with the legal convictions of the community." 
To this I would add: 
"Good faith, in the sense of taking into account the legitimate interests of the other 
contracting party, shall be an important determinant of the legal convictions of the 
community." 
To sum up: 
(1) There is no general duty of disclosure of material facts in a contractual relationship. 
(2) · The legal convictions of the community may determine the existence of such a duty, 
depending _on the facts, circumstances and relationships involved . 
(3) An important standard used in the determination of a duty of disclosure is the concept of 
good faith. 
9.4.4 Independent legal advice 
9.4.4.1 Introduction 
It should be clearly understood that independent advice cannot be a substitute for disclosure. The 
duty of disclosure relates to material facts, whilst advice is given in regard to conclusions, 
opinions and expectations which can be derived from these facts. 
A duty to disclose can be imposed by law and its breach is actionable. There is no general duty 
to give advice, but advice may play an important role in assessing a stronger party's contractual 
conduct. 209 
208 As far as suretyship is concerned, there could hardly be said that the banker has exclusive 
knowledge of material facts relating to the debtor's account, as the principal debtor 
knows these facts as well as the bank, and the surety could approach the debtor for 
information. 
209 Spencer Bower Non-Disclosure 691 puts it this way: 
"In many situations, that (seeing that the weaker party has the advice of a third 
party entirely independent of the stronger party's influence) will be a very simple 
and obvious means of escaping the difficulties of proof, and a means which 
affords an excellent test of the conscientiousness of the transaction. This course 
so plainly suggests itself to an honest and scrupulous man that, when proved to 
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As we have seen in the excursus, 210 independent advice plays a prominent role in the English and 
Australian law of non-disclosure. For the purposes ofthis chapter, I merely wish to refer to the 
guidelines in respect ofindependent legal advice issued by the Australian College of Law, 211 and 
which I believe South African bankers should try to emulate. 
The following is a summary212 relating to this topic, keeping in mind the obligations of attorneys, 
prudent conveyancing practice, general law, statutory provisions and a growing body of judicial 
decisions: 
(1) Numerous modern decisions considered endeavours by guarantors and by mortgagors 
under third-party mortgages to set aside transactions and to avoid liability on a 
variety of grounds, frequently relying on two or more of the following defences: 
(a) that the guarantor\rnortgagor did not execute the documents; or 
(b) did not know the nature of the documents signed; 
( c) that the documents were executed -
(i) under the undue influence (of the actual borrower or someone else); 
(ii) following misrepresentation to the guarantor; 
(iii) without the guarantor's having received independent legal, financial or 
any advice regarding the documents or the transaction;213 
( d) that the transaction was an unconscionable bargain;214 
have been adopted by the stronger party, it goes a very long way, and in most 
cases is sufficient of itself, to sustain the validity and bona fides of the 
transaction: whereas the omission to resort to it raises an inevitable suspicion that 
the only reason for the omission must have been a consciousness on the part of 
the [stronger] party that the transaction was unrighteous and unfair, and that any 
impartial person would so advise. 11 
See, also, Pratt v Barker (1826) 1 Sim l; Blackie v Clark (1852) 15 Beav 595; Potts v 
Surr (1865) 34 Beav 543; Taylor v Johnston (1882) 19 Ch D 603; Re Coomber, Coomber 
v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723. 
210 Chapter 5 supra. 
211 See Lang, Anderson & Skinner Protecting Mortgagors and Guarantors. Papers presented 
for the Continuing Legal Education Department of the College of Law, 93/19. 
212 Ibid, at 20. 
213 See par 3.5.1 supra. 
214 See pars 3.5.2.2 and 3.5.2.3 supra. 
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( e) statutory defences, for example, under the Trade Practices Act of 197 4 ( Cth), the 
Fair Trading Acts; Contracts Review Act of 1980 (NSW), and the UCCC of 
1996.215 
(2) Some of the following issues arise when such defences are raised: 
(a) What explanation or advice has the guarantor received at or before the signing of 
the documents? 
(b) Did the guarantor receive legal, financial or any other advice? 
(c) Was the advice independent advice? 
( d) How thorough was the advice? 
( e) What was the guarantor's appreciation of the transaction, the documents and the 
risks assumed?216 
(3) It has proved to be legally risky for lenders to entrust documents to the borrower, to have 
guarantees and related security documents executed, without ensuring that the documents 
have actually been signed by the guarantors with awareness of the nature of the 
documents, the transaction and the risks as~umed.217 
( 4) Mortgagees' attorneys need to provide their lender clients with adequate advice on what 
precautions should be taken to ensure that guarantors should, for practical purposes, be 
unable to deny liability after default on the grounds as set out in (I) above, except in a 
very small percentage of transactions. 218 
(5) The most effective mode of achieving the goal set out in (4) is to ensure that the 
guarantor receive independent legal advice, that the guarantor's signature is witnessed 
by the attorney rendering the advice, and that that attorney provide some written evidence 
for the lender relating to the execution and advice.219 
( 6) The question of the presence or absence of independent advice has arisen in mortgages 
215 See par 3.5.2.3.2 supra. 
216 See Lang, Anderson & Skinner Protecting Mortgagors and Guarantors 20. 
217 Ibid, at 21. 
218 See par 5.3.7.2 supra. 
219 See Lang, Anderson & Skinner Protecting Mortgagors and Guarantors 21. 
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involving banks, finance companies and private lenders. Furthermore, this has occurred 
when an attorney has acted for the borrower and subsequently the question of determining 
whether any of the mortgagors or guarantors were also represented by or independently 
advised by that attorney, became a difficult one. Similar problems have occurred when 
attorneys have acted for all parties in the transaction, that is the borrowers and the lenders 
and parties providing collateral securities and guarantees. Determining for whom the 
particular attorney has acted can subsequently be a difficult and contested issue - one 
that should have been clearly established and evidenced at the time of the transaction. 220 
(7) It is suggested that attorneys should adopt a conservative approach, particularly when 
acting for clients in any actual or potential conflict situation and that: 
(a) the client should receive detailed professional and cautionary advice, which 
should be diarized; 
(b) there should be some insistence on the client's obtaining independent legal advice 
(to protect the attorney and also other parties to the transaction); 
( c) there should be a full disclosure to the client or to the independent attorney 
rendering advice, of all material facts known to the attorney; 
( d) it should be ensured that the independent attorney is aware of all those material 
facts when rendering independent advice. 221 
(8) It has been held that an attorney is not debarred from being independent merely because 
of having been chosen by the stronger party to the transaction. However, it is suggested 
that it is prudent for the attorney rendering "independent" advice: (a) to interview the 
party receiving the advice without the other party to the transaction being present; (b) to 
charge that party separately for the advice; ( c) and to record in writing the nature and 
scope of the advice. When an attorney acts for all parties, independent advice should still 
be given to each borrower and guarantor. 222 
(9) It is suggested that independent legal advice should: 
(a) cover the real effect of any documents on the party's rights and position; 
(b) ensure that the party or client understands the nature and consequences of the 
220 Ibid, at 21. See, also, par 5.3.7.1 supra. 
221 See Lang, Anderson & Skinner Protecting Mortgagors and Guarantors 21-22. 
222 Ibid, at 22. 
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transaction; 
( c) cover the more fundamental questions relating to the viability and advisability of 
the transaction. 223 
(10) If any certificate is given by the advising attorney to the lender, it should be appreciated 
that: 
(a) the attorney assumes a legal responsibility to the lender, as well as to the client 
to whom advice was rendered; 
(b) it is undesirable for lawyers to render commercial or financial advice unless 
qualified and retained to do so; 
( c) certificates should be confined to what the attorney did and observed, what the 
client did or said, but not what the client "understood" (which the attorney could 
not confidently state); 
( d) care should be taken before certifying that the attorney fully explained the purport 
and effect of documents, because that may not have occurred and could involve 
several hours of consultation in the case of complex transactions. 224 
9.4.4.2 The interaction between disclosure and independent advice 
Although disclosure of facts and the rendering of advice are different concepts, their interaction 
may be vital in preventing a banker's suretyship from being pronounced unlawful. 
A banker, when dealing with an intending surety, should first of all discern whether the intending 
surety is a consumer or a business entity (or, dare I say, "non-consumer"). A non-consumer 
carries the risk of having to investigate facts for itself and must ask questions ifit needs facts or 
advice. 
If the surety is a consumer, the banker should be on guard. In defining a "consumer" as widely 
as possible, I believe that a field of potential high-risk people should be included. In fact, I would 
include in the definition of "consumer" all natural persons, and close corporations, whether or 
not they are acting as "consumers" in a strict sense, or in a business capacity. Rather than risking 
the setting aside of its suretyship, there should be disclosure of material facts to an intending 
consumer surety. A standard form containing these facts may form part of the bank's standard 
223 Ibid, at 22. 
224 Ibid, at 22-23. See, also, pars 5.3.7.6.1 supra. 
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stationery. This duty of disclosure, although going much further than our current common law, 
seems to be a vital pro-active step in ensuring contractual fairness and one which a court oflaw 
is bound to consider. Obviously, the banker would have obtained his customer's consent to the 
release from his duty of secrecy in this regard. 
This distinction between a consumer and non-consumer obviates an investigation of whether a 
duty of disclosure exists as a result of good faith, inequality of bargaining power, involuntary 
reliance, the interests of the parties, the nature of the transaction, the relationship between the 
parties and the circumstances of the case. 
Once a duty of disclosure of material facts has been established, the bank must carry out its duty, 
truthfully and without misrepresentation. 225 
Once a duty of disclosure has been attended to, it is possible that the intending consumer surety 
may be in need of advice in regard to the transaction. 
A banker would be well advised to recognize such a need, which need may be discerned during 
negotiations, owing to the fact that the surety is a customer of the bank and the bank has a duty 
to protect his financial interests, 226 whether contractually or implied, or where the customer is one 
of a perceived high-risk group. In this regard factors such as the inequality of the parties, the 
position of certain disadvantaged persons such as wives, questions of involuntary reliance, the 
interests of the parties, the nature of the transaction, and the relationship between the parties can 
·point to a need for advice. 
If a need for advice has been established, the bank should advise the customer diligently, or, if 
it does not want to undertake any advisory duties, it should insist that the surety obtain 
independent legal advice. 
Briefly, the independent advice should consist of a clear explanation of the terms of the 
225 See Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 ( 4) SA 747 (A). 
226 Our courts' attitude in regard to a banker-customer relationship is that it is a simple 
debtor and creditor relationship and not a fiduciary relationship. See Nedperm Bank Ltd 
v Verbri Projects CC 1993 (3) SA 214 0N). Bankers may be entering into a myriad of 
relationships with their customers, some of which definitely are fiduciary in character. 
As an example, if a banker undertakes a function as the "personal asset manager" of a 
customer, with the object of maximising the customers wealth, would he have a duty of 
advice if the suretyship transaction were not in his customer's interest. Furthermore, 
banks give investment advice, do tax- and estate-planning, which tasks would in my 
opinion, impose an advisory duty on the bank. 
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documents, the effects of the transaction on the surety, and the propriety of the surety entering 
into the suretyship transaction. 
If a bank goes out of its way in order to promote fairness in contract, if it liberally discloses 
material facts, and insists upon independent legal advice, a court of law is bound to take these 
steps into account when pronouncing upon the legality of a contract. 
It is furthermore hoped that, once statutory measures in regard to unfair contract terms are taken, 
recognition will be given to the voluntary actions taken by creditors to combat unfairness. 
9.5 THE ALTERNATIVE TO SURETYSHIP 
Carrying out the aforementioned pro-active steps will come at a price. If our law adopts such 
stringent protection measures, as is the case in Australia, for example, banks, particularly those 
who deal mostly with consumers, may wish to reconsider whet,her suretyship is in fact security, 
or an invitation to litigation. 
Walking away from suretyships, however, will not mean the end of the bank's problem in regard 
to unfair contracts. The real security documentation used by banks in regard to mortgage bonds 
and surety mortgage bonds, contains clauses which are similar (and in the same vein) to those 
clauses which are now coming under attack in regard to suretyship. It is also expected that in the 
foreseeable future, the problems in regard to disclosure and advice, discussed in this thesis, will 
manifest themselves in the taking of real security. 
Unfortunately, the consumer may be the real loser in the end. If banks can no longer rely upon 
their security documentation, their credit approval standards will probably be set so high as to 
prevent the persons who were supposed to have been protected, from ever obtaining vital 
financing. Such defensive lending practices will hinder entrepreneurship. 
9.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.6.1 Introduction 
After a comparative analysis of the various factors, standards and policy considerations which 
are currently having an impact on contract law and on the banker-customer relationship, I have 
drawn certain conclusions which are set out hereunder. From the conclusions drawn certain 
recommendations for South African bankers have been formulated and are set out hereunder. 
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9.6.2 Aspects of lender liability 
9.6.2.1 Risk 
Banks face risk in a variety of situations. A frequent risk for banks is that of default by a 
borrower. As a further risk, banks may be held liable to borrowers, potential borrowers, the 
shareholders, directors, creditors227 and sureties ofborrowers and potential borrowers, 228 and even 
to other lenders. 229 "Lender liability"230 is the elastic description generally used to cover situations 
where lenders may be held liable to borrowers. 231 
For borrowers, the common-law and statutory theories232 of lender liability represent a legal 
arsenal to help balance what often, traditionally, had been a "one-sided" playing field. In terms 
of these theories, a borrower has a far greater chance than in the past to right excessive, 
unnecessary or unreasonable lender conduct, or attempt to minimise the adverse impact of such 
conduct. 
227 In the United States, eg, a lender may be held liable in terms of what is called the 
"Instrumentality Theory", where his control and dominance over a borrower is so 
substantial as to indicate that the effective control of the borrower's affairs rests with the 
lender, in such a manner that the dominance causes harm to the borrower or its other 
creditors through misuse of the lender's control. See Re Clark Pipe & Supply Co Inc 893 
F 2d (5th Circuit 1990). 
228 See, eg, the situation in Germany where a bank may be held liable on the grounds of 
culpa in contrahendo, if the bank refuses to honour its promise to grant credit. See OLG 
Koblenz BB 1992 217 5. German banks can also attract liability in cases known as 
Konkursverschleppung, where the bank tries to postpone bankruptcy of the customer to 
recover its own claims at the expense of the other, new creditors, thus knowingly and 
purposefully prejudicing the other creditors. See Cranston Risk 212. 
229 See pars 7.2.6.2.2.2 and 7.2.6.2.2.3 supra. 
230 German lawyers talk of Kreditgeberhaftung. 
231 See Cranston Risk l. 
232 Various fundamental legal theories such as contract theories, tort theories, good-faith 
theories and fiduciary duty notions, have been utilised innovatively to create lender 
liability by borrowers and other persons. 
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9.6.2.2 Common risk issues faced by bankers 
9.6.2.2.1 The multi-functional bank and conflicts of interest 
Although, previously, the banker-customer relationship was not seen as a fiduciary relationship, 
bankers should be aware that, as they engage in commerce in an ever-widening sphere, and as 
banking becomes more multi-faceted, certain relationships between banker and customer may 
require a special duty of care towards the customer. 
A major problem that has arisen as a result of multi-functioning banks, is that of conflicts of 
interest. 233 Although it is nothing new in the financial field, conglomerates combining banking 
and securities business in the same group increase the risk of generating conflicts of interest. The 
policy aim is to achieve a reasonable balance between the interests of clients, who rightly expect 
that a firm acting for them will not have a conflict with either its own or another client's interests, 
and what is (apparently) the operational reality that the conduct of a modern financial services 
business will inevitably give rise to some conflicts of interest. Difficult legal questions arise 
about whether such conflicts must be avoided or whether they can be "managed", and if they can 
be managed, how this should be done. These issues are presently far from being resolved. 234 
Disclosure has sometimes been treated as a solution to the problem of conflicts of interest. Make 
full disclosure of the conflict to the customer, and the bank is absolved of any wrongdoing,235 
provided that the disclosure of a conflict of interest may not be in breach of a duty to another 
customer. 236 
The most important and preferred means of "managing" conflicts of interest is the so-called 
Chinese Wall. In essence, this is an arrangement by which different parts of a business are 
233 For an analysis of the problem of conflicts of interest arising from multi-functional 
banking, see par 2.1.2 supra (England); par 3 .2 supra (Australia); par 4.5 supra (USA); 
par 6.2.4.3 supra (Germany); and par 7.2.4 supra (the Netherlands); par 8.1.2.2 supra 
(South Africa). 
234 The English Law Commission has published a consultation paper to address these issues 
in 1992. See Law Commission Fiduciary Duties. 
235 Cranston Banking Law 25; Warne Litigation 47; Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) 
[1999] 1 AllER517;par2.1.2supra. 
236 See, eg, Winterton Constructions Pty Ltd v Ham bros Australia Ltd [ 1993] ATPR 41-205. 
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compartmentalized to avoid the leakage of sensitive information from one part to the other.237 
9.6.2.2.2 Bank confidentiality 
European, South African and Australian jurisdictions recognize a form of bank confidentiality 
in which banks are legally compelled to keep the financial affairs of their customers secret. 238 
Although, as a matter of policy, bank confidentiality is based on the customer's right of privacy, 
as a concept it tends to have other origins. 239 This discrepancy can lead to privacy being breached 
with the law's sanction. The duty of confidentiality is not an absolute duty, but a duty qualified 
by exceptions. 240 
Multi-functional banking is one reason why confidentiality is under attack at present: banks 
distribute information throughout the corporate group so that the whole range of bank services 
can be marketed to customers, despite the fact that this may be in breach of the principle. The 
other, and more defensible reason why bank confidentiality is currently being undermined is 
because the banking system has been used for fraudulent and criminal activity. The prevention 
23 7 Chinese Walls have been broadly defined as procedures for restricting the flow of 
information within an organisation to ensure that information that is confidential to one 
department is not improperly communicated (whether deliberately or inadvertently) to 
other departments in the organisation. See the English Law Commission Fiduciary Duties 
par 2.16; par 2.1.2 supra. See, also, the concept of Chinese Walls in the Dutch 
Gedragscode van de N ederlandse Vereniging van Bank en (NVB). A primary role of these 
walls is to prevent the spread of koersgevoelige informatie, in regard to trading in 
securities. See Van Dijk 1997 TVVS 235 at 236; par 7.2.4 supra. 
238 See Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461; par 
2.1.3 supra (England); Densam (Pty) Ltdv Cywilnat (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 100 (A); par 
8.2 supra (South Africa); the Dutch Privacy Act of 1989 (Wet persoonsregistraties); par 
7.2.5 supra (the Netherlands). In Germany, see Rehbein 1985 ZHR 139; Sichtermann et 
al Bankgeheimnis 111; the AGB-Banken of 1993; par 6.2.4.2 supra; in the USA, see par 
4.6 supra; Peterson v Idaho First National Bank 367 P 2d 284, 290 (1961); Milohnich 
v First National Bank of Miami Springs 224 So 2d 759 760 (Fla 1969) and the Algemene 
Bankvoorwaarden in the Netherlands. 
239 Banking secrecy is said to be founded on legislation, contract and the protection of 
privacy. See Faul 1989 TSAR 145; Faul 1989 De Jure 312; Faul 1986 TSAR 180; 
Itzikowitz 1989 BML 255; Scott 1989 SA Mere LJ 248; Fourie 1990 South African 
Banker 20; par 8.2 supra. 
240 See par 8.2 supra. 
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of money laundering is of primary importance, 241 but other concerns include tax evasion, 242 
securities violations and insolvency offences. 243 
9.6.2.2.3 The bank's liability for advice 
Advice can be given to customers or to third parties. Delictual liability enables third parties to 
sue banks for negligent advice, 244 as well as for fraudulent advice. 245 
There is no general duty that banks have to advise their customers. However, a customer may in 
certain instances also be able to sue its banker for negligent advice. In general a bank does not 
owe a customer a duty to advise on the prudence of borrowing, or on tax implications, and a 
bank's duty of care does not extend to requiring it to advise the customer of the risks involved 
in the collecting of cheques. Liability for negligent advice may be founded in contract or in tort. 
A legal duty to advise may arise out of a misrepresentation (including a failure to speak or act 
and conduct capable of giving rise to an estoppel). A duty may also arise where there has been 
a voluntary assumption of responsibility to advise, and reliance on that assumption. Finally, a 
duty may arise from a fiduciary relationship, or through regulation. 246 
241 See South African Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992; English Drug 
Trafficking Act of 1994; Australian Financial Transaction Reports Act of 1988 (Cth); 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (US); the Dutch Disclosure of Unusual Transactions Act of 
1993 and Identification Financial Services Act of 1993. 
242 See, South African Income Tax Act 58of1962; In Australia, see the Australian Income 
Tax Assessment Act of 1936; Smorgon v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd; Smorgon v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1976) 134 
CLR 475; Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v 
The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 499; the Dutch 
Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen of 1959. In Germany, the bank has an unlimited 
duty to to inform the authorities in regard to tax fraud (s 385 Abgabenordnung (Federal 
Taxation Act)). 
243 For an analysis ofa bank's duty of confidentiality, see par 2.1.3 supra (England); par 3.3 
supra (Australia); par 4.6 supra (USA); par 6.2.4.2 supra (Germany); and par 7.2.5 supra 
(the Netherlands). 
244 Hedley Byrne Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 2 All ER 575 
(England); s 826 BGB (Germany); Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank 
Ltd 1994 (4) SA 747 (A) (South Africa). See, also, par 6.2.4.4 supra in regard to the 
position in Germany; par 3.3.3.5 supra (Australia); par 7.2.6.1 supra (the Netherlands); 
and par 8.3.1 supra (South Africa). 
245 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 3 3 7 (England); Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd 
v RH Brown & Co (1972) 126 CLR 336 (Australia). 
246 On the bank's liability for advice, see par 2.1.4 supra (England); par 3.4 supra 
(Australia); par 4.7 supra (USA); par 6.2.4.4 supra (Germany); par 7.2.6.1 supra (the 
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In South African law, where investment advice is concerned, the investor is entitled to assume 
that an adviser backed by a major financial institution is skilled to advise him on his investments. 
Such an adviser is under a duty to investigate the investment before offering his advice. His 
failure to do so may result in liability for the bank. 247 
9.6.3 Common defences pleaded by customers and particularly sureties 
In most Western countries, suretyships given in favour of banks are being challenged in the 
courts on the basis of equitable doctrines of unconscionable conduct, undue influence, or 
statutory provisions248 dealing with unfair conduct or unfair contract terms. 
The cases demonstrate that there are many sureties who have not understood the nature and 
extent of their obligations under the suretyship and the financial risk represented by the debtor 
or the project being financed, 249 or who have been misled by the principal debtor or the lender 
as far as these are concerned. 250 It appears that sureties have also been subjected to undue 
influence or unfair pressure by the principal debtor or the lender, to enter into the transaction, 
under circumstances in which they did not have the opportunity to reflect on the risks involved251 
or to seek adequate independent advice, 252 and who were not informed of defaults by the principal 
debtor, or who were unaware that a suretyship, believed to be for a fixed sum loan or advance, 
was a suretyship for all the debts of the debtor. 
Netherlands); par 8.3.1 supra (South Africa). 
247 See Durr v ABSA Bank Ltd 1997 (3) SA 448 (SCA) at 469 and par 8.3.1 supra. 
248 See par 2.4.2 supra (England); pars 3.5.4.4 and 3.5.4.5 supra (Australia); par 4.8.4.3.8 
supra (USA); par 6.4 supra (Germany); par 7.2.8 supra (the Netherlands); par 8.5.3 
supra (South Africa). 
249 See par 5 .1 supra. 
250 See pars 3.5.1; 3.5.2.3; 3.5.4.5; 5.1 supra (Australia); pars 4.8.3.3.1; 4.8.3.3.2; 4.8.3.3.3 
supra (USA); par 6.5.1.2.3 supra (Germany); pars 7.2.3 and 7.2.6.2.1 supra (the 
Netherlands); pars 8.4.1 and 8.4.2 supra (South Africa); par 9.2.1 supra. 
251 See pars 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 supra (England); pars 5.1; 3.5.2.2.1 and 3.5.2.2.2 supra 
(Australia); par 6.5.1.2.3 supra (Germany); par 9.2.4 supra. 
252 See chapter 5 supra and pars 9.4.4.1 and 9.4.4.2 supra. 
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9.6.4. General fairness provisions and legislation in regard to standard term contracts 
9.6.4.1 General fairness provisions 
A common pattern among most Western jurisdictions, is that they are either already using a 
general fairness provision or, having lacked such a provision initially, and upon reflection, they 
are now developing one. 253 
The general provision of the United States provides that a court may refuse to enforce an unfair 
contract, may enforce the fair part of a contract, or may limit the effect of any unfair contract. 
A court may issue such an order if it finds as a matter of fact that the contract or any part thereof 
was unconscionable at the time when it was made. Parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity 
to adduce evidence as to the commercial setting, the purpose and the effect of the contract in 
order to aid the court in making a determination when it is claimed or when it appears to the court 
that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable. 254 
In Australia, a credit contract or associated mortgage or guarantee may be re-opened if a court 
is satisfied that it was unjust. 255 The definition of "unjust" includes "unconscionable, harsh or 
oppressive".256 The Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) has broad scope and reach. It promotes 
competition, controls mergers and acquisitions, misuse of market power, anti-competitive 
agreements, exclusive dealings, price maintenance and discrimination, misleading, deceptive and 
unconscionable conduct, sharp practices, and ensures that goods are of merchantable quality and 
covers product and manufacturers' liability.257 
In German law, s 242 BGB creates a general duty to perform according to the dictates of good 
faith (Treu und Glauben). This principle has been used in various ways by the courts to develop 
253 In the USA, see the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC); in Australia, the Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code of 1996, the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Cth), the various Fair 
Trading Acts in the States and Territories; in England, the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 
1977; Consumer Credit Act of 1974; In Germany, the AGB-Gesetz of 1976; in Israel, the 
Standard Contracts Act of 1982; in Sweden, the Act to Prohibit Improper Contract Terms 
of 1971; and in the EEC, the EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 
93/13/EEC:[l993] OJ L95/29. 
254 S 2-302 of the UCC; pars 4.8.4.3.8 and 9.2.1 supra. 
255 S 70(1) of the UCCC. 
256 S 70(7) of the UCCC. See par 3.5.4.4 supra. 
257 See par 3.5.4.5 supra. 
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a control mechanism for the whole law of contract. 258 There is neither a general rule which allows 
the person acting as a result of economic pressure to rescind the contract, nor a general concept 
of undue influence. However, under s 13 8 BGB a contract is void if a fiduciary relationship exists 
and one party abuses another's poverty, dependency, irresponsibility or inexperience, which 
resembles cases of economic duress and undue influence. 259 
In Dutch law, there is an overall duty on contracting parties to act in good faith once a legally 
relevant relationship has come into existence. This also means that the negotiating parties can 
be bound by this duty. The concept of good faith has a limiting influence in the sphere of contract 
law ( beperkende werking van de goede trouw). 260 In addition Art 6. 2 BW requires that debtor and 
creditor act towards one another according to the dictates of reasonableness and fairness, and Art 
6.248 BW states that a contract has not only the legal consequences agreed upon, but also those 
which, according to the nature of the agreement, flow from statute, usage, or the dictates of 
reasonableness and faimess. 261 
In South Africa it was widely believed that the general equitable remedy, the exceptio doli 
genera/is, which was granted to ward off the claim of a creditor acting unconscionably, was 
available where a creditor sought to use a suretyship for a purpose never envisaged at the time 
that the suretyship was concluded. However, the Appellate Division262 held that the exceptio doli 
genera/is never formed part of Roman-Dutch law and that it was therefore not part of modem 
South African law. The rejection of the exceptio doli genera/is called for the consideration of 
other approaches to the question of unconscionable contracts. After the decision in the De 
Ornelas case our courts were flooded with matters where defences were raised that suretyship 
agreements or certain of their clauses were contrary to public policy. Mo~t of these defences were 
I 
turned down, and where it was found that a certain clause in an agreement was against public 
policy, it was held to be severable from the rest of the agreement. 263 
258 See par 6.5.1.1 supra. 
259 See par 6.5.1.2.3 supra. 
260 See Art 3.11 BW. 
261 See par 7.3.2.1 supra. 
262 In Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas & Another 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 
at 607. 
263 See Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A); Conshu Holdings Ltd v Lawless (1992) 
CLD 275 (W); Standard Bank Financial Nominees (Pty) Ltdv Bamberger 1992 CLD 308 
(W); Volkskas Bank Bpk v Theron 1992 CLD 336 (T); Pangbourne Properties Ltd v 
Nitor Construction (Pty) Ltd 1993 ( 4) SA 206 (W); First National Bank of SA Ltd v 
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In Botha (Now Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd264 it was held that a court's power to declare 
contracts contrary to public policy should be exercised sparingly and only in cases in which the 
impropriety of the transaction and the element of public harm are manifest. 
Although it is unclear what legislative reforms will take place in the field of unfair contract terms 
in South Africa, one cannot ignore the draft Bill which the Working Committee of the SA Law 
Commission proposes be presented to the Minister of Justice. 265 The Working Committee of the 
SA Law Commission suggests the following provision for inclusion in an Act of Parliament to 
be entitled the Unfair Contractual Terms Act:266 
"(1) If a court, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including the relative 
bargaining positions which parties to a contract hold in relation to one another and the 
type of contract concerned, is of the opinion that the way in which the contract between 
the parties came into being or the form or content of the contract or any term thereof or 
the execution or enforcement thereof is unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive, the 
court may rescind or amend the contract or any term thereof or make such other order as 
may in the opinion of the court be necessary to prevent the effect of the contract being 
unreasonably prejudicial or oppressive to any of the parties, notwithstanding the principle 
that effect shall be given to the contractual terms agreed upon by the parties. 
(2) In deciding whether the way in which a contract came into existence or the form or 
content of the contract or any term thereof is contrary to the principles set out above, 
those circumstances shall be taken into account which existed at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract. 11 
9.6.4.2 Legislation regarding standard term contracts 
The process of mass production and distribution which has largely supplemented, if not 
supplanted, individual effort, has introduced the mass contract-uniform documents which must 
Sphinx Fashions CC 1993 (2) SA 721 (W); Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Wilkinson 1993 
(3) 822 (C). See ,also, par 8.3.3 supra. 
264 1989 (3) SA 773 (A) at 782-783. See, also, Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA I (A); 
Standard Bank of SA Ltdv Wilkinson 1993 (3) 822 (C); par 8.3.3 supra. 
265 Keeping in mind that these proposals are not final yet and the SA Law Commission is 
still entertaining comments in this regard. 
266 See SA Law Commission Discussion Paper 26-27 and par 9.2.5 supra. 
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be accepted by all who deal with large-scale organisations, including banks. Many corporations, 
public and private, have found it useful to adopt, as the basis of their transactions, a series of 
standard forms with which their customers can do little but comply. 267 A common pattern 
amongst the legal systems investigated, is that they are taking steps against unreasonably 
prejudicial standard-term contracts. 268 
Courts in America have laid down guidelines for fairness, namely: the relative bargaining 
positions of parties; the relative experience and knowledge of parties; the commercial framework 
of or circumstances surrounding the transaction; the nature and pattern of previous commercial 
transactions; the transfer of commercial risks from one party to the other; deceit or fraud; 
oppressive terms; exorbitant price; denial of fundamental remedies and defences to the detriment 
of the opponent; and the use of adhesion contracts.269 
In Australia, the following guidelines for determining whether a term is assailable evolved :from 
legislation and the judicature: a party's poverty or any indigence; poor health; advanced age; 
gender; physical or psychological defect; drunkenness; illiteracy; lack of legal assistance or 
advice, if assistance or advice is necessary. 270 
In terms of German law, terms in standard form-contracts are void where the other party is 
excessively prejudiced if regard is had to the requirement of good faith. 271 If doubt arises, a term 
is deemed to be excessively prejudicial where the term is incompatible with the fundamental 
principle of the statutory measures (ie, the regulatory law) departed from; or substantial rights 
and obligations arising out of the nature of the contract are limited in such a way as to jeopardise 
the realisation of the object of the contract. 
German legislation contains two sets of guidelines on standard terms, namely, a so-called 
blacklist of terms (which simply nullifies those terms) and a grey list of terms (rendering those 
267 See par 9.2.4 supra. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid. See, particularly, SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations 28 (South 
Africa); see, also, in regard to unconscionability, Leff 1967 University of Pennsylvania 
LR 485; Cellini & Wertz 1967 Tulane LR 193; Blumberg 1986 Am J of Comp L 99; 
Anderson 1972 Notre Dame Lawyer 879 at 888 et seq; Ellinghaus 1969 Yale LJ 757; 
Mair 1984 Pacific LJ 247 (USA). 
270 See par 9.2.4 supra. 
271 S 9 AGBG. See pars 6.2.1; 6.2.3 and 9.2.4 supra. 
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terms assailable). 272 
A standard term is void under the Dutch algemene voorwaarden if it is unreasonably prejudicial 
in view ot273 
• the nature and the remaining content of the contract; 
• the way in which the contract came about; 
• the other circumstances of the case; and 
• the fact that the other party was not granted a reasonable chance to take note of the 
standard term. 
The European Parliament adopted the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer 
Contracts274 in terms of which consumers have a choice of being bound or not to standard-form 
contracts which contain unfair terms. Such a contract is in fact binding upon the parties if it is 
capable of continuing without the unfair terms. A standard term which has not been individually 
negotiated is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance 
in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer. 275 The 
Directive contains a schedule, consisting of two parts, in which unfair terms are set forth. The 
first list contains 17 terms that are regarded as unfair, and the criterion that is used is whether 
those terms have a certain aim or effect. The second list contains five exceptions to this rule. This 
schedule is regarded as a list of so-called grey terms. 276 
In regard to unfair contract terms in South African law, at least as far as consumers are 
concerned, the national Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 71 of 1988, and the 
regional (Gauteng) Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996277 are expected 
272 S 11 and 10 AGBG. See pars 6.2.1; 6.2.3 and 9.2.4 supra. 
273 Art 6.233 BW. See, also, pars 7.1.2 and 9.2.4 supra. 
274 EC Directive (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 93/13/EEC: [1993] OJ L 95/29. 
275 Sees 3 (1); see, also, par 9.2.4 supra; Dean 1993 MLR 581 at 581-590; Ogilvie 1996 
Canadian Business LJ 439; Hondius 1994 Journal of Contract Law 34. 
276 See par 9.2.4 supra. 
277 See par 8.5.3 supra. 
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to play a larger role in the prohibition or control of business practices that prejudice consumers. 
It may, of course, happen that a totally new structure may be born out of the activities of the SA 
Law Commission. 278 
9.6.4.3 The covenant of good faith 
Notwithstanding severe problems in defining and describing the concept of good faith, 279 it is 
clear that the concept, whether as a standard or a norm, will play an important role in contract 
law, internationally.280 Even England, staunch opponent of the concept of good faith, will have 
to contend with the concept in consumer contracts as a result ofits membership of the EU. 281 One 
finds that even systems such as those in England and Ireland, which do not recognize a general 
obligation of the parties to conform to good faith in the performance of a contract, in many cases 
by specific rules, reach the results which the other systems reach by the principle of good faith. 282 
In the USA, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),283 the Restatement (Second) ofContracts,284 
and a majority of the states285 recognize the duty to perform a contract in good faith. Neither the 
Code nor the Restatement provisions deal with good faith in the negotiation and formation of a 
contract. Rather, they apply to the performance and enforcement of contracts. 286 
278 SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations. See, also, par 8.5.3 supra. 
279 See SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations 14. See, also, par 4.8.4.3 supra, 
where various approaches to the concept in the USA are discussed. A recurring theme in 
regard to good faith is that a contracting party, in pursuing his own interests, should show 
a measure of recognition and respect for the interests of his opponent. See Lubbe 1990 
Stell LR 7 at 20. 
280 See par 4.8.4.3 supra (USA); par 6.5.1.1 supra (Germany); par 7.3.2.1 supra (the 
Netherlands); par 9.2.4 supra (EC); par 9.2.6.3 supra (England). 
281 See pars 2.2.1 and 9.2.6.3 supra. 
282 See par 9.2.6.3 supra. 
283 S 1-203 of the UCC. 
284 S 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
285 See Burton 1980 Harvard LR 369; par 9.2.6 supra; pars 4.8.4.1 and 4.8.4.2 supra. 
286 Summers 1982 Cornell LR 810 at 824 n 61: 
"This Section, like Uniform Commercial Codes 1-203, does not deal with good 
faith in the formation of a contract." 
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In German law s 242 BGB creates a general duty to perform according to the dictates of good 
faith (Treu und Glauben). 281 
In Dutch law the concept of good faith has a limiting influence in the sphere of contract law 
(beperkende werking van de goede trouw). 288 
In the majority decision in Bank of Lisbon & South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Another, 289 it 
has once more been confirmed that the South African law of contract does not allow a judicial 
discretion concerning the enforcement of an unfair contract or contract term. The acceptance that 
contracts today, as in Roman-Dutch law, are regulated by good faith, does not, according to the 
Court, imply such a judicial discretion of fairness. 290 It is, however, unlikely that the decision in 
Bank of Lisbon will remain the last word on the matter of good faith and contract law. 291 
It has also been submitted that legislative intervention will be necessary to enable South African 
courts openly to perform their duty of policing unfair contract terms. A rather sweeping proposal 
along these lines has been submitted to the South African Law Commission. A statutory 
provision is recommended in terms of which the courts may either declare invalid or modify any 
contract or any clause within a contract which, in the light of all the circumstances, does not 
conform to the standard of good faith. 292 
It is submitted that as far as South Africa is concerned, our law has developed a "super control 
norm". Public policy, the boni mores, has been recognised explicitly by our Appellate Division 
as the Grundnorm for determining illegality in contract, and in delict. Several standards are taken 
See comment c to s 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contract. 
287 See par 6.5.1.1 supra. 
288 See Art 3.11 BW and par 7.3.2.1 supra. 
289 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
290 See par 9.2.6.4 supra. 
291 See, eg, Van der Merwe v Meades 1991 (2) SA 1 (A) confirming the existence of the 
replicatio doli; See, also, Kerr Principles 483 and 488. 
In a recent Appellate Division decision, Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk 
v Saayman NO 1997 (4) SA 302 (A), Olivier JA in a minority judgement, at 318, 
concluded that the appeal in that case had to be dismissed on the basis of the application 
of the bona fides principle. See par 9.2.6.4 supra and the activities of the SA Law 
Commission Unreasonable Stipulations and Discussion Paper. 
292 See par 9.2.6.4 supra and Van der Walt 1991 THRHR 367; 1993 THRHR 65. 
463 
into account when adjudicating policy aspects, such as the protection of the sanctity of contract, 
prevention of an abuse of right, prevention of an abuse of superior bargaining power and the 
protection of the public interest. 293 
It is submitted that good faith is one of these standards, namely that standard which imports into 
contractual dealings the requirement that the parties should take into account the legitimate 
interests of one another. Furthermore, good faith serves as a technique to fend off bad faith in 
contractual dealings. It is submitted that, if European and American trends are anything to go by, 
the concept of good faith will play a decisive role in the future of South African contract law. 2941t 
may also be the ideal vehicle by which to import the spirit of constitutionality295 and affirmative 
action into contract law.296 
9.6.4.4 Consumer protection 
Ballkers should understand that certain sureties may deserve special protection. A distinction will 
have to be made between "consumers" as a class deserving protection, and "non- consumers" .297 
It is clear that no longer will we have a law of contract, but a "law of contracts". 
9.6.4.5 General fairness provisions and duties of disclosure 
After surveying the South African law, it is concluded that there is no general duty of disclosure 
of material facts in a contractual relationship. The legal convictions of the community may 
determine the existence of such a duty, depending on the facts, circumstances and relationships 
involved. An important standard used in the determination of a duty of disclosure is the concept 
of good faith. 298 
Our law, in the form of the bani mores, has a general principle of fairness in contract. It is 
293 See par 9.2.6.4 supra. 
294 Ibid 
295 SeeMort NO v Chiat [2000] 2 All SA 515 (K). 
296 It has been said that good faith serves to dispel the creeping danger of fossilization to 
which the law is always vulnerable. Teubner 1982 ZHR 625. 
297 See par 2.4 supra (England); par 3.5.4.4 supra (Australia); par 6.4 supra (Germany); par 
7.2.8 supra (the Netherlands); par 8.5 supra (South Africa); and generally par 9.2.3 
supra. 
298 See par 9.4.3.3.3 supra. 
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recommended that bankers realise and accept that a more altruistic, moralistic approach to 
fairness in contract is expected rather than the conservative individualistic approach used up to 
the present. General standards of honesty, good faith, morality, and fair dealing will to a greater 
extent underlie the norm of legality, as constituted by public policy. 299 It is submitted that the 
principle that contracts wilfully entered into by the parties are to be recognized and accepted in 
law, will remain a primary standard in the determination of public policy. 
Most importantly, it is recommended that a bank's dealings and relationships with customers and 
sureties should be imbued with the spirit of the new Constitution. 300 
In a very recent contract-law case, Mort NO v Chiat3°1 the Court stated: 
"[I]t is clear that our highest Court has given the green light in the direction of the 
development of a concept of good faith in our law of contract which would render the 
body of contract law congruent with the values of our constitutional community". 
It is recommended that once a banker has complied with his duty of disclosure and it is clear that 
the surety does not understand the transaction or is one of a "high-risk" group which the law has 
already indicated may need advice, he should refer the surety to an appropriate person to obtain 
independent advice, in the sense of a clear explanation of the terms of the documents, the effects 
of the transaction on the surety and the propriety of the surety's entering into the suretyship 
transaction. 302 
9.6.5 Self-regulation or regulation? 
Banks realise the importance of suretyship as a form of debt security particularly in respect of 
smaller loans. Suretyship plays a most important part in commercial life today. As an example, 
"personal loans", especially of small sums, by banks or other institutions will often have to be 
so secured. Where a loan is made to a woman, the suretyship of the husband would well be 
299 See par 8.4.3 supra. 
300 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996. The Constitution does not 
replace the common law ,but enhances it. See Malan & Pretorius 2001 THRHR 268 at 
277. 
301 [2000] 2 All SA 515 (K) at 526. 
302 See ch 5 supra; pars 9.4.4 and 9.4.5 supra. 
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required by the lender. When credit or a credit facility or a loan is given to a private company the 
creditor would normally insist on the suretyship of the directors and possibly certain shareholders 
so as to protect himself or itself against the limited liability of the shareholders303and also the 
competing claims of the directors as creditors. 304 
Banks are painfully aware of the attacks on their suretyship contracts or certain clauses contained 
therein. It has been recommended in this thesis that banks take certain pro-active steps to avoid 
findings of unconscionability. 305 
In all the legal systems analysed in this thesis, banks have accepted a code of conduct in respect 
of their dealings with customers. The purpose of these codes is, briefly to maintain standards of 
fairness in the banker-customer relationship. 306 
The Banking Council of South Africa has also accepted a Code of Banking Practice. The Code 
professes to deal with the banks' relationship with personal and small business customers. What 
is immediately striking is the fact that the Code's preamble307 specifically states that none of its 
prov1s10ns: 
• will be justiciable in a court of law; or 
303 In Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Wilkinson 1993 (3) SA 822 at 829 the Court stated that: 
"It must furthermore be kept in mind that in modem society suretyships have 
become important because they are frequently linked to joint stock companies. 
A company that 'has no soul to be saved or body to be kicked' (per Greer LJ in 
Stepney Corporation v Osofsky [1937] 3 All ER 289 (CA) at 291H) is often 
merely a vehicle with which the debtor seeks to borrow money. He creates a 
company with the least share capital permitted by law of which he is the sole 
shareholder and director and then seeks to borrow money for this newly-formed 
company which has few, if any, assets." 
304 See Kahn Cases 770 
305 Such as the creation ofa banking industry ombudsman and a code of conduct to maintain 
standards of fairness in the banker-customer relationship. Other steps recommended 
include the ensuring of procedural fairness, substantive fairness, and the assumption of 
duties to disclose information. See ,Pars 9.4.1 to 9.4.3.3 supra. Bankers should 
furthermore insist upon the surety s obtaining independent advice, in certain 
circumstances. See ch 5 and par 9.4.4.2 supra. Suitably trained compliance staff must be 
employed to supervise these issues. See pars 9.4.3.1; 9.4.3.2 and 9.4.3.3 supra. 
306 See par 2.4.4 supra (England); par 3 .5.4.3 supra (Australia); par 6.2.3 supra (Germany); 
par 7.2.3 supra (the Netherlands). 
307 Code of Banking Practice 1. 
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• may be used to influence the interpretation of the legal relationship between a customer 
and the bank; or 
• will give rise to a trade custom or tacit contract or otherwise between a customer and the 
bank. 
This preamble creates a problem. As Pretorius308 points out, although Codes of Conduct are used 
in many countries, the main challenge is to devise an effective method of ensuring and enforcing 
compliance with such a code. "A supposed legal duty which is not matched by a remedy is a 
nonsense. "309 It is recommended that the Banking Council should adopt its stated principles 
unequivocally or not bother at all. 
A surety has a vast array of defences and benefits available. 310 As far as defences based on public 
policy are concerned, South African courts exercise the right to set aside a contract on the 
grounds of public policy, sparingly, and only in cases where the impropriety of the transaction 
and the element of public harm are manifest. In assessing the impropriety of the transaction and 
the element of public harm our courts have taken a conservative stance.311 
Ifit is the perception of the legislature that sureties need more protection against unfair contract 
terms, it should legislate against such terms. 312 Some of the legal systems analysed in this thesis 
have enacted legislation against unfair contract terms specifically. 313 Many modern, unfair 
contract term statutes do contain (apart from a general clause) a list of terms which aims at giving 
308 See JT Pretorius in I 995 ABLU I at I I-I2. See, also, McKay I 994 !BL 507 at SI I. 
309 Quoted from Sealy I987 Monash University LR I64 at I77. 
310 See pars 8.3.3 and 8.5.3 supra. 
311 See par 9.6.3 supra. 
3 I 2 The investigation team of the SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations 29-31 has 
proposed that specific guidelines must be laid down which would supplement a general 
provision of fairness. See, also, SA Law Commission Discussion Paper 4-6 in which a 
research team under the guidance of Prof CFC van der Walt identified a number of 
common provisions which could and should receive the critical attention of the 
legislature. 
313 See par 9 .2.4 supra. In Dutch law the problem of unlimited suretyships has been 
addressed in Art 7.858. This article provides that suretyships entered into by a surety, not 
related to his profession or business, are only valid if the maximum amount of the 
surety's liability has been stated in the suretyship. 
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the general clause some clarification. 314 
It is submitted that the publication of lists of prima facie unfair terms can certainly assist in 
obtaining legal certainty. It is imperative that banks (indeed all contracting parties) must be able 
to determine the legal consequences of its contracts and not be at the mercy of vague standards. 
9.6.6 The future of suretyship 
Whilst it is submitted that the publication of a list of prima facie unfair terms can assist to a large 
extent in creating legal certainty in respect of a bank's contracts, and in particular its suretyships, 
a warning must be issued against over-regulation. Most of the terms contained in a standard 
banker's suretyship have been inserted as a result of a lesson learnt some time in the past. Should 
certain terms which a banker considers essential, in his assessment of risk, be banned, or the cost 
of negotiating each suretyship become too costly, the natural result would be that suretyship will 
not be accepted as security. 315 If our law adopts such stringent protection measures, as is the case 
in Australia, for example, banks, particularly those who deal mostly with consumers, may wish 
to reconsider whether suretyship is in fact security, or an invitation to litigation. 316 
314 See, eg, in Germany s 9 AGBG. German legislation contains two sets of guidelines on 
standard terms, namely, a so-called blacklist of terms (which simply nullifies those terms) 
and a grey list of terms (rendering those terms assailable). See ss 11 and 10 AGBG; par 
9.2.4; par 6.2.1; par 6.2.3 and par 6.4 supra. See, also, the EC Directive on Unfair 
Contract Terms, discussed in par9.6.4.2 supra, which contains a schedule, consisting of 
two parts, in which unfair terms are set forth. The first list contains seventeen terms that 
are regarded as unfair, and the criterion used is whether those terms have a certain aim 
or effect. The second list contains five exceptions to this rule. 
3 15 Certain clauses which at first blush may seem to be somewhat oppressive are, in the 
context of the realities of commercial life, natural consequences of loans to sureties. See 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Wilkinson 1993 (3) SA 822 at 829. These clauses should not 
be attacked. 
316 See par 9.5 supra. 
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